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PLANNING
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UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF LAW

FROM THE LAW LIBRARY OF:

Written materials and oral presentations offered through the University of Kentucky College of
Law Office of Continuing Legal Education (UK/CLE) are designed to assist lawyers in maintaining their professional competence. The Office of Continuing Legal Education and its volunteer
speakers and writers are not rendering legal or other professional services by their participation in
continuing legal education activities. Attorneys and others using information obtained from UK/
CLE publications or seminars must also fully research original and current sources of authority to
properly serve their or their client's legal interests. The forms and sample documents contained in
our continuing legal education publications are intended for use only in conjunction with the
professional services and advice of licensed attorneys. All parties must cautiously consider whether
a particular form or document is suited to specific needs. The legal research presented herein is
believed to be accurate, but is not warranted to be so. These written materials and the comments
of speakers in presentation of these materials may contain expressions of opinion which do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Continuing Legal Education, the University of Kentucky, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or other governmental authorities. UK/CLE strives to
make its written materials and speaker presentations gender-neutral; however, gender-specific
references may remain where it would otherwise be awkward or unclear. It should be understood
that in such references the female includes the male, and vice-versa.
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ABOUT...

~~....L-1IIIIo.

The University of Kentucky College of Law, Office of Continuing Legal Education (UK/CLE) was organized in
1973 as the fIrst pennanently staffed, full-time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It
endures with the threefold purpose to: 1) assist lawyers in keeping abreast of changes in the law; 2) develop and sustain
practical lawyering skills; and 3) maintain a high degree of professionalism in the practice of law. Revenues from seminar
registrations and publication sales allow the Office to operate as a separately budgeted, self-supporting program of the
College. No tax dollars, bar dues or public funds are budgeted in the Office's finances.
Courses
UK/CLE provides a variety of workshops, conferences, and institutes to satisfy the continuing education needs of
lawyers and other professionals. Courses range from half-day programs in selected areas to in-depth programs extending
over several days. While most courses are conducted at the College of Law in Lexington, UK/CLE has a longstanding
statewide commitment. Since its first year of operation, beginning with a criminal law program in Madisonville, Kentucky,
the Office has continued to bring the highest quality continuing education to attorneys across Kentucky, the Midsouth, and
the Midwest.
Publications
Each course is accompanied by extensive speaker-prepared course materials. These bound materials are offered for
sale following courses and are consistently regarded as valuable, affordable references for lawyers. In 1987, UK/CLE began
producing a series of publications which now consist of Practice Handbooks, Monographs, and Fonns Compendiums. Each
Practice Handbook is an extensively referenced, fully indexed practice guide consisting of separately authored chapters,
sequenced for the comprehensive coverage of a distinct body of law. Their fonnat allows for updating through supplements
and cumulative indexes. Each Monograph is a concisely written practice guide, usually prepared by a single author, designed
to cover a topic of narrower scope than Practice Handbooks. Fonns Compendiums contain both official fonns and sample
documents. Designed to assist the lawyer by suggesting specific structures and language to consider in drafting documents,
these publications are beneficial in the resolution of legal drafting concerns. The Fonns Compendiums are often used most
effectively in conjunction with UK/CLE Practice Handbooks and Monographs.
Professional Management
UK/CLE serves the needs of the bar from its offices on the University of Kentucky campus in Lexington. Its staff
manages course planning, publication content planning, course registrations, publications sales, course and publication
marketing, publication composition and printing, as well as budgeting, accounting, and financial reporting. As an "income
based" program, UK/CLE's course tuitions and publications sales are budgeted to generate sufficient revenues for self
support.
Commitment to Quality and Creativity
UK/CLE is a member of the Association for Continuing Legal Education (ACLE). As such, UK/CLE subscribes to
the Standards of Operation for Continuing Legal Education Organizations, and the Standards of Fair Conduct and Voluntary
Cooperation administered under the auspices of the American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on
Continuing Professional Education. Throughout its existence UK/CLE has been actively involved in the activities and
services provided by ACLE. UK/CLE's association with national and international CLE professionals has afforded it the
opportunity to continually reassess instructional methods, quality in publications, and effective means of delivering CLE
services at consistently high levels of quality.
An Integral Part of the Legal Profession's Tradition of Service
An enonnous debt is owed to the judges, law professors, and practitioners who generously dcnale their time and
talent to continuing legal education. Their knowledge and experience are the fundamental components of our seminars and
publications. Without their motivation and freely given assistance in dedication to the legal profession, high quality continuing legal education would not exist. As a non-profit organization, UK/CLE relies upon the traditional spirit of service to thc
profession that attorneys have so long demonstrated. We are constantly striving to increase attorney involvement. in the
continuing legal education process. If you would like to participate as a volunteer speaker or writer, please contact us and
indicate your areas of interest and experience.
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NOTABLE DEVELOPHER'l'S OF INTEREST
'1'0 ES'1'A'l'E PLANNERS, 1997-1998

1997 - 1998 TAX RELATED ACTS

A.

r

1.

Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.

The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (the

\

r
r
,.r

,.

"Act")

made a number of significant changes of interest to estate planners.

Among them are the following:

a.

4980A,

the

excess

retirement

accumulation

and

distribution tax, is repealed for distributions received, and decedent's dying,
after December 31, 1996.

b.

The unified credit is renamed the applicable credit amount and

the amount sheltered increases as follows:

\

$

1998
1999
2000/01
2002/03
2004
2005
2006

r

r

Section

What

should

be

done

with

625,000
650,000
675,000
700,000
850,000
950,000
1,000,000

marital

provisions that refer to the unified credit?

deduction/credit

shelter

formula

The term "applicable credit amount"

is used in section 2010, the heading to which continues to refer to the unified

r

credit.

New documents should refer to the applicable credit amount, perhaps with

a continued reference to the unified credit.
amount (unified credit).w

...
I

Estate

plans

that

For example,

"applicable credit

There should be no need to revise existing documents.
have

been

exemption may need to be revised.

created with

reference

to

the

$600,000

For example, in a second marriage the children

of the first marriage may receive the exempt amount with the intent being for the
children to receive $600,000.

If the children's distribution is defined by the

unified credit, or the maximum amount that can pass free of estate tax (other

r

r
r
r

than to a spouse or to a charity), then the amount passing to the children will
increase over the next eight years.

A question may arise about the client's

intent.

A-l

c.
for inflation

The $10,000 gift tax annual exclusion amount has been indexed
(rounded to the next lowest $1,000)

(rounded to the next lowest $10,000),

as has the GST exemption

for years after 1998.

The $750,000

reduction under section 2032A is also indexed for years after 1998 (rounded to
the next lowest $10,000).
d.

The gift tax statute of limitations has been changed for gifts

after August 5, 1997.

-

Section 2001(f) has been added to provide that the value

of gifts may not be changed for estate tax purposes once the gift tax statute of
limitations has run.

Normally the period is three years.

In order for the

limitation to run the gift must be "disclosed in such return, or in a statement
attached to the return,
nature of such gift."

in a manner adequate to apprise the Secretary of the

The disclosure which is sufficient to begin the statute

running is unknown, although regulations can be expected soon.

A new section

7477 allows the Tax Court to adjudicate gift valuation disputes.
The change is generally positive.

If the IRS wants to increase the value

of gifts it has three years from the date of the gift tax return to do so.

Thus,

if an increase results in gift tax the interest owed will be for a limited time.
On

the

other

transactions.

hand,

there

is

no

statute

of

limitations

for

undisclosed

If a taxpayer believes a sale has occurred -- to children, for

-

instance -- the taxpayers can either disclose the transaction on the gift tax
return (by having the sale be for a little less than fair market value), and
create an audit risk,

or not disclose and be subject to audit at any time.

Similarly, gift tax audits for unreasonable compensation in a family business may
occur at any time for any year after 1996.
e.

2053.

Section 6166 interest is no longer deductible under section

On the other hand, the interest rate is now 45% of the usual rate.

Of

importance is that all interest on unpaid estate tax is not deductible if a
section 6166 election is in effect.

If the IRS denies the section 6166 election

to an estate the denial may be appealed to Tax Court under section 7479.

A-2

Revenue

-

r
!

Procedure 98-15, I.R.B. 1998-4 sets forth the procedure for estates to elect the

,..

new

J

undesirable.

r

r
r
r

section

6166

f.

interest

rate.

In general,

making

such

an

election

is

Changes have been made in the predeceased child exception for

GST purposes.
1.

Pre-1998 Law.

As originally enacted, section 2612(c) (2)

created the so-called predeceased child exception.

If, at the time of a GST

transfer, a child of transferor (or transferor's spouse) had died, the child's
children would be treated as having moved up a
determining whether or not a

generation for purposes of

direct skip occurred.

descendants were also moved up a generation.

The child's children's

The benefit existed only for direct

skips not for taxable terminations or taxable distributions.

Disclaimers could

not be used to create a "predeceased" child; the disclaimer was ineffective to
change the assignment of generations.

r

2.

New Law -- For Transfers After January 1. 1998.

The Act

made significant changes to the predeceased child exception by repealing section
2612(c) (2) and replacing it with section 2651(e).

Section 2651 generally sets

forth the rules for making generation assignments.

r

i.

Expansion of the Exception beyond Direct Skips.

The

most important effect of the change is to expand the application of the exemption
beyond direct skips to include taxable terminations and taxable distributions.
The effect of the change is to assign the children of a deceased child to the

r
r
r

r
p-

i

child's generation.

The new provision provides:

(1)
IN GENERAL. For purposes of determining whether
any transfer is a generation-skipping transfer, if -(A)
an individual is a descendant of a parent
of the transferor (or the transferor's spouse or
former spouse), and
(B)
such individual's parent who is a lineal
descendant of the parent of the transferor (or
the transferor's spouse or former spouse) is dead
at the time the transfer (from which an interest
of such individual is established or derived) is
subject to a tax imposed by chapter 11 or 12 upon
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the transferor (and if there shall be more than 1
such time, then at the earliest such time),
such individual shall be treated as if such individual
were a member of the generation which is 1 generation
below the lower of the transferor's generation or the
generation assignment of the youngest living ancestor of
such individual who is also a descendant of the parent
of the transferor (or the transferor's spouse or former
spouse), and the generation assignment of any descendant
of such individual shall be adjusted accordingly.
(2)
LIMITED APPLICATION OF SUBSECTION TO COLLATERAL
HEIRS. This subsection shall not apply with respect to
a transfer to any individual who is not a lineal
descendant of the transferor (or the transferor's spouse
or former spouse) if, at the time of the transfer, such
transferor has any living lineal descendant.
The change will simplify planning in a number of ordinary situations.
illustrate,

To

if a child has died and parent creates a trust for the parent's

remaining children and lower descendants, under the new law transfers from the
trust to the descendants of the deceased child will be exempt from the GST.
Under the old law transfers from the trust would have been subject to the GST
because the trust would not have been a skip person and thus the transfer into
the trust would not have been a direct skip.

-

Many Crummey trusts are established

for the benefit of all of a parent's descendants; such trusts were undesirable
if a child had predeceased, under the old law.
Under the old law, a grantor retained annuity trust (GRAT) or a qualified
personal residence trust (QPRT) could result in a transfer subject to the GST if
the grandchildren of a deceased child were beneficiaries of the trust after the
termination

of

the

grantor's

interest.

Because of

the

grantor's

retained

interest the trust would not be a skip person and thus the transfer into the
trust would not be a direct skip.

The result is different under the new law.

Similarly, if a child has predeceased parent, the parent may now create a
charitable lead trust for the benefit of the child's children without such trust
being subject to the GST.

The grandchildren are assigned to the predeceased

Ii

child's generation.

..

.
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Section 2651(e) (1) provides that the child must be dead at the time of the
transfer that is subject to a gift or estate tax Uand if there shall be more than
1 such time, then at the earliest such time."

Thus, planners must remember that

the change applies only if the child predeceases the transfer.
a

child is

living when a

For example, if

GRAT is created and dies during the term of the

grantor's retained interest, any of the remaining GRAT assets that pass to the
child's children will be subject to the GST.

The result would be the same for

a QPRT.
What if the GRAT or QPRT provided that the trust assets would be paid to
the grantor's probate estate if the grantor died during the trust term?
example,

if the grantor's Will provides that

For

the deceased child's children

inherit is that subject to the GST because the assets came from the GRAT or QPRT?
The answer should be no because the grantor's probate estate intervened in the

r

chain.

The result should be the same if the grantor exercised a general power

of appointment over the trust assets, even if the appointment did not change the
beneficiaries.

If the grantor retained a general power of appointment over the

trust assets which was not exercised, would that be sufficient to cause the
exception to apply?

r

The requirement that the child be dead at the time the transfer is made
will affect reverse QTIP planning in certain situations.
during

the

surviving

unavailable;

r

spouse's

lifetime

on the other hand,

the

If the child dies

predeceased child exception

is

if no reverse QTIP election were made the

surviving spouse would be treated as the transferor and the exception would be
available.

If

the

surviving

spouse

has

a

testamentary

special

power

of

appointment the reverse QTIP election can be made and the spouse can appoint the
reverse QTIP property to a child and descendants and appoint an equal portion of

r

the remaining QTIP property to the descendants of the deceased child.

r

Grandnieces and Grandnephews.

r
r
,

ii.

exception to

include a

Expansion

of

the

Exception

to

Include

Some

Section 2651(e) (2) expands the predeceased child

transferor's grandnieces and grandnephews where
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the

transferor has no descendants and the parent of the grandnieces or grandnephews
(the transferor's sibling) has died.
If

the

The section also creates an ambiguity.

transferor had living descendants

at

the

time

the

-

transferor

transfers property into trust, but does not have living descendants at the time
a

transfer is to be made to a grandniece or grandnephew,

apply?

will the exception

If the term Utransfer" means a transfer that is subject to the GST then

the exception should apply.

However, the term in section 2651(e) (1) is modified

to mean the first transfer of the property, whether or not subject to a GST.
Section 2702 allows a cornmon law grantor retained income trust (GRIT) to
be established for persons other than lineal descendants.

.
-

The leverage provided

by a GRIT is often substantial and thus the transaction is very desirable for
persons who lack descendants and who desire to benefit other members of the
family.

The significance of the expansion of the exception is that grandnieces

r

I

and grandnephews can be benefited through a GRIT if the applicable niece or
nephew has predeceased.
The

spouse

of

transferor may make

a

transferor

transfers

may

using

have

this

descendants.

exception to

Thus,

a

married

the grandnieces

and

grandnephews of the transferor's spouse, assuming the spouse's niece or nephew
has predeceased, even if the spouse has descendants.
g.

-

Revocable trusts may be taxed as part of an estate for income

tax purposes.
The Act enacted a new section 646 of the Internal Revenue Code
which applies to the estates of decedents dying after August 5, 1997.
section

646 (a),

the executor of

an estate mll:1 the

trustee of

a

Under

qualified

revocable trust" may elect to have the trust treated and taxed for income tax
purposes as part of the decedent's estate and not as a separate trust for all
taxable years of the estate ending after the decedent's date of death and before
the applicable date.
For purposes of this election, a uqualified revocable trust"
is defined as any trust (or a portion thereof) which was treated under section
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r
I

r

676 as owned by the decedent by reason of a power in the grantor, but determined

r

without regard to any powers granted under section 672(e).

r

filed, the date which is 2 years after the decedent's date of death; and (B) if

r

r

r

term "applicable date" means:

(A)

§

646 (b) (1).

The

if no estate tax return is required to be

an estate tax return is required to be filed,

the date which is 6 months after

the date of the final determination of estate tax liability (i.e., the running

§ 646(b) (2).

of the statute of limitations on the federal estate tax return).

The election to treat the qualified revocable trust as part of
the estate for income tax purposes must be made no later than the time prescribed
for filing income tax return for the first taxable year of estate,
extensions.

§

646(c).

Once made,

the election is irrevocable.

including
§

646(c).

Revenue Procedure 98-13 sets out the procedures and requirements for making an

r
r

r
r
r

election under section 646.
To make the election, the executor must attach the required statement to
the Form 1041 filed for the estate for its first taxable year.
copy of the statement must be attached to a Form 1041
the

taxable year

the

decedent's

date

filed for the trust for
of

death.

The

required

statement must:
1.

Identify the election as an election made under section 646;

2.

Contain the name, address, date of
identification number of the decedent;

3.

Contain the name, address, and taxpayer identification of the
qualified revocable trust;

4.

Contain the name, address, and taxpayer identification number
of the estate;

5.

Provide a representation that as of the decedent's date of
death, the trust for which the election is being made was
treated under section 676 as owned by the decedent by reason
of a power in the decedent to revoke the trust (determined
without regard to section 672(e)); and

6.

Be signed and dated by both an executor of the estate and a
trustee of the qualified revocable trust.

r

r

ending after

In addition, a

death

and

taxpayer

Note, however, the trust does not have to file a Form 1041 for the taxable
year ending after the decedent's date of death if it satisfies the following

i
J

r
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requirements:

(1)

the Form 1041 for the estate's first taxable year is filed

before the due date for filing a Form 1041 for the trust for the taxable year
ending after the decedent's date of death;
the decedent are reported pursuant to Reg.

(2) the trust items attributable to
§

1.671-4(b) (2) (i) (A) or (B); and (3)

the entire trust is a qualified revocable trust.
Once the election is made,

the items of income, deductions and credits

attributable to the qualified revocable trust after the decedent's death must be
reported on the estate's Form 1041, and not on a separate Form 1041 for the
trust.

...

-

Because the trust will be taxed as part of the estate until the applicable
date, it may be able to take advantage of several income tax provisions which,
in the past, were only available to estates.

For example:

1.

The trust will be able to use the estate's fiscal year end for
income tax purposes (§ 644(a».

2.

The trust will qualify, along with the estate, for a single
$600 exemption instead of a $100 or $300 exemption (§ 642(b».

3•

The trust will be able to take a deduction for "income
permanently set aside for charity" as opposed to a deduction
for only amounts currently paid to charity (§ 642(c».

4.

The trust will qualify to hold stock in an S corporation (§
1361 (b) (1) (B» .

5.

The trust may deduct on the decedent's final return medical
expenses that it pays within one year of the decedent's death
(§ 213(c)(1).

6.

The trust may engage in sales and
pecuniary bequests (§ 267(b) (13».

exchanges

to

satisfy

7.

The trust may dispose of depreciable property
pecuniary bequests (§ 1239(b) (3».

to

satisfy

8.

Along with the estate, the trust qualifies for the $25,000
exemption with respect to passive activity losses
(§
469 (i) (4) (A» .

9.

The trust is not required to pay estimated taxes for the first
two years after the decedent's death (§ 6654(1) (2) (A».

h.

-

-

A new section 2031(c) has been added which allows up to 40% of

the value of land subject to a qualified conservation easement to be deducted
from the estate (up to $500,000, after year 2001).
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i.

overruled by a

r
r

j

r
r
r

r

r
,.
r

r

revised section 2035 (e)

which provides that gifts made from

revocable trusts are treated as gifts from the decedent directly.

The trust must

be taxed to the grantor by section 676 (ignoring section 672(e)).
j.

(whether a

Charitable remainder trusts may not have more than a 50% payout

unitrust or an annuity trust)

charitable deduction must be at least 10%.

and the value of

the

income

tax

The latter requirement makes CRTs for

young people, and for parents and children, impossible in many instances.
k.

Section 6034A(c) has been added which requires a beneficiary's

income tax return be consistent with an estate or trust return unless the IRS is
notified.

For instance, an estate cannot claim that an assets is worth $100 and

a beneficiary, who intends to sell the assets, claim a basis of $150.
1.

r

Estate of Jalkut y. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 675 (1991) has been

A

new

section

2033A

was

added.

Subsequently,

the

IRS

Restructuring Act repealed section 2033A and created a new provision, section
2057.
B.

See subsequent outline for details.
CKARzTABLE MATTERS - Sections 170. 642, 664. 501, 509, 2055, 2522,
4940-4947
1.

Necessity

of

Appraisal.

The

Tax

Court

denied

an

income

and
tax

charitable deduction for a contribution of closely-held stock in Hewitt. et ux
y.

Commissioner, 109 T.C. 258

(1997), because the taxpayers did not submit a

qualified appraisal (as defined in Treas. Reg. §1.170A-13).

The taxpayers argued

for substantial compliance which the court discussed as follows:
Petitioners rely on Bond y. commissioner, 100 T.C. 32
(1993), to sustain their position that a qualified
appraisal is not a requirement under the circumstances
herein.
In that case,
respondent challenged a
charitable deduction for failure to obtain a qualified
appraisal prior to filing the return.
The parties
stipulated there was no valuation overstatement.
We
found that the taxpayers had had the subject property,
two blimps, appraised by a qualified appraiser within
the specified time frame, and that substantially all of
the information required by respondent's regulations,
section 1.170A-13(c) (3) (i),
Income Tax Regs., was
contained in an appraisal summary, signed by a qualified
appraiser, set forth in the Form 8283 attached to their
return.
Accordingly, we held that the taxpayers had
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substantially complied with the requirements of the
statute and the regulations even though a separate
appraisal had not been obtained and the qualifications
of the appraiser were omitted from the appraisal summary
attached to the return.
In so holding, we stated:
the essence of section 170 is to allow certain
taxpayers
a
charitable
deduction
for
contributions made to certain organizations. * *
* However, the reporting requirements (of section
1.170A-13, Income Tax Regs.,) do not relate to
the substance or essence of whether or not a
charitabie contribution was actually made. * * *
[Bond y. Commissioner, 100 T.C. at 41.]
As a consequence, we concluded that the reporting
requirements of section 1.170A-13, Income Tax
Regs. ,
were
directory,
not mandatory,
and
therefore, that these requirements could be met
by substantial, rather than strict, compliance.
Bond y. commissioner, 100 T.C. at 41. In effect,
we held that the appraisal summary itself
constituted the required appraisal.
In this
connection,
we
note
that
the
appraisal
requirements may not be entirely procedural so as
to justify the application of the substantial
compliance rules under any and all circumstances.
See Atlantic Veneer Corp. y. COmmissioner, 812
F.2d 158, 160-161 (4th Cir. 1987), affg. 85 T.C.
1075 (1985).
We find nothing in Bond y. commissioner, supra, which
relieves petitioners of the requirement of obtaining a
qualified appraisal. Such a requirement is statutorily
imposed by section 155(a) (1) (A), and its impact is
reflected in the legislative history of that provision.
See H. Conf. Rept. 98-861, at 995-996 (1984), 1984-3
C.B. (Vol. 2) 1, 249-250, stating:
pursuant to present law (sec. 170(a) (1)), which
expressly allows a charitable deduction only if
the contribution is verified in the manner
specified by Treasury regulations, no deduction
is allowed for a contribution of property for
which an appraisal
is
required under
the
conference
agreement
unless
the
appraisal
requirements are satisfied.

-

-

-

-

* * * * * *

For donations of property as to which the donor
appraisal requirements apply, the donor must
obtain and retain a qualified written appraisal
by a qualified appraiser for the property
contributed and must attach a signed appraisal
summary to the return on which the deduction is
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r

first claimed (with such other
prescribed by regulations) .

r

Petitioners herein furnished practically none of the
information required by either the statute or the
regulations.
Given the statutory language and the
thrust of the concerns about the need of respondent to
be provided with appropriate information in order to
alert respondent to potential overvaluations, see infra
p. 12, petitioners simply do not fall within the
permissible boundaries of Bond V. Commissioner, supra,
where an appraisal summary, which was completed by a
qualified appraiser, contained most of the required
information and could therefore by treated as a written
appraisal, was attached to the return. Cf. D'Arcangelo
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-572 (respondent
prevailed where no qualified appraisal was obtained.

r
r

r

r
r

r

r

r

r
r

r
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information as

2.

options

Transfer of Incentive Stock Options to Charity.
have

become

increasingly popular.

PLR

9737015

Incentive stock

considers

the

tax

consequences of transferring such options to an Intermediary which, at a stated
date,

would exercise the options and transfer the proceeds to charity.

The

employee could alter the date and the charities at any time prior to the date.
The ruling described the exercise process as follows:
Option A is subject to the terms and conditions of a
Gift Administration Agreement ("Agreement"). Under that
Agreement, Intermediary must exercise Option A on a
specified date, which Employee has reserved the right to
change.
Under that Agreement, Employee retains the
right to specify and subsequently change (until the
exercise date) the maximum spread that may result from
exercise of Option A and the amount of withholding taxes
to be paid upon exercise.
Under the Agreement, upon the exercise of Option A,
Intermediary must immediately sell the Company shares
received and deposit the net proceeds of the sale (gross
proceeds less the exercise prices, withholding taxes,
and costs relating to the exercise) into the Asset
Account.
In accordance with the Agreement, Employee
will contemporaneously identify one or more charities
(described in section 170(c) (2) of the Code) to receive
a contributions, and Intermediary will make a wire
transfer from the Asset Account of the amounts specified
for contribution to the charities.
Intermediary will
not commingle any other payment or contribution to the
charity (or charities) in that wire transfer.
Under the Agreement, if Employee dies prior to the full
exercise of Option A, Intermediary must transfer what
remains of Option A to a previously designated charity
(or charities), and the charity may exercise Option A
without regard to the criteria for permissible exercise
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dates.
To the extent that Option A is not exercised
before its expiration date, it will expire unexercised.
Intermediary, as the agent of Employee, will receive
from
each
charity
a
contemporaneous
written
acknowledgment stating that a specified amount was
received by the charity on a specified date by a
specified wire transfer from a specified asset account
maintained by Intermediary.
The acknowledgment will
also state the other information required by section
l70(f) (i) of the Code.
Intermediary will promptly
furnish the charity's acknowledgment to Employee.
Intermediary will also furnish to Employee statements
detailing the activities in the Asset Account during
each month that a contribution is made to a charity.
These statements will include the amount, number, date,
and recipient of any wire transfer to a charity.
Upon exercise, income would be triggered:
(1)
Employee did not recognize income or gain upon the
transfer of Option A to Intermediary.
(2)

If Option A is exercised while Employee is living,

(a)
Employee will recognize compensation income
equal to the excess of the fair market value of the
optioned shares on the date of exercise over the
exercise price of the option; and
(b)
the compensation income recognized by
Employee will constitute "wages," under section 3401 of
the Code, that are subject to federal income tax
withholding.
See Revenue Ruling 67-257, 1967-2 C.B.
359.
(3)

If Option A is exercised after Employee dies,
(b)
the compensation income attributable to such
exercise will not constitute "wages" under section 3401
of the Code.
See Revenue Ruling 86-109, 1986-2 C.B.
196.
A charitable deduction would also be allowed if the exercise occurred

-

-

.....1

-

during the employee's lifetime:
Although, on Date Y, Employee irrevocably transferred
Option A to Intermediary with the proceeds to go to a
charity (or charities) described in section 170(c) (2) of
the Code, he also reserved rights that control whether,
and the extent to which, Option A may be exercised.
Thus, on Date Y, Employee did not make a contribution
that was deductible under section 170.
See section
1.170A-l(e) of the regulations.
If Option A is exercised while Employee is alive,
Intermediary must sell the shares received and deposit
the proceeds of the sale (net of any amounts needed to
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pay the exercise price, withholding taxes, and other
costs relating to the transfer and exercise of the
option} in the Asset Account. Afterwards, Intermediary
will make a wire transfer from the Asset Account to each
of those charities in the specified amount. At the time
of such transfer(s}, Employee A will be making a
"charitable contribution," within the meaning of section
170(c}, of money.

r
r

If the charities to which the funds are transferred are
organizations described in section 170(b} (1) (A) of the
Code, the limitation on the deductions will be governed
by that section. The charity's contemporaneous written
acknowledgment (identifying the number, amount, and date
of
the wire
transfer and containing the other
information required by section 170(f) (8}) that Employee
will receive through Intermediary along with the
statement of account from Intermediary (detailing the
activity in the Asset Account) will substantiate the
contribution for purposes of section 170(f} (8) (A).

r
r
r
r

r

r
r
r
r
r

The gift is incomplete until the option is exercised.

Therefore, if the

exercise occurred after or within three years prior to the decedent's death, the
option would be included in the decedent's estate and a charitable deduction
would be allowed:
Accordingly, based upon the facts submitted and the
representation made, to the extent that Option A has not
been exercised by Intermediary before Employee's death,
the value of Option A will be includible in Employee'S
gross estate under section 2036 and/or section 2038.
Furthermore,
if
the
charity
or
charities
are
organizations described in section 2055 (a) and the
deductions are not disallowed under section 2055(e),
Employee'S estate will be eligible for federal estate
tax charitable deductions, under section 2055(a}, for
the transfer of Option A to the charity or charities.
Further, pursuant to sections 2035(d} (2) and 2036
(and/or section 2038), to the extent that Intermediary
exercised an option for Employee and transfers the net
proceeds to a charity during the three-year period
ending on Employee's date of death, the value that
Option A would have had on the date of this death will
be includible in Employee's gross estate.
If the
charity is an organization described in section 2055(a}
and the deduction is not disallowed under section
2055 (e), Employee's estate will be eligible for a
federal estate tax charitable deduction, under section
2055(a), for the amount included in the gross estate.
PLRs 9737014 and 9737016 consider substantially similar issues with the

r
!:

same resul t .

See also the discussion at §2501-2524,

options generally.
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dealing with gifts of

3.

Easemept

Valuatiop.

Commissioner, 109 T.C. 303

Before

the

Tax

Court

in

Browning

v.

(1997) was the valuation of a charitable easement.

Treas. Reg. §1.170A-14(h) (3) (i) states:
The value of the contribution under section 170 in the
case of a charitable contribution of a perpetual
conservation restriction is the fair market value of the
perpetual conservation restriction at the time of the
contribution. See section 1.170A-7(c). If there is a
substantial record of sales of easements comparable to
the donated easement (such as purchases pursuant to a
governmental program), the fair market value of the
donated easement is based on the sales prices of such
comparable easements.
If no substantial record of
market-place sales is available to use as a meaningful
or valid comparison, as a general rule (but not
necessarily in all cases) the fair market value of a
perpetual conservation restriction is equal to the
difference between the fair market value of the property
it encumbers before the granting of the restriction and
the fair market value of the encumbered property after
the granting of the restriction.
The first issue was the meaning of the regulations.

-

..

The taxpayer was paid

by the county for the easement but claimed that there was a bargain sale.
IRS argued the county's purchase price was determinative of value.

The

The court

held:
In the case of a perpetual conservation restriction, if
the market
for
such
restrictions
is
not well
established, it is usually necessary to value the
restriction by applying a ubefore and after" analysis;
i . e., a comparison of the fair market value of the
donor's property unencumbered by the restriction with
the fair market value of the property after the
conveyance of the restriction, with any diminution of
value to be ascribed to the fair market value of the
restrictions.
See, e.g., Symington y. Commissioner,
supra at 895 & n.5, which states as follows:
This method has been approved by the Internal
Revenue Service, see Rev. Rul. 73-339, 1973-2
C.B. 68, as clarified by Rev. Rul. 76-376, 1976-2
C.B. 53, and endorsed by Congress in connection
with the adoption of the Tax Treatment Extension
Act of 1980, see S. Rept. 96-1007 (1980), 1980-2
C.B. 599, 606.
Nothing in section 1.170A-14(h) (3) (i), Income Tax
Regs. (the PCR valuation regulation), contradicts
that
analysis;
indeed,
the
PCR
valuation
regulations adopts the serial approach described:
UIf no substantial record of market-place sales
is available to use as a meaningful or valid
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comparison," the general rule is a
after approach.

Respondent, however, argues that the second substantive
sentence of the PCR valuation regulation, see supra sec.
II., which sets forth the marketplace sales analysis, is
the beginning and end of the inquiry into the fair
market value of the easement, notwithstanding evidence
to support a finding that sales of development rights in
Howard County occur in an inhibited market. Respondent,
thus, seeks to preclude petitioners from using appraisal
evidence to establish a greater value. We believe that
respondent's
interpretation of the regulation is
misguided.
The first substantive sentence of the PCR valuation
regulation, see supra sec. II., establishes the general
rule that the value of the contribution under section
170 of a perpetual conservation restriction is the fair
market value of the restriction at the time of
contribution.
When there is evidence to support a
finding that marketplace sales of such restrictions are
unreliable, blind application of the second substantive
sentence, which provides a method for determining the
amount required by the rule of the first substantive
sentence, would ignore the purpose of the regulation.
Essentially, respondent's interpretation of the PCR
valuation regulation narrowly focuses on whether there
exists a substantial record of sales of comparable
easements, irrespective of whether a comparison of the
sale of the subject easement to such sales of comparable
easements would yield the proper amount of the deduction
under section 170.
That misguided approach fails to
recognize that a substantial record of sales of
comparable easements must provide a "meaningful or valid
comparison" to be considered a record of comparable
sales. Sec. 1.170A-14(h) (3) (i), Income Tax Regs. (third
substantive sentence).
The meaningful or valid comparison standard serves the
purpose of determining the proper amount of the
deduction under section 170 by establishing the fair
market value of the contributed property rights and does
not serve the function of determining some market value
of the subject easement as an independent objective.
Indeed, other portions of the PCR valuation regulation
support that assertion.
In the case of a charitable
contribution of a perpetual conservation restriction
covering a portion of the contiguous property owned by
a donor and the donor's family, the amount of the
deduction under section 170 is the difference between
the fair market value of the entire contiguous parcel of
property before and after
the granting of
the
restriction. Sec. 1.170A-14(h) (3) (i), Income Tax Regs.
(fourth substantive sentence).
Sales of easements
comparable to the donated easement covering a portion of
the contiguous property owned by the donor and the
donor's family and, thus, the market value of such
easements are irrelevant.
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In conclusion, we must examine the applicability of the
second substantive sentence of the PCR valuation
regulation in light of its role in determining the
proper amount of the deduction under section 170.
Therefore, we are not required to accept the substantial
record of sales of development rights to Howard County
under the Program as determinative of the fair market
value of the easement when there is evidence to support
a finding that those sales occur in an inhibited market.

-

* * *
On brief, respondent recites:
Petitioners contend that the cash paid by Howard
County for the development rights to their
property does not represent the fair market value
of the development rights.
This argument is
largely based on two factors: 1. petitioners did
not believe the cash payments represented the
fair market value of the property conveyed; and
2. Howard County did not intend to pay them fair
market value for their easement.
In response, respondent concedes that petitioners'
evidence as to the subjective beliefs of the parties
(petitioners and Howard County) is persuasive on the
issue of donative intent. See supra sec. IV.A. We take
that response as a concession by respondent that
peti tioners and the county intended a bargain sale;
i.e., a part sale part gift. Certainly, that conclusion
is supported by the testimony of petitioner Charles
Browning (the $6,000 an acre received for the easement
"couldn't possibly represent the fair market value of
the easement") and Donna Mennitto, administrator of the
Program ("It was never the intention of the County to
pay the full easement value and we do not believe that
we ever did with the information that he had
available."),
and,
thus,
we
accept
respondent's
concession and so find. Moreover, we believe that the
record supports a finding that, under the Program
generally, at the time petitioners conveyed the easement
to the county and before, participants in the Program
intended to make a gift to the county by way of a
bargain sale of development rights.
We have the
testimony of two participants in the Program as to that
point, petitioner Charles Browning and his neighbor,
Gene Mullinix.
In addition, Mr. Mullinix, who was a
chairman of the board that supervised the Program and
served on that board for 10 years, testified that the
board that ran the Program never paid "full" fair market
value for any easement that it purchased under the
Program. Ms. Mennitto's testimony as to the procedures
followed to implement the Program, including publication
of the Program, public hearings at which properties
offered to the Program were presented for comment, the
limitations on what the county would pay, and the
appraisal process designed to insure that the county did
not pay the full amount of the value of the development
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rights indicated by that appraisal, all convince us that
participants in the Program generally intended to make
a gift to the county by way of a bargain sale of
development rights, and we so find.

,...
J

Of course, our finding that participants in the Program
INTENDED a bargain sale is not determinative that there
was a bargain sale. Nevertheless, it is determinative
that the universe of sales to the county under the
Program does not represent a universe populated with
sellers all of whom (or, perhaps, even, ANY of whom)
were looking for the best deal (highest price) possible.
Sales data from that universe, thus, are not reflective
of a market populated by buyers and sellers EACH trying
to maximize profits by searching for the lowest (buyers)
or highest (sellers) price possible. Any "market price"
based on evidence from that market is not a market price
fairly reflective of the price the easement would fetch
in an uninhibited market.
It is not a "fair" market
price within the meaning of Heider v. Crosby, 24 F.2d at
193, nor are the sales "market-place" sales within the
meaning of section 1.170A-14(h) (3) (i), Income Tax Regs.,
available to use as a "meaningful or valid" comparison
to the sale of the easement.
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The court then reviewed the experts' opinions to determine the "before and
after" value.
4.

Termination of

:Interest

interesting factual situation.

in Trust.

9728026

The decedent's Will created a

decedent's spouse followed by several charitable bequests.
be included in the spouse's estate.

deals

with

an

trust for the

The trust would not

The trust's terms were as follows:

My trustee shall pay to or apply for the benefit of my
wife, [Spouse], for her lifetime, such amounts of income
and principal up to the whole thereof, only for my
beneficiary's special needs for health, safety and well
being, when such requisites are not presently being
provided by any public entity, office or department of
the beneficiary's state of residence, or any other
state, or of the United States.
"Special needs" shall
include, but not be limited to, medical and dental
expenses; equipment; and programs of treatment; my
trustee shall have no discretion in my trustee's
distribution of income and principal for special needs,
and
shall
refer
to
current
applicable
state
administrative
rules,
procedure
manuals,
and
corresponding federal statutory and administrative
sources for current eligibility and reimbursement
mandates. The express purpose of this trust shall be to
provide for my beneficiary's extra and supplemental
needs for health, safety and well being, in addition to
and over and above the benefits provided for by any
public entity, office or department of the United
States. It is the express purpose of the trustor to use
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the trust estate only to supplement
received by my wife, [Spouse].

other

benefits

Decedent's estate obtained an extension for filing the estate tax return.
Spouse died a year after decedent.

The estate claimed a charitable deduction for

-

the remainder interests passing to charity.
The Service discussed the applicable portion of section 2055 as follows:
Section 20.2055-2(c) (1) of the Estate Tax Regulations
provides that in the case of a bequest, devise, or
transfer made by a decedent dying after December 31,
1976, the amount of a bequest, devise or transfer for
which a deduction is allowable under section 2055
includes an interest which falls into the bequest,
devise or transfer as the result of either:
(i)
A qualified
section 2518], or

disclaimer

[described

in

(ii) The complete termination of a power to
consume, invade, or appropriate property for the
benefit of an individual by reason of the death
of such individual or for any other reason, if
the termination occurs within the period of time
(including extensions) for filing the decedent's
Federal estate tax return and before such power
has been exercised.

* * *
In this case, the trustee's power to invade income and
principal for Spouse's health, safety and well being,
pursuant to the terms of the instrument, terminated on
Spouse's death, prior to the due date (including
extensions) for filing Decedent's estate tax return.
Accordingly, under section 2055(a) and section 20.20552(c) (1) (i) an estate tax charitable deduction is allowed
for the portion of the trust passing directly to
Charities A, B, C, D and E as a result of the
termination of Spouse's discretionary interest in the
trust (assuming these entities are described in section
2055 (a) ) .
5.

Gifts by Attorney-in-Pact.

-

-

The federal District Court for Vermont

has refused to grant summary judgment in Estate of Smith v. United States, 979
F.Supp 279 (D. Vt. 1997).

The facts reviewed by the court were straightforward:

In 1952, Smith II bought a 291 acre farm located in
Danby, Vermont, where he lived until his death in 1991.
On January 25, 1989, he executed a durable power of
attorney naming his son, Charles S. Smith, III, ("Smith
III") as his attorney-in-fact. The instrument gave the
son the power to "sell, purchase, lease, mortgage, and
convey" any real property owned by the father. On
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September 24, 1990, Smith III executed a deed donating
the development rights to the farm to the VLT. Smith II
died on March 2, 1991. Smith III and Fleet Bank were
named co-administrators of Smith II's estate.
On January 5, 1992, the Estate filed its federal estate
tax return. In its return, the Estate excluded $436,000
from the value of the gross estate as a charitable gift.
The Estate claimed that this amount represented the fair
market value of the development rights to the farm,
based on a 1990 appraisal.
The IRS audited the return,
and disallowed the
deduction. The IRS claimed that Smith III exceeded his
authority as attorney-in-fact when he donated the
development rights to the farm to the VLT.
The IRS assessed an additional tax of $189,247.83, plus
interest of $38,017.87, for a total of $227,265.70. The
Estate paid this amount to the IRS in April and June,
1994. It thereafter filed a claim for refund of the tax
and interest. On January 19, 1995, the IRS denied the
Estate's claim for refund. On administrative appeal by
the Estate, the denial was upheld. This action for
refund followed.
The court determined that the power of attorney instrument was ambiguous
and thus denied summary judgment for either the government or the estate.
instrument was discussed by the court:
The Power of Attorney enumerated the following powers:
to demand, receive and sue for all accounts, debts,
moneys, legacies or other personal property to which I
am now or hereafter may be entitled; to sign my name to
checks on all banks and trust companies in which I have
or may have deposits; to have access to all safe deposit
boxes leased by any banking or trust companies; to
endorse my name on all checks, drafts and other
instruments in writing payable to me or to my order, to
sell, assign, pledge and convey all stocks, bonds or
other securities in my name or to my personal account,
and for that purpose to sign, execute and deliver all
assignments and other instruments in writing necessary
to transfer said stocks, bonds and other securities to
the purchaser thereof; TO SELL,
PURCHASE, LEASE,
MORTGAGE AND CONVEY ANY REAL PROPERTY OWNED BY ME OR TO
BE ACQUIRED BY ME, AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, MAKE, EXECUTE,
SIGN, SEAL, ACKNOWLEDGE AND DELIVER UNTO THE SELLER OR
PURCHASER THEREOF, A PROPER AND SUFFICIENT DEED OF
CONVEYANCE OF ALL MY RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST AND
ESTATE IN SAID REAL ESTATE, OR ANY OTHER DOCUMENTS
NECESSARY FOR THE COMPLETION OF SUCH TRANSACTIONS.
Hereby giving and granting unto my said Attorney full
power and authority to do and perform all and every act
and thing whatever requisite and necessary to be done in
and about the premises as fully and to all intents and
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purposes as I might do or could do if personally
present, hereby ratifying and confirming all that said
Attorney shall do or cause to be done by reason hereof,
The court concluded:
To date, no reported decision from a Vermont court has
addressed the meaning of "convey" in the context of a
general power of attorney. Other jurisdictions have
frequently held that a general power of attorney
authorizing a person to convey real property does not
authorize conveyance as a gift. See King y. Bankerd, 492
A.2d 608, 612 (Md. 1985) (collecting cases). As the
Court in Kina pointed out, the power to make a gift is
a power that is potentially hazardous to the principal's
interests, and will not lightly be inferred from broad,
all-encompassing grants of power to the agent. IQ. at
613. See also, Aiello M. Clark, 680 P. 2d 1162, 1166
(Alaska 1984); Whitford y. Gaskill, 480 S.E.2d 690,
691-92 (N.C. 1997); Johnson y. Fraccacreta, 348 So. 2d
570, 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Honeycutt y.
Farmers & Merchant Bank, 487 S.E.2d 166, 168 (N.C. App.
July 15, 1997).
The Supreme Court of Vermont has consistently used the
term "convey" to refer to any transfer of an interest in
land. In Colby y. Colby, 157 Vt. 233, 235, 596 A.2d 901,
902
(1991), for example, the Court discussed two
transactions in which it described land as "conveyed,"
one for consideration, and the other as a gift. In ~
y. Wardsboro Sch. Dist., 150 vt. 541, 542-43, 554 A.2d
673, 674-75 (1988), the Court referred to the gift of
real property to build a school as a "conveyance." A
parcel of-land was "conveyed" as a gift in Tokarski y.
~ , 138 Vt. 220, 221, 414 A.2d 1155, 1156 (1980). In
Ball y. Hall, 129 Vt. 200, 274 A.2d 516 (1971), the term
"conveyance" was used to describe a gift of land to the
town of Bakersfield.
None of these cases, however, addressed the nature of an
agent's authority to "convey," when the term is preceded
and followed by terms that suggest that the context is
a transfer for consideration: "sell, purchase, lease,
mortgage and convey.
. and for this purpose .
deliver unto the Seller or Purchaser thereof General,
all-embracing expressions, such as the second paragraph
of the power of attorney at issue, granting "full power
and authority to do and perform all and every act and
thing whatever requisite and necessary.
. as fully
and to all intents and purposes as I might or could do
if personally present, hereby ratifying and confirming
[the
agent's
actions],"
add
nothing
to
the
attorney-in-fact's
enumerated
powers,
and
are
disregarded, in the words of the Restatement, as
"meaningless verbiage." Restatement, section 34, Comment
on Clause (e). See also Estate of Casey v. commissioner,
948 F.2d 895, 901 (4th Cir. 1991). These features of the
power of attorney suggest that inclusion of the term
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"convey" did not authorize a donative transfer of an
interest in land.
But see Estate of Neff v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2606 (1997)
(general
language sufficient evidence of principal's intent to
allow conveyance of property as gift); In re Estate of
Augustine, 695 A.2d 836, 838 (Pa. Super. 1997) (same);
Taylor y. Vernon, 652 A.2d 912, 916 (Pa. Super. 1995)
(same) .
The language of the power of attorney as a whole,
however, does not clearly and unambiguously preclude the
power to make a gift. In ~ , by contrast, the power
of attorney authorized a son to "lease, sell, grant,
convey, assign, transfer, mortgage and set over to any
person, firm or corporation and for such consideration
as he may deem advantageous, any and all of my property
and to "accept and receive any and all
consideration payable to me on account of any such
lease, sale, conveyance, transfer or assignment and to
invest and reinvest the proceeds derived therefrom." 948
F.2d at 896-97. The enumeration of general powers to
grant, convey and transfer was qualified by the phrase
"for such consideration as he may deem advantageous,"
and followed by an authorization to receive payment for
any such transfer or conveyance. Here, the general power
to convey was not qualified by a reference to
consideration, or an authorization to accept payment.
The power of attorney at issue here, after authorizing
Smith III to sell, purchase, lease, mortgage and convey
real property, states that he may "for this purpose,
make, execute, sign, seal, acknowledge and deliver unto
the Seller or Purchaser thereof, a proper and sufficient
deed of conveyance of all [the principal's] right, title
and interest and estate" in the property. A literal
reading of some of this language is impossible: it would
authorize an attorney-in-fact to deliver to a seller a
deed conveying the principal's right, title and interest
to land he did not own Furthermore, if the conveyance is
to be of all "right, title and interest and estate," an
attorney-in-fact would be unable to lease or mortgage
property on behalf of his principal, as authorized by
the previous clause.
The two clauses are inconsistent with one another, and
appear to be the result of careless drafting or
inadvertent omission of additional terms. How the
clauses may be construed to form a "harmonious whole" is
far from clear at this stage of the proceedings. The
second clause certainly cannot support the construction
that the Government urges: that it unambiguously
expresses that any conveyance of property would be to a
"Purchaser."
Given the absence of any explicit
expression of intention in the document, the broad
powers conveyed therein, the broad use of the term
"convey"
in
Vermont
law,
and
the
internal
inconsistencies of the clauses in the document, the
Court finds as a matter of law that the term "convey" as
used in the power of attorney is ambiguous. "Convey"
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could reasonably be interpreted either as authorizing
gifts of real property or as a general term that did not
expand the attorney-in- fact's powers beyond transfers
for consideration.
The court also discussed the effect of the Dead Man's Statute:
The dead man's statutes were created as exceptions to
the broad common law rule that disqualified interested
parties from testifying in their own favor, and are thus
intended
to
allow
the
admission
of
otherwise
inadmissible evidence rather than to create rules of
disqualification.
In re Estate of Farr, 150 Vt. 196,
199, 552 A.2d 387, 390 (1988) Section 1602 provides that
" [a] party shall not be allowed to testify in his own
favor where the other party to the contract or cause of
action in issue and on trial is dead . . . " Section 1603
provides that " [w]hen an executor or administrator is a
party, the other party shall not be permitted to testify
in his own favor . . . " Both sections contain exceptions
to this disqualification, none of which apply to the
circumstances of this case.

.tiltI

The dead man's statutes do not disqualify Smith III from
testifying as to the nature and extent of his agency. An
agent is a competent witness, either for or against a
principal, to prove his acts done and contracts made as
agent, and to prove his agency. Lytle y. Bond's Estate,
40 Vt. 618, 622 (1868); Gifford y. Thomas' Estate, 62
Vt. 34, 35, 19 A. 1088 (1889). The dead man's statutes
provide that a survivor who is a party to the contract
or cause of action in issue and on trial may not testify
in his or her own favor. The agent in this case would
not be testifying in his own favor, but on behalf of the
estate of his principal. Furthermore, the estate and the
agent in this case are parties on the same side of the
controversy. The dead man's statutes were designed to
protect decedents or estates from adverse parties, not
to bar testimony presented on behalf of estates. See 3
Jack B. Weinstein,
et al., Weinstein's Evidence,
paragraph 601[03] (1996); McCormick on Evidence section
65 (Edward W. Cleary, ed., 3rd ed. 1984).

.,

I

.
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See also the discussion at §§ 2501-2524, dealing with gifts by a guardian.
6.

payment to Charity in Settlement of a Claim.

The facts submitted to

the IRS in PLR 9812014 were that an attorney in fact altered the residuary takers
under the incompetent decedent's trust, replacing a charity with the decedent's
niece.

After death,

the charity objected and a settlement was reached.

estate took a charitable deduction for the amounts payable to charity.
The ruling discusses the general rule and determines as follows:
Thus, in the present case, a deduction is allowable
under section 2055(a) to the Decedent's estate for the

The

,
,
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amounts paid to Charity C pursuant to the Settlement
Agreement if:

J

(1)
the agreement was negotiated, and is in settlement
of a bona fide will contest;

r

(2)
Charity C has an enforceable right to the residue
of the Decedent's estate and trust, and the payments are
in recognition of that right;

r

(3)
the payments do not exceed what Charity C would
have received if it had pursued the right in litigation;
and

r

r
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(4)
the form of the payments passing to Charity C
under the Settlement Agreement resembles the form of the
benefits that Charity C could have received under the
terms of the Decedent's will and trust agreement.
For purposes of section 2055, a charitable deduction is
allowable only for what is actually received by the
charity. Ahmanson Foundation v. United States, at 772.
In Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, supra, the Court
held that where an issue involves the determination of
property interests for federal tax purposes, and that
determination is based on state law, the highest court
of the state is the best authority on its own law. The
Court held that, if there is no decision on the issue by
the state's highest court, federal authorities must
apply what they find to be state law after giving proper
regard to the relevant rulings of other courts of the
state.

* * *
Based on the facts submitted and the representations
made and on an analysis of applicable local law, we
believe that a court could have decided that the spouse
did not have the authority under the durable power of
attorney to change the beneficiary of the residue of the
Decedent's trust and, thus, Charity C had an enforceable
right to the residue.
The Settlement Agreement was negotiated in settlement of
a bona fide contest relating to the residuary provision
of the Decedent's Trust.
Charity C has a legitimate
claim that it possesses an enforceable right to the
residue of the Decedent's Trust, and the payments are
made in recognition of that right.
Further, the
payments totaling $750,000 are less than the $1,000,000
(plus) that Charity C would have obtained if Charity C
had successfully pursued in litigation the right to the
residue of the Decedent's Trust. Finally, the outright
payments to Charity C under the Settlement Agreement
have the same form as the outright payments under the
terms of Decedent's Trust.
Therefore, a deduction is
allowable to the Decedent's estate under section 2055(a)
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for the payments received
Settlement Agreement.

by

Charity

C

under

J

the
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However, in computing the amount of the deduction, the
total amount paid to Charity C must be reduced by the
$46,000 income tax obligation that the charity must bear
under the Settlement Agreement since the charity is, in
effect, assuming an obligation otherwise fully payable
from the residue to be received by the Niece.
Fla.
Stat. Ann. section 733.805 (West); section 20.2055-3(a);
Ahmanson Foundation y. United States.

J
j

The state law was Florida, as to which the ruling states:
Under State law, a principal may execute a durable power
of attorney designating an attorney in fact. Fla. Stat.
Ann. section 709.08 (West). A durable power of attorney
creates the relationship of principal and agent between
the one who gives the power and the one who holds it.
It is the principal's intent that controls, not the
agent's. A durable power of attorney grants only those
powers specified, and the durable power is closely
examined to ascertain the principal's intent. Kotsch y.
Kotsch, 608 So.2d 879 (1992).
If the agent exercises
the durable power of attorney in a manner inconsistent
with the principal's intent, the exercise is void.
Kotsch y. Kotsch, at 880.

J

To avoid questions about an attorney in fact's authority over a revocable
trust, the trust should provide either that an attorney in fact has no authority
or that

it does

(in which case the power of attorney form should contain

equivalent language).
7.

Ability of Donor to Enforce a Charitable Gift Restriction.

The

Connecticut Supreme Court has determined that under neither the common law nor
the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act - as in effect in Connecticut does a donor, or the donor's family or heirs, have standing to sue to enforce the
restrictions on a gift.

J
J
J
J
J
J
J

The nature of the gift and the facts in Herzog Found.

y. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997), were as follows:
The plaintiff alleged in its revised complaint that
prior to August 12, 1986, it made various grants to the
defendant 'to provide need-based merit scholarship aid
to
disadvantaged
students
for
medical
related
education.' On August 12, 1986, the plaintiff agreed,
by letter, to participate in a matching grant program
that would provide need-based merit scholarships to
disadvantaged students for medical related education on
a continuing basis. On September 9, 1986, the defendant
wrote a letter accepting the offer of a matching grant
of up to $250,000. Over a period of time, the defendant
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raised the necessary $250,000, which the plaintiff
matched in accordance with the agreement. The plaintiff
transferred $144,000 on June 26, 1987, and $106,000 on
June 28, 1988, to the defendant. The grants were used
to provide scholarships to students in the defendant's
nursing program.
On November 21, 1991, however, the
plaintiff was informed that the defendant had closed its
nursing school on June 20, 1991.
The court summarized the common law:
At common law, a donor who has made a completed
charitable contribution, whether as an absolute gift or
in trust, had no standing to bring an action to enforce
the terms of his or her gift or trust unless he or she
had expressly reserved the right to do so.
"Where
property is given to a charitable corporation and it is
directed by the terms of the gift to devote the property
to a particular one of its purposes, it is under a duty,
enforceable at the suit of the [a]ttorney [g]eneral, to
devote the property to that purpose." (Emphasis added.)
2 Restatement (Second), Trusts § 348, comment (f), p.
212 (1959); Attorney General y. First United Baptist
Church of Lee, 601 A.2d 96, 98 (Me. 1992); see Sarkeys
y. Independent School District No. 40, 592 P.2d 529, 533
(Okla. 1979) ("[i]t has long been recognized at common
law that the [a] ttorney [g] eneral has the duty of
representing the public interest in securing the
enforcement of charitable trusts"); Wilbur y. Uniyersity
of vermont, 129 Vt. 33, 44, 270 A.2d 889 (1970) (where no
provision in trust instrument for forfeiture or
reverter, "the remedy for a breach of trust is by suit
at the instance of the [a]ttorney [g]eneral of the state
to compel compliance").
At common law,
it was
established that "[e]quity will afford protection to a
donor to a charitable corporation in that the [a]ttorney
[g]eneral may maintain a suit to compel the property to
be held for the charitable purpose for which it was
given to the corporation."
(Emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Lefkowitz y. Lebensfeld, 68
App. Div. 488, 494-95, 417 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1979).
"The
general rule is that charitable trusts or gifts to
charitable
corporations
for
stated purposes
are
[enforceable]
at the instance of the
[a]ttorney
[g]eneral.
It matters not whether the gift is
absolute or in trust or whether a technical condition is
attached to the gift."
(Internal quotation marks
omitted).
Id., 495.
"The theory underlying the power of the [a] ttorney
[g]eneral to enforce gifts for a stated purpose is that
a donor who attaches conditions to his gift has a right
to have his intention enforced."
Id., 495-96.
The
donor's right, however, is enforceable only at the
instance of the attorney general; Wier y. Howard Hughes
Medical
Institute,
407
A.2d
1051,
1057
(Del.
1979) (attorney general "has the exclusive power to bring
actions to enforce charitable trusts" [emphasis added]
); Lopez y. Medford COmmunity Center, Inc., 384 Mass.

A-25

163, 167, 424 N.E. 2d 229 (1981) (common law rule that
"it is the exclusive function of the [a]ttorney
[g]eneral to correct abuses in the administration of a
public charity by the institution of proper proceedings"
[emphasis added] ); and the donor himself has no
standing to enforce the terms of his gift when he has
not retained a specific right to control the property,
such as a right of reverter, after relinquishing
physical possession of it.
See, e.g., Marin Hospital
District V. Dept. of Health, 92 Cal.App. 3d 442, 448,
154 Cal.Rptr. 838 (1979) (fact that charity is bound to
use contributions for purposes for which they were given
does not confer to donor standing to bring action to
enforce terms of gift). As a matter of common law, when
a settlor of a trust or a donor of property to a charity
fails specifically to provide for a reservation of
rights in the trust or gift instrument, "'neither the
donor nor his heirs have any standing in court in a
proceeding to compel the proper execution of the trust,
except as relators.'" Smith v. Thompson, 266 Ill.App.
165, 169 (1932), quoting 2 J. Perry, Trusts and Trustees
(7th Ed. 1929) § 732a, pp. 1255-56; see Wilbur V.
University of Vermont, supra, 129 Vt. at 44, 270 A.2d
889 (breach of trust "creates no right in the donor's
heirs to enforce a resulting trust"); Hagaman V. Board
of Education, 117 N.J.Super. 446, 454, 285 A.2d 63
(1971) (heirs of settlor generally cannot enforce
charitable trust).
"There is no such thing as a
resulting trust with respect to a charity. . . . Where
the donor has effectually passed out of himself all
interest in the fund devoted to a charity, neither he
nor those claiming under him have any standing in a
court of equity as to its disposition and control."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v, Thompson,
supra, at 169; see Wier v. Howard Hughes Medical
Institute, supra, at 1057; but see McGee V. vandeventer,
326 Ill. 425, 441, 158 N.E. 127 (1927)
On the basis of
the weight of the foregoing authorities, we conclude
that it is clear that the general rule at common law was
that a donor had no standing to enforce the terms of a
completed charitable gift unless the donor had expressly
reserved a property interest in the gift.

.....
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The applicable provisions of the CUMIFA were:
"Release of restriction in gift instrument:
Written
consent, court order. Limitations. Doctrine of cy pres
applicable.
(a) With the written consent of the donor,
the governing board may release, in whole or in part, a
restriction imposed by the applicable gift instrument on
the use or investment of an institutional fund.
"(b) If written consent of the donor cannot be obtained
by reason of his death, disability, unavailability or
impossibility of identification, the governing board may
apply, in the name of the institution, to the Superior
Court for a judicial district in which the institution
conducts its affairs for release of a restriction
imposed by the applicable gift instrument on the use or

A-26

-

-

,.
r
,,..

r

investment of an institutional fund.
The Attorney
General shall be notified of the application and shall
be given an opportunity to be heard. If the court finds
that the restriction is obsolete, inappropriate or
impracticable, it may by order release the restriction
in whole or in part.
A release under this subsection
may not change an endowment fund to a fund that is not
an endowment fund.

r

U(c) A release under this section may not allow a fund
to be used for purposes other than the educational,
religious, charitable or other eleemosynary purposes of
the institution affected.

r

U(d) This section does not limit the application of the
doctrine of cy pres or approximation."

I

r

r
r
r
I

r
r
r
J

r
r
r
r
r
t

r

The court reviewed the history of the statute and concluded:
The specific area of relief to institutions focused upon
by the Appellate Court and the plaintiff is that
embodied in § 7, of UMIFA, entitled URelease of
Restrictions on Use or Investment." The prefatory note
to that section provides:
Ult is established law that
the donor may place restrictions on his largesse which
the donee institution must honor.
Too often, the
restrictions on use or investment become outmoded or
wasteful or unworkable. There is a need for review of
obsolete restrictions and a way of modifying or
adjusting them. The Act authorizes the governing board
to obtain the acquiescence of the donor to a release of
restrictions and, in the absence of the donor, to
petition the appropriate court for relief in appropriate
cases." Id., 709. In the comment to § 7, the drafters
of UMIFA expressly provided that the donor of a
completed gift would not have standing to enforce the
terms of the gift.
UThe donor has no right to enforce
the restriction, no interest in the fund and no power to
change the eleemosynary beneficiary of the fund. He may
only acquiesce in a lessening of a restriction already
in effect."
(Emphasis added.) UMIFA, § 7, comment, 7A
U.L.A. 724 (1985).
These clear comments regarding the power of a donor to
enforce restrictions on a charitable gift arose in the
context of debate concerning the creation of potential
adverse tax consequences for donors, if UMIFA was
interpreted to provide donors with control over their
gift property after the completion of the gift.
Pursuant to § 170(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and §
1.170A-1(c) of the Treasury Regulations, an income tax
deduction for a charitable contribution is disallowed
unless
the
taxpayer
has
permanently
surrendered
udominion and control" over the property or funds in
question. Where there is a possibility not Uso remote
as to be negligible" that the charitable gift subject to
a condition might fail, the tax deduction is disallowed.
See also I.R.C. §2055; Treas. Reg. §20.2055-2(b) (similar
provisions for estate tax deductions). The drafters of
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UMIFA worked closely with an impressive group of
professionals,
including
tax
advisers,
who
were
concerned with the federal tax implications of the
proposed act. The drafters' principal concern in this
regard was that the matter of donor restrictions not
affect the donor's charitable contribution deduction for
the purposes of federal income taxation.
In other
words, the concern was that the donor not be so tethered
to
the charitable gift
through the control
of
restrictions in the gift that the donor would not be
entitled to claim a federal charitable contribution
exemption for the gift. See I.R.C. §170(a); Treas. Reg.
§ 1. 170A-1 (c) .

..

In resolving these concerns, the drafters of UMIFA
clearly stated their position in the commentary.
"No
federal tax problems for the donor are anticipated by
permitting release of a restriction. The donor has no
right to enforce the restriction, no interest in the
fund and no power to change the eleemosynary beneficiary
of the fund. He may only acquiesce in a lessening of a
restriction already in effect."
(Emphasis added.)
UMIFA, § 7, comment, 7A U.L.A. 724 (1985).
The
Appellate Court dismissed this language, reasoning that
it is limited to "tax implications when a donor does
consent in writing to a release of a restriction" and
does not answer the question of whether the sole right
to speak to the donor's interest in the release of a
restriction "lies with the attorney general, to the
exclusion of a donor." Carl J. Herzog Foundation. Inc.
y. Uniyersity of Bridgeport, supra, 41 Conn.App. at 800,
677 A.2d 1378. We disagree. Although the comments and
the prefatory note to UMIFA do recognize that a donor
has an interest in a restriction, as analyzed herein,
we find no support in any source for the proposition
that the drafters of either UMIFA or CUMIFA intended
that a donor or his heirs would supplant the attorney
general as the designated enforcer of the terms of
completed and absolute charitable gifts.

.

-

Indeed, it would have been anomalous for the drafters of
UMIFA to strive to assist charitable institutions by
creating smoother procedural avenues for the release of
restrictions while simultaneously establishing standing
for a new class of litigants, donors, who would defeat
this very purpose by virtue of the potential of lengthy
and complicated litigation.
8.

Charitable Lead Trust to Private Foundation.

Charitable lead trusts

-

may benefit a private foundation so long as the donor does not participate in the
governance of the
children

to

foundation.

control

the

PLR 9821030 allowed the donor's

foundation.

The

treatment of the trust:
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ruling describes

the

spouse and
income

tax

-

,.
r

In the present case, the terms of Trust provide for a
unitrust amount to be paid annually to Foundation that
is represented to be described in sections 170 (c) ,
2055(a) and 2522(a). In addition, in the event that the
Trust's designated charitable beneficiary ceases to
exist or is no longer a "Charitable Organization" as
defined in Article VII, paragraph G, of Trust, the
trustees shall pay any amount which would otherwise be
payable to such a charitable beneficiary to such one or
more organizations selected by the Trustees, each of
which is a "Charitable Organization," as defined in
Trust instrument, at the time of payment, in such
proportions among such organizations as the Trustees, in
their sole discretion, shall decide.
Accordingly,
except to the extent that Trust has unrelated business
income within the meaning of section 681(a), we conclude
that Trust will be allowed deductions in accordance with
section 642 (c) (1) for amounts of gross income paid
during the taxable year or by the close of the following
taxable year (if the trustees so elect in accordance
with section 1.642(c)-1(b)) to charitable beneficiaries
described in section 170 (c) .
Because the deduction
under section 642(c) (1) is limited to amounts of gross
income of the trust, a deduction will be allowed for a
distribution of trust principal only to the extent that
the amount distributed has been included in Trust's
gross income and has not been allowed as a deduction in
any prior year.

,.
J

r
r

r

r
r

r
r
r
r
r

In addition, the ordering of the income distributions
provided in Article III, paragraph A, of Trust will not
be given effect for federal income tax purposes because
the ordering provision has no economic effect on the
distributions independent of tax consequences. Trust is
required to pay annually a stated unitrust amount to an
organization described in section 170(c), 2055(a) and
2522(a), regardless of the amount or character of income
earned by Trust.
Instead,
income distributed to
organizations described in sections 170(c), 2055(a) and
2522(a) shall consist of the same proportion of each
class of items of income of Trust as the total of each
class bears to the total of all classes.
See section
1.642(c)- 3(b)(2).

9.
ruling.

Rights Oyer a Charitable Lead Trust.

PLR 9737023 is an interesting

The donor created a 6% charitable lead unitrust with a 40 year term; at

r

the end of the term, the trust assets were payable to the donor's daughter (or,

r

respect to

if deceased,

as she appointed under a general power of appointment).

the designation of the charities to receive the annual unitrust

payments, the ruling stated:

r

Donor, Daughter, the Daughter's husband, (Husband) are
the initial trustees of Trust. At the time for payment
of each installment of the unitrust amount, the trustees

r
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With

other
than
Donor,
can
designate
one
or
more
organizations described in section 170(c), 2055(a) and
2522(a) to receive the unitrust amount.
The trustees
shall not designate as a charitable beneficiary any
organization in which Donor has an interest as a
director, officer or employee. In addition, no trustee
who has made a contribution to Trust can participate in
the exercise of any power granted to the trustees
involving
the
designation
of
the
charitable
beneficiaries, or any power to amend Trust to ensure
qualification as a charitable lead unitrust, or any
power to appoint or remove a corporate trustee.
The ruling determined:

-

-

1.
The contribution of funds to Trust by Donor will
constitute a completed gift under section 2511.
2.
Trust will qualify as a charitable unitrust
described in section 25.2522(c)-3(c) (2) (vii).
3.
Donor will be entitled to a gift tax charitable
deduction under section 2522 (c) (2) (B) equal to the
present value of the unitrust interest.
4.
Upon the death of Donor, the remaining principal
of Trust will not be included in the gross estate of the
Donor under sections 2036 or 2038.

-

The Service also addressed the effect of the rights to designate the
charitable beneficiaries:
In this case, a trustee who also has made a contribution
to Trust is precluded, under the terms of the trust
instrument, from participating is any decision regarding
the designation of the charitable beneficiaries of
Trust.
Accordingly, the power held by Daughter and
Husband to designate charitable beneficiaries will not
be exercisable with respect to any property they may
transfer to Trust and accordingly will not cause
inclusion of Trust corpus in their respective gross
estates, for estate tax purposes. However, we note that
Daughter possesses a testamentary general power to
appoint Trust corpus.
Accordingly,
if Daughter
possesses that power at the time of her death (and does
not release the power prior to her death) the value of
the interest subject to the power at the time of her
death will be includible in Daughter's gross estate
under section 2041. See section 20.2041-1(b) (3).
The designations would not be self-dealing either:
Under section 4946 (a) (1), Daughter and Husband are
disqualified persons with respect to Trust since they
are foundation managers.
Daughter and Husband, as
trustees, will designate the charitable beneficiary of
the unitrust amount.
Only organizations described in
sections 170(c), 2055(a) and 2552(a) may be designated

A-30

-

...

r
I

r
r

r
r
r
r,

r
r
r

as recipients.
Daughter and Husband may designate a
charitable beneficiary of which either or both are
officers, directors, and trustees. Any benefit to them
from such designation will be incidental or tenuous.
See section 53.4941(d)-2(f) (2).
The
designation of a
charitable beneficiary is
distinguishable from the transactions that are normally
considered self-dealing under section 4941.
Such
transactions generally include the provision of personal
services, sale or exchange of property, loans, leases,
or payment of compensation.
There is not inherent
violation of the self-dealing rules under section 4941
in the transactions described above.
The same rationale explains why contributions to a depository account, like
the Community Foundation of Louisville Depository,

retains the right to designate charitable beneficiaries does not cause the assets
to be included in the donor's estate.
10 «

Ordinarily, we would consider a charitable remainder
trust's reformation of its payment provision to be an
act of self-dealing under section 4941(d) (1) (E) of the
Code.
However, under the circumstances presented in
this case, we find no act of self-dealing, since we are
satisfied that the signatory parties to the Trust
Instrument never intended to create a NIMCRUT payment
method trust in the first place.
A key fact in our
consideration is that Trust has been consistently
administered using the Fixed Percentage method. Another
is that the payment provision error was discovered, and
action to correct the error was taken, in a relatively
short period of time after Trust was created. Another
is E's sworn admission of a drafting mistake. Another
is the lack of evidence that A or other income
beneficiaries are reducing their own taxes or using the
benefit of hindsight in making the change to the Fixed
Percentage payment method.

r
,

r

The ruling

stated:

r
r

r

The Service allowed a charitable

was drafted as a net income with makeup trust -- in PLR 9804036.

r

r

CRT RefomatioDs« Drafting Mistake.

remainder trust to be reformed -- it was intended to be a standard unitrust but

r

r

Inc., over which the donor

Consequently, the amendment ab initio of the Trust
Instrument is not an act of self-dealing under section
4941 of the Code.
State law allowed the reformation upon court approval and the beneficiaries
consent.

PLR 9822041 approved changing,
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with court approval,

a net income

charitable remainder unitrust into a straight charitable remainder unitrust.

The

drafting attorney admitted using the wrong form.
A charitable trust may restrict the remainder beneficiary to organizations
described

in section 170 (b) (1) (A),

which excludes

private

foundations.

A

limitation only to section 170(c) organizations allows a private foundation to
be a beneficiary, thus, the donor's income tax deduction is limited even if a
public charity is the named beneficiary.
PLR 9818027 concerned the reformation of a CRT to allow private foundations
as beneficiaries.
original intent.

The IRS allowed the reformation because of the grantor's
The ruling describes the facts as follows:

A states
that
the proposed reformation of
the
irrevocable trust is necessary due to a drafting error
that makes it impossible for her to designate one or
more private foundations, organizations described in
section 170(c) but not in section 170(b) (1) (A) or in
section 509 (a) (3), as remainder beneficiaries as she
originally intended. To establish her original intent,
A has provided a comprehensive explanation of her
overall estate plan, copies of documents evidencing that
estate plan, and letters from her former representative
who drafted the estate documents,
including the
unitrust. The documents indicate that A's estate plan
involved leaving the bulk of her assets to one or more
private foundations controlled by family members. The
letters from her former representative, which were
written contemporaneous with changes to the taxpayer's
will and creation of one of the private foundations
mentioned, contain language confirming that a primary
concern of A was to allow her family to direct the
ultimate charitable disposition of her assets after her
death. The letters clearly focus on the family private
foundations,
which
do
not
qualify
as
section
170 (b) (1) (A) organizations.
The documents submitted
establish that A's original intent in creating Trust was
to be able to designate one or more private foundations
as remainder beneficiaries.
As reformed, the trust
agreement would allow A to designate one or more
substi tute
chari table
organizations
as
remainder
beneficiaries provided that they qualify at the time of
distribution as organizations described in sections
170(c), 2055(a), and 2522(a).
The reformation occurred by court order, with the attorney general as a
party.

-

The ruling states:
After reviewing the facts and relevant documents
submitted, we conclude that the proposed reformation
will not violate sections 1.664-1(a), 1.664-3(a) (3) (ii)
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and 1.664-3(a) (4) or any provisions under section 664
and the remaining regulations thereunder. Because the
proposed reformation is the correction of a drafting
error,
it will not be treated as violating the
requirement that the remainder interest to charity must
be irrevocable.
Accordingly, we conclude that the
proposed reformation of Trust will not adversely affect
Trust's qualification as a charitable remainder unitrust
if it otherwise meets the requirements of section 664
and the applicable regulations.

,..
I

r

r

The ruling also considered the donor's income tax deduction:
However, the proposed reformation of Trust will affect
A's income tax deduction under section 170 allowable for
the charitable contribution made to Trust.
The
deduction is subject to the provisions of section
170(e) (1) (B) (ii) because the exception provided in
section 170(e) (5) for contributions of publicly traded
stock was not in effect when A funded the trust. Under
section 170(e) (1) (B) (ii) the value of the contribution
will be determined using ~he taxpayer's adjusted basis,
rather than the fair market value, in the contributed
stock. In addition, under section 170(b) (1) (D) (i) (1) (I)
the taxpayer's charitable contribution deduction will
now be limited to 20% of the taxpayer's contribution
base. Consequently, this ruling is conditioned on A's
filing a timely amended return for the tax year that
includes D1 reporting a reduced charitable deduction
because of the limitation of the deduction to basis,
rather than fair market value, and because of the 20%
limitation.

r
r

r

r
r

r
r
r
r
r
r
r

r
r

11.

RecisioD of CRT.

PLR 9816030 considered unusual facts.

Husband and

wife, in their seventies, created a charitable remainder trust on July 20, 1993.
The ruling states the couple'S reason for creating the trust:
At that time, X and Y were concerned that their income
was not sufficient to cover their living expenses and
maintain a level of principal consistent with inflation.
having heard of the income benefits of a charitable
remainder annuity trust, X, on July 20, 1993, executed
trust T, a charitable remainder annuity trust requiring
a payout of 6 percent annually for X's life, and at her
death, to Y for his life, assuming that he survived her.
X contributed the sum of $a to T to fund the trust.
Z
was named trustee of T.
At some time after creation of the CRT -- the ruling does not give the date
husband suffered a "catastrophic illness" and the couple needed principal to
meet their needs.

Trustee resisted and litigation ensued.

rescinded the trust ab initio.

The ruling stated:
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In 1997 the Court

The allegations asserted by the plaintiff, X, with
respect to the litigation were disputed on the merits by
the trustee of T. The court held for the plaintiff on
the merits of the case.
By order of court dated
November 25, 1997, a final judgment was entered in favor
of X for rescission of the trust, T, as void ab initio.
In the litigation, wife stated that she did not understand the restriction
of a CRT.

-

The ruling determined:
We find that the court case was litigated on the merits
by both parties and was decided on the merits by the
court.
This is not the situation of a "friendly" law
suit where the trustees consent to the plaintiff's
action.
The court declared the trust void ab initio.
The trust is deemed not to have existed under state law.
Accordingly, we find that no valid trust is deemed to
have existed for federal income tax purposes by virtue
of the fact that the court declared the trust void ab
initio. We rule as follows:

-

1.
The return of the assets possessed by T to X under
the court order will not constitute an act of selfdealing and the Trustee, Z, will not be liable under
section 4941 of the code for such action.
2.
The return of the assets possessed by T to X under
the terms of the court order will not constitute a
taxable expenditure, and Z will not be liable under
section 4945 of the Code for such actions.
3.
The return of the assets possessed by T to X under
the terms of the court order will not subject T to the
tax on termination of the private foundation status
imposed by section 507(c) of the Code and T will not be
liable for the tax imposed by section 507 of the Code.
What of the income tax status of the trust during the year in which it was
treated as a CRT?

If the ordinary income of the trust were less than the annuity

and no capital gains were realized income tax would be a wash -- husband and wife
would have paid tax on all trust income.

More likely,

however,

-

is that the

exempt status of the trust sheltered some otherwise taxable income.
12.

Trust as Creator of CRT.

Suppose an

individual has an inter vivos

special power of appointment over a trust to appoint among his descendants and
charitable organizations.

May that power be exercised to create a CRT for a term

of years with the trust as beneficiary?

The IRS approved such a transaction in

PLR 99821029, which states:
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Section 1.664-3(a) (3) (i) of the Income Tax Regulations
provides that the unitrust amount must be payable to or
for the use of a named person or persons, at least one
of which is not an organization described in section
170(c).
Section 1.664-3 (a) (5) (i) provides that the
period for which the unitrust amount is payable begins
with the first year of the charitable remainder trust
and continues either for the life or lives of a named
individual or individuals or for a term of years not to
exceed 20 years. Only an individual or an organization
described in section 170(c) may receive an amount for
the life of an individual.

"..
i

r
r
r
r

Section 7701(a) (1) defines the term "person" to include
an individual, trust, estate, association, company,
corporation, and partnership.
Qualification of Trust as Permissible Grantor for the
CRUT

r

There is nothing in section 664 or the applicable
regulations that prohibits a trust from being a
permissible donor to an otherwise qualified charitable
remainder
unitrust.
Therefore,
the
Trust
is
a
permissible donor for the CRUT.

r

Trust as a Permissible Recipient of Unitrust Amount
In the present situation, the unitrust amount from the
CRUT is payable to Trust for a term of 20 years.
Because the term of the CRUT does not exceed 20 years,
the recipient of the unitrust amount may be any person
or persons, including a trust, if at least one such
person is not a charitable organization.
Therefore,
Trust is a permissible recipient of the unitrust amount
from the CRUT.

r

r
r
r

r
r
r

r
r

The ruling does not address the income tax deduction under section 170, but
presumably it was not available.
13.

xncome Tax Consequences of Distributions fram CRT.

1998-13 IRB 1,

Notice 98-20,

sets forth the IRS ordering provisions for distributions from

CRTs:
Section
664 (b)
contains
the
ordering
rule
for
determining the character of a CRT distribution in the
hands of the recipient. The character of a CRT's income
is determined at the time the income is realized by the
trust.
Under section 664(bl, the following ordering
rule applies for determining the character of a
distribution in the hands of the recipient:
(1) first,
as ordinary income to the extent of the trust's ordinary
income
for
the
trust's
taxable
year
and
its
undistributed ordinary income for prior years,
(2)
second, as capital gain to the extent of the trust's
capital gain for the trust's taxable year and its
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undistributed capital gain for prior years, (3) third,
as other income to the extent of the trust's other
income
for
the
trust's
taxable
year
and
its
undistributed other income for prior years, and (4)
fourth, as a distribution of trust corpus.
The underlying policy in the ordering rule of section
664(b) and the existing regulations thereunder is that
a CRT distribution is deemed to consist first of income
that is subject to the highest federal income tax rate
in effect at the time of the distribution and then of
income that is subject to progressively lower (or no)
federal income tax rates in effect at the time of
distribution. The same policy applies in the regulations
under section 664 when different income tax rates apply
to different groups of income within a category of the
items described in section 664(b), such as short-term
and long-term capital gains. Therefore, income from a
group that is subject to a higher federal income tax
rate is deemed distributed before other income from a
group, within the same category, that is subject to a
lower federal income tax rate.
The following example illustrates how this principle
applies to capital gain distributions after TRA 1997.
Assume
for
the
1998
taxable year,
a
CRT has
undistributed long-term capital gain in each of the
three groups of long-term capital gain, i.e., the 28percent group, the 25-percent group, and the 20-percent
group, and also has undistributed short-term capital
gain.
To the extent capital gains are deemed
distributed for the 1998 taxable year, the short-term
capital gain is deemed distributed prior to any
long-term capital gain. The long-term capital gain is
deemed distributed in the following order: (1) the gain
in the 28-percent group is deemed distributed prior to
any other long-term capital gain; (2) the gain in the
25-percent group is deemed distributed prior to any gain
in the 20-percent group; and (3) the gain in the
20-percent group is deemed distributed last of any
long-term capital gain.

* * *
Pre-1997 long-term capital gains were characterized by
the CRT based on the definitions of short-term and
long-term capital gains applicable at the time the CRT
sold a capital asset. CRTs have never been required to
segregate these gains based upon the tax rate or holding
period in effect at the time the gains were realized by
the CRT. Thus, the undistributed pre-1997 long-term
capital gains reflect gains realized when various tax
rates and holding periods were in effect. Treasury will
exercise its regulatory authority to treat undistributed
CRT pre-1997 long-term capital gains as falling within
the 20-percent group.

* * *
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Long-term capital gains properly taken into account from
January 1, 1997, through May 6, 1997, are covered by the
rules in section 1 (h) regarding pre-effective date
gains.
Under section l(h), for the taxable year that
includes May 7, 1997, gains and losses properly taken
into account by the CRT for the portion of the taxable
year before May 7, 1997, must be taken into account in
determining long-term capital gain in the 28-percent
group.
Because the taxable year for CRTs is the
calendar year, long-term capital gains properly taken
into account by a CRT from January 1, 1997, through May
6, 1997, are treated as long-term capital gains in the
28-percent group.

r
r

,.
t

14.

Partial Termination of CRT.

PLR 9817010 discusses a method by which

the partial termination of a CRT may be accomplished.

r

have a

CRT segregate certain amounts

taxpayer's

interest

to

into a

The taxpayer intends to

new trust and then

the charitable remainderman.

The

to assign

trust would then

terminate because of an identity of interests with the assets of the new trust
distributed to charity.

r
r

15.

XRA

PLR 9818009 confirms that

Proceeds Paid to a Private Foundation.

IRA and qualified plan benefits may be paid to a private foundation and the
estate receive an estate tax charitable deduction.

The ruling also holds that

I

the estate will not recognize income from the benefits.

The ruling states that

being considered separately are (1) whether the Foundation will recognize income

r
r

t

r

upon receipt of the benefits and (2) whether the Foundation will be subject to
the section 4940(a) excise tax on net investment income.
16.

Substitution

of

Supported

Oraanizations.

A

section

509(a) (3)

organization -- known as a supporting organization -- obtains public charity
status, rather than being classified as a private foundation, by supporting one
or more independent charities.

A common example would be a perpetual charitable

trust which distributes its income to one or more charitable organizations.
PLR 9739040

r

the Service determined that

switching the

In

supported charitable

organizations in a charitable trust pursuant to a court order would not affect
the status of the trust as a supporting organization.
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17.

Charitable Hatch.

The Virginia Supreme Court applied basic contract

law to a charitable pledge and determined it was not binding on the pledge's
estate in Virginia School of the Arts. Inc. y. Eichelbaum, 493 S.E.2d 510 (Va.
1997).

The facts were:

-

The transaction in question took place in October 1993.
At that time, the school was involved in soliciting
prospective donors for the 1993-94 annual fund for the
fiscal year July 1, 1993 to June 30, 1994. Because Mrs.
Eichelbaum had been "a major donor to the school," the
school's administrators decided to ask her to make a
"challenge gift" in order to encourage other persons to
contribute to the fund drive.
Helen Burnette Harvey, who managed the school's internal
operations, visited Mrs. Eichelbaum armed with fundraising "materials" and a "request letter" dated October
5, 1993. The letter provided:
"A gift of $100,000 as
a challenge grant to the 1993-94 Annual Fund would
ensure the School's place in this community as both a
cuI tural and economic asset."
The letter further
provided:
"With your permission we would like to
promote your gift to encourage renewing and new donors
to invest
. We must raise $200,000 during this
year's Annual Fund period; we believe a matching grant
would make it possible for us to achieve this goal."
Following the visit, Mrs. Eichelbaum consulted her
financial adviser and signed a statement dated October
8, 1993 affixed to the end of the letter in which she
"agree[d] to commit the sum of $100,000.
. to The
Virginia school of the Arts."
The letter did not mention periodic payments of the
"matching grant" or how the pledge would be paid, nor
were those subjects discussed with Mrs. Eichelbaum or
her
financial
adviser
by any
of
the
school's
representatives.
On October 18, 1993, Mrs. Harvey on behalf of the school
wrote Mrs. Eichelbaum a letter of appreciation, stating
her "recent generous gift
in the form of a
$100,000 matching grant is exactly what we needed to
ensure the success of the '93-'94 Annual Fund drive."
On December 3, 1993, the school issued a press release
announcing an anonymous "challenge gift" of $100,000,
which "will encourage other individuals, business and
industry sources, and private foundations in the
community and beyond to contribute to the school's
operations and programs." The press statement said the
school "must match this challenge gift by the end of
this fiscal year."
The school then attempted to raise funds to match the
pledge.
In letters to prospects, the school called
attention to the $100,000 challenge gift" and stated it
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was "striving to meet this generous offering."
In
letters of appreciation to donors, the school stated
that the particular gift "brings us closer to meeting
our responsibility in relation to the $100,000 challenge
grant that we received from a loyal supporter."

I

,..
I

Mrs. Eichelbaum died testate on January 14, 1994. The
school had not asked her to make any payments on the
pledge and she had made none.
Additionally, by that
date, the school had not raised $100,000 to equal the
decedent's matching grant.
By the end of the 1993-94
fiscal year, the school had raised only $67,592.71.
The Court held;
A charitable subscription is governed by the law of
contracts and must be supported by an offer, an
acceptance, and consideration. Galt y. Swain, 50 Va. (9
Gratt.) 633, 635 (1853). And "a subscription, like any
other promise or offer, may be conditional.
If
particular terms are prescribed,
these terms in
themselves are conditions which must be complied with
before the subscription is binding." Id.

r
r
I

In the present case, there was valuable consideration to
support a binding contract between the decedent and the
school.
The decedent's promise of a "matching" or
"challenge" grant was relied on by school officials, who
expended effort to solicit matching funds.

r
r

But the contract as expressed in the letter of October
5, 1993, and evidenced by the school's subsequent
conduct and statements, clearly and unambiguously
included a condition, that is, the school was obligated
to raise $100,000 during the 1993-94 fiscal year ending
June 30, 1994. This the school failed to do.

r
r

The October 5 "request letter" tied the request for a
"challenge grant" specifically to the "1993-94 Annual
Fund. "
The evidence plainly showed that the school
operated on a fiscal year basis of July 1, 1993 to June
30, 1994, and that school officials considered the
school had the "responsibility" to match the pledge
during that period.
The fact that the school raised
$212,000 by June 1995 did not satisfy the condition.

r

r
r

Therefore, because the school failed to fulfill the
condition, the contract is unenforceable, and the pledge
is not binding on the decedent's estate.
Gaming Publication for Tax-Exampt Organizations.

18.

Publication 3079,

r

Gaming Publication for Tax-Exempt Organizations, is now available for tax-exempt

r

regarding

r
,

r

organizations conducting gaming.
tax

requirements

exemption,

(income tax,

The

unrelated

publicatio~

business

withholding tax,
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provides general information

tax,

excise,

record

keeping,

filing

and employment tax),

and

provides examples of the type of records that should be maintained by tax-exempt
organizations conducting bingo,

pull-tabs,

and other games of chance.

The

publication also provides information regarding related publications that contain
additional information on the topics discussed in the publication.
Publication 3079 may be obtained by calling 1-800-TAX-FORM (1-800-8293676) .
19.

For-Profit JOint Yentures with Charitable Organization.

98-15,

1998-12 IRB 6,

profit

organizations

Rev. Rul.

sets forth IRS guidance on joint ventures between forand section 501 (c) (3)

hospitals.

The Rul ing mus t

-

be

considered in planning any significant joint venture arrangements.
20.

supporting Organizations.

In TAM 9730002 the National Office refused

to allow a charitable trust to qualify as a supporting organization under section
509.

Thus the trust remained a private foundation.
The ruling discussed the Service's position:
1.
The first alternative integral part test under
section 1.509(a)-4(i) (3) (ii) of the regulations is met
if X engages in activities to perform the functions of
or to carry out the purposes of the City's Science
Center, and, but for X's involvement, such activities
would normally be engaged in by the City itself. Under
the circumstances, X' s mere investing of funds and
granting of funds to the City does not perform the
City's functions or carry out its purposes, even though
such activity may benefit the City.
2.
The
second alternative
integral
part
test
described in section 1.509(a)-4(i) (3) (iii)
of the
regulations is met if
(1)
X makes payments of
substantially all of its "income" to or for the use of
the City's Science Center, and (2) the amount of the
support is sufficient to assure the City's attentiveness
to X's operations. X provides sufficient support to the
Science Center to assure the City's attentiveness to X's
operations. The main issue is whether X's "income" for
such purposes includes its net short-term capital gains.

-

The term "income" (or "annual net income") in section
1.509(a)-4(i) (3) (iii) of the regulations, like the term
"substantially all," is not further defined in that
section of the regulations, but is defined in section
4942 of the Code and the regulations thereunder. For the
reasons expressed in Rev. Rul. 76-208,
the term
"adjusted net income" under section 4942(f) (1) of the
Code should be used as the definition of "income" for
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purposes of section 1.509(a)- 4(i) (3) (iii) (a) of the
regulations.
"Adjusted net income"
under section
4942(f) (1) includes net short-term capital gain.

,.
t

t

Therefore,
under the facts described, X did not
distribute substantially all of its "income" during 1991
through
1993.
We
caution,
however,
that
the
"substantially all" test is not an inflexible test that
allows for no accumulation of income beyond the taxable
year at issue. For example, an organization may meet the
test if it accumulates its income for a limited period
at the request of the publicly supported organization.

r
r

#

21.

Charitable Trust Created By Conservator.

charitable income trust.

r
I

,.
j

r
r
I

r

r
r
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r
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PLR 9742006 dealt with a

The facts of the trust's creation were:

Conservator is a bank that was appointed by court order
as conservator of the estate of Grantor.
Conservator
assists Grantor in planning and carrying out her
financial affairs, including her charitable objectives.
Grantor desires to make additional charitable gifts and
pledges. Accordingly, Conservator proposes to create an
irrevocable trust (Trust).
Under the terms of the trust agreement, Trustee must
distribute all of the annual net income to one or more
charitable beneficiaries designated by Conservator
within 60 days following the end of each taxable year.
The
designated charitable
beneficiaries
must
be
organizations described in sections 170(c), 2055(a), and
2522 (a) (qualified
charitable
organizations).
If
Conservator fails to designate one or more qualified
charitable organizations within the specified time,
Trustee is directed to distribute the trust income to
such qualified charitable organizations as Trustee
selects.
Trust will terminate upon the death of Grantor.
Upon
terrninat~on of Trust, Trustee will make final payment of
income to designated charitable income beneficiaries,
and the trust property will then be distributed free of
trust.
Grantor has retained a testamentary power to
appoint the trust corpus to and among the charitable and
noncharitable
beneficiaries
listed
in
the
trust
agreement.
If Grantor
fails
to exercise this
testamentary power of appointment, trust property will
be distributed to the noncharitable beneficiaries in the
amount set forth in the trust agreement. However, the
amounts distributed to these noncharitable beneficiaries
will
be
reduced
by
amounts
received
by
such
beneficiaries under the last will and testament of
Grantor. Any balance of the trust property will then be
distributed to the named charitable beneficiaries in the
percentages indicated in the trust agreement.
The Service concluded that the income interest was an incomplete gift:
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Rev. Rul. 77-275 concludes that the gift of the income
interest was incomplete upon creation of the trust under
section 25.2511-2(c). The termination of the settlor's
power to designate income beneficiaries will constitute
a completed gift of the income interest in the trust for
the period covered by the termination. Under the terms
of the trust agreement, the gift of the right to trust
income for any year will always occur before the income
for that year is earned.
However, no charitable
deduction is allowable for the present value of the
future income because the income interest in the trust
is not in the form of a guaranteed annuity or fixed
percentage of the fair market value of the property as
required by section 2522(c) (2) (B).
Rev. Rul. 77-275 states different conclusions if the
trust had provided for the settlor's designation to be
made after the end of the year in which the income was
earned. In that situation, the gift of the income would
be complete by reason of such designation, or by the
lapse of the right to designate, after the income was
earned by the trust. The completed gift would be a gift
of money, separate from the trust property itself.
Thus, in those circumstances a charitable deduction
would be allowable under section 2522 for the amount of
income
transferred
to
qualified
charitable
organizations.
In the present situation, Conservator, acting on behalf
of Grantor, has retained the power to designate the
charitable organizations to receive the trust income.
In addition, Grantor has retained the testamentary power
to appoint the trust remainder.
Thus, Grantor has
retained dominion and control over the trust assets and
pursuant to section 25.2511-2(c) has made no completed
gift upon funding Trust.
Conservator's power to designate the recipient of the
trust income is exercisable during the 60-day period
following the close of the taxable year in which the
income is earned by Trust. A completed gift occurs when
Conservator designates the charitable organization to
receive the trust income during that period.
If
Conservator makes no designation in a particular year,
the completed gift occurs upon the lapse of the power at
the end of the 60-day period. Pursuant to Rev. Rul. 77275, the completed gift is a gift of money that is
separate from the trust property itself. Therefore, a
charitable deduction is allowable under section 2522 for
the amounts of trust income that are paid to qualified
charitable organizations.
Further, the Grantor would not be taxed on the income of the trust, but
would be the grantor with respect to the corpus portion:
Our examination of the trust agreement reveals none of
the circumstances that would cause administrative
controls to be considered exercisable primarily for the
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benefit of Grantor under section 675.
Thus, the
circumstances attendant on the operation of Trust will
determined [sic] whether Grantor will be treated as the
owner of any portion of Trust under section 675. This
is a question of fact, the determination of which must
be made by the Office of the District Director with
which the parties file their tax returns.

* * *
Under the terms of the trust agreement, Conservator,
acting on behalf of Grantor, has the power, during
Grantor's
lifetime,
to
appoint
the
charitable
beneficiaries of the net trust income.
Pursuant to
section 674(b) (4), however, Grantor will not be treated
as the owner of the net trust income. Grantor also has
a testamentary power of appointment over the remainder.
Under local law, capi tal gains are added to corpus.
Pursuant to section 1.674(b)-1(b) (3), Grantor will be
treated as the owner of the portion of Trust that
includes income allocable to corpus.
Finally, the trust would not be a private foundation under section 4947:
Section 4947(a) (1) provides that for purposes of section
507-509 (other than section 508(a), (b), and (c)) and
for purposes of this chapter, a trust which is not
exempt from taxation under section 501(a), all of the
unexpired interests in which are devoted to one or more
of the purposes described in section 170(c) (2) (B), and
for which a deduction was allowed under section 170,
. . 652(c), 2055 . . . , or 2522 . . . shall be treated
as an organization described in section 501(c) (3).
Section 4947 (a) (2) provides that in case of a trust
which is not exempt from tax under section 501(a), not
all of the unexpired interests in which are devoted to
one or more of the purposes described in section
170(c) (2) (B), and which have amounts in trust for which
a deduction was allowed under sections 170, 545(b) (2),
556 (b) (2), 642 (c), 2055, 2106 (a) (2), or 2522, section
507 (relating to termination of private foundation
status),
section
508(e) (relating
to
governing
instruments) to the extent applicable to a trust
described in this paragraph, section 4941 (relating to
taxes on self-dealing), section 4943 (relating to taxes
on excess business holdings) except as provided in
subsection (b) (3), section 4944 (relating to investments
which jeopardize charitable purpose) except as provided
in subsection (b) (3), and section 4945 (relating to
taxes on taxable expenditure) shall apply as if such
trust were a private foundation.
For
purposes
of
section
4947 (a) (1) ,
Trust
has
noncharitable remainder beneficiaries whose interests
will remain unexpired until the termination of Trust.
Thus, all of its unexpired interests are not devoted to
one or more of the purposes in section 170(c) (2) (3).
Therefore, Trust is not a non-exempt charitable trust
within the meaning of section 4947(a) (1).
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For purposes of section 4947(a)(2), the amounts for
which a deduction will be allowed are not "amounts in
trust." Therefore, Trust is not a split interest trust
within the meaning of section 4947(a) (2).
The trust is,

of course,

nQ!:. tax-exempt

under section 501 (a)

because

noncharitable remainder beneficiaries were potentially present.
22.

Xndete~inate

Bequest.

In Estate of Lockett Yo Commissioner,

75

T.C.M. 1731 (1997), the decedent directed the trustee of her revocable trust to
set aside her residence as a historical site.

,

,

There was no requirement that the

residence be distributed to a charitable organization thus no deduction was
allowed under section 205.

Even though the trustees did transfer the residence,

the possibility that the residence would not be transferred to a charitable
organization was not so remote as to be negligible.
23.

Jeopardizina Xnyestm8nts.

Private Foundations Handbook.

The IRS has revised Chapter 16 of the

The Handbook lists these as investments deserving

close scrutiny:

1

.,

16.2.3 (04/30/98)
Close Scrutiny of Certain Investments
(1) No category of investments is to be treated as a per
se violation of IRe 4944. Thus, there are no specific
investments
that
are
treated
as
jeopardizing
investments. There are, however, examples of types or
methods of investments which require close scrutiny to
determine whether foundation managers have met the
requisite standard of ordinary business care and
prudence. See Reg. 53.4944-1(a) (2) (i).

,
1

(2) Examples of types or methods of transactions in the
regulations which require close scrutiny are:
o Trading in securities on margin
o Trading in commodity futures
o Investments in working interests in oil and gas wells
o Purchase of puts, calls, and straddles
o Purchase of warrants
o Selling short
(3) Other recent investment
close scrutiny are:
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strategies

that

deserve
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o Investment in junk bonds
o Risk arbitrage
o Hedge funds
o Derivatives
o Distressed real estate
o International equities in third world countries

,r

(4) Guarantees or collateralizations are a type of a
lending of money or an extension of credit and, thus,
are forms of investment activity. Such investments also
deserve close scrutiny.
See Janpol y.
Commissioner,
101 T.C. 518 (1993).

,..
r

24.

CRT Purchase of Deferred Annuities.

purchase deferred annuities.
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TAM 9825001 allowed a CRT to

The facts were:

x is a charitable remainder unitrust which was intended
to qualify under section 664 of the Internal Revenue
Code.
X was created by A by a trust instrument dated
June 25, 1990. The trust instrument provides that the
Trustee shall pay to A, and upon A's death, to A's wife,
a unitrust amount equal to the lesser of (1) the trust
income for the year or (2) eight percent of the
aggregate fair market value of the trust assets for the
year.
The Trust instrument includes a make-up
provisions so that for any year that the unitrust
payment is less than eight percent, the shortfall for
prior years may be made-up in subsequent years when
trust income exceeds eight percent. B is the trustee of
X and is also the nephew of A.
Upon the death of the survivor of A or A's wife, the
trust shall terminate and the balance of trust assets
are to be distributed to designated charities.
In December, 1991, X entered into a contract to purchase
two deferred annuity contracts from R, a commercial life
insurance company. In one policy A is named the
annuitant and in the other policy A's wife is named the
annuitant.
In other respects the two policies are
identical.
X is the owner of the policy and is
beneficiary of the policies should either annuitant fail
to reach the maturity date of the policies which is age
80. As a result of the endorsement of the two policies
in 1997, the Trust, X, became the annuitant. Additional
information relating to the policies is discussed
hereafter in greater detail.
The Service determined that the purchase was not self-dealing:
In analyzing an issue of self-dealing under section
4941(d) (1) (E) of the Code, the Service has focused on
three elements. Is a property right created? Is there

r
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a transfer of such property right to a disqualified
person? Does the disqualified person receive a benefit
from the receipt of such property right?
It is the view of the Service that a valid contract
right constitutes an enforceable property interest.
Michtom y. United States, 573 F.2d 58, 63 (Ct. Cl.,
1978).
Thus, the donor's rights under the annuity
contract constitute a property interest.
It has been the Service view that the prohibition
against transferring or using foundation assets to
disqualified persons was intended to be extremely broad.
The range of transactions described under 4941(d) (1) (E)
would also include transactions described under sections
4941 (d) (1) (A) , (B) , (C) , (D), or (F).
Here, the
property interest (the annuity right in the contract)
was transferred to the donor and the donor's wife who
are disqualified persons under section 4946 of the Code.
The final element for consideration is whether the
receipt of the right to the annuity under the contract
by the Donor or his wife confers a benefit on the Donor.
Certainly there is a potential benefit to the donor. If
the donor and his wife reach age 80 the contract will be
annuitized and the donor and his wife have the potential
to receive all the payments to be made under the
contract.
This would leave the charitable remainder
interest with nothing.
However, the annuity rights in the contracts are
contingent on several factors. The donor and his wife
must survive to age 80 to receive annuity payments.
Further, assuming that X is the owner of the policy, the
right of the named annuitants can be defeated by the
policy owner's rights to a partial withdrawal from the
policy or the surrender of the policy in exchange for
the cash value of the policy. Additionally, the owner
may defeat the benefit to the named annuitants by
changing the maturity date; the date when the annuity
payments are to begin.
The partial withdrawals and
surrender of the policy are subject to some restrictions
and penalties for early surrender.
A change of the
maturity date does require written notice to the
company.
Nevertheless, the owner of the policy does
have the power to preempt the annuity by taking such
actions.
The Service has found an act of self-dealing under
section 4941(d) (1) (E) only in the case where the
disqualified person has received a current benefit.
In
Rev. Rul. 74-600, 1974-2 C.B. 385, the Service held that
self-dealing occurred under section 4941(d) (1) (E) when
paintings owned by a private foundation were allowed to
be placed in the residence of a disqualified person. In
Rev. Rul. 77- 160, 1977-1 C.B. 351, the Service held
that the dues paid to a church on behalf of a
disqualified person in order to allow such person to
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retain his membership
self-dealing.

in

the

church

was

an

act

In summary, it is our position that the donor receives
no present value from the contract right to receive
annuity payments.
We do not believe that the annuity
right could be currently assigned by the donor and his
wife to a third party for any significant value. The
donor and his wife have recently assigned their interest
in the policy as named annuitants to X.
Thus, the
problem is resolved for future years.
The Service also determined that the failure of the trustee to withdraw
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funds from an annuity is self-dealing:
We have examined the transaction with the intention of
ascertaining whether B, acting in concert with A on an
ongoing basis, manipulated the assets of X for the
personal benefit of A, by furthering his income,
retirement and tax planning goals. There was a concern
that the entire transaction taken as a whole; the
purchase of a deferred annuity, the failure to make
withdrawals from the annuity policies, and the intention
to subsequently make unitrust payments to A under the
"make-up" provision of the Trust; could be construed as
an act of self-dealing under section 4941(d) (1) (E) of
the Code by virtue of the authority provided by section
53.4941(d)-2(f) (1) of the Regulations.
In as much as A, a disqualified person, is entitled to
receive the income interest from the trust, it is
difficult to argue that the disqualified person receives
an inappropriate benefit by deferring the income
interest, particularly where such deferral is permitted
under section 664 of the Code. The underlying problem
is that the income beneficiary interest is in itself a
use for the benefit of the disqualified person of the
assets of the trust.
Inherently, any investment
decision regarding the trust assets that increases or
decreases the amount of payout of this income interest
is a use for the benefit of the disqualified person
(assuming the disqualified person does not object).
Section 4947(a) (2) (A) provides that section 4941 will
not apply to any amounts payable under the terms of the
trust to the income beneficiary. The amounts of income
deferred by the investment decision in this case were
payable to the income beneficiary under the terms of
Trust X.
Accordingly, these uses must be permitted
under the income exception of section 4947 (a) (2) (A)
unless the disqualified person controls the investment
decision and uses this control to unreasonably affect
the charitable remainder beneficiary's interest.
While section 53.4941(d)-1(a)
of the regulations
provides that it is immaterial whether the transaction
results in a benefit or a detriment to the private
foundation, the regulation is incompatible with section
4947(a) (2) (A)
because,
as
discussed
above,
any
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investment decision regarding trust assets that results
in an increase or decrease in the unitrust amount will
inescapably constitute an attempted use for the benefit
of the disqualified person.
Therefore, rather than
focusing on whether the deferral of income is a use of
trust assets, the relevant question is whether the
deferral of income is a permitted use. Since charitable
remainder trusts by their intrinsic nature provide for
a continuous use by the disqualified person of the
entire trust corpus, we conclude that the presence of an
unreasonable affect on the charitable remainder interest
distinguishes a permissible use of trust assets from an
impermissible use.
In addition to failing to show harm to the charitable
remainder interest, the facts of this case do not
clearly show control by the disqualified person.
X
represented that an independent attorney/trustee signed
the contract to purchase the deferred annuity policies.
Moreover, even if we conclude that B, as trustee,
purchased the deferred annuity policies, the facts are
insufficient to demonstrate that A usurped control from
the trustee or that he could compel or influence the
trustee to purchase the deferred annuity policies in
question.
Instead, the trustee merely took into
consideration the particular financial needs of A before
reinvesting the proceeds from the sale of the trust
assets.

...

-

The final issue of importance was whether the funds from the annuity could
be classified as income:
The applicable state law, the Uniform Principal and
Income Act of Tennessee, appears ambiguous on whether a
trust's right to receive money is income to the trust,
whether characterized as principal or income.
The
implication from the sections that define income and
principal, however, is that a trust does not realize
either until the trust actually receives possession of
money or other property.
See Tenn. Code Ann. section
35-6-102 and section 35-6-104 (1991). Therefore, the
Trust's right to receive either the cash value or the
surrender value of the contracts does not create trust
accounting income under section 643(b) of the Code.
If the trustee were not independent not only could self-dealing occur but

J

the trust would likely be a grantor trust not a charitable remainder trust
because of the right of the trustee to allocate between income and principal in
a net.income with make-up unitrust.
25.

Charitable Lead Trust as Grantor Trust.

Typically, charitable lead

trusts are not grantor trusts because such status creates an income tax deduction
upon funding but causes the trust income to be taxable to the grantor, with no
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offsetting deduction, thereafter.

reviewing if a grantor lead trust is desirable.
26.

Protection From Creditors.

The Bankruptcy Code has been amended to

protect from creditors contributions not in excess of 15% of the debtor's gross
income for the year of the contribution.
protected if

Contributions in excess of 15% may be

such were consistent with the practices

contribution must

be

of

cash or

financial

organization described in sections 170{C) (1)
foundations.
C.

instruments
or

(2),

of

the debtor.

and must
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to

an

which includes private

The contributions may continue while the debtor is in bankruptcy.

welch).

General Discussion (Thanks to Sharon A. Mattinglv, Ogden Newell &
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 made changes to existing IRAs and also

creates two new types of IRAs -- the Roth IRA and the Education IRA.

r

be

The

SECTION 408 -- IRAS
1.

r

PLR 9810019 is a contrary example and worth

The changes

to the traditional IRA and the highlights of the new ones include:
Traditional :IRAs

•

If you are an active participant in an employer-sponsored retirement
plan, whether or not you can make a deductible IRA contribution
depends upon your adjusted gross income ("AGI").
If your AGI is
below the phase out range, you will get a full deduction; if your
AGI is above the phase out range, you are not entitled to any
deduction.
Under prior law, the $2,000 IRA deduction limit was
phased out between $40,000 and $50,000 of AGI for married taxpayers
filing jointly and between $25,000 and $35,000 of AGI for single
taxpayers. The phase out limits have now been increased as follows:

Tax Years
Beginning:

Single Taxpayers

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007 and thereafter

$30,000
$31,000
$32,000
$33,000
$34,000
$40,000
$45,000
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000

•

to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to

$40,000
$41,000
$42,000
$43,000
$44,000
$50,000
$55,000
$60,000
$60,000
$60,000

Married Taxpayers
Filing Jointly
$50,000
$51,000
$52,000
$53,000
$54,000
$60,000
$65,000
$70,000
$75,000
$80,000

to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to

$60,000
$61,000
$62,000
$63,000
$64,000
$70,000
$75,000
$80,000
$85,000
$100,000

You will no longer be considered an active participant in an
employer-sponsored plan merely because your spouse is an active
participant in such a plan.
However, if your spouse is an active
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plan participant, the deductibility of your $2,000 IRA contribution
will be phased out if you have AGI between $150,000 and $160,000.

1

.,

•

The 10-percent tax on early withdrawals will not apply to IRA
distributions used to pay qualified educational expenses for the IRA
owner, the owner's spouse, or any child or grandchild of the owner
or the owner's spouse. Qualified higher education expenses include
tuition, fees, books, supplies, and equipment for post-secondary
education.

,

•

The 10-percent early withdrawal tax does not apply to a distribution
for "first-time home buyer expenses."
You will now be allowed to
withdraw $10,000 during your lifetime which will not be subject to
the penalty, but will still be subject to income taxes.
The money
must be used within 120 days to buy, build, or re-build a "first"
home that is a principal residence of the IRA holder, the holder's
spouse, or the child, grandchild, or ancestor of the holder or the
holder's spouse.
To be considered a "first-time home buyer," you
(and your spouse, if married) must not have had an ownership
interest in a principal residence during the two-year period ending
on the date the new home is acquired.

.,
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The Taxpayer Relief Act established a new type of "backloaded" IRA.

The

contribution itself will not be deductible, but the earnings will accumulate taxfree and, if the distributions meet certain requirements, the earnings will not
be taxed upon distribution.

The laws governing Roth IRAs provide that:

The maximum yearly contribution to a Roth IRA is phased out for single
taxpayers with AGI between $95,000 and $110,000 and for joint filers with
AGI between $150,000 and $160,000.
You can make contributions to a Roth IRA after age 70~, and there is no
required minimum distribution from the IRA after reaching age 70~.
Qualified distributions are not included in your gross income and are not
subject to the additional 10-percent early withdrawal penalty.
To be a
"qualified distribution," the contributions must have been held for a
five-year period Am2 the distribution meet one of the following four
requirements:
•
made on or after the date you reach age 59~;
•
made to your beneficiary after your death;
•
made to you because you are disabled; or
•
made to you to pay for "qualified first-time homebuyer expenses."
You may convert a regular IRA to a Roth IRA if your AGI for the tax year
does not exceed $100,000 and you are not married filing separate returns.
If the conversion is made prior to January 1, 1999, the amount that would
have been included in gross income if you had taken a distribution can be
included in gross income over a four-year period.
After that date, the
portion of the rollover from the ordinary IRA which would have been
included in gross income if you had taken a distribution will be included
in your income the year of the rollover.

.,
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If

you

have

an

ordinary

IRA,

should you

roll

it

into

a

Roth

IRA?

,...

Preliminary analysis by consultants in the field indicates that conversion may

l

not be a good idea if you will be dropping from a high tax bracket to a lower tax

r

bracket when you retire.

Also, if you do not have other funds to pay the income

taxes on conversion and must pay those out of the IRA monies, it may take you
more years

to earn that

tax money back than any benefit you

gain in the

conversion.

r

r
r
r

Education IRAs
Another new type of IRA may
education expenses.

per year to an education individual retirement account.

r

r
r
r
r
r

If you

The contribution itself

is not deductible, but the earnings on the contributions will be distributed taxfree as long as they are used to pay the beneficiary's post-secondary education
expenses.

Some features of the education IRA are:

The contribution to an education IRA is limited if your modified AGI
exceeds $150,000 for joint filers and $95,000 for single filers.
If your
modified AGI is at or above $160,000 (joint) or $110,000 (single), you
cannot make contributions to an education IRA on behalf of any individual.

r
r

The education IRA will be available January 1, 1998.

fall within the AGI limits, you can contribute up to $500 per beneficiary (child)

r

r

help low and middle-income taxpayers save for

Contributions must be made in cash and must be made before the beneficiary
reaches age 18.

•

The IRA funds must be distributed by the time the beneficiary reaches age
30.
Any
balance remaining at that time must be distributed to the
beneficiary and the portion attributable to earnings will be includable in
the beneficiary's gross income.

•

Education IRAs can be rolled over to another family member of the
beneficiary.
"Family member" is defined to include the beneficiary's
child, brother, sister, nephew, niece, certain in-laws, and the spouses of
those relatives.
Distributions can be taken tax-free as long as the distributions are for
the payment of "qualified higher education expenses."
"Qualified higher
education expenses" are defined as tuition, fees, books, supplies, and
equipment required for the enrollment or attendance of a designated
beneficiary at an eligible education institution. Expenses for room and
board will be considered higher education costs only if the beneficiary is
enrolled in a degree or certificate program on at least a half-time basis.
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The Taxpayer Relief Act also contained provisions for new tax credits which
can be elected by certain individuals
credits are referred to as the
learning credit."

If a

for college tuition expenses.

"HOPE scholarship credit"

These

and the

"lifetime

taxpayer claims either of these credits,

then the

exclusion for the education IRA is not available.

Also,

J

you cannot make a

J
J

contribution to an education IRA on behalf of a beneficiary during any tax year
in which contributions are made to a qualified state tuition program by anyone

j

on behalf of the same beneficiary.
In the November, 1996 issue of the Ogden Newell & Welch Client Update, we

J

reported to you the changes to retirement plans as a result of the Small Business
Job Protection Act passed in August, 1996.

Once again, Congress has made changes

in the laws relating to retirement plans.

What should you know? A brief summary

of the major pension-related provisions of The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 is set
out below.

Whether

you are the sponsor of a retirement plan or a participant

in a retirement plan, some of these changes will apply to you.
2.

Revocable Trust a, Designated Beneficiary.

If a participant in a

retirement plan or the owner of an IRA dies without providing for a "designated
beneficiary," the remaining assets of the plan or IRA must be paid out within 5
years thus losing the benefit of tax-free investment.

In many instances it is

desirable to name a trust as designated beneficiary.

J
j

.J
.J
j

Proposed regulations under section 401 issued in 1987 required,
others,

J

among

that a trust must be irrevocable on the earlier of the participant's

.J

death or required beginning date (normally April 1 of the year after the year in
which the participant became

70~).

In other words,

a named trust had to be

irrevocable at the time the participant began receiving distributions.

.J

This

requirement was widely criticized because, for example, there was no necessity

J

to make the beneficiary designation irrevocable, and testamentary trusts cannot

.J

be irrevcoable until the testator's death.
The Service has now amended the proposed regulations, Reg- 209463-82.
rationale for the change is described as follows:
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Section 401(a) (9) (A) provides that, in order for a plan
to be qualified under section 401(a), distributions of
each employee's interest in the plan must commence no
later than the "required beginning date" for the
employee and must be distributed over a period not to
exceed the joint lives or joint life expectancy of the
employee and the employee's designated beneficiary.
Section 401(a) (9) (B) provides that if distribution does
not commence prior to death in accordance with section
401(a) (9) (A), distributions of the employee's interest
must be made within 5 years of the employee's death, or,
generally, commence within one year of the employee's
death and be made over the life or life expectancy of
the designated beneficiary.
Section 401(a) (9) (E) defines the term "designated
beneficiary"
as
an
individual
designated
as
a
beneficiary by the employee.
The Existing Proposed
Regulations provide that, for purposes of section
401(a) (9),
only
individuals
may
be
designated
beneficiaries. A beneficiary who is not an individual,
such as the employee's estate, may not be a designated
beneficiary for purposes of determining the minimum
required
distribution,
but
nevertheless
may
be
designated as the employee's beneficiary under the plan.
If a beneficiary who is not an individual is designated
to receive an employee's benefit after death, the
employee is treated as having no designated beneficiary
when determining the required minimum distribution.
In
that case, under section 401(a) (9), distributions
commencing before death must be made over the employee's
single life or life expectancy and distributions
commencing after death must be made within 5 years of
the employee's death.
However, the Existing Proposed Regulations provide that
if a trust is named as a beneficiary of an employee's
benefit under the plan, the underlying beneficiaries of
the trust may be treated as designated beneficiaries for
purposes of section 401(1) (9) if certain requirements
are satisfied. In response to comments, these proposed
regulations modify these trust beneficiary requirements
as explained below by:
Permitting the designated beneficiary of a
revocable trust to be treated as the designated
beneficiary for purposes of determining the
minimum distribution under section 401(a) (9),
provided that the trust becomes irrevocable upon
the death of the employee.
Providing relief from the requirement that the
plan be provided with a copy of the trust
document if certain certification requirements
are met.
Irrevocability of trust
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The Existing Proposed Regulations generally provide that
a trust must be irrevocable as of the employee's
required beginning date in order for the beneficiaries
of the trust to be treated as designated beneficiaries
under the plan for purposes of determining the
distribution
period
under
section
401 (a) (9) (A) .
Commentators have indicated that most trusts established
for estate planning purposes and designated as the
beneficiary of an employee'S plan benefits are revocable
instruments prior to the death of the employee.
In
response to those comments, these proposed regulations
provide that a trust named as beneficiary of an
employee's interest in a retirement plan be permitted to
be revocable while the employee is alive, provided that
it becomes irrevocable, by its terms, upon the death of
the employee. The requirements in the Existing Proposed
Regulations that the trust be valid under state law (or
would be but for the fact that there is no corpus) and
that the beneficiaries be identifiable from the trust
instrument are retained.
In order for a trust to qualify it must (1) be valid under state law,

(2)

be irrevocable or become so no later than the participant's death, and (3) have
ascertainable

beneficiaries.

In addition,

the plan administrator must

be

furnished with certain documentation:
(a)
Required distributions commencing before death.
In order to satisfy the requirement of paragraph (b) (4)
of D-5A of this section for distributions required under
section 401(a) (9) to commence before the death of an
employee, the employee must comply with either paragraph
(a) (1) or (2) of this D-7A:

(1)
The
employee
provides
to
the
plan
administrator a copy of the trust instrument and agrees
that if the trust instrument is amended at any time in
the future, the employee will, within a reasonable time,
provide to the plan administrator a copy of each such
amendment, or
(2)

The employee --

(i)
Provides to the plan administrator a
list of all of the beneficiaries of the trust (including
contingent and remainderman beneficiaries with a
description of the conditions on their entitlement);
(ii)
Certifies that, to the best of the
employee'S knowledge, this list is correct and complete
and that the requirements of paragraph (b) (1), (2), and
(3) of D-5A of this section are satisfied;
(iii)Agrees
to
provide
corrected
certifications to the extent that an amendment changes
any information previously certified; and

A-54

....

I

r

r

r
r

r

r
r
r

r
r
r

r
r
r
r
r
r

r
r

(iv) Agrees to provide a copy of the trust
instrument to the plan administrator upon demand.
(b)
Required distributions after death.
In order to
satisfy the documentation requirement of this D-7 for
required distributions after death, by the end of the
ninth month beginning after the death of the employee,
the trustee of the trust must either
(1)
Provide the plan administrator with a final
list of all of the beneficiaries of the trust (including
contingent and remainderman beneficiaries with a
description of the conditions on their entitlement) as
of the date of death; certify that, to the best of the
trustee's knowledge, this list is correct and complete
and that the requirements of paragraph (b) (1), (2), and
(3) of D-5A of this section are satisfied as of the date
of death; and agree to provide a copy of the trust
instrument to the plan administrator upon demand; or
(2)
Provide the plan administrator with a copy
of the actual trust document for the trust that is named
as a beneficiary of the employee under the plan as of
the employee's date of death.
The amended regulations also provide relief for discrepancies between the
trust and the information the plan administrator has:
Relief for discrepancy between trust instrument and
employee certifications or earlier trust instruments.
(1)
If required distributions are determined based on
the information provided to the plan administrator in
certifications or trust instruments described in
paragraph (a) (1), (a) (2) or (b) of this D-7A, a plan
w{ll not fail to satisfy section 401 (a) (9) merely
because the actual terms of the trust instrument are
inconsistent
with
the
information
in
those
certifications or trust instruments previously provided
to the plan administrator, but only if the plan
administrator reasonably relied on the information
provided and the minimum required distributions for
calendar years after the calendar year in which the
discrepancy is discovered are determined based on the
actual terms of the trust instrument. For purposes of
determining whether the plan satisfies section 401(a) (9)
for calendar years after the calendar year in which the
discrepancy is discovered, if the actual beneficiaries
under the trust instrument are different from the
beneficiaries previously certified or listed in the
trust instrument previously provided to the plan
administrator, or the trust instrument specifying the
actual beneficiaries does not satisfy the other
requirements of paragraph (b) of D-5A of this section,
the minimum required distribution will be determined by
treating the beneficiaries of the employee as having
been changed in the calendar year in which the
discrepancy was discovered to conform to the corrected
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information and by applying the change in beneficiary
provisions of E-5 of this section.
3.

IRA Trust Rollover.

PLR 9744024 is another ruling from the IRS

.....

confirming that if the surviving spouse has sole control over the distribution
of IRA proceeds then proceeds which are distributed to the surviving spouse will
be treated as having passed from the decedent such that the surviving spouse can
roll them over into the surviving spouse's own IRA.
thus far in 1998.

There have been over a dozen

The facts of PLR 9744024 were:

-

Individual B established Trust M on * * * which became
irrevocable upon his death. Individual B died on * * *,
at the age of * * *. His surviving spouse is Individual
A.
Individual B was the trustee of Trust M.
Article VIII of Trust M provides that, upon the death of
Individual B, the largest pecuniary amount which would
not result in or increase the federal estate tax payable
by reason of Individual B's death be held as a separate
trust, Trust N, for the benefit of Individual A during
her lifetime.
Article IX of Trust M provides that the remainder of
Trust M will be distributed outright to Individual A.
Individual B named Trust M as the beneficiary of IRA G.
The only other assets of Trust M were life insurance
proceeds having an approximate value of $125,000. Upon
Individual B's death, Individual A became the sole
successor trustee of Trust M. As sole successor trustee
the allocation of assets between Trust N and the residue
of Trust M was in the sole discretion and control of
Individual A. Approximately $475,000 of IRA G has been
allocated to Trust N. The remainder of IRA G has been
allocated to the residue of Trust M which will be
distributed outright to Individual A.
The residue is
made up solely of IRA G assets. Individual A intends to
rollover the residue of Trust M directly into an IRA
maintained for her benefit.
This rollover will take
place within 60 days of the date of the distribution
from Trust M.
The rulings were:
1.
That the portion of the IRA G allocated to
the residue of Trust M ("residuary amount") and which
will be distributed, outright, to Individual A, does not
represent an inherited IRA within the meaning of section
408(d) (3) (C) of the Code; and
2.
That pursuant to section 408(d) of the Code,
Individual A is not required to include any of the
residuary amount in income for federal income tax
purposes, for the year in which such amount will be
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distributed to her, when the amount is contributed to a
rollover IRA for her benefit.
D.

SECT+QNS 671-678 -- GRANTOR TRUST RULES

I

Effect of Withdrawal Right.

1.

r

r
r

that the holder of a Crununey withdrawal right is the owner for
purposes

,,..

the

portion of

the

trust

over which

PLR 9739026 is an example.

the

income tax

powerholder

has

the

The ruling considers 10 separate

trusts:
Because contributions to Trusts 1 through 10 will be
subject to the withdrawal power of beneficiaries B
through K, in amounts permitted under section 7 of each
Trust, respectively, B through K will be treated as
having a power to vest such amounts of each contribution
in himself or herself within the meaning of section
678(a) (1) of the Code.
If any of B through K fail to
exercise the withdrawal power, they will be treated as
having released the power, while retaining a right to
have all trust income allocable to the portion of the
contributions subject to the power to withdraw (ordinary
income and income allocable to corpus), in the sole
discretion of the trustee, distributed to them or
accumulated for future distribution, for purposes of
sections 678(a) (2) and 677(a). Therefore, B through K
will be treated as the owners of those portions of
Trusts 1 through 10 over which they have the power to
withdraw, respectively, under section 678 (a) of the
Code.
If, but only if, B through K have the power to withdraw
all of each contribution to each Trust, under the
provisions of section 7 of each respective Trust, B
through K will be considered the owners of the entirety
of Trusts 1 through 10, respectively, for purposes of
section 671 of the Code, and the Trusts will be
permitted S corporation shareholders as described in
section 1361 (c) (2) (A) (i) .

r

r
r
r

of

withdrawal rights.

r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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The National Office ruling policy is

In PLRs 9810006, 9810007, and 9810008 the IRS ruled similarly.
Of interest are the items expressly reserved by the Service in those
rulings:
Specifically, no opinion is expressed concerning whether
X meets
the requirements of a
"small business
corporation" under section 1361(b), whether the nonvoting stock to be transferred to Trust is a second
class of stock under section 1361(b) (1) (D), or whether
future trusts meet the requirements to be a QSST.
Why the reservation is unknown.
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Transferring S corp stock to a Crummey trust or to a trust over which a
beneficiary has a 5x5 power presents problems because the trust will be partially
a grantor trust and partially something else (e.g., a QSST or ESBT).
that a

Ensuring

Crummey trust is a grantor trust with respect to the true donor is

beneficial

-

(care should be taken in dealing with the trust during the period

after the donor's death but before all Crummey rights have lapsed),
limiting 5x5 withdrawal rights where S-corp stock is involved.

as

is

The issue of

whether a Crummey trust can co-exist as a grantor and an ESBT has not been

-

decided.
E.

SECTION 1361 - S CORPORATIONS
1.

~.

Notice 97-49, 1997-31 IRB 1, clarifies some rules relating

to ESBTs.
Section 1361(e) (1) (A) (i) provides that an ESBT may not
have as a beneficiary any person other than (I) an
individual, (II) an estate, or (III) an organization
described in paragraph (2), (3), (4), or (5) of section
170(c), which holds a contingent interest and is not a
potential current beneficiary. For tax years beginning
after December 31, 1997, the clause "which holds a
contingent interest and is not a potential current
beneficiary" is deleted.
Section 1361 (e) does not
provide a specific definition of the term "beneficiary."

-

There are three rules for determining a beneficiary:
1.
The term "beneficiary" does not include a
distributee trust (other than a trust described in
paragraphs (2) or (3) of section 170(c)), but does
include those persons who have a beneficial interest in
the property held by the distributee trust.
For
example,
an intended ESBT's governing instrument
provides for discretionary distributions of income or
principal to A for life, and upon A's death the division
of the remainder into separate trusts for the benefit of
A's children. For purposes of section 1361(e) (1) (A) (i),
the beneficiaries of the intended ESBT are A and A's
children, and not the separate trusts for the benefit of
A's children. Therefore, because all the beneficiaries
of the intended ESBT are individuals, the intended ESBT
meets the requirements of section 1361(e) (1) (A) (i).
2.
The term "beneficiary" does not include a person
in whose favor a power of appointment could be
exercised.
Such a person becomes a beneficiary only
when the holder of the power of appointment actually
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favor.
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3.
The term "beneficiary" does not include a person
whose contingent interest is so remote as to be
negligible.
For
example,
except
in
unusual
circumstances, the contingent interest a State has under
its laws pertaining to escheat would be considered
negligible, and the State would not be considered a
beneficiary of the intended ESBT.
Rules

are

also

created

for

determining

who

is

a

potential

beneficiary:
1.
If a distributee trust becomes entitled to, or at
the discretion of any person may receive, a distribution
from principal or income of the intended ESBT, then the
S corporation election will terminate unless the
distributee trust is a trust described in section
1361(c) (2) (A) (e.g., ESBT, qualified subchapter S trust,
etc.). In addition, if the distributee trust is a trust
described
in section 1361(c)(2)(A),
the
persons
described in section 1361(c) (2) (B) are treated as
shareholders of the corporation for purposes of
determining whether the shareholder restrictions under
section 1361 (b) (1) are met.
In the above example
involving the distributee trusts for A's children, the
distributee trusts for A's children will become entitled
to receive distributions from the ESBT upon A's death.
At such time, the S corporation election will terminate
unless (i) the distributee trusts are trusts described
in section 1361(c) (2) (A), and (ii) the persons described
in
section
1361 (c) (2) (B),
with
respect
to
the
distributee trusts, satisfy the shareholder restrictions
in section 1361(b) (1). If, for example, the distributee
trusts are qualified subchapter S trusts, and A's
children are the current income beneficiaries, A's
children are treated as shareholders of the corporation
for purposes of satisfying the shareholder restrictions
under section 1361(b) (1).
2.
A person who is entitled to receive a distribution
only after a specified time or upon the occurrence of a
specified event (such as the death of the holder of the
power of appointment) is not a potential current
beneficiary until such time or the occurrence of such
event.
Whether a person to whom a distribution is or
may be made during a period pursuant to a power of
appointment is a potential current beneficiary is
currently under study.
The notice contains these other comments:
Section 641(d) (1) provides that the portion of an ESBT
that consists of stock in one or more S corporations ("S
portion") is taxed as a separate trust.
Section
641(d) (2) (C) specifies that the only items of income,
loss, deduction, or credit to be taken into account by
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the S portion ("S portion items") are (i) the items
required to be taken into account under section 1366;
(ii) any gain or loss from the disposition of stock in
an S corporation; and (iii) to the extent provided in
regulations,
State
or
local
income
taxes
or
administrative expenses to the extent allocable to items
described in clauses (i) and (ii).
Section 641(d) (3) provides that the S portion items are
excluded for purposes of determining the amount of tax
on the portion of the trust that is not treated as a
separate trust under section 641(d) (1) ("non-S portion")
and are excluded in determining the distributable net
income (ONI) of the entire trust.
Section 641(d) (3)
also provides that, except as otherwise provided,
section 641 (d) does not affect the taxation of any
distribution from the trust.
Guidance has been requested on the treatment of
distributions from an ESBT when the trust has fiduciary
accounting income in both the S portion and the non-S
portion of the trust.
Section 641(d) (3) specifically
provides that, except as otherwise specified, section
641(d) does not change the taxation of any distribution
from the trust.
Because the S portion items are not
included in the computation of the ESBTs ONI, they are
treated for purposes of determining the treatment of
trust distributions in the same manner as any other item
that does not enter into the ONI computation (e. g. ,
capital gains and losses allocated to corpus).
For
example, for the tax year an ESBT has $40 of ONI from
the non-S portion and $70 of net fiduciary accounting
income from the S portion.
If the ESBT makes a
distribution of $100, the distribution includes $40 of
ONI.
F.

SECTZONS 2031
1.

~.

and

-

-

2512 -- YALVATZQN

Valuation of Ope-Half Cgmmupity Property znterest in Closely-Held

In Estate of Fleming, 74 T.C.M. 1049 (1997), the Tax Court determined the

value of a one-half community property interest in shares of B & W Financial
Corporation of Longview.
Estate and the IRS.

The court largely rejected the appraisers of both the

The court stated:

Each of the parties' experts agree that, under the
transaction method that each applied under the market
approach
to
valuation,
the
starting
point
for
determining the fair market value of the stock interest
in question should be the book value of B&W Longview on
the valuation date plus a 23-percent premium on the
gross amount of the trade notes receivable that that
corporation held on that date. We accept that starting
point under the transaction method as reasonable.
According to the expert reports, market conditions on
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the valuation date, like market conditions in 1991 at
the time of the FNFS transaction in which a 23-percent
premium was applied to the trade notes receivable there
involved, were more favorable than they were in 1989 at
the time the B&W El Paso transaction occurred in which
a 15-percent premium was applied to the trade notes
receivable involved in that transaction.
A major difference between the parties' experts in
valuing the stock interest in question relates to the
discounts that each applied.
Respondent's expert
applied only a la-percent minority discount, and
petitioner'S expert applied a 35-percent combined
minority and lack-of-marketability discount. Discounts
for a minority interest and for lack of marketability
are conceptually distinct.
Estate of Newhouse v.
Commissioner, m.mn at 249.
A minority discount
reflects the minority shareholder's inability to compel
liquidation and thereby realize a pro rata share of the
corporation's net asset value. A discount for lack of
marketability reflects the fact that there is no ready
market for the stock of a closely held corporation. rd.
The appropriate amount of a minority discount and/or a
lack-of-marketability discount is a question of fact.
rd.
We agree with both parties' experts that a minority
discount should be applied in valuing decedent's 50percent stock interest in B&W Longview.
Although Mr.
Harrell specified that he would apply a la-percent
discount, Mr. Bernstein did not specify how much of the
35-percent combined discount that he applied was
attributable to the fact that decedent did not own a
controlling stock interest in B&W Longview on the
valuation date.
On brief, petitioner, who has the
burden of proof, does not insist that a minority
discount in excess of 10 percent be applied in this
case.
Respondent contends, and petitioner disputes, that,
because the precedent transactions on which both
experts, inter alia, relied involved stock for which
there was no ready market, the respective prices paid
for the stock sold in those transactions reflected some
lack of marketability discount.
While we generally
agree with respondent, it is significant that the stock
interests acquired in the precedent transactions were
different from decedent's 50-percent stock interest in
B&W Longview in that (1) the respective purchasers in
the transactions involving (a) B&W El Paso and (b) B&W
Brownsville, B&W Harlington, B&W Mission, B&W Austin,
and B&W Finance acquired 100 percent of the stock of
each of those corporations; and (2) although decedent
purchased only 50 percent of the stock of TA&T Finance
in the Young transaction, after that purchase, decedent
owned 100 percent of the stock of that corporation. On
the record before us, we find that there was even less
of a ready market for decedent's 50-percent stock
interest in B&W Longview than there was for the stock
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interests
sold
in
the
precedent
transactions.
Consequently, we conclude that, in addition to a
minority discount, some amount of lack-of-marketability
discount should be applied in determining the fair
market value on the valuation date of decedent's 50percent stock interest in B&W Longview.
Based on our consideration of the entire record before
us, and using our best judgment, we find that the fair
market value on the valuation date of decedent's 50percent stock interest in B&W Longview was $875,000.
2.

valuation of Common Stock.

In Estate of Mitchell v. Commissioner,

74 T.C.M. 872 (1997), the Tax Court valued 49.04% of John Paul Mitchell Systems
common stock as of April 21, 1989, Mr. Mitchell's date of death.

-

The formation

of the company was described by the court:
Messrs. Mitchell and DeJoria first met in the early
1970's. They eventually developed a close friendship.
In 1979, they joined forces to market Mr. Mitchell's
hair care products (particularly the sculpting lotion)
through professional-only hair salons.
Mr. DeJoria
believed he could successfully market the line.
Initially, Messrs. Mitchell and DeJoria were unable to
find anyone willing to provide financial assistance;
thus, they pooled their resources of $700 to purchase an
answering machine, bottles, and caps and hire an artist
to design a logo for their labels.
Mr. DeJoria
persuaded a cosmetics laboratory to manufacture the
first batch of products on credit.
Instead of the
orange and white bottles Mr. Mitchell had previously
used, these products were packaged in white bottles with
Paul Mitchell's name displayed in black lettering down
the side.
At all relevant times, Paul Mitchell products were sold
to the public only through professional hair salons.
1.

STRUCTURE AND OWNERSHIP

On March 31, 1980, Messrs. Mitchell and DeJoria formed
Paul Mitchell Systems, Inc.
On May 9, 1985, the
corporation changed its name to John Paul Mitchell
System (JPMS).
Messrs. Mitchell and DeJoria granted
JPMS all proprietary and distribution rights to the hair
and skin products that Mr. Mitchell developed (or had
developed under his direction), including the products'
trademark, service mark, or other intellectual property
rights.
JPMS' articles of incorporation authorized the issuance
of 10,000 shares of common stock.
Between March 3,
1980, and April 21, 1989 (the date of Mr. Mitchell's
death), JPMS had 2,500 shares issued and outstanding.
Article VII of JPMS' bylaws provided that any transfer
of JPMS stock was subject to a right of first refusal,
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exercisable first by the corporation,
nontransferring shareholder.

then by

each

Initially, Mr. DeJoria owned 1,250 shares of JPMS common
stock and Paul Mitchell Associates, Ltd. (PMA) , owned
1,250 shares.
Mr. Mitchell owned all of PMA.
On
February 20, 1982, PMA assigned its JPMS shares to Mr.
Mitchell. On November 20, 1984, Mr. Mitchell assigned
his JPMS shares to the Trust.
On August 1, 1987, Mr.
Mitchell, acting as trustee of the Trust, assigned 16
shares of JPMS common stock to Jeanne Braa, his longtime stage partner in hair shows, and 8 shares of JPMS
Mr. DeJoria
common stock to Angus Mitchell, his son.
and JPMS executed written waivers of the right of first
refusal with respect to all of these transfers.
As of April 21, 1989, the common stock of JPMS was owned
as follows:
Number of Shares
Mr. DeJoria
The Trust
Ms. Braa
Angus Mitchell
Total

1,250
1,226
16

Percent

8

50.00
49.04
0.64
0.32

2,500

100.00

In valuing the stock, the court began with purchase discussions and offers,
one from Gillette and another described as follows:
Another
suitor
of
JPMS
was
Minnetonka
Corp.
(Minnetonka), a publicly traded company. Robert Taylor
was Minnetonka's president and chief executive officer.
Mr. Taylor co-founded Minnetonka in 1961 and took the
company public in 1968.
Minnetonka was involved. in consumer product brands,
primarily those that were sold through the department
store, gift, or beauty trade.
Minnetonka was the
licensee for Calvin Klein and created Obsession and
Eternity women's fragrances.
In addition, Minnetonka
created Foltene, a treatment used in the beauty salon
business for fine and thinning hair, a product line for
home fragrance, and a gift soap product line for
department stores.
In 1990, Mr. Taylor started a salon-only hair products
company, Graham Webb International, which grew to $25
million in sales in 5 years.
From 1992 or 1993 to
approximately 1995, Mr. Taylor was on the board of
directors of Banker's Trust Venture Capital Fund in New
York (Bankers Trust), which specializes in providing
funds for small businesses or recapitalization funds.
As chairman, Mr. Taylor was responsible for Minnetonka's
strategic acquisitions.
In 1985, when JPMS' sales
approximated $10 million, a financial adviser to JPMS
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solici ted Mr. Taylor's interest in acquiring JPMS.
However, Minnetonka determined that JPMS was too small
and that the Paul Mitchell brand name was not strong
enough to stand on its own; accordingly, Mr. Taylor
declined to enter discussions at that time.
Two years later, Minnetonka targeted the salon industry
for acquisition candidates, and Mr. Taylor contacted
Redken, Sebastian, and JPMS.
During this time, the
annual sales of these companies were approximately $120
million, $60 million, and $50 million, respectively.
Although Minnetonka agreed to acquire Sebastian for $100
million in late 1987, the sale was not consummated.
Mr. Taylor initiated discussions with Mr. DeJoria in the
fall of 1987 (JPMS' 1988 fiscal year) when JPMS' sales
were approximately $50 million. Mr. Taylor informed Mr.
DeJoria that Minnetonka was willing to pay $100 million
to acquire all of the JPMS stock, assuming officers'
salaries were revised. Mr. DeJoria insisted on a $125
million acquisition price. Mr. Taylor refused to raise
Minnetonka's bid, and the negotiations were terminated.

-

In the fall of 1988, Mr. Taylor again approached Messrs.
DeJoria and Mitchell.
(At the time, JPMS' sales were in
the $65 million range.) Mr. Taylor offered $125 million
to acquire all of the JPMS stock.
(At this time, Mr.
Taylor was unaware that Mr. Mitchell was seriously ill.)
The proposed acquisition price assumed that:
(1) Mr.
DeJoria would continue managing JPMS; (2) Mr. Mitchell
would continue promoting the products for at least 18
months to 2 years as a transition period; and (3) both
Messrs. Mitchell and DeJoria would be compensated in
salary and stock at a level paid to officers of other
Minnetonka subsidiaries, such as Calvin Klein.

....j

Mr. DeJoria did not accept Minnetoka' s $125 million
offer; he believed that Minnetonka was "just a little
short every time."
(Mr. DeJoria represented to Mr.
Taylor that he had received from Gillette a $150 million
offer plus a royalty of 2 percent of sales for lifetime.
Mr. Taylor informed Mr. DeJoria that he could not match
Gillette's offer.)
Sales discussions with Minnetonka
thus ended.
The court held:
We have considered all of the testimony before us, as
well as the expert witness reports, and have weighed all
other relevant factors. As articulated by the parties,
each expert witness report is susceptible to criticism.
We are unable to accept the moment-of-death valuations
given to the 1,226 shares of JPMS common stock by any of
the expert witnesses.
Instead, we rely on our own
analysis, based on all the evidence in the record.
We begin our analysis by placing a $150 million value on
JPMS at the moment immediately prior to Mr. Mitchell's
death. In determining this value, we considered all the
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evidence but gave the greatest consideration to
Minnetonka's "real world" $125 million offer in the fall
of 1988 (which Mr. DeJoria found "a little short") and
Mr. DeJoria's representation to Mr. Taylor that he had
received from Gillette a $150 million offer PLUS a
royalty of 2 percent of sales for a lifetime (which Mr.
Taylor found to be an offer he could not match) .
We next consider the impact of Mr. Mitchell's death on
JPMS. Mr. Mitchell embodied JPMS to distributors, hair
stylists, and salon owners. he was vitally important to
its product development, marketing, and training.
Moreover, he possessed a unique vision that enabled him
to foresee fashion trends in the hair styling industry.
It is clear that the loss of Mr. Mitchell, along with
the
structural
inadequacies
of
JPMS,
created
uncertainties as to the future of JPMS at the moment of
death.
In particular, a hypothetical buyer or seller would have
to consider the following factors in valuing the 1,226
shares of JPMS common stock at the moment of Mr.
Mitchell's death: (1) Whether it would be necessary to
increase JPMS' advertising and marketing expenses; (2)
whether litigation concerning Mr. DeJoria's compensation
would ensue;
(3) whether the lack of a ready or
available market for the stock would affect its fair
market value; (4) whether and how JPMS would continue
its history of successful product development and
styling leadership; (5) whether rumors concerning JPMS'
"going retail" would adversely affect its relationships
with salons; (6) whether JPMS' history of unreliable
suppliers would continue; (7) whether JPMS would solve
its
inventory control
and
financial
information
reporting problems;
and
(8)
whether JPMS'
thin
management and total reliance on Mr. DeJoria would
hinder its performance.
Nonetheless, Mr. DeJoria stepped in to single-handedly
run JPMS upon Mr. Mitchell's death.
Mr. DeJoria had
always overseen JPMS' marketing.
Indeed, despite his
reputation for creativity,
Mr.
Mitchell had not
succeeded in marketing his product line in the late
1970's. Although there is no doubt that Mr. Mitchell's
fame was an important component in launching JPMS in the
early 1980's, Mr. DeJoria's salesmanship, marketing
savvy, and construction of the distribution network were
also vitally important.
In addition, Mr. Taylor, whom we found extremely
credible, testified that Mr. Mitchell was not as
essential to Minnetonka's interest in JPMS as Mr.
DeJoria.
Mr. Taylor also observed that the deaths of
fashion designers Perry Ellis and Anne Klein did not
affect their ongoing businesses to any significant
degree "because the consumer somehow is so far removed
from the actual * * * involvement of that designer * *
* they're still buying the product.
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In our opinion, the $150 million value for JPMS at the
moment immediately prior to Mr. Mitchell's death should
be discounted by 10 percent to reflect the loss of Mr.
Mitchell to JPMS. Thus, we believe that at the moment
of Mr. Mitchell's death, JPMS had a value of $135
million.

-

We further believe:
(1) A total 35-percent discount is
appropriate, reflecting combined discounts for lack of
marketability and minority interest; and (2) a $1. 5
million discount, reflecting the possibility of a
lawsuit over Mr. DeJoria' s compensation, should be
applied.
Taking these factors into consideration, we
find, and thus hold, that the value of decedent' s
interest was $41,532,600 as of the moment of his death.
Footnote 25 contains this calculation:
Value of JPMS at the moment
immediately prior to Mr.
Mitchell's death

$150,000,000

Less: Discount to reflect the
loss of Mr. Mitchell to JPMS
Value of JPMS at the moment of
Mr. Mitchell's death

$135,000,000

Percent of Trust's interest
in JPMS

x

Value of Trust's interest in
JPMS prior to discounts

$ 66,204,000

Discount for lack of marketability
and minority interest (35%)
Discount for possibility of
lawsuit
Value of Trust's interest in
JPMS after discounts

3.

Appraisal Quality.

-

15,000(000)

J

49.04

( 23,171(400)
$ 43,032,600

-

1.500,000)
$ 41,532,600

All appraisals are not created equal.

A federal

district court had occasion to dismiss taxpayer's expert because of "fundamental
errors" in Estate of Hagerman y. United States, 81 AFTR2d Par. 98-771 No. 962032.

The court's discussion of the taxpayer's appraiser is worth quoting:
Plaintiffs relied upon the appraisal of John Trapp. Mr.
Trapp graduated from the University of Illinois in 1939
with a B.S. degree. He obtained a real estate broker's
license in 1965 and at that time, started selling and
appraising real estate. He holds no certification but
has done appraisals in connection with partitions,
estates,
condemnations, and divorces,
as well as
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appraisals related to bank loans. Approximately sixty
percent (60%) of his appraisal work has been done in
connection with federal estate tax returns.
He has
prepared appraisals exclusively for estates and never
the Internal Revenue Service. Mr. Trapp limits his work
to Vermilion, Edgar, Champaign, and Douglas Counties.
In 1991, he did approximately 20 farm appraisals.
Although Mr. Trapp has attended as many seminars as he
could find, he has admitted that he has not researched
Internal Revenue Service rulings and regulations as part
of his process.
He did obtain some materials of a
summary nature approximately 20 years ago from an
attorney in Paris, Illinois, but has not kept abreast of
the changes since.
While Mr. Trapp was able to appraise closer in time to
the valuation date, and was certainly more thorough in
his on-site inspection of the premises, including
inspection when growing crops were not obstructing his
view, the major errors he made in his appraisals dealt
a fatal blow to Plaintiff's case.
In assigning a total value of $158,170 for Farm 3, Mr.
Trapp determined a land value of $1,075 per acre.
In
reaching this conclusion, he relied upon four comparable
sales.
One, listed as Sale 2, was reported as a July
24, 1990, sale of 60 acres with a sale price per acre of
$866.66.
In reality, the sale was a 1971 transaction
making the price used by Mr. Trapp of no value.
Further, he referenced Sale 3, an October 17, 1990, sale
of 40 acres at a sale price of $1,075. However, only 20
acres were involved in that particular sale so the per
acre price was actually twice that used by Mr. Trapp.
The remaining comparables had sale prices of $2,175 and
$1,775. The Court concludes that the per acre valuation
assigned by Mr. Trapp is contrary to his own supporting
evidence, thus rendering his valuation of Farm 3
unreliable.
Mr. Trapp determined the value of Farm 4 to be $866.66
per acre for a total of $121,330.
He relied upon the
same four comparables used in connection with Farm 3.
In fact,
according to his narrative,
he relied
particularly on Sale 2 finding the subject farm was of
the same value. Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, the sale
price for Sale 2 was as previously indicated 20 years
outdated. Clearly, Mr. Trapp's valuation of Farm 4 is
seriously flawed.
Mr. Trapp's assigned a value of $1,575 per acre to Farm
2 for a total of $196,955. He included eight sales from
Vermilion County,
Illinois,
and four sales from
Champaign County, Illinois, on his written appraisal.
However, in his narrative, Mr. Trapp declared a November
30, 1990, sale of 248 acres from Lo to Prudential
Insurance Company (Sale 1) to be "indicative" of the
subject farm's market value. He re-ported a sale price
of $1,674.19 per acre and reduced the subject tract $100
per acre because it was inferior to Sale 1. Mrs. Lo
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testified at trial that two separate tracts comprised
the transaction used by Mr. Trapp. She and her husband
sold
several
tracts
to
Prudential,
negotiating
individual prices for each but Prudential grouped them
together and paid three lump sums. Specifically, the
transaction used by Mr. Trapp involved a 168 acre parcel
sold for $1,400 per acre and an 80 acre parcel sold for
$2,250 per acre. The latter farm is in Jamaica Township
as is Farm 2.
By co-mingling the tracts, Mr. Trapp
significantly diluted the per acre figure for that farm
resulting in an unreliably low value for Farm 2.
Although no such fundamental errors were noted regarding
the Mr. Trapp's appraisal of Farm 1, the errors noted
above, coupled with the Court's observation of Mr. Trapp
while testifying have led the court to conclude that the
valuation offered by Mr. Trapp is not reliable.
The IRS expert, well-liked by the court, was described as follows:
Perhaps the discussion could simply stop here. However,
the court had the additional benefit of testimony from
defense expert, John T. Scott, Ph.D. Dr. Scott has lived
in Champaign County, Illinois, since 1965. He grew up
on a farm in Ford County where he helped his father.
After graduating from high school, he continued to work
on the farm until he entered the University of Illinois
from which he obtained his B.S. in agriculture in 1951.
He also obtained a M.S. in agronomy and stayed in
graduate school until leaving to enter the Army prior to
completing his doctoral work. Upon his return, he farmed
with his parents until leaving to work as a fieldman
advising farmers.
Dr. Scott starting [sic] doing
appraisal work in 1958. He returned to graduate school
and
obtained his
Ph.D.
in
economics
in
1965.
Thereafter, he started with the University of Illinois
in August of 1965 as an Associate Professor in farm
management and production economics. He became a full
professor in 1971. During the decade of the 80's, Dr.
Scott started doing approximately eight
to
ten
appraisals per year.
He taught courses in farm
appraisal.
In connection with that, he required the
students to do a demonstration appraisal.
He had to
gather data and appraise farms in the Champaign County
area in connection with this course. In order to grade
student appraisals, Dr. Scott did his own appraisal. He
is the chairman of the Federal Farmland Assessment
Technical Advisory Committee of the Illinois Department
of Revenue.

..

Dr. Scott is a member of the APpraisal Institute
{M.A.I.}
which designation required course work,
presentation
of
a
demonstration
appraisal,
and
successful passage of a comprehensive examination. He
is a state certified general real estate appraiser, a
status necessary in order to appraise property that has
a mortgage guaranteed by the government or one that will
ultimately be sold to the government.
Dr. Scott has
authored or co-authored over 300 publications, many in

...J
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real estate value and management.
In sum, he has
studied, taught, engaged in, and written about farm
appraisals.
He was a far superior witness and his
credentials are far superior to Plaintiff's expert, Mr.
Trapp. The difference between the two, both in terms of
credentials and the Court's observation in trial was
scientist versus knowledgeable layman.

r

r

The Court does recognize that Dr. Scott's appraisal work
was done well after the valuation date. The Court has
previously noted that the field work undertaken by Mr.
Trapp was more thorough.
However, Dr. Scott did take
into consideration the relevant characteristics, both
attributes and deficiencies, which had been noted by Mr.
Trapp.
Consequently, the Court does not feel the
quality of the appraisal has suffered in any way.
For
example, Dr. Scott discounted the value of Farm 1 for
subsidence and coal mine sinks, a permanent pasture,
high tension wires, and the proximity of a slag pile.
Further, regarding Farm 2, Dr. Scott recognized the
irregular shape of the farm, as well as the presence of
a drainage district that runs through and thus divides
the farm.
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One comparison regarding methodology is important to
note. Dr. Scott rejected the notion that an appraiser
could form an impression regarding what the value of a
tract should be and then find comparables to support
that value. The Court was left with the conclusion that
Mr. Trapp followed such an approach. The Court agrees
with Dr. Scott that an appraiser must inspect the land,
find appropriate comparables, analyze those comparables,
and then, comparing the comparables to the subject
property, determine the value of the land.
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4.

IRS ValuatioD Course Book.

A May,

1997 Valuation Course Book

designed to train appeals officers, has been obtained from the IRS.
Book discusses Murphy in this way:
Transactions Structured for Tax Benefits
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Where the evidence shows that a transaction was
structured to attain a minority discount solely for the
tax benefits, the Courts generally have not allowed a
minority discount.
In other words, the courts are
inclined to look for economic substance (or business
purpose aside from the tax consequences) .
In Murphy,
the decedent's accountant periodically
advised decedent to reduce her stock ownership below 50
percent. Eighteen days before her death, she made gifts
of .88 percent of the stock to each of her two children,
resulting in her ownership of 49.65 percent at her
death.
EXTRACT
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The Course

J
Murphy, 60 T.C.M. 645, page 658
* * * * *
[T]he facts in this case are extreme. Briefly, control
was kept in and exercised continuously by the Murphy
family, including decedent, followed by her children.
Decedent implemented a plan 18 days before her death
with the sole and explicit purpose to obtain a minority
discount.
We are aware of no case where a court has
allowed a minority discount in this situation."

J

* * * * *
Because the facts are extreme, the Murphy case does not
have general application in many minority discount
cases.
But, if the facts do indicate a transfer was
made solely to achieve a NUMERICAL minority without
relinquishing any ACTUAL control, a minority discount
would not be allowable.

.J

This discussion seems somewhat at odds with the National Office position
in partnerships that transfers of control should be disregarded.
The Course Book discusses the discount for built-in capital gains:
HIDDEN DISCOUNTS
Liquidation Expenses
The
courts
have never
liquidation expenses.

recognized

components

of

...

Capital Gains Tax
The taxpayer might take a deduction for prospective
income tax liability, such as capital gains tax on
unsold,
but
appreciated
property,
held
by
the
corporation. This hidden discount might appear either
in the calculation of the corporation's income stream or
as a liability in the corporation's computation of
adjusted book value.
The case law has indicated prospective capital gains tax
and liquidation expenses are speculative and not
includible in the valuation.
However, since the General Utilities doctrine has been
revoked by statute,
(Tax Reform of 1986), a tax
liability
upon
liquidation
is
not
necessarily
speculative.
General Utilities Doctrine
For 51 years, acquiring corporations could revalue the
target corporation's assets to current fair market
values, without paying a capital gains tax on the
increase in the tax basis of target corporation assets
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(target corporation did pay ordinary tax on recapture of
depreciation, ITC, etc.) under the General Utilities
doctrine.
The doctrine is based on a federal court
case, General Utilities and Operating Co. y. Helvering.
Congress endorsed this doctrine by writing it into IRC
sections 311, 336 and 337.
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the General
Utilities
doctrine
for
liquidations
after
1986,
generally. This has the effect of increasing the tax on
the sale of a corporation.
If the election is made
under IRC section 338 to assign cost to underlying
assets, the target corporation has an immediate tax
liability, due to recognizing current fair market value
gain on the deemed sale of all assets. The only way to
avoid this immediate tax is to forgo the tax basis
reorganization and to continue the target corporation on
its old basis rather than on a new basis, that is, to
continue the business of the target as a wholly owned
subsidiary, rather than to liquidate it and merge it.

",.

r

While, as noted above, since the repeal of the General
Utilities doctrine, a tax liability upon liquidation is
not
necessarily
speculative,
in many
instances,
liquidation of the corporation cannot be contemplated.
In a very typical circumstances, such as the valuation
of a minority interest in a personal holding or real
estate investment company, the holder of the minority
interest cannot force the company into liquidation. As
such, unless there is a reason to believe that the
corporation cannot be contemplated and the deduction for
capital gains tax should not be taken. In addition, the
prospective capital gains tax expenses are considered
speculative because unless liquidation of the taxes or
their occurrence at all cannot be known with certainty
because of the likelihood of changes in future tax laws.
(See TAM 9150001.)
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5.

DiSCounted Cash FlOW Method.

The tax court used the discounted cash

flow method of taxpayer's expert in Estate of Lehmann y. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M.
415 (1997), to value real estate subject to a 99 year lease owned by a limited
partnership.

Discounts were not at issue because the decedent owned a 1% general

partnership interest.
The opinion summarized taxpayer's expert's report as follows:

r

Petitioner relies upon the report and testimony of its
expert, P. Richard Zitelman. Zitelman is the president
of The Zitelman Group, a firm providing investment
advisory and investment services.

,,.

Zitelman also considered two methods of evaluating the
fair market value of decedent's interest:
(1) The
liquidation method, and (2) the DCF method. Ultimately,
Zitelman selected the DCF method because, in his view,

r
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a 'potential buyer' of decedent's interest would be an
individual or entity seeking long-term cash-flows but
having no expectation of receiving the return of its
invested capital.
Under the DCF method, zitelman estimated the fair market
value of decedent's interest by calculating the present
value of decedent's pro rata share of the partnerships'
expected net cash-flows. He calculated the net income
due pursuant to the lease and the net reversionary
interest in the land.

-

For purposes of calculating the annual rent, Zitelman
assumed that the fair market value of the unencumbered
land, as of the valuation date and as of January 1,
1993, was $5,479,883. Thereafter, Zitelrnan assumed the
value increased annually at a rate of 2.6 percent. He
also assumed the rental rate for the lease period of
January 1, 2013, through March 31, 2062, was 7.05
percent.
In estimating all of the expenses for 1992 except for
the management fees and the franchise tax, Zitelman
averaged the deductions reported upon the partnership's
Federal income tax returns for taxable years 1989
through 1991. See appendix A. Thereafter, he treated
the expenses as increasing at a rate of 2.6 percent per
year.
zi telman estimated the management fee as equal to 5
percent of the gross rental income and the franchise tax
expense as equal to the product of the estimated net
income and the tax rates in effect as of the valuation
date.
Zitelman made several assumptions regarding the rate of
return a hypothetical buyer would demand. He initially
noted that, as of the valuation date, the rate of return
of 30-year Treasury bonds was 7.9 percent and assumed
that the applicable discount rate would have to be at
least between 9.9 percent and 11.9 percent.
zitelman
assumed that the discount rate necessary to achieve an
acceptable rate of return required that such a discount
rate should be increased for each of the following
perceived risks:
(1) The partnership agreement permits
the general partners to make loans at (a) the prime rate
to the partners for estate taxes, estate administrative
expenses, and medical expenses or (b) the rate at which
petitioner borrowed the funds; (2) there is a likelihood
of a disagreement between the lessee and the partnership
as to the future renal rates or the value of the
property; (3) a potential buyer would have to invest
substantial time, energy, aggravation, and cost to
evaluate decedent's interest;
(4)
the partnership
agreement granted the other partners a right of first
refusal; and (5) the potential buyer did not have
control over the partnership's management.
zi telman
concluded that a hypothetical buyer would demand a
purchase price based upon a discount rate between 15.3
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percent and 22.6 percent. Ultimately, Zitelman averaged
the present values calculated based upon these rates and
assigned a fair market value to decedent's interest in
the partnership of $399,000.
The court criticized the report as well:
Although we accept that the DCF method is an appropriate
approach in the instant case, we have found weaknesses
in Zitelman' s analysis.
The DCF method generally
requires assumptions regarding the future revenue,
operating costs, and trends, see generally Estate of
Cartwright y. commissioner, T.C. Memo, 1996-286, but
some of Zitelman's assumptions are unreasonable.
We are not convinced that the perceived risks cited by
Zitelman would depress the hypothetical purchase price
as significantly as petitioner would have us believe.
Zitelman correctly notes that the partnership agreement
permits the general partners to lend money to the estate
of a deceased partner, and obviously, in making such
loans, the general partners would be motivated in part
by their family ties to the deceased partner, but the
partnership agreement also provides that the deceased
partner's interest in the partnership must secure such
a loan, and the loan must be at the prime rate or the
rate at which the partnership borrows the funds.
Accordingly, we do not see such lending as particularly
jeopardizing the partnership's cash-flow.
Nor do we find that the risk of future litigation over
determining the rental rates or the fair market values
of
the
unencumbered
land
substantially affected
decedent's potential share of the cash-flows.
To a
large extent, the ground lease and the amendments
eliminated these risks by setting forth a mechanism for
settling such disputes through the use of appraisers.
Similarly, we disagree with Zitelman's view that the
hypothetical buyer would demand a higher rate of return
because of the 'substantial amount of time, energy,
aggravation, and cost' required to value decedent' s
interest. Although such an interest is not as easy to
value as other investments, such as a 30-year Treasury
bond or annuity, the present value of the cash-flows is,
nevertheless, not so difficult or inconvenient to
calculate as to justify a significant increase in such
a rate of return. The partnership principally owns only
one income-producing asset.
Zitelman' s own analysis
evidences the relative ease by which decedent's interest
may be valued.
We are not convinced that the right of first refusal
significantly affected the value of decedent's interest.
The partnership agreement does not provide a price or a
formula for determining the fair market value of the
transferred partnership interest.
The absence of a
fixed price clearly has a less dramatic effect than
fixed-price restrictions, see, e.g., Worcester County
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Trust Co. y. commissioner, 134 F.2d 578, 581-582 (1st
Cir. 1943), revg. Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 46
B.T.A. 337 (1942); Estate of Reynolds y. Commissioner,
55 T.C. 172, 188-190 (1970); Mandelbaum y. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1995-255, affd. without published opinion 91
F.3d 124 (1996).
Indeed, a right of first refusal
without a fixed price does not limit the buyers to whom
a seller could see the interest or the price for the
interest, but merely governs the order in which
prospective buyers must stand in line to purchase.
Mandelbaum y, Commissioner, supra. Given the fact that
such a right actually protects and benefits the other
partners, the depressant effect (if any) upon the value
of a privately held partnership interest subject to a
right of first refusal is not necessarily substantial.
Overall, from our perspective, Zitelman's report lacks
a wholly objective analysis of the willing buyer/willing
seller standard.
Consequently, we do not find the
report as compelling as petitioner suggests.
Rather,
Zitelman focuses exclusively upon the hypothetical
willing buyer.
Zitelman failed to consider whether a
hypothetical seller would sell his or her interest in
the partnership for $399,000. The test of fair market
value rests upon the concept of a hypothetical willing
buyer and hypothetical willing seller.
We find
incredible the proposition that any partner, limited or
general, would be wiling to see his or her interest for
such a low amount as to generate an internal rate of
return of approximately 15 percent to 22 percent.
Ignoring the views of a willing seller is contrary to
this well-established rule.
Id.
In this regard,
Zitelman's failure to consider a hypothetical willing
seller of an interest in the partnership weakens his
analysis.
The IRS had claimed a value of $1,100,000; Zitelman, $399,000; the court
settled on $699,900.

The opinion's comments about

especially interesting.

-

the willing seller are

Saying that a willing seller would not sell at such a

low value as to provide an internal return of 15% to 22% appears to be only
another way of saying that the investment is not so risky as to require a 15% to
22% return.
6.

Effect of Buy-Sell Agreement.

commissioner,

74 T.C.

M.

346

(1997),

At issue in Bommer Reyocable Trust y.

was the effect of a

restrictive stock

agreement on the value of shares included in the decedent's estate. Through a
revocable trust the decedent had an interest in 86% of the stock of CamVic Corp.
The decedent's wife owned 1.9%, and other members of the decedent's family owned
the remaining shares.
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In 1975

the

shareholders

entered into an agreement giving

other

shareholders the option to purchase the decedent's stock at the decedent's death
for $11,333 per share.

The decedent died on September 10, 1990 and the estate

valued the shares at $11,333 per share.
The Court used an analysis based on the Lauder case:

r

In Estate of Lauder v.
Commissioner,
summarized these requirements:

r

It is axiomatic that the offering price must be fixed
and determinable under the agreement. In addition, the
agreement must be binding on the parties both during
life and after death. Finally, the restrictive agreement
must have been entered into for a bona fide business
reason and must not be a substitute for a testamentary
disposition. [Citations omitted.]

r

the

supra,

we

The analysis is similar to that of section 2703, in effect today.
The first issue was whether the decedent was bound by the Agreement:

r

r
r
I

r
r
r
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r
r

r
r
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r

The original Buy-Sell Agreement, executed in May 1975,
expressly provided that "This Agreement may be amended
or altered by the written consent of the holder of at
least seventy-five percent (75%) of the issued and
outstanding shares of the Corporation." Decedent owned
a beneficial interest (via the CWB Trust) in 86 percent
of CamVic's outstanding stock on the date the Buy-Sell
Agreement was executed and for the remainder of his
life. This beneficial interest included the right to
vote the shares. Thus, the plain wording of the Buy-Sell
Agreement leaves no question as to the unilateral
authority
that
decedent
possessed.
Decedent
singlehandedly could have altered the price-per-share
clause, as well as any other terms of the agreement.
Ronald [the decedent's son] testified that the parties
to the original agreement never intended that decedent
should have the unilateral right to amend and that, in
1981 (6 years later), Ronald discovered this "error" in
the agreement. We cannot accept this explanation. The
evidence indicates that decedent was a man who liked to
control his affairs. In 1975, he was 62 years old and in
good health. The language of the agreement is clear. It
was signed in 1975 by decedent, Ronald, and Kenneth
Hughes. Mr. Hughes prepared the agreement and was also
the trustee of the CWE Trust. We have no doubt that
decedent, Ronald, and the attorneys at Santen, Santen
Hughes recognized that the agreement gave decedent the
authority
to
amend
the
agreement.
Under
these
circumstances, we need not, and do not, accept Ronald's
self-serving and uncorroborated testimony that the 1981
change was simply a correction of a scrivener's error in
the 1975 Buy-Sell Agreement.
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The next issue is whether the terms of the Revised
Agreement executed in 1981 were binding on decedent.
Pursuant to the Revised Agreement, the holders of at
least 87.5 percent of CamVic stock could alter the terms
of the agreement. While decedent held a beneficial
interest in only 86 percent of the corporation's stock,
his wife Marcella owned an additional 1.9 percent.
Marcella did not actively participate in the affairs of
the corporation. With Marcella's interest, decedent
would have held the requisite amount of stock ownership
to alter the agreement. Decedent also could have gained
the required percentage if Marcella had predeceased him.
We note that decedent's son, Ronald, and Ronald's three
children, i.e.,
those shareholders with interests
presumably adverse to the interests of an older majority
shareholder, never had the abili ty by themselves to
prevent decedent from amending the Revised Agreement. We
view the Revised Agreement as an attempt to remedy an
estate tax problem, while at the same time allowing
decedent to retain the effective ability to alter the
terms of the Revised Agreement.

..
..

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that neither the
original Buy-Sell Agreement nor the Revised Agreement
was
binding
on
decedent
during
his
lifetime.
Nevertheless, even assuming that either agreement is
construed as binding, petitioners still would not
prevail because, as explained later, we believe that the
Buy-Sell
Agreement
and
Revised
Agreement
were
testamentary devices to transfer decedent's interest in
camVic's stock to the natural objects of his bounty.
The Court also considered whether the agreements served a business purpose:
Petitioners raise several business purposes which they
contend were furthered by the Buy-Sell Agreement. First,
they maintain that the agreement was intended to
preserve family control within the group consisting of
the CamVic shareholders. The preservation of family
ownership and control of a corporation
has been
recognized in certain cases as a legitimate business
purpose. See Estate of Bischoff y. Commissioner, 69 T.C.
at 39-40; Estate of Littick y. commissioner, 31 T.C.
181, 187 (1958); Estate of Lauder y. Commissioner,
supra.

-

Petitioners also assert that the Buy-Sell Agreement was
intended to prevent Ronald from leaving CamVic.
Respondent contends
that
the evidence
fails
to
demonstrate that Ronald was uniquely qualified for any
of his responsibilities at CamVic such that there was a
bona fide business need to retain him.
Ronald began working for CamVic in 1959. Ronald
testified that he supervised the construction of Dina
Terrace, and he drew the plans for and supervised the
construction of Dina Tower. When these apartments were
completed, Ronald managed the properties for CamVic.
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Moreover, Ronald testified that he and decedent had
conflicting business philosophies. Ronald stated that he
believed CamVic should build and manage properties,
whereas decedent had a build and sell philosophy. Ronald
further testified that decedent had previously made
impulsive business decisions which Ronald believed were
to the detriment of CamVic. For instance, Ronald
testified that decedent had constructed a golf course on
land unsuitable for that purpose, purchased a mobile
home park in a flood plain at a price above the land's
appraised value, and insisted on purchasing nearly 4
acres of land for a car wash when a half acre was
sufficient. Ronald stated that these concerns prompted
him to approach Mr. Hughes, who, in turn, suggested the
efficacy of a restrictive stock agreement.
Following our review of the record, we find that
Ronald's retention played some part in the creation of
the Buy-Sell Agreement. At the time the agreement was
created, Ronald was relatively young and had already
worked at CamVic for over 20 years. During that time, he
had gained solid experience through his work wi th
CamVic s properties. Ronald also had concerns with
respect to his security in the business. Under these
circumstances, we conclude that it was reasonable for
Ronald to attempt to solidify his future at CamVic
through the creation of a restrictive stock agreement.
We find that there was some business purpose for
entering into the Buy-Sell Agreement and the Revised
Agreement.
I

However, the Court concluded the agreements were a testamentary device:
First, the purchase price set forth in the agreements
was fixed at $11,333.30 per share. It was not subject to
any periodic reevaluation in order to account for an
increase in CamVic's value. We find it unrealistic to
assume that decedent, as the majority shareholder, would
have negotiated a fixed price for the agreements if he
had been bargaining with unrelated parties.

r

r
r
r

r
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Petitioners argue that the Buy-Sell Agreement was not a
testamentary device because real estate values fluctuate
and
decedent
had
personally
experienced
these
fluctuations in his own business. We fail to see how
concern about the fluctuation in the value of real
es ta te
or
CamVic ' s
shares
could
have
been
a
nontestamentary purpose for decedent to have agreed to
a fixed price per share. The Buy-Sell Agreement granted
a purchase option; it did not require CamVic or the
other shareholders to buy the shares if tendered. If the
value of the shares declined, below $11,333.30, the
rights to buy shares pursuant to the agreement would not
be exercised. Therefore, neither decedent nor his estate
was protected in the event of declining values. On the
other hand, if the value of real estate in general, and
CamVic in particular, rose, neither decedent nor his
estate could sell the controlling interest in CamVic for
more than $11,333.30. The only beneficiaries of an
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increase in the value of CamVic's stock were the natural
objects of decedent's bounty.
In addition to the fixed price per share, the generous
payment terms of the Buy-Sell Agreement and the Revised
Agreement are a further indication of their testamentary
nature.
Under the agreements, payments could be made
pursuant to the following terms: A 10-percent cash
downpayment and a promissory note to pay 10 annual
installments with the unpaid balance accruing interest
at a 5-percent annual rate. Petitioners' own expert
witness stated that in the first half of 1975 banks were
not granting loans to borrowers who had less than an AAA
credit history, and the interest rate on business loans
in excess of $1 million during this period was 11.81
percent. He also stated that in 1981 the prime interest
ra te exceeded 21 percent. Based on these figures,
purchasers of CamVic under the agreements enjoyed the
benefit of an interest rate that was less than one-half
of the rate for 1975 and less than one-fourth of the
rate for 1981.
We are also unpersuaded that decedent was anticipating
a decline in value. There is no credible evidence
suggesting that CamVic's value was declining at the time
the original Buy-Sell Agreement was executed in 1975 or
in 1981. Indeed, valuations of CamVic stock made between
1969 and 1974 indicate that CamVic's value was actually
increasing during this time. On a gift tax return filed
January 8, 1969, decedent reported the value of 9 shares
of CamVic stock that he had gifted to Ronald at
$7,091.07 per share. When CamVic later merged on June
21, 1971, with two other corporations owned by the
Bommer family, the value of CamVic's stock for purposes
of computing the exchange ratio for the merger was
$14,192.45 per share. In addition, between 1972 and
1974, decedent made several gifts of CamVic stock to
Ronald and his grandchildren. Each gift was valued for
gift tax purposes at $15,105.74 per share.

...

-

...

...

Second, an inference of testamentary device can be drawn
from the manner in which the parties elected the
$11,333.30 price per share for the purchase of CamVic
stock. Decedent was an experienced businessman, yet he
failed to obtain a professional appraisal of CamVic, its
subsidiaries, or its real properties. Instead, decedent
did nothing more than consult with his attorney Mr.
Hughes. Decedent and Ronald had one meeting with Mr.
Hughes, who completed his computation, upon which the
above price per share was based, in 1 day. No bona fide
negotiations occurred with respect to the stock price,
as Mr. Hughes and his law firm represented all parties
to the Buy-Sell Agreement. Instead, the parties selected
a value of $11,333.30 per share, a price which was
approximately $4,000 less than the value decedent had
reported for every gift of CamVic stock he made between
1972 and 1974.

...
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The Court also determined that $11,333 was not the fair value of a share
either when the agreements were entered into or at death.
7•

continues

valuation of plm; ly Limited Partnerships.
to assert

the

inapplicability of discounts

partnership which owned farmland,

The National
for

a

family

limited

where the partnership was formed when the

decedent was terminally ill and about two months before his death.
8.

Office

TAM 9730004.

Valuation Where Securities Restriction Disappears at Death.

The

r

Ninth Circuit has addressed an interesting fact pattern in Estate of McClatchy

r

securities restrictions; the estate was not.

r
r
r

r
r
I

r
r

r

r

r
r

r

v. Commissioner,

81 AFTR 2d i98-5001.

The decedent was subject to Rule 144
What effect had the restrictions

on the value of the stock?
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held that the stock should be
valued pursuant to the restriction:
The federal estate tax is a tax on lithe transfer of the
taxable estate of.
. decedent.
26 U.S.C. section
2001(a)i see also United States Trust Co. V. Helvering,
307 U.S. 57, 60 (1939) ("[A]n estate tax is not levied
upon the property of which an estate is composed. It is
an excise imposed upon the transfer of or shifting in
relationships to property at death."); Ithaca Trust Co.
V. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929) (liThe tax is
on the act of the testator not on the receipt of
property by the legatees. "); Young Men s Christian Ass' n
v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47, 50 (1924) ("YMCA") ("What this law
taxes is not the interest to which the legatees and
devisees succeeded on death, but the interest which
ceased by reason of the death. ") .
The value of the
estate includes lithe value of all property to the extent
of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of
his death.
26 U.S.C. section 2033.
At issue is
whether the stock is to be valued in the hands of the
decedent or the estate for estate tax purposes.
II

I

II

There is no question that the estate tax is on the
transfer of property at death and that, therefore, the
property to be valued is the interest transferred at
death, " r ather than the interest held by the decedent
before death or that held by the legatee after death.
Propstra V. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir.
1982) (citing Estate of Bright V. United States, 658
F.2d 999, 1001 (Former 5th Cir. 1981) (en bane)).
However, the Commissioner argues that, because the stock
was
transferred
to
a
non-affiliate estate upon
McClatchy's death, this is one of those rare cases in
which death itself alters the value of the property. See
II
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McClatchy, 106 T.C. at 214 (reasoning that the stock
transferred "at the moment of death and passed to the
decedent's
estate, "
causing
the
securities
laws
restrictions to "evaporate [ ] at the moment of death").
According to the Commissioner, then, the stock is to be
valued at its higher value in the hands of the
non-affiliate
estate
because
the
property
was
transformed prior to distribution to the estate.
The Commissioner relies on Abmanson Found. v. United
States, 674 F.2d 761, 767-68 (9th Cir. 1981), and
similar cases where death itself alters the value of the
decedent's property. In Abmanson, the decedent held,
through a revocable trust, a controlling interest (600
shares) in voting common stock of HFA, a holding company
which owned 81 percent of the stock of Horne Savings &
Loan Association. Also in the trust were all 100 shares
(99 nonvoting and one voting share) of Ahrnanco, a
corporate shell with no assets prior to the decedent's
death.
At the moment of death, Ahrnanco became
unconditionally entitled to the 600 shares of voting HFA
common stock, pursuant to declarations of trust. Under
the same declarations, Ahrnanson Foundation, a charitable
organization, became entitled to the 99 nonvoting shares
of Ahrnanco, and the voting share remained in the control
of Ahrnanson's family. The court stated that valuation
must "take into account any transformations of the
property that are logically prior to its distribution to
the beneficiaries," and so the Ahrnanco shares were to be
valued based on the 600 shares of HFA that passed at
death.
Id. at 767.
The court noted that, although
death itself does not usually alter the value of
property owned by the decedent, in some instances, such
as in the death of a key partner, death might change the
value. Id. at 768 (citing united States v. Land, 303
F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1962)).
The Foundation argued that the Ahrnanco shares should be
split into two blocks for valuation, with its 99
nonvoting Ahrnanco shares valued separately from the
voting share.
Id.
The court declined to value the
nonvoting shares separately from the voting share,
reasoning that "'predistribution' transformations and
changes in value brought about by the testator's death
[must be distinguished] from changes in value resulting
f~om the fact that under the decedent's estate plan the
assets in the gross estate ultimately corne to rest in
the hands of different beneficiaries."
Id. The court
therefore concluded that the 100 shares should be
"viewed in the hands of the testator," not as two
separate assets, because "nothing in the statutes or in
the case law . . . suggests that valuation of the gross
estate should take into account that the assets will
corne to rest in several hands rather than one." Id. at
768-69.
In .I&llil, a parQ1ership interest was restricted to
two-thirds of its value during the partner's lifetime,
but upon death, the surviving partners had to pay full
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value in order to purchase the interest. Because death
"sealed the fact" that the interests would be purchased
at full value, the court ruled that the full value
controlled for estate tax purposes.
303 F.2d at 175.
In Goodman y. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1957),
another case on which the Conunissioner relies, an
employment contract provided for the payment of benefits
after the termination of employment, dependent upon
contingencies which could cause forfeiture of the
payments.
Upon the employee's death, however, the
possibility of any of the contingencies occurring was
extinguished. The court reasoned that "[d]eath ripened
the interest in the deferred payments into an absolute
one;" consequently, the estate tax was measured by "the
value of that absolute interest in property." 243 F.2d
at 269.
In these cases, death clearly is the precipitating event
and is the only event required to fix the value of the
property. Similarly, the death of a key partner can
instantly decrease the value of a business. See
Abmanson, 674 F.2d at 768. But in the instant case,
death alone did not effect the transformation in the
stock's value. The value of the stock was transformed
only because the estate was a non-affiliate.
Thus,
contrary to the conunissioner's assertion, the property
was not transformed prior to distribution to the estate.
If the estate had been an affiliate, the securities law
restrictions still would have applied.
See 17 C.F.R.
section 230.144{e) (3) (v) (setting forth restrictions on
sale of securities by an affiliate estate but providing
no limitation for a non-affiliate estate).
The affiliate or non-affiliate status of an estate
depends on the status of the executor or other person
who serves "in any similar capacity." 17 C. F . R. section
230.144 (a) (2) (ii).
The personal representatives for
the estate were not issued letters testamentary until 25
days after McClatchy's death.
The restrictions
therefore did not evaporate at the moment of death.
Making the amount of estate tax dependent on the
affiliate or non-affiliate status of the executor
contradicts the principle that valuation should not
depend on the status of the recipient.
See Estate of
BOnner y. United States, 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996)
(the fact that decedent held a partial interest in
property whose remaining interest was held in a trust
that was included in decedent's estate did not allow the
interests to be merged for 100% ownership of the assets
by the estate); Ahmanson, 674 F. 2d at 768 ("To take into
account for valuation purposes the fact that the
testator's unitary holding has become divided in the
hands of two or more beneficiaries, would invite
abuse."); Bright, 658 F.2d at 1006 ("It would be strange
indeed if the estate tax value of a block of stock would
vary depending upon the legatee to whom it was
devised.") .
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The dissent stated:
Applying the logic and language of Abmanson to the
instant case, McClatchy's death altered the value of his
property by causing the shares to be passed to his
non-affiliate estate, thereby voiding the restrictions
that had previously attached on account of McClatchy's
affiliate status. As in Ahmanson, the transformation at
issue here -- the lapse of the securities restrictions
went into effect prior to the distribution of
McClatchy's property to his beneficiaries.
Under
Abmanson, this pre-distribution transformation must be
considered in determining McClatchy's estate tax
liability.

-

The hypotheticals offered by the Ahmanson court to
illustrate the difference between pre-distribution and
post-distribution transformations
in a
decedent's
property fully support the Tax Court's decision.
For
example,
the Abmanson court posed the following
scenario: "[I]f a public figure ordered his executor to
shred and burn his papers, and then to turn the ashes
over to a newspaper, the value to be counted would be
the value of the ashes, rather than the papers."
Id.
Here, McClatchy's estate plan ordered that the stock be
transferred to his executors prior to being distributed
to his beneficiaries. Like the papers in the Abmanson
example, the stock should be valued in the aftermath of
the pre-distribution transformation,
free of the
restrictions that attached while the stock was still in
McClatchy's possession.
The majority reasons
that whereas
the property
transformation in the Ahmanson "ashes" example was
occasioned by "death alone," the property transformation
in the case at bar was occasioned by the non-affiliate
status of decedent's estate. Given that the papers in
the Ahmanson hypothetical were not burned and shred as
a direct result of the decedent's death, but rather as
the result of an order contained within the estate plan,
I find the majority's distinction unconvincing.

-

Moreover, I believe that the Fifth Circuit's opinion in
United States y, Land, 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1962),
which the majority cites in support of its decision,
only bolsters the Tax Court's reasoning. The Land court
held that in determining the federal estate tax,
restrictions applicable by virtue of the decedent's
status in life must be disregarded:
To find the fair market value of a property
interest at the decedent's death we put ourselves
in the position of a potential purchaser of the
interest at that time.
Such a person would not
be influenced in his calculations by past risks
that had failed to materialize or by restrictions
that had ended. Death tolls the bell for risks,
contingencies, or restrictions which exist only
during the life of the decedent.
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Id. at 173. Here, McClatchy's death "tolled the bell"
for the securities law restrictions that existed only
during his lifetime. In the words of the Tax Court, the
restrictions "evaporated at the moment of death."

r

McClatchy attempts to confuse the issue by obscuring the
difference between the transfer to his estate and the
subsequent transfer to his beneficiaries or legatees.
McClatchy maintains, for example, that "[c]hanges in the
value of an asset which occur by reason of the identity
and status of the recipient, not death, must be ignored
for estate tax purposes."
McClatchy's use of the
generic term "recipient" blurs the line between the
estate and the ultimate beneficiary of the decedent's
property interest.
Of course, it is well-established
that changes in value resulting from distribution to
beneficiaries or legatees are not accounted for in
determining the federal estate tax. See, e.g., Ithaca
Trust Co. y. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929).
However, this court held in Abmanson that there is a
sharp distinction for estate tax purposes between preand post-distribution changes in the value of a
decedent's property.
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9.

Discount Levels.

the court allowed a
marketability.

In Dockery y. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. 2032 (1998)

40% discount for a minority interest and for a lack of

KPMG Peat Marwick did the appraisal for the taxpayer.

The

examining agent was Ray Wise who allowed a 35% discount.
In Estate of Furman y.

commissioner,

75 T.C.M.

2206

(1998)

the court

!

allowed a 40% cumulative minority interest and lack of marketability discount,

r

plus a 10% key person discount.

r

r
r

The court accepted the taxpayer appraiser's

methods:
Peti tioners rely on the expert report of Francis X.
Burns (Mr. Burns) and Brian R. Oliver (Mr. Oliver) of
IPC Group, LLC (IPC). Messrs. Burns and Oliver are both
experienced in business valuation and, in addition to
their undergraduate degrees, hold master's degrees in
finance from Northwestern University's Kellogg School of
Management. Although Messrs. Burns and Oliver are not
formally accredited as appraisers, we are satisfied that
they are qualified to perform a business valuation.
Fed. R. Evid. 702; see Martin Ice Cream Co. y.
Commissioner, 110 T.C.
,
(1998) (slip op. at 52) .

r

IPC valued the FIC shares using two approaches: A
capitalized income method (income method) and a multiple
of EBITDA method (EBITDA multiple method) .

r
r
,.

Applying the income method, IPC determined per-share
values for the stock transferred in the 1980 Gifts and
the 1981 Recapitalization of $7,388 and $4,273,
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respectively.
Value was determined under the income
method by capitalizing a measure of normalized earnings,
adding the fair market value of nonoperating assets, and
then applying a marketability discount to the per-share
value.
IPC determined normalized earnings using net
operating cash-flow available to equity holders (NCF),
adjusted to reflect noncash charges.
In valuing the
1980 Gifts, IPC used the NCF for FY 1979, a 10-month
fiscal year.
A weighted average of the net operating
cash- flows for the previous 3 years was used to compute
the August 1981 fair market value of the stock.
IPC applied CAPM principles to determine the rate of
return an investor would expect in February 1980 and
August 1981.
IPC used market data from Ibbotson
Associates and determined that the expected rate of
return an investor in FIC stock would demand would be
equal to the sum of the applicable risk-free rate, risk
premium, and small-stock premium, as well as an
additional premium to account for the risk specific to
FIC.
To reflect the effect of nominal long-term
earnings growth, IPC subtracted a growth factor from the
expected rate of return and determined a capitalization
rate of 21.38 percent for valuing the 1980 Gifts and a
25.50 percent capitalization rate for valuing the stock
transferred in the Recapitalization.
After capitalizing normalized earnings to determine
enterprise value from operations, IPC added the market
value of FIC's nonoperating assets to determine total
equity value. IPC computed a per-share equity value of
$11,366 for the 1980 Gifts and $6,574 per share for the
Recapitalization.
IPC
then
determined
that
a
marketability discount of 35 percent should be applied
because of the following factors: (1) The transactions
at issue involved minority interests, which are harder
to sell; (2) the size of FIC precluded the possibility
of a public offering; and (3), as of the relevant dates,
no dividends had ever been paid by FIC on its common
stock. After applying the marketability discount, IPC
determined that the fair market value of the stock, per
share, was $7,388 in 1980 and $4,273 in 1981.
In
comparison, book value per share after applying a
30-percent minority interest discount and a 35-percent
marketability discount was determined to be $4,703 in
1980 and $5,048 in 1981. Applying book value as a floor
in the valuation, IPC determined that use of the income
method resulted in an undervaluation.
Peti tioners have relied upon IPC' s second method of
valuation, the EBITDA multiple method.
Under this
method, a multiple of net earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) was used
to determine total enterprise value. IPC determined the
EBITDA of FIC for the FY 1979 through FY 1981.
In
valuing the 1980 Gifts, IPC used a multiple of FY 1979
EBITDA; a multiple of the weighted average of EBITDA for
FY 1979 through FY 1981 was used to value the stock
transferred in the Recapitalization. The parties have
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stipulated FIC's EBITDA for FY 1979 through FY 1981,

using the figures determined by IPC.
IPC determined that a multiple of 4 to 6 times EBITDA
was a commonly used valuation guideline that should be
applied in this case. IPC determined that high interest
rates, a sluggish economy, and the high returns required
by investors in small companies were factors that would
depress the value of FIC stock, leading to a multiple in
the order of 4.0 to 4.5, while the modestly successful
sales growth of FIC between 1979 and 1981 suggested a
multiple of 5.0 to 5.5.
IPC concluded that FIC should
be valued using an EBITDA multiple of 5.0 for both 1980
and 1981.
After determining total enterprise value, IPC made
various adjustments, such as subtracting the value of
outstanding debt, to determine total equity value, which
was then converted to equity value per share.
Equity
value per share was determined to be $20,842 in February
1980 and $26,245 in August 1981.
After applying a
30-percent minority discount, a 35-percent marketability
discount, and a 10-percent key-person discount, or a
total of 59.05 percent in discounts, IPC determined a
fair market value per share of $8,535 in February 1980
and $10,747 in August 1981; following these conclusions
would result in an overstatement of $10,806 for Royal
and Maude's 1980 taxable gifts, and zero taxable gifts
for their transfers in 1981.
We found Messrs. Burns and Oliver to be qualified,
experienced, and credible expert witnesses.
We agree
with them that valuing FIC using the income method would
not be appropriate inasmuch as the income method
produces a value less than book value for August 1981.
While it is odd that the use of an accepted method like
this one would produce a value lower than book value,
this oddity is explained by IPC's incorrect computation
of book value for August 1981, and, we suspect, an
overstated capitalization rate.
With respect to the appropriate discounts, the opinion states:
Because the blocks of stock transferred in the 1980
Gifts and in the 1981 Recapitalization were minority
interests, it is appropriate to apply a minority
interest discount in their valuation. Since the willing
buyer-willing seller test is an objective test,
requiring that potential transactions be analyzed from
the viewpoint of a hypothetical seller, whether a block
of stock is a minority interest must be determined
without regard to the identity and holdings of the
transferee. See Estate of watts v. Commissioner, 823
F.2d 483, 486-487 (11th Cir. 1987), affg. T.C. Memo.
1985-595; Estate of Bright y. United States, 658 F.2d at
1005-1006. Consequently, the fact that the 1980 Gifts
enabled Robert Furman to gain control of FIC can not be
considered.
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Both parties agree that a minority discount should be
applied in valuing both the 1980 Gifts and 1981
transfers by decedents in the Recapitalization, although
we do not understand how respondent's expert determined
that both a minority discount and a control premium
should be applied, since the two are essentially
opposites.
We recognize that a hypothetical investor
would not be willing to purchase a minority interest in
FIC without a significant discount; no matter how
successful the corporation, a minority interest in a
corporation that does not pay dividends and whose stock
does not have a ready market is of limited value.
Petitioners' expert cited three articles on minority
discounts. The first, Bolten, "Discounts for Stocks of
Closely Held Corporations", 129 Tr. & Est. 47 (Dec.
1990), summarized nine studies regarding discounts for
minority interests that indicated a mean discount of
29.63 percent. The second article, "Survey Shows Trend
Towards Larger Minority Discounts", 10 Est. Planning 281
(Sept. 1983), summarized the results of a study
conducted by H. Calvin Coolidge that compared the actual
sales of minority interests in closely held corporations
to the reported book value of those corporations. The
Coolidge study found an average discount of 39.9 percent
and a median discount of 39 percent against book value.
The third article cited by IPC, Pratt, "Discounts and
Premia", in Valuation of Closely Held Companies and
Inactively Traded Securities 38 (Dec. 5, 1989) (on file
with The Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts),
summarized several empirical studies regarding both
minority and marketability discounts.
By analyzing
control premium data, Pratt found an implied minority
discount of approximately 33 percent for 1980 and 1981
in the studied transactions.
Based on the cited
articles, IPC determined that a 30-percent minority
interest discount was appropriate.
We do not believe that any control premium is warranted.
We reject respondent's argument that a swing vote
potential existed,
since we have found that the
transferred shares did not have swing vote potential.
We are required to value the shares as if they were
transferred to a hypothetical buyer and are not
permitted to take into account the circumstances of the
actual transferee in valuing the shares.

-

...

-

* * *
The factors limiting the marketability of stock in FIC
in February 1980 and August 1981 included the following:
(1) FIC had never paid dividends on its common stock;
(2) the corporation was managed and controlled by one
individual; (3) the blocks of stock to be transferred
were minority interests; (4) a long holding period was
required to realize a return; (5) FIC had no custom or
policy of redeeming common stock; (6) because FIC's
annual sales were only in the $7 million range, it was
not likely to go public; and (7) there was no secondary
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market for FIC stock. While FIC had significant
potential for controlled growth, a healthy balance
sheet, and robust earnings growth, we find the factors
limiting marketability to be significant.
In concluding that a 35-percent marketability discount
should be applied, petitioners' expert cited four
articles, including three studies on the sale of
restricted stock that have been frequently brought to
the attention of this Court. See, e.g., Estate of Jung
v.
Commissioner,
101 T.C.
412,
435-436
(1993);
Mandelbaum y. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-255 (1995),
affd. without published opinion 91 F.3d 124 (3d Cir.
1996); Estate of Lauder y. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1992-736; Estate of Friedberg y. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1992-310; Estate of Berg y. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1991-279, affd. in part and revd. and remanded in
part 976 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1992); Estate of O'Connell
y. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1978-191, affd. in part and
revd. in part 640 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1981). The first
restricted stock study, Gelman, "An Economist-Financial
Analyst's Approach to Valuing Stock of a Closely-Held
Company", 36 J. Taxn. 353 (June 1972), studied the
transactions of four large, closed-end publicly traded
investment companies that specialized in restricted
securities.
The study found mean marketability
discounts of 33 percent after analyzing 89 restricted
stock investments by the four investment companies. The
second study, Moroney, "Most Courts Overvalue Closely
Held Stocks", 51 Taxes 144 (Mar. 1973), is based on 10
registered investment companies that held a total of 146
blocks of restricted equity securities.
The Moroney study found an average discount on the
restricted stock transactions of 35.6 percent.
The
third study, Maher, "Discounts for Lack of Marketability
for Closely Held Business Interests", 54 Taxes 562
(Sept. 1976), is based on reports filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission by four mutual fund
companies reporting their restricted stock transactions.
The Maher study found a mean discount of 34.73 percent.
The final study cited was an IPO study, Emory, "The
Value of Marketability as Illustrated in Initial Public
Offerings of Common Stock February 1992 through July
1993", Bus. Valuation Rev. 3 (Mar. 1994).
The Emory
study found an average marketability discount of 46
percent after comparing the share price in private
transactions that occurred within 5 months of an IPO by
the same corporation. We find petitioners' reliance on
the restricted stock studies to be misplaced, since
those studies analyzed only restricted stock that had a
holding period of 2 years.
Inasmuch as we expect the
investment time horizon of an investor in the stock of
a closely held corporation like FIC to be long term, we
do not believe that marketability concerns rise to the
same level as a security with a short-term holding
period like restricted stock.
In light of the
foregoing, we find no persuasive evidence in the record
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to support our reliance on the restricted stock studies
in determining an appropriate marketability discount.

-

The court allowed a key person discount:
Where a corporation is substantially dependent upon the
services of one person, and where that person would no
longer be able to perform services for the corporation
by reason of death or incapacity, an investor would
expect some form of discount below fair market value
when purchasing stock in the corporation to compensate
for the loss of that key employee. See Estate of
Huntsman y. Cqrnmissioner, 66 T.C. 861 (1976); Estate of
Mitchell y, Cqrnmissioner, supra; Estate of Feldmar y.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-429; Estate of Yeager v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-448. Although FIC could
have purchased key-person l i fe insurance on Robert's
life, a minority shareholder could not compel FIC to
purchase such insurance, and FIC had no such insurance
in effect.

}

..

We have found as facts that Robert was a key person in
the management of FIC, that FIC had no second layer of
management, and that Robert's contacts, experience, and
managerial expertise were critically important to the
success of FIC. While the operation of a franchised
Burger King restaurant might appear to be formulaic, FIC
was
a
growing
organization,
and
Robert's
responsibilities extended well beyond the operation of
existing restaurants.
Moreover,
since BKC had
considerable control over FIC's costs,
expansion
opportunities, competition, and ultimately profits,
Robert's personal relationships with the founders of BKC
were very helpful to the success of FIC. We therefore
agree with petitioners and find that a key-person
discount of 10 percent was appropriate in determining
the value of FIC stock as of February 1980 and August
1981.

-

The total discount was 46%.
10.

Market Absorption Discount.

Estate of Auker y. Commissioner,

75

T.C.M. 2321 (1998) involved the calculation of a market absorption discount in
apartment complexes owned by the decedent.

wi th respect to the factors to

consider, the opinion stats:
Finding none of the experts dispositive to our decision
in this case, we address the issue on the basis of the
record before us, which is abundant with data on the
subject properties and their marketability. In passing
on whether a market absorption discount applies in the
instant setting, and the amount of such a discount if it
does apply, we utilize a five-part analysis. First, we
examine the assets to be valued and categorize these
assets by type. Second, we ascertain the market value
(i.e., the fair market value without consideration of a
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discount for market absorption) of each asset in each
category, assuming that each asset will be marketed
separately. Third, we compare the number of assets in
each category to the number of assets of that type which
are traded in the market over a reasonable period of
time. Fourth, we ascertain how much longer than this
reasonable time period it would take to sell at market
value (as defined above) each asset that could not be
sold in this reasonable time period. Fifth, we discount
the value of each asset in the category of assets that
cannot be sold within a reasonable time period, taking
into account the time value of money and the period of
time that the category of assets would have to be
marketed in order to sell each asset therein.
The court concluded:
We must discount the value of each apartment complex
that cannot be sold within a reasonable time, taking
into account the time value of money and the time that
each complex must be marketed in order to be sold. For
purposes of our analysis, we use the following formula
to calculate the applicable present value rates: 1--(1
+- i/n) -ny; i equals the discount rate, n equals the
number of months over which the discount rate is
compounded, and y equals the number of years involved.
We round percentages to the third decimal point, and we
round dollar amounts to the nearest dollar.
The appraisers factored an 18-month marketing period
into their market value of each apartment complex.
Thus, we do not take the 18-month period after the
applicable valuation date into account to arrive at the
market absorption discount that applies herein. We have
concluded that it would take a total of 42 months to
sell all three complexes, or, in other words, 18 months
after the end of the 6-month reasonable period of time
starting 18 months after the applicable valuation date.
Thus, one complex would sell within the reasonable time
and the other two would not; of the two that would sell
outside this time, one would sell 6 months after the end
of it and the other would sell 18 months after the end
of it.
The appraisers applied 9.738-percent capitalization
rates to Stonehenge and Fox Hill and a 10.238-percent
capitalization rate to The Landings in order to
ascertain their values.
We believe that
this
capitalization rate reflects the time value of money,
and that a weighted average of the rates (i.e., 9.905
percent) is the appropriate annual rate to use to
determine the complexes market absorption discount. As
to the base to which this rate is applied, we use the
average market value of the three complexes.
We must
determine how much lower than the market value a
hypothetical seller will have to drop his or her price
for each complex in order to sell all three within a
reasonable time after the applicable valuation date. It
would be inappropriate to apply the full discount to all
I
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three complexes because only two must be discounted in
order to sell them within the reasonable time. However,
if we were to discount two complexes, but not the other
one, the discounted complexes, which are essentially
similar to the remaining complex, but for the discount,
would sell and the complex that was not discounted would
not.
To overcome this dilemma, we determine the
discount on each complex that will not sell within the
reasonable of time and apportion one-third of the
aggregate
discount
to
each complex
so
that
a
hypothetical buyer will buy all three complexes within
the reasonable time.
Because we are unsure which
complexes will not sell within the reasonable time, we
determine the discount on the basis of the complexes'
average market value.
A discount of 6.189% was allowed.
11.

Undivided :Interelt in Realty.

Folklore says that a

15% -

discount for an undivided interest in real property is sustainable.
Williams v. cgmmissioner, 75 T.C.M. 1758 (1998) allowed a 44% discount.

20%

Estate of
The IRS

would have allowed only a 5% discount, which corresponded roughly to the costs
of partition.
expert.

The court rejected this approach and relied on the taxpayer's

The opinion is worth reviewing in detail:
The applicability and extent of a discount for a
fractional interest is a question of fact to be decided
based on the entire record.
Estate of Fawcett v.
commissioner, 64 T.C. 889, 898 (1975); Estate of
Campanari v. Commissioner, 5 T.. C. 488, 492 (1945).
Courts have held that the sum of all fractional
interests can be less than the whole and have used
fractional interest discounts to value undivided
interests. Estate of BOnner v. United States, 84 F.3d
196, 197 (5th Cir. 1996); Estate of Bright v. United
States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981); see, e.g., Estate
of Wildman v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo.
1989-667
(40-percent discount); Estate of van Loben Sels v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-501 (60-percent discount) .

-

Respondent offered no evidence relating to the size of
the discount that should apply, and concedes that a
5-percent discount should apply. Petitioners' expert,
Wiggins, testified that the value of petitioner's
undivided one-half interests in timberland should be
discounted by 44 percent.
a. WHETHER PETITIONERS' PROPERTY INTERESTS SHOULD
BE DISCOUNTED ABSENT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL SALES OF
FRACTIONAL INTERESTS IN REAL PROPERTY
Respondent contends that no discount larger than 5
percent should apply because petitioner offered no
evidence of actual sales of fractional interests in real
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property. We disagree.
Pitts credibly testified that
banks generally will not lend money to the owner of a
fractional interest in real property without the consent
of the coowner.
We believe that Moses' and pitts'
inability to find sales of fractional interests in
comparable real property in Florida shows that there was
no market for fractional interests in such real
property.
Respondent points out that neither Moses nor Elmore
applied a discount for a fractional interest in real
estate.
We give little weight to the fact that Moses
did not discount the property interests at issue here
because petitioner retained him to value the fee simple
interests in the properties, not petitioner's or
decedent' s
undivided
one-half
interests
in
the
properties.

....

b. WHETHER THE DISCOUNT SHOULD BE LIMITED TO
SCRUBY'S ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF PARTITIONING THE
PROPERTY INTERESTS
Respondent points out that respondent's 5-percent
discount equals $41,300 (2,360 acres x $350 x .05) for
the 1980 gift and $52,087.50 (2,315 acres x $450 x .05)
for the 1983 gift. Respondent argues that we should not
apply a discount greater than 5 percent because the
5-percent discount
is
greater
than petitioners'
expert's,
Scruby' s,
estimate
of
the
costs
of
partitioning the properties. We disagree.
First,
Wiggins estimated that partition costs here would be
substantially more than respondent's 5-percent discount,
that is, $164,400 for the Putnam County property,
$172,500 for the Clay County property, and $76,500 for
the estate property. Second, respondent's 5-percent
discount does not give adequate weight to other reasons
for discounting a fractional interest in real property,
such as lack of control and the historic difficulty of
selling an undivided fractional interest in real
property, discussed below.
c. DISCOUNTS FOR LACK OF MARKETABILITY AND LACK OF
CONTROL

-

-

Petitioners'
expert,
Wiggins,
testified that the
fractional interests at issue here should be discounted
by 20 percent due to lack of marketability and by 30
percent for lack of control and the necessity of
resorting to partition and related costs to liquidate
one's interest, for a total discount of 44 percent. He
concluded that a marketability discount is appropriate
because of the 9-month marketing time and 10-percent
real estate commission cost involved in selling real
property in that particular market.
He said that the
holder of a fractional interest in real estate lacks
control because he or she cannot unilaterally decide how
to manage it. Wiggins noted that a partition action can
take a considerable amount of time and expense.
He
estimated that partition costs would be $164,400 for the
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1980 transfer, $172,500 for the 1983 transfer, and
$76,500 for the estate property because the properties
are irregularly shaped parcels and contain pineland,
swampland, and riverfront acreage. Respondent did not
cross-examine Wiggins or offer any evidence to rebut
Wiggins, testimony.
Respondent offered no evidence
regarding the size of the discount that should apply
here.
See Hess y. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 475, 478
(1931) (Court adopted the taxpayer's contention of value
where the Commissioner introduced no evidence to rebut
the taxpayer's expert's testimony).
Respondent argues that Wiggins was not qualified to
value real property because he is a business appraiser
and not a real estate appraiser.
Respondent contends
that Wiggins provided no factual basis for his
conclusions that a 20-percent discount for lack of
marketability should apply. Respondent points out that
Wiggins included in his report as evidence of the
appropriate amount for marketability discounts a
discussion of the illiquidity of privately held
companies and discounts relating to sales of their
stock. Respondent argues that we should give no weight
to Wiggins' opinion because he did not consider the
marketability of real property. Respondent argues that
Wiggins, use of a 30-percent discount for lack of
control for the cost of partitioning the properties was
not supported by any verifiable data in his reports and
far exceeds Scruby's estimated costs of partition.
We disagree that we should disregard Wiggins report
because he is not a real estate appraiser. Wiggins is
an experienced business appraiser who has given expert
opinions
in
valuing
fractional
interests
in
partnerships, businesses, and real property. We believe
that he correctly considered various factors affecting
the potential costs of partitioning the properties in
issue.
He considered the time and expense of selling
real property in that particular market.
Wiggins
appropriately considered all relevant facts and gave a
reasonable explanation for the discount he applied to
the property interests at issue here.
Respondent's expert, Elmore, applied no discount to
petitioner's and decedent's property interests.
He
admitted, however, that an undivided one-half interest
in real property has a limited market and that a
fractional interest may be discounted, although he did
not quantify the amount of the discount. This generally
supports petitioner's claim that the Putnam and Clay
County properties and the estate property should be
discounted because they are undivided one- half
interests.
G.
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SECTXON 203 2A -- SPECIAL USE VALUATION
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Easement as Disposition.

In Estate of Gibbs y. U.S., 81 A.F.T.R.2d
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98-901 (D. N.J.) the court in an unpublished opinion held that under New Jersey
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under section 2032A.
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law the granting of a conservation easement was not a disposition of the property

The question with which this Court is confronted is
whether the Conservation Servitude as identified in the
Deed of Easement constituted the disposition of an
interest in plaintiff's specially valued farmland.
To
answer this question, the Court must determine how New
Jersey
law
construes
conservation
or
equitable
servitude. The Conservation Servitude burdened the land
in question here by imposing certain restrictions on its
use and development, namely, that the land must be used
as a farm in perpetuity.
As a result of the
Conservation Servitude, the land is considered part of
a farmland preservation program, encompassed by New
Jersey's Right to Farm Act. The land use restrictions
imposed upon land in that program are covenants that run
with the land.
Such restrictions on the use of land
owned by another are generally referred to as "equitable
servitudes." They are enforceable only in equity. See
Homann y. Torchinsky, 296 N.J. Super. 326, 333 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 141 (1997).
New Jersey adheres to the minority view which treats an
equitable servitude as a contract right, not a property
right.
Thus, in New Jersey, an equitable servitude
creates no possessory interest in the burdened land.
The burden imposed is enforceable only as a contract
right.
See McComb y. Hanly,
132 N.J.
Eq. 182
(1942) (cited with approval in HOmann, 296 N.J. Super. at
334) .
Thus,
it appears that under New Jersey law,
a
conservation or equitable servitude is not an interest
in land, but is, as plaintiff argues, a contractual
burdening of it.
Defendant argues that the phrase
"interest in land" should be read more broadly.
Defendant contends that what plaintiff gave up was an
"unqualified right to develop the farm property which is
an interest in the real property."
(See Br. at 11).
Defendant cites no cases to support this contention.
They rely on the language in the Deed of Easement which
states that the Deed "transfer[s] and conveys to [the
State] all of the nonagricultural development rights and
development credits appurtenant to the lands and
premises described herein."
This argument, however,
ignores the treatment of such language in New Jersey as
a contractual burdening and not as a transfer of
property rights. Moreover, as a practical matter, the
State of New Jersey acquired no right to use or direct
the use of the land, and no rights which can be sold or
conveyed to a third party.
The Court's holding was narrow:
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The Court also notes that while the restrictions imposed
on the land at issue here unquestionably further the
purpose of the special use valuation provision of
section 2032A, the Court's decision neither turns nor
depends on that fact.
In other words, the Court's
decision should not be construed as carving out an
exception for the particular land use restrictions
imposed here, just by virtue of the fact that they have
the effect of giving the United States "more than it
originally bargained for
farmland in perpetuity
rather than being limited to a ten-year period."
(See
Plaintiff's Br. at 2).
Rather, the Court determines,
simply, that plaintiff did not dispose of any interest
in the land in question.
The estate tax recapture
provision at issue here only triggers the recapture tax
if there is a disposition of an interest in the
specially valued property.
Under New Jersey law, the
burdening of this farmland with a conservation servitude
was not a disposition of an interest in land; therefore,
it did not trigger the recapture of estate tax.
Accordingly, judgment must be awarded in favor of
plaintiff.
B.

SECTXQNS 2035-2038
1.

Termination of

-

RljnxNEP XN'l'BBESTS
Old GRXT.

In 1941

a

taxpayer

created a

retaining the income for life with remainder to descendants, per stirpes.

trust
PLR

9815023 approves the termination of the trust and distribution of the assets
among the beneficiaries on an actuarial basis as not being a gift by any of the
beneficiaries.

A gift of the entire remainder interest had been made when the

f

trust was created.

The ruling specifically does not consider whether the trust

would be included in the taxpayer's estate if taxpayer died within three years
of the termination.
2.

Rights Oyer Trust.

In PLR 9809032 the IRS determined that grantor's

retained right to set trustee's compensation was not a retained right under
section 2036.

The facts of the ruling were:

On May 7, 1982, Decedent created an irrevocable trust
(Trust) and transferred certain life insurance policies
to the trust. Individual and Corporation were appointed
trustees of the Trust and continue to serve as trustees.
Paragraph C of Article FIRST of Trust provides that the
trustees are vested with all right, title, and interest
in and to the policies of insurance that were
transferred to the trust and any additional policies of
insurance assigned to the trust by any person.
Paragraph C also authorizes the trustees to exercise all
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options, benefits, rights, elections, privileges, and
other powers under the policies, including the right to
borrow upon the policy or policies, to pledge any for a
loan, to surrender any policy for the cash surrender
value, and to convert a policy into other forms of
insurance.
Paragraph E of Article FIRST authorizes the trustees to
receive all payments on insurance policies.
Paragraph (4) of Article SECOND provides that, at the
death of Decedent and if his wife predeceases him, the
trustees shall pay $1,000,000 to Individual, if he
survives decedent or, if not, to Individual's issue that
survive Decedent. If the $1,000,000 amount is more than
five percent of the Decedent's gross estate including
the principal held by the Trustees, the amount shall be
reduced so that it is no greater than five percent of
Decedent's gross estate. The balance of the remaining
principal shall be paid to the issue of the Decedent.
Article THIRD provides that Trust's principal shall be
divided into equal shares, one for each of Decedent's
children who is then living and each of his children who
has died leaving issue.
Article THIRTEENTH provides that, during Decedent's
life, the trustees shall receive compensation for their
services as fiduciaries as is determined by Decedent.
Individual is granted the authority to name a successor
trustee provided any such successor trustee is a partner
of Individual's law firm.
with respect to whether the decedent had an incident of ownership in the
insurance policies, the ruling stated:
Section
20.2042-1 (c) (2)
provides
that
the
term
"incidents of ownership" is not limited in its meaning
to ownership of the policy in the technical sense.
Generally speaking, the term has reference to the right
of the insured or his estate to the economic benefits of
the policy. Thus, it includes the power to change the
beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to
assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge
the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a
loan against the surrender value of the policy, etc.
In this case, Decedent transferred insurance policies to
Trust during his life.
Trust was irrevocable and
authorized the trustees to exercise all options,
benefits, rights, elections, privileges, and other
powers under the policies, including the right to borrow
upon the policy or policies, to pledge any for a loan,
to surrender any policy for the cash surrender value,
and to convert a policy into other forms of insurance.
The trustees were Individual and Corporation.
Under
these circumstances, Decedent did not have the incidents
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of ownership in the policies as that term is defined in
section 20.2042-1(c) (2).
3.

Inclusion of Gift Tax Paid Within Three Years of Death.

In TAM

9729005 the Service considered whether gift tax paid by a decedent's spouse
should be included in the decedent's estate.

-

In a community property state a

couple created an irrevocable trust in which to make gifts.

Husband wrote checks

to wife from his separate property, and wife in turn made gifts to the trust.
Wife did not have separate assets with which to make the gifts.
procedure was followed to enable wife to pay the gift tax.

..

The same

Husband died within

six months.
The Service applied a substance over form theory:
It is a well established legal principle that the form
of a transaction will be recognized for federal tax
purposes only if it comports with the substance of the
transaction. In Estate of Cidulka y. commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1996-149, for example, the donor in form made
gifts of stock to his son and the son's wife. These
gifts were designed
to use
the
donor's
annual
exclusions. The son's wife immediately transferred the
stock to the donor's son. Concerning this activity, the
court stated:
The purported gift to John Cidulka's wife
Charlesa is clearly a gift to John. For a number
of years decedent had given shares to Charlesa,
who had immediately transferred them to John.
Our inference from this record is that the shares
were given to Charlesa to be passed on to John,
and were, in fact, a gift to John.

...

Supra,
at 1098.
See al so,
..El.iisl..lto.laiLt~e50...........looo!.olf"--..&.IM~uL.lor
....p.uh","vx-......:.Y:......
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-472 .
In the present situation, the Decedent transferred to
the Spouse the exact amount of cash needed to pay the
gift taxes due on the Decedent's and the Spouse's
returns.
The
only discernable purpose
for
this
transaction was to reduce the Decedent's gross estate by
the amount of the gift taxes paid. Thus, by running the
payment through the Spouse's bank account, the Decedent
attempted to do indirectly what he could not do
directly. In substance, the Decedent paid gift taxes in
the amount of $1,415,732 on gifts made by the Decedent
and the Spouse during the three-year period ending on
the date of the Decedent's death. The Decedent's gross
estate, therefore, is increased by the amount of these
gift taxes under section 2035(c).
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SECTZON 2040
1.

Gallenstein

Pre-19"
y.

Property: Gallenstein Followed.

United

States,

975

F.2d

286

r

Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 14,

r

summarizes the statutory history as follows:
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(6th

The Tax Court has followed
Cir.

1992),

Hahn

v.

(1998) holding that section 2040(b) (1) does not

apply to spousal joint interests created before January 1, 1977.

Section 1001 governs the determination of gains and
losses on the disposition of property. Commissioner y.
~ , 461 U.S. 300,
304 (1983).
Generally, gain or
loss from the disposition of property is measured by the
amount realized less the adjusted basis of the property.
Sec. 1001(a). Section 1014 generally provides that the
basis of property acquired from a decedent is the fair
market value of the property at the date of the
decedent's death or on the alternate valuation date.
Sec. 1014(a).
A surviving joint tenant, however, is
considered to have acquired property from the decedent
only to the extent that the property was required to be
included in the estate of the deceased joint tenant.
Sec. 1014(b) (9).
Correspondingly, the portion of the
property not included in the decedent's estate retains
the survivor's adjusted basis. Thus, determination of
petitioner's basis in the CPW shares hinges on the
portion of the property required to be included in her
husband's estate.
Section 2040 governs the value of jointly-owned property
to be included in a decedent's estate.
Before 1977,
section 2040 provided that the gross estate includes the
value of all property held at the time of a decedent's
death by the decedent and another person in a joint
tenancy or tenancy by the entirety, except such part of
the entire value that is attributable to the amount of
consideration in money or money's worth furnished by
such other person.
Thus, the rule es tablished a
"contribution test," whereby the estate of the deceased
joint tenant must generally include the value of the
entire property less the portion of the property
attributable to the consideration furnished by the
surviving joint tenant.
The statute creates a
rebuttable presumption that the value of the entire
property is includable in the deceased joint tenant's
estate, and the burden of showing original ownership or
contribution to the purchase price by the surviving
joint tenant falls upon the estate. Estate of Heidt v.
commissioner, 8 T.C. 969 (1947), affd. per curiam 170
F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1948); Estate of Balazs y.
commissioner,
T.C.
Memo.
1981-423,
affd.
without
published opinion 693 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1982).

r

In 1976, subsection (b) of section 2040 was added to the
Code by section 2002(c) (1) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976

r
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(TRA 76), Pub. L. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1855. The 1976
amendment created a special rule where the joint tenants
were husband and wife. If the interest was a "qualified
joint interest," only one-half of the value of the
property owned in joint tenancy was includable in the
decedent's gross estate, without regard to which spouse
furnished the consideration to acquire the jointly held
property.
TRA 76 sec. 2002 (d) (3), 90 Stat. 1856,
provided an effective date for the new 50- percent
inclusion rule of section 2040(b), making it applicable
to "joint interests created after December 31, 1976."
Congress amended section 2040 again in 1978, with the
addition of subsections (c), (d), and (3). Revenue Act
of 1978, Pub. L. 95-600, secs. 511(a) and 702(k) (2), 92
Stat. 2763, 2881, 2932. Essentially, these subsections
provided a mechanism whereby an election could be made
to treat joint interests created prior to 1977 as
"qualified joint interests" subject to the 50-percent
inclusion rule of section 2040(b).

-

The final relevant amendment to section 2040 took place
in 1981. Subsections (c), (d), and (e), which had been
adopted in 1978, were repealed. Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1982 (ERTA), sec. 403(c) (3), Pub. L. 97-34, 95
Stat. 172, 302.
The definition of a "qualified joint
interest" in section 2040(b) (2) was redefined to
eliminate the requirement that the creation (or recreation), of the joint interest be treated as a gift.
ERTA Sec. 403(c) (1), 95 Stat. 301-302.
However, the
operational provision of section 2040(b) (1), providing
for 50 percent inclusion, was not changed.
The
effective date provision of the 1981 amendment made
these changes applicable "to the estates of decedents
dying after December 31, 1981." ERTA sec. 403(e) (1), 95
Stat. 305.
In Baszto y. United States,

80 A.F.T.R.2d 97-7740

(M.D. Fla.

J
1997)

court followed Patten y. United States, 116 F.3d 1029 (4th Cir. 1997):
The government argues that the effective date of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 controls application
of 26 U.S.C. Section 2040(b) for determining, pursuant
to 26 U. S. C. Section 1014, the basis of property
acquired from a decedent.
However, Congress did not
expressly repeal
the
effective date
of
Section
2040(b) (1). Furthermore, the provisions are capable of
coexistence and, consequently, preclude implied repeal.
Radzanower y. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154, 96
S. Ct. 1989, 1993, 48 L. Ed. 540 (1976).
The government invites the Court to disregard the
unanimous authority supporting the plaintiff's position.
The Court declines this suspect invitation from the IRS
to embrace its uniformly rejected theory, and adopts the
holdings of Patten y. United States, 116 F.3d 1029 (4th
Cir. 1997), and Gallenstein y. United States, 975 F.2d
286 (6th Cir. 1992). Accordingly the plaintiff's motion
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is GRANTED and the defendant's motion is DENIED.
The
Clerk is directed to (1) enter judgment in favor of the
plaintiff in the amount of $54,952.00, plus interest,
for overpayment of federal income taxes for the 1989 tax
year and (2) close this file.

r

2.

Valuatiop of Joipt Xpterests.

Should real estate owned by spouses

I

joint with right of survivorship be valued as the entire interest multiplied by

r
r

r
r

r

r
r
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r
I
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r
r

r
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one-half, or as a one-half interest in the property taking into consideration any
appropriate discounts for partial interests?
Court in Estate of Young y. Commissioner,

That issue was addressed by the Tax
110 T.C. No.

24

(1998).

The case

involved a California decedent and the court first determined that the real
estate

involved was

held

joint with right

of

survivorship

rather

community property.
The opinion discusses the operation of section 2040:
Petitioner argues that section 2040 is an includability
section, determining the interest in the gross estate,
not a valuation section. Petitioner notes that section
2040, like section 2033, contains the language "to the
extent of the interest therein". After determining the
inclusion of property under section 2033 or 2040,
petitioner argues that sections 2031, 2032, and 2032A
determine the value. Therefore, with the same goal in
sections 2033 and 2040, petitioner argues that the
language of section 2040 cannot be construed to prohibit
fractional interest discounts and lack of marketability
discounts, while such valuation discounts have been
allowed under section 2033.
In cases dealing with section 2033, the rationale for a
fractional interest discount is based on the rights of
the tenants in common under local law, arising from the
unity of interest and unity of possession. A fractional
interest discount may be appropriate when a partial
interest in property would sell for less than its
proportionate share. Estate of Iacono y. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1980-520.
For example, decedent owns Real
Property A with X as tenants in common. While decedent
has an undivided one-half interest in the property, a
willing buyer may discount the value of decedent's
interest in Property A due to the fact that a buyer of
such interest would own the property concurrently with
the other tenant in common, and as such, there is the
inconvenience of dealing with several owners, partition
suits, and potential disagreements among the owners.
See Estate of Barclay y. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 696
(1925) i Estate of Youle v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1989-138. Discounts for lack of marketability arise from
the inherent difficulty in the sale of the asset.
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In arguing for the application of fractional interest
discounts and/or lack of marketability discounts in the
context of section 2040, petitioner primarily relies on
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Propstra y. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th cir.
1982), where a fractional interest discount was allowed
for community property under section 2033.
In Propstra, the Ninth Circuit upheld a 15-percent
discount in the value of the decedent's undivided
one-half interest in real property held as community
property.
Id. at 1253.
The court noted that the
Federal estate tax is an excise tax, levied on the
privilege of transferring property at death.
Id. at
1250 {citing Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d 999, 1001 (5th
Cir. 1981)).
The amount to be taxed is valued by the
property actually transferred, rather than what is owned
by the decedent before death, or the interest held by
the legatee after death. Id. The Government argued that
under a unity of ownership theory, a fractional interest
discount was inapplicable because "one can reasonably
assume that the interest held by the estate will
ultimately be sold with the other undivided interest and
that interest's proportionate share of the market value
of the whole will thereby be realized." Id. at 1251.
After considering the language of section 2031 and
section 2033, the court was unwilling to impute "unity
of ownership" principles for valuation purposes.
Id.
Further, the court looked at the "willing seller" as a
hypothetical seller, rather than the estate or any of
decedent's beneficiaries. Id. at 1251-1252.

I

.J

-

-

In Propstra, the court allowed a fractional interest
discount
for
community
property.
Contrary
to
petitioner'S arguments, we find the situation presented
in Propstra is not analogous to the current situation
involving joint tenancy.
First, Propstra dealt with section 2033, which provides
that the value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property to the extent of the interest
therein held by the decedent at the time of his death,
and not section 2040, the relevant provision in our
case.
Section 2033 looks to the interest held by the
decedent at his death.
With community property, each
spouse owns a present vested one-half interest in the
community property. Their respective interests in such
property are individually wholly owned (that is,
separate property),
so that the decedent has no
interest, title or ownership, marital or otherwise, in
the other's interest in the community property.
As a
result under section 2033, one-half of the value of
property held as community property (that being the
decedent's interest in the property) is includable in a
decedent's gross estate, and the surviving spouse's
one-half of the value is excluded from decedent's gross
estate.
In light of this, Propstra y, United States,
supra, looked at the undivided one-half interest held by
the decedent at his death.
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On the other hand, joint tenancy is a distinct property
interest from tenancy in common and community property.
The right of survivorship is the chief characteristic
that distinguishes a joint tenancy from other interests
in property. United States v. Jacobs, 306 u.S. 363, 370
(1939); Zeigler v. Bonnell, 126 P.2d 118, 120 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1942). While a joint tenancy may be
severed by mutual agreement or by a conveyance by one of
the joint tenants during the lives of the joint tenants,
the decedent cannot devise property held by the decedent
and another in joint tenancy.
Estate of Sullivan v.
commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949), rev'g 10
T.C. 961 (1948). Joint tenancy has been characterized as
a specialized form of a life estate, with what amounts
to a contingent remainder in the fee, the contingency
being dependent upon which joint tenant survives. Id.
The surviving joint tenant does not secure that right
from the deceased joint tenant, but from the devise or
conveyance by which the joint tenancy was first created.
At the time of decedent's death, decedent's interest in
the property is extinguished, with the joint tenancy
automatically passing to the surviving joint tenant by
the operation of law, avoiding the need for probate.

* * *
In arguing that section 2040 is a mere includability
section, petitioner focuses on the language in "to the
extent
of
the
interest
therein. "
According
to
petitioner, section 2040 merely determines the interest
to be included in decedent's gross estate. In light of
similar language in section 2033, petitioner argues that
discounts should be available to joint tenancy under the
valuation provision of section 2031.
We think petitioner's focus is incomplete. In addition
to the cited language, section 2040(a) also provides the
following introductory language: "The VALUE of the gross
estate shall include the VALUE OF ALL PROPERTY to the
extent of the interest therein held as joint tenants
with right of survivorship BY THE DECEDENT AND OTHER
PERSON" . (Emphasis added.) While petitioner categorizes
section 2031 as the only section to determine value and
section 2040 as a mere inclusion section, we conclude
that determining value is dependent on examining both
section 2031 and section 2040.
Section 2031 provides the starting point, but it is very
broad.
In section 2031's accompanying regulations, we
learn that value is determined by looking at the willing
buyer and the willing seller, which then needs to be
considered in conjunction with sections 2033 through
2044.
Sec. 20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax Regs.

* * *

r

Under the scheme of section 2040(a),
the amount
includable in a decedent's gross estate does not depend
on a valuation of property rights actually transferred

r
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at death, or on a valuation of the actual interest held
by the decedent (legal title); instead, decedent's gross
estate includes the entire value of property held in a
joint tenancy by him and any other person, except to the
extent the consideration for the property was furnished
by such other person.
See Estate of Peters y.
Commissioner, 386 F.2d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 1967), affg.
46 T.C. 407 (1966). Contrary to petitioner's argument,
the statute does not inquire how much a willing buyer
would pay to purchase the decedent's interest in the
joint tenancy at the date of his death, because, at the
moment of death, decedent no longer holds any interest
in the property.
The property passes by right of
survivorship, unlike property governed by section 2033
which passes under a decedent's will or by intestate
succession. Even if prior to death, decedent sold his
interest in the joint tenancy (and by doing so severed
the joint tenancy with right of survivorship), the value
that a willing buyer would pay does not necessarily
compare to the approach taken by Congress in section
2040. Section 2040(a) provides an artificial inclusion
of the joint tenancy property: the entire value of the
property less any contribution by the surviving joint
tenant. Except for the statutory exclusions in section
2040(a), there is no further allowance to account for
the fact that less than the entire interest is being
included.
As a result of this artificial inclusion, we conclude
that section 2040 is not concerned with quantifying the
value of the fractional interest held by the decedent
(as would be the case under section 2033).
The
fractional interest discount, as applied in section
2033, is based on the notion that the interest is worth
less than its proportionate share, due in part to the
problems of concurrent ownership. These problems are
created by the unity of interest and unity of
possession. However, at the moment of death, the
co-ownership
in
joint tenancy is
severed,
thus
alleviating the problems associated with co-ownership.
We conclude that the Young Property is not entitled to
a fractional interest discount.
Similarly, a lack of marketability discount arises from
an inherent difficulty in the sale of the asset. It has
been applied in determining the value of works of art
and the value of restricted securities.
See, e.g.,
Estate of Q'Keeffe y. commissioner, T.C. Nemo. 1992-210.
In regard to the Young Property, there is no inherent
difficulty in its sale. We conclude that a lack of
marketability discount is not applicable to the Young
Property.
Petitioner argues that respondent's position is based on
the unity of ownership theory; i.e., the theory that
because the surviving joint tenant succeeds to the
interest of the deceased j oint tenant, there can be
nothing to apply a fractional interest discount against.
We note that the unity of ownership theory has been
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rejected by the courts, as in Propstra y. United States,
680 F.2d 1248
(9th Cir.
1982),
but we do not
characterize respondent's position as relying on the
unity of ownership theory.
Instead, we are looking at
the inherent property characteristics of joint tenancy
and the approach taken by Congress to value the property
under section 2040 and section 2031.

r

r
r

We conclude that a fractional interest discount and a
lack of marketability discount are inapplicable to the
Young Property.
The opinion points out the tax-problem with owning property as
tenants, namely no discount.

joint

An additional problem is that such property passes

outside whatever estate planning documents have been prepared.

r
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the effect of the release of the right to receive income for ascertainable
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SECTIONS 2041 AND 2514 -- GENERAL POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
1.

standards.

Belease of Nan-General Power of Appointm.nt.

PLR 9739006 considered

The ruling discussed the issue:
Under Items 3(iii) and 3(iv) of Trust, the trustee is
required to distribute among the issue of Child all of
the income from the equal part of Trust set aside for
Child and Child's issue, unless Child has made a written
request for any of that income and the trustee has
determined that the requested income would be used for
Child's support and maintenance in keeping with the
standard of living enjoyed by Child on the date Trust
was executed and medical,
surgical, and hospital
services reasonably necessary to maintain Child in good
health.
Further, the trustee cannot distribute income
to Child without a written request by Child and without
determining that the distribution would satisfy the
purpose provided in Item 3(iii).
Consequently, based on the trustee's representations,
Item 3(iii) creates in Child a power to appoint to Child
income from an equal part. This power is exercisable by
Child in conjunction with the trustee, who is not a
person with a substantial and adverse interest under
section 2514(c) (3) (B).
See, Estate of Towle v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 368 (1970).
However, Child's
power of appointment under Item 3 (iii) of Trust is
limited by an ascertainable standard related to Child's
support, maintenance, and health.
Therefore, Child's
power is a non-general power of appointment.
This case is similar to section 25.2514-3(e), Example 2.
In that example, income is accumulated unless L
appoints it to L. Here, income must be paid to Child's
issue, unless Child (with the consent of the trustee)
appoints it to Child.
Thus, because we conclude that
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Child's power is limited by an ascertainable standard,
the release of the power will not be a transfer of
property for gift tax purposes.
2.

Renunciation of Trust J:nterest.

PLR 9738016 addressed whether a

beneficiary's renunciation of interests in a trust was the lapse of a general
power of appointment.

-

-

The beneficiary's interests in the trust were set forth:

Trust is an inter vivos trust created by Decedent in
1961.
Under the terms of Trust, A, Decedent's former
spouse, had the right to receive all of the net income
from Trust. In addition, the trustee had the discretion
to distribute to A such amounts of principal as the
trustee determined to enable A to meet the expenses of
specified emergencies, and to provide for her support
and maintenance.
After A's death, under Item 3 of Trust, Trust income is
to be distributed at four specified times each year,
until the death of the last surviving child of Decedent
and A.
Under Item 3 (i), on each distribution date,
Trust income must be divided into as many equal parts as
there are then living children of Decedent and A as well
as deceased children of Decedent and A with then living
issue.
Under Item 3(ii), the trustee must distribute
one equal part to a child with no then living children.
With respect to a child that has living issue, under
Item 3(iii), the trustee is given the power, in its sole
discretion, upon written request from the child, to
distribute any amount of income from an equal part to
the requesting child for support and maintenance in
keeping with the standard of living enjoyed by that
child on the date Trust was executed and for medical,
surgical, and hospital services reasonably necessary to
maintain the child in good health.
Under Item 3 (iv), to the extent that income from an
equal part is not distributed under Item 3(iii) to a
child, the trustee is required to distribute that income
equally among the issue of that child.
On the death of the last survivor of the children of
Decedent and A, Trust is to be distributed equally among
the grandchildren of Decedent and A.
At issue was the power under section 3(iii):
Consequently, based on the trustee's representations,
Item 3(iii) creates in Child a power to appoint to Child
income from an equal part. This power is exercisable by
Child in conjunction with the trustee, who is not a
person with a substantial and adverse interest under
section 2514(c) (3) (B).
See, Estate of Towel v.
couunissioner, 54 T.C. 368 (1970).
However, Child's
power of appointment under Item 3 (iii) of Trust is
limited by an ascertainable standard related to Child's
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support, maintenance, and health.
Therefore, Child's
power is a non-general power of appointment.

r
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r
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This case is similar to section 25.2514-3(e), Example 2.
In that example, income is accumulated unless L appoints
it to L.
Here, income must be paid to Child's issue,
unless Child (with the consent of the trustee) appoints
it to Child.
Thus, because we conclude that Child's
power if limited by an ascertainable standard, the
release of the power will not be a transfer of property
for gift tax purposes.
PLR 9738019 reaches the same result in very similar circumstances.
3.

veto Power.

At issue in PLR 9741009 was whether the following power

was a general power of appointment:

r

Article X appointed Spouse and Attorney 1 as the
original trustees. Article X further provides that as
each son attains the age of twenty-five, he will become
a trustee of his trust. However, under Article XIII the
son or other issue of Grantor, who is serving as a
trustee,
is prohibited from participating in any
decision relating to discretionary distributions of
income or principal. Each son is currently serving as
a co-trustee of his own trust with Spouse, Attorney 1,
and Attorney 2.

r

Trusts 1 and 2 both provide that on the death,
resignation, or inability of attorney 1 to serve as cotrustee, the vacancy will be filled by:

,..
I

r

r
r
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such member of the firm of
as
[Attorney 1] may designate in his Will or in any
other written instrument delivered to his coTrustees during his lifetime, but in the event he
fails so to designate, or if his designee dies,
resigns or is unable to serve, the said vacancy
shall be filled, and shall continue to be filled,
by such member of the firm of.
. as shall be
designated by that firm, from time to time.
It is proposed that Firm now will agree to a letter of
understanding regarding the appointment of successor cotrustees from Firm after both Attorney 1 and Attorney 2
are no longer serving as a trustee.
At such time as
neither Attorney 1 nor Attorney 2 is serving as a cotrustee, Firm will appoint a successor co-trustee as
provided under the terms of the trust instruments.
However, the proposed agreement provides that if Firm's
designee as successor co-trustee does not meet with the
approval of Spouse (or if she is unable to indicate her
approval, then the majority of the sons), Firm will make
another designation from among the members of Firm.
This procedure will continue each time a vacancy occurs.
The power of disapproval is referred to as a "veto
power."
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In addition, the proposed agreement provides that if no
proposed designee is approved, Firm will decline to name
a successor trustee. A petition will then be filed with
the court having jurisdiction over the trusts to appoint
a
substitute co-trustee who
is not
related or
subordinate to any of the beneficiaries, as defined in
section 672(c). Firm will agree to assist in connection
with the filing of the petition.
The Service determined there was no general power:
In this case, Spouse (or sons if Spouse is incapable of
acting) will have the power to veto any trustee that is
appointed by Firm.
If no member of Firm is acceptable
to Spouse (or sons), a court will appoint an independent
trustee who is not related or subordinate to any trust
beneficiary (within the meaning of section 672 (c) ) .
Although Spouse and sons serve as co-trustees, they are
prohibited by the trust instrument from participating in
any discretionary decisions to distribute income or
principal to the trust beneficiaries.
Thus, the
independent trustee's discretion is the sole standard
for distribution.
Consequently, neither Spouse's and
sons' retained power to veto a replacement trustee
selected by Firm nor their right to petition the court
to select an independent trustee that is not related or
subordinate to any beneficiary of the trust constitutes
a general power of appointment under sections 2041 and
2514.
Based on the facts submitted and representations made,
we conclude that Spouse and sons will not be deemed,
under sections 2041 and 2514, to have a general power of
appointment over the income and principal of any of the
trusts by virtue of their power to veto a replacement
trustee and their right to petition the court to select
an independent replacement trustee.
Accordingly, the
assets of the trusts will not be included in the gross
estate of Spouse or sons and will not be deemed
transferred by Spouse or sons for gift tax purposes.

4.

Power Hot Limited By Ascertainable Standard But Exercisable With

Consent of Adverse Party.

PLR 9809037 considered the application of section 2041

to a trust the dispositive provisions of which were stated as follows:
Under the terms of Trust, the trustees are authorized to
distribute to Daughter A and her descendants such
amounts of income and principal as the trustees in their
discretion may deem for the best interest of the
distributees as a class, considering the age and
condition of health of each of them from time to time,
the income and means of support available to them and
each of them from other sources known to the trustees,
and the reasonable cost of support, maintenance and
education of each beneficiary according to his or her
station in life. The trust will terminate on the later
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of the death of Daughter A or when Daughter A's children
all have attained age 21 (or die before attaining such
age) .
Upon termination, the Trust estate is to be
distributed outright to Daughter A's then living
children or their descendants, per stirpes, if a child
predeceases termination.
On Daughter A's death, if
Daughter A has no living descendants, then the trust
property will pass to the beneficiaries of another
trust.

r
r

r

Daughter A, Child A, and Child B were to become the sole trustees of the
trust, replacing 5 other trustees.

The proposed reduction of the board of trustees from
five members to three members will not affect the exempt
status of the Trust under section 2601.
However, we
note that it is proposed that Child A, Child B, and
Daughter A will act as trustees, and as trustees, will
have the power (by majority vote) to distribute trust
property to themselves as provided in the trust
instrument. Under the proposed arrangement, Daughter A
does not have a general power of appointment because the
power to distribute trust property will require the
consent of a remainderman (child A or Child B), a person
having a substantial interest in the property subject to
the power which is adverse to the exercise of the power
in favor of Daughter A.
See section 20.2041-3(cl (2),
example 1. Likewise, Child A and Child B will not have
a general power of appointment, because the exercise
will require the consent of a person having a
substantial interest adverse to either child.
We
express no opinion as to whether Daughter A, Child A, or
Child B will have a general power of appointment if any
of the proposed trustees is replaced at some point in
time by a new trustee.

r
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The ruling states:

5.

Bepeficiary's Pqwers.

PLR 9818054 considered a trust which gave two

i

powers to the beneficiary.

r

The first was the right to withdraw principal with

the consent of the trustees:

I
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Paragraph (c) of article IV provides the terms of the
Taxpayer's separate trust. Until the Taxpayer reaches
age 25, the trustees have discretion to distribute any
or all of the net income to the Taxpayer as in the
opinion of the trustees is reasonably neCessary for her
weI fare, support, comfort and happiness.
When the
Taxpayer reaches age 25, the trustees must distribute
all of the trust income to her.
In addition, after
reaching age 30, the Taxpayer may withdraw up to onefourth of the principal of her trust "with the consent
and approval of the trustees" and after reaching age 35,
she may withdraw up to one-third of the remaining
principal "with the consent and approval of the
trustees." Further, under paragraph (h) of article IV,
the trustees may distribute to the Taxpayer any amounts
of principal from her trust as the trustees "in their
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uncontrolled discretion
Taxpayer is over age 35.

may

deem

advisable."

The

Such a power would be taxable under sections 2041, unless the trustees were
adverse (§2041(b) (1) (C) (ii)).

This power, however, had

been created prior to

October 21, 1942:
Under section 2041 (b) (1) (B), a power of appointment
created on or before October 21, 1942 (a "pre-1942
power") which is exercisable by the decedent only in
conjunction with another person shall not be deemed a
general power of appointment.

...

Under section 2041(b) (3), a power of appointment created
by a will executed on or before October 21, 1942, shall
be considered a power created on or before such date if
the person executing such will died before July 1, 1949,
without having republished such will, by codicil or
otherwise, after October 21, 1942.
The second power was the right to remove the trustee:
The individual trustees or trustee at any time acting
hereunder shall have the power at any time and from time
to time, by a written instrument signed by such trustees
or trustee, to remove the corporate Trustee then acting
hereunder.
In the event of the resignation, removal,
refusal, or inability to act of the corporate Trustee at
any time, the individual Trustees or Trustee then acting
hereunder must, by written instrument signed by them,
appoint as successor corporate Trustee hereunder, any
bank or trust company, wherever situated, having a
capital and surplus of not less then One Million Dollars
($1,000,000),
as evidenced by its last authentic
published statement.
It is represented that this removal and replacement
power has never been exercised. The current co-trustees
of the Taxpayer's trust are the Taxpayer, the Taxpayer's
brother, and Bank.
As authorized under paragraph (c) of article V, the
Taxpayer and the Taxpayer's brother plan to remove Bank
as their co-trustee and replace Bank with another
corporate trustee. It is represented that any successor
corporate trustee will not be related or. subordinate to
the Taxpayer.
The IRS discussed the effects of this power:
Under paragraph (c) of article V, the Taxpayer has the
power to remove and replace the acting corporate trustee
with another corporate trustee.
Paragraph (c) of
article V expressly requires that the Taxpayer replace
the corporate trustee with another corporate trustee.
Further, because the Decedent's will requires that there
must always be a corporate trustee, the Taxpayer cannot
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appoint herself in lieu of a corporate trustee, under
any provision of the will, and the Taxpayer can never be
the sole trustee.
Thus, for purposes of sections
20 . 2041-1 (b) (1), 25. 2514 -1 (b) (1), 20. 2036 -1 (b) (3), and
section 20.2038-1(a) (3), the Taxpayer does not have the
power to remove a corporate trustee and appoint herself.
Instead, the Taxpayer's removal and replacement power is
similar to that under Rev. Rul. 77-182, in which the
decedent grantor retained the power to replace the
corporate trustee with another corporate trustee.
Consequently, we conclude that the Taxpayer's power
under paragraph (c) of article V is not a power of
appointment under section 2041 and 2514.

r
r
r
r
r

Revenue Ruling 77-182 was summarized in this way:
Under Rev. Rul. 77-182, 1977-1 C.B. 273, the value of
the trust estate is not includible in a decedent
grantor's gross estate under section 2036, where a
corporate trustee determines distributions of income
among the grantor's children and the decedent retained
the right to appoint a successor corporate trustee if
the designated trustee resigned or was removed by
judicial process.

r

r
r
r
,r

r
r
r,

r
r
r
rI

6.

amandment to Pelaware Asset Protection Trust Statute.

of the Delaware Statutes has been amended.

Section 3573

Alimony creditors can reach the

assets of a properly created asset protection trust, as can tort creditors but
only if the damage occurs before the date of a qualified disposition to the
trust.
A qualified disposition is a gift to a trustee.

Other key definitions

under the statute are:
"Trustee" means a person who:
a.
In the case of a natural person, is a
resident of this State or, in all other cases, is
authorized by the law of this State to act as a trustee
and whose activities are subject to supervision by the
Bank Commissioner of the State, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency,
or the Office of Thrift Supervision or any successor
thereto; and
b.
Maintains or arranges for custody in this
State of some or all of the property transferred to the
trustee, maintains records for the trust on an exclusive
or nonexclusive basis, prepares or arranges for the
preparation of fiduciary income tax returns for the
trust, or otherwise materially participates in the
administration of the trust.
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"Trust instrument" means an instrument appointing a
trustee for the property that is the subject of a
disposition, which instrument:
a.
Expressly incorporates the law of this State
to govern the validity, construction and administration
of the trust;
b.
Is irrevocable, but a trust instrument shall
not be deemed.revocable on account of its inclusion of
1 or more of the following:
A transferor's power to
veto a distribution from a trust, a testamentary special
power of appointment or similar power vested in the
transferor, or the transferor's potential or actual
receipt of a distribution of income, principal or both,
in the sole discretion of a trustee who is neither the
transferor not a related or subordinate party of the
transferor within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 672(c); and
~

c.
Provides that the interest of a beneficiary
in the trust property or the income therefrom may not be
transferred
or
assigned,
whether voluntarily
or
involuntarily, before the trustee distributes the
property or income to the beneficiary.

.J

The beneficiary should not be able to receive distributions under an
ascertainable standard and neither the beneficiary,

nor a person related or

subordinate to the beneficiary under section 672(c) of the Code, may be trustee.

trust statutes is Matter of Shurley, 115 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1997), in which the

-

court reversed a Bankruptcy Court decision that the entire trust of a Texas

.-

Of interest in connection with the Alaska and Delaware asset protection

..~

debtor was a part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate.

The trust had been created

by the debtor's parent and sister, and by the debtor.

The trust contained a

spendthrift clause; income from the debtor's part of the trust was distributed

-

to the debtor, and principal could be distributed to the debtor or the debtor's
descendants for their maintenance and support in their accustomed manner of
living.

Under Texas law, only the debtor's portion of the trust could be reached

by the creditors.

i

Mississippi has created a public policy exception for tort claimants to the
general rule that spendthrift trusts are unreachable by creditors.
First National Bank of Holmes County,

704

A-lID

So.

2d 1020

(Miss.

Sligh y.

1997).

The

-

-

r

r

r
r

r
r
r
r
r
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r

r
r
r

r
r

r
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r
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spendthrift doctrine is judicial in Mississippi, created by Leigh y. Harrison,
11 So. 604 (1892) and Calhoun V. Markow, 151 So. 547 (1933).

The opinion states:

Upon examination of the two Mississippi cases,
~
and Calhoun, one can identify three public policy
considerations observed by this Court when enforcing
spendthrift trust provisions:
(1) the right of donors
to dispose of their property as they wish;
(2) the
public interest in protecting spendthrift individuals
from personal pauperism, so that they do not become
public burdens; and (3) the responsibility of creditors
to make themselves aware of their debtors' spendthrift
trust protections. Upon consideration of these public
policy concerns in the present context, we find that
they do not weigh in favor of enforcing spendthrift
trust provisions as against the claims of tort creditors
or those found liable for gross negligence.
Wi th respect

to the second and third policies,

the court

protection from tort creditors was not the purpose:
Regarding the responsibility of creditors when entering
into transactions with spendthrift trust beneficiaries,
Austin W. Scott stated in The Law of Trusts:
In many of the cases in which it has been held
that by the terms of the trust the interest of a
beneficiary may be put beyond the reach of his
creditors, the courts have laid some stress on
the fact that the creditors had only themselves
to blame for extending credit to a person whose
interest under the trust had been put beyond
their reach.
The courts have said that before
extending credit they could have ascertained the
extent and character of the debtor's resources.
Certainly, the situation of a tort creditor is
quite different from that of a contract creditor.
A man who is about to be knocked down by an
automobile has no opportunity to investigate the
credit of the driver of the automobile and has no
opportunity to avoid being injured no matter what
the resources of the driver may be.
Scott, supra.
Likewise, George T. Bogert reasoned in
Trusts and Trustees:
It is true that a tort creditor has had no chance
to choose his debtor and cannot be said to have
assumed the risk of the collectibility of his
claim.
The argument for the validity of
spendthrift trusts based on notice to the
business world of the limited interest of the
beneficiary does not apply.
It may be argued
that the beneficiary should not be permitted to
circumvent the case and statute law as to
liability for wrongs by taking advantage of the
spendthrift clause.
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found that

George T. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees S 224 (2d ed.
Rev.1992). As these scholars point out, it is plain to
see that one of the main reasons for enforcing
spendthrift trust provisions--the responsibility of
creditors to be aware of the law and of the substance of
such provisions--simply does not apply in the case of
tort judgment creditors.
As for the public interest in protecting spendthrift
individuals from personal pauperism, we believe that
this interest is not as strong in the case of tort
judgment creditors, where the inability to collect on
their claims may well result in their own personal
pauperism.
While it is true that most contract
creditors do not risk becoming insolvent if they do not
collect on a particular claim, such is often not the
case with tort judgment creditors, particularly those
who have suffered such devastating and expensive
injuries as did the Slighs. The public interest against
individuals becoming public burdens would not be served
by protecting a spendthrift tort feasor from personal
pauperism where such protection would result merely in
the pauperism of his victim. If one must choose whom to
reduce to personal pauperism in such a case, the
spendthrift tort feasor or the innocent tort judgment
creditor, we are inclined to choose the party at fault,
especially where that fault rises to the level of gross
negligence or intentional conduct.
The court had more difficulty with the right of persons
property as desired:
Clearly, the right of donors to place restrictions on
the disposition of their property is not absolute, for
as discussed above,
there are several generally
recognized exceptions to the spendthrift trust doctrine.
Rather, a donor may dispose of his property as he sees
fit so long as such disposition does not violate the law
or public policy.
We find that it is indeed against
public policy to dispose of property in such a way that
the beneficiary may enjoy the income from such property
without fear that his interest may be attached to
satisfy the claims of his gross negligence or
intentional torts.
Our tort doctrine has evolved into two types of torts,
ordinary torts and intentional torts.
Public policy
deems it so important to
deter the commission of
intentional torts or acts of gross negligence, that we
allow victims of gross negligence or intentional torts
to recover damages above and beyond what is necessary to
compensate them for their injuries, Le., punitive
damages. However, the intended deterrent effect would
be completely lost upon individuals whose interests are
immune from the satisfaction of such claims.
The Slighs have alleged facts to the effect that
Lorance's mother intended that her son should be able to
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commit acts of gross negligence or intentional torts
without fear that his beneficial interests would be
attached as a result thereof. However, in cases such as
this where the donor has died, such facts may often be
difficult, if not impossible, to prove.
We hold that
plaintiffs need not prove such facts but that such
intent shall be presumed where a party has obtained a
judgment based upon facts evidencing gross negligence or
an intentional tort against the beneficiary of a
spendthrift trust.
Furthermore, we state the natural
corollary that when assessing punitive damages against
a tort feasor found to have committed gross negligence or
an intentional tort who is a
spendthrift trust
beneficiary, the beneficiary's interest should be taken
into account as a factor in determining his monetary
worth.
However, in order to uphold spendthrift trust
provisions so much as is reasonably possible, we hold
that the beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust
should not be attached in satisfaction of a claim until
all of his other available assets have first been
exhausted.

r

r
r
r
r
r

The dissenting justices expressed concern:
I must respectfully dissent to the limitations placed by
the majority on the exempt status of spendthrift trust
benefits. The majority acknowledges that Louisiana is
the only other State to place such limitations on
spendthrift trust benefits for tort creditors, and said
limitations
were
implemented
by
the
Louisiana
legislature rather than the courts of said state. This
Court is thus, apparently, the first to so limit the
exempt status of spendthrift trust benefits. I am aware
of the public policy considerations which motivated the
majority's decision, but, in my view, the general rule
favoring the exempt status of spendthrift trusts
benefits is a sound one which is in no need of revision.

r

r
r

r

Spendthrift trusts provide a means for a parent or other
concerned party to provide for the basic needs of a
beneficiary, and the largely exempt status of the trust
benefits has given comfort and support to countless
settlors and beneficiaries.
The facts of the present
case are tragic, but this Court should, in my view,
avoid changing longstanding precedent based on the fact
pattern of a particular case. Creditors in this state
have at their disposal a number of means of collecting
judgments, and I fear that the majority opinion signals
the start of a gradual decline of the spendthrift trust
in this state. I would affirm the ruling of the trial
court, and I must accordingly dissent.

r

r
r

r

A petition for rehearing was denied.
K.

SECTION 2042 - LIPE INSURANCE

r
r

r
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1.

Private Split-Dollar.

In PLR 9745019, the IRS ruled favorably on a

private split-dollar life insurance arrangement.

Husband and Wife entered into

the arrangement with an irrevocable trust and a second to die policy.

The ruling

describes the arrangement:
The taxpayers initially funded the primary trust with a
cash gift. With this initial contribution the trustee
purchased, and paid the first premium on, a second-todie life insurance policy covering the lives of the
taxpayers.
The irrevocable trust was named the owner
and beneficiary of the policy.
The taxpayers and the
trustee propose to enter into a collateral assignment
split-dollar agreement with respect to any policies held
by the trust.
under the collateral assignment split-dollar agreement,
the trustee is designated the owner of the policy.
During the joint lives of the taxpayers, the trustee
will pay that portion of the annual policy premiums
equal to the insurer's current published premium rate
for
annually
renewable
term
insurance
generally
available for standard risks.
After the death of the
first taxpayer to die, the trustee will pay that portion
of the annual policy premiums equal to the lesser of 1)
the applicable amount provided in the P.S. 58 tables set
forth in Rev. Rul. 55-747, 1955-2 C.B. 228, or 2) the
insurer's current published premium rate for annually
renewable term insurance general available for standard
risks. The taxpayers will pay the remaining portion of
the annual premium. The entire premium may be remitted
by the taxpayers, and, if the taxpayers remit the total
premium, the trustee is obligated to reimburse the
taxpayers within 30 days for the trustee's portion of
the premium.
The split-dollar agreement may be terminated at will by
either the trustee or the taxpayers if the value of the
assets held by the trust, excluding the value of the
insurance policy, but including the loan value of the
policy, equal or exceed the amount that is to be paid to
the taxpayers upon termination as set forth below.
In
all other cases, the split-dollar agreement may be
terminated only through the mutual consent of the
trustee and the taxpayers.
The agreement will also
terminate upon the bankruptcy of the taxpayers, the
failure of the trustee to timely reimburse the
taxpayers, the failure of the taxpayers to pay the
premiums, or the death of the survivor of the taxpayers.
If the agreement is terminated prior to the death of the
survivor of the taxpayers, the survivor of the taxpayers
will be entitled to receive an amount equal to the cash
surrender value of the policy (net of the cash surrender
value at the end of the initial policy year). For a 60day period after the date of termination the owner has
the option of obtaining a release from the collateral
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assignment by returning to the insureds {taxpayers} or
the survivor an amount equal to the then cash surrender
value of the policy less the cash surrender value at the
end of the initial policy year.
If the owner fails to
exercise this option, the insureds or the survivor have
the right to surrender the policy and obtain the cash
surrender value less the cash surrender value at the end
of the initial policy year.

r
r

If the agreement is terminated as a result of the death
of the survivor of the taxpayers, the estate of the
survivor
of
the
taxpayers
{or
its
designated
beneficiaries} will be entitled to receive an amount
equal to the cash surrender value of the policy
immediately prior to the death of the survivor of the
taxpayers less the cash surrender value at the end of
the initial policy year.

r

r

In order to secure the taxpayers' interest (or the
interest of the estate of the survivor) in the policy,
the trustee will assign to the taxpayers, under a
collateral assignment agreement, certain rights in the
policy. Under the agreement, the following rights are
assigned to the taxpayers:
I} the right to receive a
portion of the proceeds payable on the survivor's death
equal to the taxpayers' interest under the split-dollar
agreement; and 2} the right to receive the cash value of
the policy if the policy is surrendered by the trustee,
less the cash surrender value amount at the end of the
initial policy year. All other rights with respect to
the policy are reserved to the trustee and all such
rights may be exercised solely by the trustee subject to
the taxpayer's security interest.

r

r

r
r

r
r

r
r
r

r
r
r

With respect to the income tax consequences of the arrangement, the ruling
stated:
The arrangement in Rev. Rul. 78-420 arises out of the
employer-employee relationship between the employee and
the corporation.
The arrangement is of the type
contemplated by Rev. Rul. 64-328, and, consequently, the
premium payments by the corporation are deemed to be
compensatory in nature and income to the employee. The
employee is then deemed to make a gift of this income to
his spouse.
Unlike the relationships contemplated in the above
mentioned revenue rulings, the premium payments by the
trustee of the trust, in the present case, are not
compensatory in nature. The taxpayers have no employeremployee relationship with the trustee of the trust.
The taxpayers made a taxable transfer to the trust at
its inception and they receive nothing else of value,
compensatory or otherwise, when the premium payments are
made.
Under the terms of the split-dollar agreement, the
taxpayers will pay the portion of the premiums in excess
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of that paid by the trustee.
If the agreement is
terminated prior to the death of both taxpayers, the
surviving taxpayer or taxpayers will receive, as
reimbursement for their premium payments, an amount
equal to the cash surrender value of the policy, less
the cash surrender value at the end of the initial
policy year. The death of the last taxpayer to die, the
estate of that taxpayer will receive, as reimbursement
for the premium payments, an amount equal to the cash
value of the policy immediately prior to the taxpayer's
death, less the cash surrender value at the end of the
initial policy year. Since the taxpayer (if living) or
the estate of the last taxpayer to die will be
reimbursed by the trust for the portion of the premium
payments made by the taxpayers, the portion of the
premium payments made by the taxpayers will not
constitute gifts to the trust for gift tax purposes. We
note
that,
if
the
taxpayers
make
additional
contributions to the trust in order to provide funds for
the trustee's portion of the premium payments, these
latter contributions will be taxable for gift tax
purposes.

-

-

We conclude that the payment by the taxpayers of the
portion of the premiums for which they are responsible
under the split-dollar agreement, will not result in a
gift to the trust by the taxpayers or a deemed gift to
the trust by the taxpayers under section 2511.
The

Service

determined

that

neither

spouse

retained

an

incident

of

ownership:
In the present case, the taxpayers have retained no
incidents of ownership in the second-to-die life
insurance policy on their lives. In the event that the
trust includes assets (other than the insurance policy)
such that these assets when added to the loan value of
the policy would allow the trustee to pay the specified
amount upon termination and the taxpayer(s) elects to
cancel the agreement,
the trustee could pay the
taxpayer(s) an amount equal to the cash surrender value
of the policy (net of the cash surrender value at the
end of the initial policy year).
The taxpayer(s)
cannot, thus, force the cancellation of the policy.
We conclude that the insurance proceeds payable to the
trust pursuant to the split-dollar agreement from the
second-to-die life insurance policy held by the
irrevocable trust will not be includible in the gross
estate of the last taxpayer to die under section 2042.

-

-

The Service also specifically declined to rule on the application of

....
j

section 7872 or 2503.
2.

Change of Beneficiary.

Insurance Company,

690 A.2d 882

In Engelman y.

Connecticut General Life

(Conn. 1997), the Connecticut Supreme Court
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expanded the substantial compliance doctrine to encompass a situation in which
the insured sent the company a letter which referred specifically to the policy
by number and was signed, dated, and witnessed.

r

L.

r

has overruled Estate of Park v. commissioner, 475 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1973), in

r

The issue was the deductibility of administration expenses.

r
r
r

r
r
r
r

r
r
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SECTIQN 2053
1.

and

2054 - PEBTS AND ADMINiSTRATION EXPENSES

Allowance of Expenses: Effect of Probate Decree.

The Sixth Circuit

Estate of Millikin v. Commissioner, 125 F.3d 339 (6th Cir. 1997), heard en banco

section 2053 refers only to state probate law.

£su:k held that

The opinion described the issue:

The Commissioner relies on Treasury Regulation §
20.2053-3(a), which provides, in part:
"The amounts
deductible
from
a
decedent's
gross
estate
as
'administration expenses'
are limited to such
expenses as are actually and necessarily, incurred in
the administration of the decedent's estate; that is, in
the collection of assets, payments of debts, and
distribution of property to the persons entitled to it."
26 C.F.R. § 20.2053-3(a). The Commissioner asserts that
this regulation imposes a separate, federal requirement
that expenses must be "actually and necessarily
incurred" in order to be deductible, and claims that
this requirement is in addition to the statutory
requirement that the expenses must be "allowable by the
laws of the jurisdiction." The Commissioner argues that
this additional requirement does not conflict with the
statutory standard.
Instead, the regulation merely
defines the allegedly ambiguous term "administration
expenses" in the statute.
Over twenty years ago, a panel of this Court considered
a similar question in Estate of Park V. Commissioner,
475
F.2d 673
(6th Cir.
1973),
and ruled that
deductibility of administration expenses is determined
solely under state probate law. The Tax Court properly
considered itself bound by Estate of Park, as did the
panel of our Court that heard the estate's initial
appeal.
In this en banc review,
however,
the
Commissioner has asked us to reconsider Estate of Park.
In light of developments in the law since Estate of Park
was decided -- particularly the Supreme Court's decision
in Chevron U. S . A. Inc. V. Natural Resources De fense
Council. Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d
694 (1984), and opinions from other circuits -- we find
that Estate of Park is no longer good law, and we
therefore overturn that decision.
The Court cited Chevron as follows:

A-117

In Chevron U. S. A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council. Inc" the Supreme Court held:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of
the
statute
which
it
administers,
it
is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is
the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue.
If the intent
of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress,
If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.
467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778,
(1984) (citations omitted) .

81 L.Ed,2d 694

-

The Court held:
The structure of 26 U.S.C. § 2053(a) compels a two-part
test for deductibility of expenses under that statute.
First, an expense must be one of the four types of
expenses specifically enumerated in the statute. If an
expense qualifies as one of those four types, it must
further be "allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction .
. . under which the estate is being administered." 26
U.S.C. § 2053(a). We agree with the Commissioner that
the phrase "administration expenses" is neither selfdefining nor unambiguous.
Moreover we find that the
Treasury Regulation's construction of that phrase to
include only those expenses "actually and necessarily [
] incurred in the administration of the decedent's
estate; that is, in the collection of assets, payment of
debts, and distribution of property to the persons
entitled to it."
26 C.F.R. § 20.2053-3(a), is a
permissible construction of the statute.
We are
therefore bound by that construction.
The opinion noted that the Second,
Circuits have similarly held.

Fourth,

Fifth,

Ninth,

-

and Eleventh

The opinion also discussed the rule in the Seventh
~

Circuit:
Estate of Jenner V. commissioner, 577 F.2d 1100 (7th
Cir. 1978), can be read to hold that deductibility of
administration expenses is governed solely by state law.
Indeed, at least one other circuit appears to have read
Estate of Jenner in that manner. See Estate of Love v.
Commissioner, 923 F.2d 335, 337 n, 6 (4th Cir. 1991).
That is not the only possible reading of that case,
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however. In fact, the Estate of Jenner court quoted the
Treasury Regulation restriction on administration
expenses with apparent approval, Estate of Jenner, 577
F.2d at 1105, but concluded that "[b]ecause Illinois
laws . . . only permit executors to sell estate assets
when it is necessary for the proper administration of
the estate,
. the probate court's approval of the
account
constitutes an implicit
finding
of
the
'necessity' of the sale," id. at 1106 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Only when it turned to the
separate issue of whether state court determinations of
the reasonableness of claimed expenses are binding on
the Commissioner did the Estate of Jenner court cite
Estate of Park with approval and provide the analysis
which could be viewed as an endorsement of the Estate of
~ holding.
~

--

--

-

In Kentucky this may mean a significant change in the way the IRS reviews
estates.
2.

Amounts

Payable

to

Children

as

a

Result

of

Divorce.

The

deductibility under section 2053 of amounts payable to children as a result of

--

----

...

-

-

---

a divorce was at issue in Estate of Edwards, 74 T.C.M. 748 (1997).

The taxpayer

argued that the payments to the children were payable under a divorce decree; the
Internal Revenue Service argued that the amounts were payable pursuant to a
property settlement agreement.

The Court summarized the facts as follows:

Decedent, at the time of the divorce, desired to
maintain control of the Company.
Ann Goss was not
opposed to decedent's desire to run the Company, because
she recognized that the Company has prospered under his
stewardship.
However, in return, Ann Goss demanded
certain property rights that she may not have otherwise
received in a dissolution proceeding, such as alimony
that would continue after her remarriage. On March 6,
1970, in order to meet these goals, decedent and Ann
Goss entered into a written property settlement
agreement (the 1970 PSA) incident to the divorce
proceedings.
Pursuant to the 1970 PSA, Ann Goss
received one-half of the jointly owned stock.
In
addition, she agreed to place her shares of stock in
trust (the voting trust), and then execute a voting
trust agreement in favor of decedent. Pursuant to the
terms of the voting trust, decedent would be entitled to
vote her shares of stock in the Company and Highland
Properties for 21 years or until his death, if sooner.
In return, decedent agreed to pay alimony that would not
terminate upon her remarriage.
Further, decedent and
Ann Goss agreed to maintain their reciprocal will
provisions. At that time, each of their wills provided
that the stock in the Company and Highland Properties
would pass, in trust, to the surviving spouse for life,
with the remainder to the three children.
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On March 10, 1970, decedent's marriage to Ann Goss was
dissolved by a Los Angeles County Superior Court
interlocutory order.
The Los Angeles County Superior
Court entered a final judgment of dissolution of
marriage on March 12, 1970 (the final judgment).
The
1970 PSA was incorporated into the final judgment. At
the time the final judgment was entered, each of the
Edwards children was over 21 years old.
A disagreement between Ann Goss and decedent arose
concerning some of the terms of the 1970 PSA. In order
to resolve the disagreement, decedent, Ann Goss, their
three children, and the Company entered into a second
property settlement agreement on January 20, 1984 (the
1984 PSA).
On June 6, 1984, a stipulation for
modification of judgment and order thereon was entered
by the California Superior Court (the 1984 court order) .
The 1984 court order incorporated the 1984 PSA into the
final judgment in place of paragraph 14 of the 1970 PSA.
Paragraph 14 had dealt with the reciprocal will
provisions of petitioner and Ann Goss.
In the 1984
court order, decedent was prohibited from modifying,
without prior approval of the court, the Arthur C.
Edwards settlement trust (settlement trust), a revocable
living trust that he had created in 1981.
Under the
terms of the settlement trust, decedent was to receive
the income from his stock in the Company and Highland
Properties during his life; at his death, Ann Goss was
to receive such income for life; and, at her death, the
trust property was to be distributed to the three
children.
On November 6, 1988, the date of decedent's death, the
fair market values of decedent's interests in the
Company and Highland Properties , respectively, were
$18,113,960 and $106,184. Pursuant to the terms of the
settlement trust, outlined supra, Ann Goss possessed an
income interest in this property for her life.
The
parties have agreed that the fair market value of that
income interest was $6,741,453.
After decedent's death, a Federal estate tax return was
filed by the executor of decedent's estate.
In the
return, the executors claimed deductions for the value
of Ann Goss' life interest in decedent's stock and the
value of the Edwards children's remainder interest.
Respondent, in the notice of deficiency, disallowed both
deductions. Respondent has subsequently conceded that
the claim of Ann Goss is deductible. The deductibility
of the remainder interest of the Edwards children,
however, is still in dispute.
The requirements of section 2053 were reviewed by the Court:
Section 2053(a) (3) provides that the value of the gross
estate is determined by deducting the amount of claims
against the estate.
Section 2053(c) (1) (A) limits the
deduction for claims founded on a promise or agreement
to the amount of claims that were contracted for full
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and adequate consideration.
One purpose of this
consideration requirement is to prevent decedents from
reducing their gross estate through contractually
arranged
transfers
that
serve
a
"donative
or
testamentary intent."
Estate of Huntington v.
commissioner, 100 T.C. 313, 316 (1993), affd. 16 F.3d
462 (1st Ciro 1994); see also United States V. Stapf,
375 U.S. 118, 130-133 (1963)
However, liabilities
imposed by law and not founded on a promise or agreement
are deductible from the gross estate regardless of the
ability to show consideration. Sec. 20.2053-4, Estate
Tax Regs.
0

A claim founded on a divorce decree is a liability
imposed by law and deductible without regard to the
limitations of section 2053 (c) (1) (A) .
See Harris V.
commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950); Estate of Robinson v.
commissioner,
63 T.C. 717 (1975). Petitioner asserts
that the claim of the Edwards children is founded on the
divorce decree and is therefore deductible as a claim
imposed by law. Respondent disagrees, arguing that the
claim is founded on the 1970 PSA, not the divorce
decree.
In order for the claim to be imposed at law, the divorce
decree, rather than the agreement between the parties,
must be the "operative element" of a claim. Estate of
Satz V. commissioner, 78 T.C. 1172, 1179 (1982).
Whether the divorce decree is the "operative element"
depends upon whether the divorce court has the power to
vary the terms of the agreement between the parties -here the rights of the Edwards children vis-a-vis the
stock. Harris V. Commissioner, supra at 109-110; Estate
of Fenton V. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 263, 271-2724 (1978).
If the divorce court has the power to prescribe a
property settlement with terms different from those
agreed to by the spouses, then it is the decree that
fixes the right of the spouses, and, under the rationale
of Harris V. Commissioner, supra, any subsequent claim
by a Spouse is founded on that decree. Estate of Fenton
VI Commissioner, supra at 272. The fact that a property
settlement agreement is incorporated into the divorce
decree is not determinative in ascertaining whether the
decree is the operative element of a claim. Id.
The Court held for the IRS:
In this regard, our examination of California law
indicates that, absent exceptional circumstances, a
California divorce court lacks the power to modify a
property settlement agreement before incorporating it
into a divorce decree. See Flynn V. Flynn, 265 Po2d 865
(Cal. 1954); Adams V. Adams, 177 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1947).
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has addressed
this question in Grav V United States, 541 F.2d 228 (9th
Cir. 1976). In Gray, the decedent husband and his wife
had entered into a property settlement agreement,
whereby the husband agreed to maintain an insurance
policy on his life, designating his wife as the
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----beneficiary. Id. at 230. The husband died in a plane
crash shortly after the divorce court had entered a
divorce decree, wherein the court approved the property
settlement agreement and ordered the parties to carry
out its provisions.
rd.
The proceeds of the policy
were paid directly to the wife; the executor included
the proceeds in the gross estate and claimed a deduction
for that same amount.
rd. at 231. The District Court
held that the claim was founded on a divorce decree and
thereby deductible under
section 2053,
and the
Government appealed. rd.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
District Court.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit agreed with the Government's position that a
claim is founded on the court decree only where "the
court entering the decree had the power to modify or
alter the terms of the agreement."
rd. at 231.
The
Court of Appeals, in concluding that the wife'S claim
was founded on the marriage settlement agreement,
observed that "under California law a California court
entering a divorce decree, in the absence of fraud, has
no power to modify or alter the property agreement."
rd. at 232.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the fact
that the divorce court ordered the parties to carry out
the terms of the agreement only imposed an additional
method for enforcing its terms and did not change the
conclusion that the wife's claim was founded on the
agreement.
Petitioner attempts to distinguish the present case by
noting that the law relating to property
settlement
agreements has changed since the Ninth Circuit decided
Gray y. United States, supra, and cites a number of
cases where the divorce court altered the terms of a
marriage settlement agreement.
See Adkins y. Adkins,
186 Cal. Rptr. 818 (Ct. App. 1983); Brennan y. Brennan,
177 CI. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1981); Moore y. Moore, 169
Cal. Rptr. 619 (Ct. App. 1980). Petitioner'S attempts
to distinguish the case at bar from Gray y, United
States, supra, fall short.
In each of the above cases, the presence of exceptional
circumstances, such as fraud or overreaching, gave the
court grounds to set aside the agreements. See Adkins
y. Adkins, supra at 822 (sufficient showing of extrinsic
fraud for the court to set aside a marital settlement
agreement where the husband, unable to.read or write,
signed the agreement based on his wife's misleading
representations); Brennan y. Brennan, supra at 525
(sufficient showing of extrinsic fraud for the court to
set aside a marriage settlement agreement where the
wife, unrepresented by counsel, relied to her detriment
on the advice of her husband and his attorney); Moore y.
Moore, supra at 624 (wife'S waiver of her interest in
the community property set aside where she was not
represented by counsel and spoke only limited English) .
Moreover, in each of these cases, the court set aside a
property settlement agreement after a divorce decree had
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been previously entered. None of the cases involves a
court's power to modify an agreement PRIOR TO entering
the decree.

r

r

3.

Theft Loss.

In an unusual case described under Pennsylvania law an

estate was allowed to take a theft deduction where the attorney for the estate
had been paid, the Orphans' court refused to approve payment, and the attorney

r

was bankrupt and could not pay.

r

her.

Estate of Meriano y. commissioner, 81 A.F.T.R.2d

M.

SECTIONS 2056 AND 2056A - MARITAL DEDUCTXON

r
r

estate because the executor had been removed and a prior settlement reached with

1.

The provision was described as follows:

The son was nominated as trustee of the Trust, but his
authority to manage the Trust was made subject to
several conditions. As long as the son continued in the
day-to-day management of the company, the voting rights
of the stock were to be vested in him. But if, for any
reason, the son became unwilling or unable to continue
active management of the company, the voting rights were
to be vested in Rinaldi's wife, or, if she was no longer
living, in the fiduciary of the Trust. Additionally, as
soon as practicable after the son gave up day-to-day
management, the fiduciary of the Trust was to offer to
sell the Trust's stock to the son at book value. If the
sale to the son was not effectuated, then the fiduciary
was to select other potential buyers and offer
reasonable terms for the stock's sale. The will went on
to provide that:

r
r
r
r

I hereby authorize but do not direct my Personal
Representative
to
elect
that
the
property
(Rinaldi
Printing
Company
capital
stock)
constituting the principal of this Trust be
treated as qualified terminable interest property
for the purpose of qualifying for the marital
deduction allowed in determining the federal
estate tax upon my estate.
The Court held that the marital deduction must be determined as of the date
of death.

In this instance,

the stock was actually redeemed by the company

before the estate tax return was filed and the QTIP election made. The reason for
the

redemption was

to

enable

the

company

I

r

r

(3d Cir. 1998).

In Estate of Rinaldi y. United States, 38 Fed. Cl.

contained an unusual provision.

r
r

r

OTXP; Copditign.

~98-640

341 (1997) the Court of Federal Claims denied the QTIP election for a trust which

r

r

The executor was not required to reimburse the

A-123

to

make

an

S

election;

it

was

represented that an S election could not have been made if the trust were a
shareholder.
The estate analogized the facts to the contingent QTIP cases (Estate of

....

1

Spencer y. Commissioner, 43 F.3d 226, 231 (6th Cir. 1995); Estate of Clayton y.
Commissioner,

976

F.2d

Commissioner, 15 F.3d 779,

1486,

(5th

Cir.

(8th Cir. 1994)).

1992);

Estate

of

Robertson

The Court rejected the analogy:

The
difficulty
with
accepting
plaintiff's
characterization sterns from the means by which the
trust's defect was allegedly remedied.
The trust may
indeed have rid itself of the troublesome stock in
question; what remains unchanged, however, are the terms
of the will that rendered the trust ineligible for QTIP
treatment in the first place.
There exists no legal
impediment to the trust's ownership of the printing
company's stock.
Rather, it is only the company's
desire to continue as an S corporation that led to the
shares' redemption. And it is only the maintenance of
that desire which keeps the trust's defect from again
rising to the surface. For example, if a change in tax
law were to diminish the disparity between "S"
corporations'
and "C" corporations'
relative tax
burdens,
thereby making
the
company's
continued
operation as an S corporation significantly less
desirable, there is nothing to prevent the trust from
reacquiring shares of the company. In the event of such
a reacquisition, the terms of Rinaldi's will presumably
would still govern.
Under those terms, the shares
potentially would be subject once again to a bargain
sale to Rinaldi's son or a third party, thereby
diminishing the corpus of the trust. The portion of the
trust's corpus lost in the bargain sale would have
escaped taxation in both Rinaldi's and his surviving
spouse's estates -- the very potentiality which the
statutory QTIP requirements were implemented to avoid.
Granted, the likelihood that Rinaldi's trust will
reacquire the company's stock, and that his son will
quit the company's management -- thereby spurring the
bargain sale -- may be remote.
but when it comes to
judging QTIP eligibility, "it is the possibility, not
the probability, that an interest will terminate or fail
that will determine whether the surviving spouse's
interest is a 'qualifying income interest for life.'"
Estate of Kyle y. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 829, 845 (1990).
Because deductions, whether from income or estate taxes,
are "a matter of legislative grace,'" the taxpayer must
meet every condition of eligibility set forth by
Congress:
It is not enough that such conditions are nearly
met, or that a potentiality inconsistent with the
legislative mandate is unlikely to actually
become operative.
The taxpayer may not haggle
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with Congress; he either fits squarely within the
statute in every particular or the deduction is
unavailable.

r

Estate of Weisberger v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.
217, 220 (1957). This mindset has led courts to
take consistently firm stances against QTIP
treatment for trusts failing to meet one of
section 2056's requirements.
See Estate of
Doherty y. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 446, 460-61
(1990) (rejecting QTIP treatment for trust where
surviving spouse had discretion as trustee to
accumulate all or part of trust income for
distribution to others upon his death), rev'd on
other grounds, 982 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1992);
Estate of Bowling y. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 286,
296 (1989) (rejecting QTIP treatment for trust
where trustee was authorized to invade trust
corpus during life of surviving spouse to provide
for emergency needs not only of surviving spouse,
but also of decedent's
surviving son and
brother) .

r

r
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r
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r
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r
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The Court's holding is correct.

The representations involving the S

election are curious because it would appear that the trust could have qualified
as a qualified subchapter S trust.

What would the result have been if the

restriction had been in a stock agreement?
2.

deal

with

Requirement

That Spouse Receiye All Ipcgme.

substantially similar

facts,

and address

PLRs 9739015 - 9739018
the

appropriateness

of

allocating liquidating payments from a partnership between income and principal.
The marital deduction was allowed. The language to be included in the trust was:
It is anticipated that the trustee will be receiving
from the remaining partners of [Partnership], a [State]
limited partnership
(the "Partnership")
presently
located at [---] as partial purchase price for my entire
interest in the Partnership, an amount equal to a
specified percentage of the net profits, if any, of the
Partnership for a specified period of time, pursuant to
the terms of that certain Restated Partnership Agreement
of Limited Partnership dated as of
, (or pursuant
to any successor partnership agreements) (such purchase
price payments being hereinafter referred to as the
"Contingent Payments").
In this regard, for all
purposes of this instrument,
a portion of each
contingent payment will be treated as a payment of
interest and the remainder as a payment of principal.
The principal amount of each contingent payment will
equal the present value of the payment, discounted at
the appropriate Applicable Federal Rate (as published in
the Internal Revenue Bulletin) from the date the payment
is made to the date of the sale or exchange.
Such
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amount of each payment shall be allocated to and
considered principal of the trust.
The excess of the
amount of the contingent payment over the amount treated
as principal will be treated as interest and shall be
allocated to and considered principal of the trust. The
excess of the amount of the contingent payment over the
amount treated as principal will be treated as interest
and shall be allocated to and considered income of the
trust.
However, if a contingent payment is made not
more than six months after the date of the sale or
exchange, no portion of the payment will be treated as
interest and such payment shall be treated as principal.
3.

proceeds,

Rollover

to

ODOT.

received annually,

PLR

9746049

discusses

the

rollover

into a qualified domestic trust

("QDOT")

...
'I

of

IRA

under

section 2056A.
4.

Terqdnation of Rights Upon Incompetepcy.

In Estate of Walsh y.

Commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 29 (1998) the court denied a marital deduction to a
trust with the following provisions:
1.
During the life of the surviving spouse who
remains competent as set forth in Article XXIII * * *
a.
The net income, beginning as of the date of
the first to die, may be paid to said spouse in
quarterly or other convenient installments during the
life of said spouse.

J
.....

b.
The Trustee may pay to said spouse or apply
for the benefit of said spouse such amounts of principal
as the Trustee deems necessary or advisable for the
proper care, comfort, support, maintenance, and welfare
of said spouse, including reasonable luxuries.
c.
Said spouse shall withdraw any amount or all
of this Trust by written request to the Trustee.
d.
If said spouse should at any time be
determined as incompetent * * *, said spouse shall take
no benefits hereunder and this Trust shall be treated
and distributed as if said spouse had died.
2.
After the death of the surviving spouse or after
the incompetency of the surviving spouse * * *
a.
All property in TRUST A, including income,
shall be distributed to such appointee or appointees in
the manner and proportions as the surviving spouse may
designate by will expressly referring to this general
power of appointment, including the power in said spouse
to appoint all thereof to said spouse's estate, free of
any Trust hereunder. Such general power of appointment
shall exist immediately upon the death of the first one
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of us to die and shall be exercisable by the surviving
spouse exclusively and in all events.
The issues were summarized in the opinion:
Respondent determined and argues that the property
passing to Trust A does not qualify for the marital
deduction because the property is a terminable interest.
Respondent reaches this result mainly because, in
respondent's view, the Agreement revokes the surviving
spouses's right to receive income from the Trust, or to
appoint the Trust's property, upon incompetency.
The
estate argues primarily that the property is not a
terminable interest because the surviving spouse has a
general power of appointment over the Trust's assets
that allows the surviving spouse to dispose of these
assets any time before the Trust terminates on account
of the surviving spouse's death or incompetency.
The
estate asserts that the Agreement states clearly that
the intent of the Trust's settlors was to qualify Trust
A for the marital deduction.
If the property is a
terminable interest, the estate argues alternatively,
the decedent's estate tax liability must be computed as
if no completed gift of property was made to the Trust
before the decedent died. The estate asserts that the
Trust fails because its settlors never relinquished
control over the property transferred to it. The estate
asserts that the Trust is revoked if the settlors'
intent to qualify Trust A for the marital deduction is
thwarted.
The applicable Treasury Regulations relating to section 2056(b) (5) were
noted by the court, which then held:
Section 20.2056(b)-5(g) (1) and (3), Estate Tax Regs.,
provides:
(g) Power of appointment in surviving spouse. -- (1) The
conditions * * * that the surviving spouse must have a
power of appointment exercisable in favor of herself or
her estate and exercisable alone and in all events, are
not met unless the power of the surviving spouse to
appoint the entire interest or a specific portion of it
falls within one of the following categories:
(i)
A power so to appoint fully exercisable in
her own favor at any time following the decedent's death
(as, for example, an unlimited power to invade); or

r
r

(ii)
A power so to appoint exercisable in favor
of her estate.
Such a power, if exercisable during
life, must be fully exercisable at any time during life,
or, if exercisable by will, must be fully exercisable
irrespective of the time of her death * * *; or

r

(iii)
A combination of the powers described under
subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of this subparagraph. * * *
However, the condition that the spouse's power must be

r
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exercisable in all events is not satisfied unless
irrespective of when the surviving spouse may die the
entire interest or a specific portion of it will at the
time of her death be subject to one power or the other

* * *
* * * * *
(3)
A power is not considered to be a power
exercisable by a surviving spouse alone and in all
events * * * if the exercise of the power in the
surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest or a
specific portion of it to herself or to her estate
requires the joinder or consent of any other person.
The power is not "exercisable in all events", if it can
be terminated during the life of the surviving spouse by
any event other than her complete exercise or release of
it. * * *

-

(Ellipses in opinion) .
From this text, we discern that the surviving spouse
must have the ability during life to exercise or release
the power of appointment in all events.
A power of
appointment that may terminate upon the happening of an
event does not meet this requirement, unless the event
is the voluntary exercise or release of the power by the
surviving spouse. See Eckel y. United States, 259 F.
Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (surviving spouse not entitled
to income for life when spouse s right to income is
terminated upon remarriage); see also Starrett y.
commissioner, 223 F.2d at 166. A power of appointment
that lapses on the happening of a contingent event such
as incompetency is outside the reach of section
2056(b) (5). This is especially true in the instant case
where applicable State law requires that an exercise or
release of a power of appointment must adhere to the
same formalities as those that must be followed to
create a power of appointment or to transfer property in
general, e.g., by a written instrument.
Minn. Stat.
Ann. sec. 502.64, 502.79 Subd. 2 (West 1990).
I

The opinion discusses Estate of Tingley as follows:
The incompetency provisions in Article VII of the
Agreement take the property passing to Trust A outside
the statutory and regulatory requirements for the
marital
deduction.
In
Estate
of
Tingley
v.
Commissioner, 22 T.C. 402 (1954), the surviving spouse
received an income interest and an inter vivos right to
withdraw corpus.
Under the terms of the trust, this
right terminated upon the surviving spouse sIegal
incapacity or upon the appointment of a guardian; upon
legal incapacity or the appointment of a guardian, the
trustee was given the discretion to use and apply this
part of the net income and corpus for the surviving
spouse's benefit. The Court in Estate of Tingley held
that the estate was not entitled to the marital
deduction mainly because the income interest and power
I

A-128

-

r
r
r
r
rr

r
r
r

r
r
r
r
r

,,.

r
r

r
r

of appointment were outside the scope of the predecessor
to section 2056 (b) (5) .
This was so even though the
surviving spouse could invade corpus and actually did so
shortly after the decedent died. The Court noted that
the surviving spouse could not invade corpus in all
events because the trust would terminate that right upon
legal incapacity or upon the appointment of a guardian.
The Court noted that the surviving spouse's right to
receive income would terminate at the same time.
The estate argues that the facts of Estate of Tingley
are distinguishable from the facts at hand. The estate
contends that the power of appointment in Estate of
Tingley, which terminated upon the surviving spouse's
legal incapacity or the appointment of a guardian, is
different from the power of appointment in this case,
which, the estate asserts, is activated by incompetency.
The estate claims that the surviving spouse in Estate of
Tingley could lose the power to appoint the property for
reasons other than legal incapacity, whereas the
Agreement here terminates the Trust only on death or
incompetency.
The estate concludes
that
these
differences in fact warrant a result in the instant case
different from the result in Estate of Tingley.
We disagree with the estate that Estate of Tingley is
inapposite to our decision herein. Although there may be
differences between the facts of Estate of Tingley and
the facts of this case, the critical fact that appears
in both cases is that the surviving spouse could lose
power over the corpus upon the happening of a contingent
event; namely, incompetency (in the instant case) and
incapacity or the appointment of a guardian (in the case
of Estate of Tingley).
In Estate of Tingley, the
surviving spouse would lose any power over the corpus if
the contingent event occurred before the surviving
spouse wi thdrew the corpus. Al though the surviving
spouse in Estate of Tingley did actually withdraw the
corpus before the happening of this contingent event,
the Court held that, when viewed at the time of the
decedent's death, the surviving spouse's power was not
exercisable in all events.
Estate of Tingley y.
Commissioner, 22 T.C. at 404, 406.
The same is true
here. When viewed at the time of the decedent's death,
the surviving spouse would lose power over the corpus if
the contingent event occurred before the surviving
spouse either withdrew the corpus or provided in his
will for the corpus' disposition. Given this possible
loss of power, we are unable to conclude that the
surviving spouse's power of appointment was exercisable
by
the
surviving
spouse
alone,
see
sec.
20.2056{b)-5{g) (i), Estate Tax Regs., and that it was
exercisable by the surviving spouse in all events, see
sec. 20.2056{b)-5{g) (3), Estate Tax Regs.; see also S.
Rept. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1948), 1948-1 C.B.
285, 343 {"An example of a power which * * * [is not
exercisable alone and in all events] is a power which
(unless sooner exercised or released) will terminate on
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* * * [a given date] or on the date of death of the
surviving spouse, whichever occurs first.").
Oddly, footnote 6 would appear dispositive without the foregoing analysis
or the court's struggle with it:
We are also unable to conclude that the Trust meets the
requirements of sec. 2056(b) (5) in that the Agreement
provides that the surviving spouse is not entitled to
any trust income upon incompetency.
5.

of RaDD v,

RefOrmation.

The Ninth Circuit has upheld the Tax Court in Estate

commissioner,

140 F.3d 1211

(1998),

J
.J

finding that the post-mortem

reformation by a California probate court of a trust that authorized distribution
of income and principal among the surviving spouse and children to create a QTIP
trust was not effective for marital deduction purposes.
U.S. Supreme Court decision in

~

The court discussed the

and Rev. Rul. 73-142.

Because the latter

is not often used when it could be to good effect, the opinion is worth reviewing
in detail:
The IRS argues, and the tax court agreed, that the
probate court s reformation of Mr. Rapp' s will is
without binding effect for the purpose of determining
federal estate taxes owed, unless California's highest
court has affirmed the result.
Both rely on
Commissioner of Internal Revenue V. Estate of Bosch, 387
U;S. 456 (1967). We agree that Bosch is controlling.
I

A.
In Bosch, the respondent, Mrs. Bosch, filed a federal
estate tax return in which she claimed a marital
deduction.
Id. at 458. The IRS denied the deduction.
Mr. Bosch's will had created a trust from which Mrs.
Bosch was to receive all income and in which Mrs. Bosch
had a general power of appointment.
If she declined
that appointment, however, half of the corpus of the
trust was to go to Mr. Bosch's heirs.
The entire trust would qualify as tax .exempt only if
Mrs. Bosch retained the general power of appointment.
Before Mr. Bosch died, Mrs. Bosch executed a release of
her general power of appointment. Thus, whether or not
the entire value of the trust was to be taxed depended
upon the validity of the release. Before the tax court,
Mrs. Bosch claimed that the release was invalid. While
those proceedings were pending, Mrs. Bosch sought and
received a determination from a New York state court
that the release was a nullity under state law.
The
result was that a larger estate was to go to Mrs. Bosch
as the surviving spouse, a diminished inheritance was to
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go to other beneficiaries,
deduction could be claimed.

and

a

larger

marital

The issue before the Supreme Court was what effect was
to be given to the state court's determination regarding
the validity of the release. The Court first noted that
neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applied.
Id. at 463.
The Court then reviewed the legislative
history of the marital deduction statute, and concluded
that Congress did not intend state court actions to have
a determinative effect on federal tax questions.
It noted:
[Congress]
said that
"proper
regard, "
not
finality "should be given to interpretations of
the will" by state courts and then only when
entered by a court "in a bona fide adversary
proceeding." We cannot say that the authors of
this directive intended that the decrees of state
trial courts were to be conclusive and binding on
the computation of the federal estate tax as
levied by the Congress.
If the Congress had
intended state trial court determinations to have
that effect on the federal actions, it certainly
would have said so -- which it did not do.
Id. at 464 (citations omitted).
Relying on Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 u.S. 64 (1938), the Court stated:
when the application of a federal statute is
involved, the decision of a state trial court as
to an underlying issue of state law should a
fortiori not be controlling.
If there be
no decision by [the State's highest court] then
federal authorities must apply what they find to
be the state law after giving the "proper regard"
to relevant rulings of other courts of the State.
In this respect, it may be said to be, in effect,
sitting as a state court.
Id. at 465 (citation omitted) .
This rule remains valid today.
See, e. g., Abmanson
Found. v. U.S., 674 F.2d 761, 774 (9th cir. 1981)
(holding that neither a lower state court decision
following a good faith adversary proceeding nor a
private good faith settlement is binding on federal
courts
when
determining
federal
estate
tax
consequences); Estate of Kraus v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 875 F.2d 597, 600-01 (7th Cir. 1989)
(holding that state court's reformation of a will is not
binding on federal courts because "only the state's
highest court can make a ruling on state law that binds
the federal courts"); Estate of Selby v. U.S., 726 F.2d
643, 646 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that the federal
court is obligated to review state probate court
proceeding to determine whether proper state law was
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applied where highest state court has not spoken, and
where issue of federal tax liability is involved).
In this case, Mrs. Rapp sought modification in the
probate proceeding for the sole purpose of reforming her
husband's will so that the trust would qualify as a QTIP
trust. As in Bosch, the state court proceedings were
"brought for the purpose of directly affecting federal
estate tax liability," and, as in Bosch, the issue
before the state court was "determinative of federal
estate tax consequences." ~ , 387 u.s. at 462-63.
Accordingly, the principle of Bosch applies here. The
tax court correctly held that it was not bound by the
California probate court's reformation of Mr. Rapp's
will.
B.

j

1
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The executor does not argue that the tax court
improperly applied California law.
In fact,
the
executor concedes that the probate court's decision to
reform Mr. Rapp' s will was erroneous.
Instead, the
executor argues that the tax court was without power to
ignore the California probate court decision to reform
Mr. Rapp's will, i.e., that Bosch is inapplicable to the
instant case. He argues that the tax court only needed
to determine whether Mrs. Rapp had a QTIP trust as of
the proper "measuring date." According to the executor,
the proper measuring date is the date on which the
executor elected a QTIP deduction, and as of that date,
Mrs. Rapp had a QTIP trust because the probate court's
order had become final.
Bosch, he argues, cannot be
read to stand for the proposition that a state court
order affixing the property rights of a taxpayer may be
ignored where the order becomes final and unappealable
as of the relevant measuring date for federal tax
purposes.
The executor argues that Rev. Rul. 73-142,
1973-1 C.B. 405 (hereinafter Revenue Ruling 73- 142),
supports his position, and is binding on the IRS
Commissioner.
Regardless of the proper measuring date, however, the
executor's argument fails because, contrary to the
executor's
assertion,
Bosch does
stand for
the
proposition that a probate court decision may be ignored
when determining federal tax consequences, even when
that order is final, if the decision is contrary to
state law.
The executor's argument that Bosch is inapplicable is
unavailing.
The executor argues that Bosch does not
permit the tax court to ignore the import of a state
court decision that has become final and unappealable,
i.e., one that cannot be directly challenged. There is
no language in Bosch or subsequent decisions, however,
that would support this position. That the California
Supreme Court itself can no longer overrule the probate
court's decision is irrelevant. Bosch stands only for
the proposition that the federal court is not bound by
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the state court proceedings for determining federal
estate taxes; to this end, the tax court decision does
nothing to upset the actual outcome of the probate court
proceedings. Mrs. Rapp will still enjoy the benefits of
the reformation for which she petitioned in probate
court. The estate simply will not receive the federal
tax benefits of a QTIP.
Revenue Ruling 73-142, cited by the executor, does not
support his position. As the executor correctly notes,
revenue rulings are not binding as to the taxpayer, but
may limit the IRS' ability to assert a position that is
contrary to that asserted in the ruling if the ruling is
published, to the extent that the ruling addresses a
similar issue. See Beneficial Found.! Inc. V. U.S., 8
CI. Ct. 639, 644-45 (CI. Ct. 1985); cf. Estate of Kosow
v. commissioner of Internal Revenue, 45 F.3d 1524, 1528
n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that taxpayers may assert
revenue rulings as a shield, although they do not have
the effect of law and are not binding on the courts).
However, Revenue Ruling 73-142 is not analogous to the
instant case.

r

The decedent in Revenue Ruling 73-142 created a trust
during his lifetime for the benefit of his wife and
children. Under the terms of the trust instrument, the
decedent reserved to himself the power to appoint or
discharge a trustee at any time.
The trustee had the
unreserved power to distribute income from the trust.
Before his death, the decedent, in a non-adversary
action before the state court, asked the state court to
interpret the trust instrument.
The state court held
that the trust the decedent created gave the decedent
the power to remove and appoint a trustee only once.
This decision was contrary to the law of the state.
Subsequent to this order, the decedent removed the
original trustee and appointed another. Thus, under the
state court order, the decedent no longer had a right to
remove the trustee as of the date of his death.

r

The question before the IRS was the effect to be given
to the state order in determining the estate tax
consequences of the trust created by the decedent.
Under the tax law at the time, if the decedent had
retained the unfettered right during his life to
designate the trustee, the value of the trust was to be
included in his estate for tax purposes; if not, the
value of the trust was to be excluded.

r
r

r

r
r

r
r
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In its ruling, the IRS held that the grantor did not
have the unlimited power to appoint a trustee because
the
state
court
decree
had
become
final
and
unappealable, and was "conclusive as to those parties,"
despite the fact that the decision was contrary to state
law. Revenue Ruling 73-142 (emphasis added). The value
of the trust, therefore, could not be included in the
decedent's federal estate taxes. The IRS noted:
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In this case the lower court had jurisdiction
over the parties and over the subject matter of
the proceeding. Thus, the time for appeal having
elapsed, its judgment is final and conclusive as
to those parties, regardless of how erroneous the
court's application of the state law may have
been.
Consequently, after the time for appeal
had expired, the grantor-decedent did not have
the power to appoint himself as successor
trustee.
The aforesaid rights and powers which
would otherwise have brought the value of the
trust corpus within the provisions of the [tax
code] were thus effectively cut off before his
death.

..J

j

Unlike the situation in Bosch, the decree in this case
was handed down before the time of the event giving rise
to the tax (that is, the date of the grantor's death).
Thus, while the decree would not be binding on the
Government as to questions relating to the grantor's
power to appoint himself as trustee prior to the date of
the decree, it is controlling after such date since the
decree, in and of itself, effectively extinguished the
power.
Revenue Ruling 73-142. That is not this case. The state
court proceeding at issue in Revenue Ruling 73-142 bound
the testator himself before his death. After the decree
became final and the testator exercised his power once,
the testator no longer retained the type of power
necessary for the trust to be considered under his
control during his lifetime and thus was not part of his
estate upon his death.
By contrast, here the state
court proceedings took place after Mr. Rapp's death.
The executor argues that this distinction is irrelevant.
We disagree. Before death, the testator is free to
create estate plans and execute documents for the
express purpose of minimizing taxes.
In this case,
however, persons other than the testator sought to
modify his will after death. They did so not to effect
his intent, but to avoid taxes. This is precisely the
situation addressed by the Court in Bosch.

J

unavailable but perhaps more effective would have been an argument based
on "scrivener's error."

Footnote 7 to the opinion discusses the role of Mr.

Clark, decedent's attorney who prepared the Will:
Mr. Clark initially was retained as counsel for the
estate but was subsequently replaced. Although Mr. Clark
did not testify at the reformation hearing, he did
testify before the tax court at the behest of the
government.
He indicated that Mr. Rapp specifically
intended to create a trust for his children'S benefit,
and did not wish to leave outright his money to Mrs.
Rapp.
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6.

Disclaimer to Create QTXP.

Attempted reformation of trusts to create

trusts that qualify for the QTIP election are an on-going issue.

PLR 9818005

considered the following language:
(b)
[the] Trustee.
. shall use such part of the
income and/or principal . . . as it may deem necessary
to provide for the support in reasonable comfort of my
wife, and to provide for the support and education of my
children and the descendants of any deceased child of
mine.
(c)
My wife shall have the power at any time and from
time to time by instrument in writing signed by her and
delivered to the Trustee, to direct the Trustee to turn
over any part of the property in this trust to or among
such of my descendants, or spouses of such descendants,
and in such manner, in trust or otherwise, as my said
wife may in such instrument direct or appoint, provided
that she shall have no power to appoint said property to
herself, to her estate, to her creditors or to the
creditors of her estate.
(d)
On the death of my said wife, the property then
remaining in this trust shall be distributed to or among
such of my descendants, and in such manner, in trust or
otherwise as my said wife may by her Last will and
Testament direct or appoint, provided that she shall
have no power to appoint said property to herself, to
her creditors, to her estate or to the creditors of her
estate.
(e)
Should my said wife fail to exercise her power of
appointment as to all of the property in this trust . .
. the property of this trust as to which she fails to
exercise such power of appointment shall be divided into
as many separate and equal shares as I have children
then living and deceased children with descendants then
living.
A series of disclaimers were undertaken.

The IRS accepted those by the

beneficiaries of the trust other than wife:
The disclaimers executed by A's adult children, A' s
minor
child,
and
the
unborn
and
unascertained
descendants of A, as well as the disclaimer executed by
B in her individual capacity, purport to disclaim any
right or interest to have income withheld from the
income beneficiary or accumulated during the lifetime of
B and any right or interest to cause the trustee to so
withhold or accumulate income.
These rights and
interests were not granted to the beneficiaries under
the terms of A' s will.
Whether income is to be
distributed or accumulated is determined by the terms of
the
governing
instrument,
not
by
the
trust
beneficiaries.
For these reasons, we do not believe
these portions of the disclaimers have any force or
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effect. However, to the extent that the disclaimers by
the children and unborn and unascertained descendants
renounce the right to receive principal and income of
the Residuary Trust during the life of B, we conclude
that they are effective under State law and are
qualified disclaimers under section 2518. The result of
these disclaimers is that B is the only permissible
distributee of income of the Residuary Trust during her
lifetime.

J

Wife, as trustee, also disclaimed certain trustee powers:
the Trustee, on behalf of herself and all
successors and assigns, in accordance with [State
statute] Section 53-2-115, having neither exercised nor
accepted any of the above-described powers as trustee,
hereby (i) affirms that under both [State] law and the
terms of the Residuary Trust the Trustee has no
directive, power or authority to withhold from the
income beneficiary or accumulate income under the
Residuary Trust; (ii) irrevocably and unqualifiedly
disclaims, renounces and refuses such Trustee Power to
Distribute to Decedent's Descendants; (iii) irrevocably
and unqualifiedly disclaims, renounces and refuses any
directive, power or authority that may be said to exist
to withhold from the income beneficiary or accumulate
income as Trustee under the Residuary Trust during the
lifetime of the surviving spouse; (iv) irrevocably and
unqualifiedly disclaims, renounces and refuses any
directive, power or authority that may be said to exist
to acquire or retain unproductive property during the
lifetime of the surviving spouse without the surviving
spouse's consent; and (v) irrevocably and unqualifiedly
disclaims, renounces and refuses any directive, power or
authority that may be said to exist to treat any receipt
or other item as principal which is properly treated
under applicable law as income.
One of the trustee's powers was fatal to qualification of the trust under
section 2056:
Generally, a trustee cannot accept a trust in part and
disclaim in part. This is true whether he purports to
accept the trust only as to a part of the trust
property, or only as to some of the duties.
Also,
generally, a disclaimer by a trustee does not extinguish
a power except with respect to the disclaiming
fiduciary. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts sections
35 and 102 (1959); Scott on Trusts sections 102.3 and
102.4 (1987).
In Rev. Rul. 90-110, 1990-2 C.B. 209, the surviving
spouse disclaimed her power as trustee to invade corpus
during the life of the surviving spouse for the benefit
of a grandchild of decedent.
The grandchild neither
disclaimed his interest in the trust nor consented to
the trustee's disclaimer of the power.
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The decedent's will did not authorize the trustee to
make such a disclaimer. Under applicable state law, the
trustee's attempt to disclaim this type of power was
ineffective without
the written consent of
the
beneficiary or an express grant of authority to make
such a disclaimer in the governing instrument.
The
revenue ruling holds that because neither local law nor
the governing instrument authorized the trustee to make
a unilateral disclaimer of a fiduciary power, the
trustee's attempted renunciation of the power to invade
corpus was not qualified under local law and was not,
therefore, a qualified disclaimer under section 2518.
In the present case, the governing instrument (A's will)
did not authorize the trustee to disclaim any powers or
duties; on the contrary, the will provides that "the
provisions of each and every subparagraph of this Item
[Item XII, which lists the trustee's powers] are
intended to apply to each fiduciary named in this will.
State statute allows a fiduciary, ACTING ON BEHALF OF
ANOTHER PERSON, to renounce property or an interest in
property which was transferred TO THAT OTHER PERSON. We
cannot read this statute as authorizing a trustee to
disclaim certain powers and duties given to the office
of the trustee by the governing instrument, with or
without the consent of the trust beneficiaries.
In
attempting to disclaim these powers,
B was not
renouncing an interest in property on behalf of another
person to whom that property was transferred; rather,
she was attempting to renounce her own powers and duties
which she possessed by virtue of being the trustee. We
therefore conclude that B' s attempted disclaimer of
certain trustee powers and duties was not a valid
disclaimer under local law and, therefore, is not a
qualified disclaimer under section 2518.
In reaching this conclusion we have taken into
consideration the state statute which prohibits a
trustee from disclaiming a trusteeship after acceptance
of the trusteeship.
B petitioned the court for
appointment as trustee.
The court appointed B as
trustee more than one month prior to B's filing of the
document in which she states that she has "neither
exercised nor accepted" the powers she wished to
disclaim.
The statute does not address a partial
disclaimer by a trustee of only certain powers or
duties. We interpret the omission as meaning that once
a trusteeship has been accepted, it cannot be partially
disclaimed. This would be in keeping with the general
rule
cited previously with
respect
to
partial
disclaimers by trustees.
We also note that for federal tax purposes,
in
determining the effect of state law on a question of
property rights , where there has been no decision by
the highest court of the state, the Service must
determine what it finds to be state law from the
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viewpoint of the state's highest court. COmmissioner y.
Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
I t is our
determination that, based on state statutes and the
facts of the present case, the Supreme Court of State
would find the attempted disclaimer of the trustee
powers to be ineffective under local law.
Thus, the trust did not qualify for QTIP:
In the present case, the powers given to the trustee
which B has attempted to disclaim are expressly and
unconditionally granted by A in his will. The terms of
the Residuary Trust, in their entirety, provide no
reason to believe that A intended these powers to be
circumscribed in order that B may be deemed to be
entitled to that degree of beneficial enjoyment of the
trust property during her life which is necessary for
the allowance of a marital deduction under section
2056(b) (7).
B is not empowered by the will to demand
that the trust be made fully productive; nor may she
challenge the good faith determinations regarding items
of income and principal made by the trustee in its
discretion.
In sum, the trustee's powers to allocate
income to principal and to invest in unproductive
property disqualify B's interest in the Residuary Trust
for the marital deduction. See Estate of Bennett, 100
T.C. at 58, 59.
N.

J

SECTXQRS 2501 TO 2524 - GXlTS
1.

Reduction for Built-Xn Capital Gains.

In Eisenberg y. Commissioner,

74 T.C.M. 1046 (1997), the issue was the effect of built-in capital gains on gift
tax valuation.

I

Avenue N Realty Corp. was a C corporation which owned cash and

a building which was leased.

The court reviewed these transactions.

On December 23,
1991,
the first transfer date,
petitioner made gifts of 668 shares of stock in the
corporation as follows:
(1) 334 shares to her son,
Joseph Eisenberg; (2) 167 shares to her granddaughter,
Joanne B. Bayer; and (3) 167 shares to her grandson,
David Blum.
Subsequently on September 20, 1997, the
second transfer date, and on February 23, 1993, the
third transfer date, petitioner gave as gifts 275 shares
and 57 shares of stock in the corporation, respectively,
to her son Joseph Eisenberg.
The fair market value of the stock, after a 25-percent
minority discount, was $517.20 per share on the first
transfer date, $356.71 per share on the second transfer
date, and $341.77 per share on the third transfer date.
On the first, second, and third transfer dates, the
property's adjusted basis was $69,500, $67,906, and
$67,108, respectively.
At the time of the first
transfer, the fair market value of the property was
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$600,000.
At the time of the second and third
transfers, the fair market value of the property was
$470,000. The corporation, however, did not possess a
plan to liquidate, sell, or distribute the property in
conjunction with the stock transfers.

r
r

On or about October 16, 1992, April 16, 1993, and April
12, 1994, respondent received petitioner's timely filed
Federal gift tax returns, Form 709, for the taxable
years 1991, 1992 and 1993, respectively.
Respondent
issued a statutory notice of deficiency to petitioner on
July 18, 1995.

r
r
i

The only issue before the court was the effect of the built-in
gains:

r
r

Here, the parties have agreed that the net asset value
method is appropriate for the value of the stock of the
corporation. They are also in agreement as to the fair
market value of the property in question and the
valuation of the shares as reported on petitioner's
Federal gift tax returns.
The parties further agree
that the corporation would have recognized capital gains
in the amount of $530,500, $402,094, and $402,892 for
the taxable years 1991, 1992, and 1993, respectively, if
the property had been disposed of in a taxable
disposition (built-in capital gain).
However, the
parties diverge on whether,
in arriving at the
corporation's net asset value, adjustments should be
made to reflect costs that would, potentially, be
incurred if its assets were liquidated.

,

r

r
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Petitioner contends that, for gift tax purposes, she is
entitled to take into account the full amount of capital
gain taxes to reduce the fair market value of the stock
of the corporation. Simply put, petitioner argues that
a willing purchaser of the corporate stock would have
discounted the otherwise applicable fair market value
because of the income tax liability inherent in the
aforementioned property.
The parties have stipulated
the amounts that would have been realized in the years
under consideration if a sale of the property had
actually taken place.
In that regard, petitioner
computed the capital gain tax reductions as though the
corporation had sold the property in a
taxable
disposition on the transfer dates.

i
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Respondent, on the other hand, argues that petitioner is
not entitled to reduce the fair market value of the
corporate stock to account for potential capital gain
taxes since there was no liquidation, distribution, or
sale of the stock at the transfer dates.
A number of previous Tax Court cases disallowed a discount for built-in
capital gains.

The court disagreed with the taxpayer's attempt to distinguish

those cases:
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This Court has repeatedly held that no reduction in the
value of closely held stock to reflect potential capital
gains is warranted where the evidence fails to establish
that a liquidation of the corporation or sale of the
corporation's assets is likely to occur.
Ward v
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78, 103-104 (1986); Estate of
Andrews y, Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938, 942 (1982); Estate
of Piper VI commissioner, 72 T.C. 1062, 1087 (1979);
Estate of Robinson V. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 222, 226
(1977); Estate of Cruikshank v. commissioner, 9 T.C.
162, 165 (1947).
Moreover, we have also held that a
discount to asset values for the "lost use of money" is
inappropriate because it fails to recognize that the
underlying assets will themselves appreciate, most
likely, at a rate similar to that applied as a discount.
Estate of Andrews V. commissioner, supra at 950.
I

..

-

* * *
Petitioner
contents
that
Estate
of
Piper
y.
Commissioner, supra at 1087, and Estate of Luton v.
commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-539, among other cases,
represent the denial of a discount for potential capital
gain taxes was based, in part, on the possibility that
the
taxes
could be avoided by liquidating the
corporation.

J

In that regard, petitioner argues that those cases have
lost their vitality as a result of the October 22, 1986,
enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA), Pub. L.
99-514, sec. 631, 100 Stat. 2269.
Specifically,
petitioner contends that the amendments made by the TRA
to sections 336 and 337 repealed the General Utilities
doctrine. Petitioner states that prior to the effective
date of TRA, the corporation could have liquidated
completely and distributed the property and cash to her,
or
to any other individual or entity,
without
recognizing the built-in gain.
Further, petitioner
asserts that, subsequent to the effective date of TRA,
she does not possess the ability to completely liquidate
the corporation without the recognition of the built-in
gain. Further, petitioner asserts that, subsequent to
the effective date of TRA, she does not possess the
ability to completely liquidate the corporation without
the recognition of the built-in gain. See e.g., sees.
336(a) and 337. As a result, petitioner argues that it
is now a virtual certainty that if the corporation is
liquidated, capital gain taxes will be imposed at the
corporate level. Moreover, petitioner states that any
"willing buyer"
of
the
corporate
stock,
having
"reasonable knowledge" of the applicability of the
capital gain taxes, would reduce the price paid for the
stock by the full amount of the tax.
Sec. 25.2512-1,
Gift Tax Regs. Thus, petitioner argues that this change
in the law justifies the allowance of a discount for
potential taxes.

..J

In contrast, respondent counters that a hypothetical
buyer possesses the option of avoiding the imposition of

-
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any capital gain taxes through the purchase of corporate
stock and the continuation of the business of leasing
the property in question through the corporate form.
Thus, respondent asserts that any individual or entity
may indefinitely defer taxes. Additionally, respondent
argues that there are several transactions in which the
corporation may transfer the property to a new
corporation in exchange for the new corporation's stock
and thus avoid the recognition of gain. See e.g., secs.
351 and 355.
We agree with respondent that a discount for capital
gain taxes does not apply here. As noted, we have held
that a discount for potential costs of sale or
liquidation, whether in the nature of selling expenses
or income taxes that might be incurred, is inappropriate
where the sale or liquidation is itself speculative.
In this instance, both parties have stipulatd that there
was no plan of liquidation.
Accordingly, it is
inapposite to apply a discount for potential capital
gain taxes when the recognition event itself is purely
speculative.
Similarly is the Estate of welch y. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1998-167.

valuation was performed by Mercer Capital Management, of Memphis, Tennessee,
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which has an office in Louisville.

The opinion states:

The parties agree that the fair market value of
decedent's interest in ESI and ISC as of the applicable
valuation date, absent a discount for built-in capital
gains, is $328,294 and $365,419, respectively.
The
estate argues that a willing seller and a willing buyer
of the corporate stock would have discounted the value
of ESI' sand ISC' s stock to reflect the income tax
liability due upon sale of the condemned properties. In
support thereof, the estate contends:
At the time of
decedent's death, the real property owned by ESI and ISC
was under threat of condemnation by the Housing
Authority; that the real property was in fact sold to
the Housing Authority; and that a portion of the
nonvoting common stock owned by the decedent at her
death was sold on March 4, 1994, at a per share price
equal to the per share price shown on the estate's
Federal estate tax return.
As to the March 4, 1994,
stock sale, the estate is, in essence, arguing that the
sale is indicative of what a willing buyer would have
paid for the stock on the valuation date given the
income tax liability inherent in the aforementioned
property.
Respondent makes several arguments for disallowing a
built-in capital· gains discount.
First, respondent
argues that the estate has not established that a
liquidation of the corporations or the sale of the
corporations' assets was likely to occur. Among other
things, respondent contends that the estate has failed
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to show that the condemnation of the subject properties
was foreseeable on the valuation date, and that the
evidence establishes that legislative action to condemn
the property was not taken until August 12, 1993, more
than 5 months after the valuation date.
Second,
respondent argues that the discount is not warranted
where only the real estate, and not the corporations,
was subject to condemnation. Third, respondent argues
that
the discount
is not warranted where both
corporations could avoid, and did indeed avoid, the
recognition of gain under section 1033.
As previously stated, ordinarily a [stricken work] sale
within a reasonable time before or after the valuation
date is the best criteria of market value. See Estate
of Scanlan y. commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-331, affd.
without published opinion 116 F.3d 1476 (5th Cir. 1997).
However, in this case, we do not assign any weight to
the March 4, 1994, stock sale which included the sale of
nonvoting common shares in ESI and ISC.
The sale was
between related parties, the coexecutors (decedent's son
and daughter). Moreover, the coexecutors appear to have
determined the sales price of the stock solely by
referencing its fair market value as reported on
decedent's Federal estate tax return, even though the
sale occurred approximately 12 months after decedent's
death. We therefore focus our attention on the issue of
whether the value of decedent's interest in ESI and ISC
includes a discount for built-in capital gains tax
liability. The estate must prove error in respondent's
determination of value as set forth in respondent's
notice of deficiency. Rule 142(a); Welch y. Helyering,
290 u.S. 111, 115 (1933).

-

This Court has repeatedly rejected reductions in value
of closely held stock to reflect built-in capital gains
tax liability where the evidence fails to establish that
a liquidation of the corporation or sale of the
corporation's assets is likely to occur.
See ward v.
commissioner, 87 T.C. 78, 103-104 (1986); Estate of
Andrews y. commissioner, supra at 942; Estate of
Cruikshank y. commissioner, 9 T.C. 162, 165 (1947);
Estate of Thalheimer y. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1974-203, affd. on this issue and remanded without
published opinion 532 F.2d 751
(4th Cir. 1976).
Recently, in Eisenberg y. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1997-483, the Court stated:
taxpayers may not obtain a valuation discount for
estate and gift tax purposes based on an event
that may not transpire. Hence, "When liquidation
is only speculative, the valuation of assets
should not take these costs into account because
it is unlikely they will EVER BE incurred."
[Estate of Andrews y. Commissioner, supra at 942;
emphasis added.]
In sum, the primary reason for disallowing a discount
for capital gain taxes in this situation is that the tax
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liability itself is deemed to be speculative. [In prior
cases] * * * there was a failure to show the requisite
likelihood that the beneficiaries would liquidate the
corporation or sell the underlying assets and incur the
tax and other expenses. Further, there was no showing
that a hypothetical willing buyer would desire to
purchase the stock with the view toward liquidating the
corporation or selling the assets, such that the
potential tax liability would be of material and
significant concern.
We find that in this case the potential for capital
gains tax recognition was too speculative to warrant
application of the capital gains discount. As suggested
in Eisenberg v. Commissioner, supra, and other cases
cited above,
the estate must show the requisite
likelihood that the corporation would sell the assets
and incur the tax. Assuming that the condemnation of the
subject properties was foreseeable as of the valuation
date, see Ithaca Trust Co. y. United States, 279 U.S.
151 (1929) (subsequent events are not considered in
determining fair market value, except to the extent that
they were reasonably foreseeable at the date of
valuation); Estate of Scanlan y. Commissioner, supra,
and consequently there was the requisite likelihood that
the corporations would sell the properties, the estate
has failed to show that it was likely that either of the
corporations would pay built-in capital gains tax upon
sale.
As a general rule, gain realized from the sale or other
disposition of property must be recognized. See sec.
1001(c).
Section 1033 provides an exception to this
general rule by allowing gain realized from certain
involuntary conversions to be deferred. Realized gain
can be deferred in its entirety under section 1033 if:
(1) nonrecognition treatment is elected; (2) qualified
replacement property is purchased within the time limits
specified; and (3) the cost of the qualified replacement
property equals or exceeds the amount realized on the
conversion. Sec. 1033(a) (2) (A). Among other things, an
involuntary conversion results when property is
condemned by the government.
Sec. 1033(a). The
aforementioned exception to the general rule that gain
is recognized casts doubt on whether or when a taxpayer
would have to recognize gain as a result of an
involuntary conversion.
A section 1033 election was available to the estate on
the applicable valuation date. The estate presented no
evidence that on or near the valuation date either
corporation considered recognizing the built-in capital
gain and foregoing the election under section 1033.
Additionally, ESI and ISC manifested their intent to
find replacement properties by filing the section 1033
elections with each corporation's 1994 Federal income
tax returns. The principal shareholder, and now sole
shareholder, Newton covenanted to find replacement
property when he acquired the shares of the other
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shareholders. Given these facts, no reduction in value
should be allowed for the corporations' built-in capital
gains,
and
we
therefore
uphold
respondent's
determination on this issue.

.J

The Tax Court has handed down an extremely important case in Estate of
Dayis y. commissioner, 110 T.C. No. 35 (1998).
not reviewed but was a regular opinion.

The opinion of Judge Chiechi was

...I

The court allowed a reduction for built-

in capital gains as part of a lack of marketability discount.
The stock to be valued was of a personal holding company which owned

-

considerable Winn-Dixie stock:
Decedent, who was one of the founders of Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc. (Winn-Dixie), died testate on June 11,
1995, while he was a legal resident of Florida. Robert
Davis, the personal representative of decedent's estate,
resided in Jacksonville, Florida, at the time the
petition was filed.
On or about November 2, 1992 (the valuation date),
ADDI&C, a closely held Florida corporation that was
incorporated on December 22, 1947, had a total of 97
shares of common stock issued and outstanding, all of
which were owned by a trust (Davis trust) for the
benefit of decedent and none of which was subject to any
restrictive sale provisions or buy-sell agreements.
On
the valuation date, decedent transferred 25 shares of
such stock to his son Robert Davis and 25 shares of such
stock to his son Lee Davis. On that date, each of those
two blocks of ADDI&C common stock constituted 25.77
percent of the issued and outstanding common stock of
ADDI&C.
As of the valuation date, ADDI&C was primarily a holding
company for various assets of decedent, although ADDI&C
also had certain cattle operations (both feeder and
breeding cattle) as of that date. Specifically, on the
valuation date, ADDI&C owned 1,020,666 shares, or 1.328
percent, of the issued and outstanding common stock of
Winn-Dixie, which was at all relevant times traded on
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE); 3,456 shares, or
.0737 percent, of the issued and outstanding common
stock of D.D.I., Inc. (DDI), which was a holding company
for various assets of decedent and his family and the
stock of which was at all relevant times not publicly
traded; various feeder and breeding cattle; certain
equipment; and certain other unidentified assets.

j

-

On the valuation date, the net asset value of the company was a little over
$80,000,000 with a tax basis of about $7,600,000.
issue:
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Petitioner's
Expert
Mr. Howard
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Blockage and/or SEC
rule 144 discount

4.9 percent
or $3,432,117

Petitioner's
Expert
Mr. Pratt
10 percent
or $7,004,320

-$0-

Factored in as
part of lack-ofmarketability
discount

Factored in as
part of lack-ofmarketability
discount

Discount or
adjustment
attributable to
ADDI&C's built-in
capital gains tax

25,395,109

Net asset value of
ADDI&C

51,313,043

73,135,976

80,140,269

r

Minority discount

15 percent or
7,696,956

20 percent or
14,627,195

12 percent or
9,616,832

r

Lack-ofmarketability
discount

35 percent or
15,265,630

50 percent or
29,254,391

38 percent or
26,798,906

15 percent or
8,776,317

15 percent or
10,578,516

r
I

r
r

r
r

Portion of lack-ofmarketability
discount attributable
to ADDI&C's built-in
capital gains tax
Total dollar amount
of discounts or
adjustments

-0-

51,789,812

50,885,906

36,415,738

Fair market value
of each 25-share
block of ADDI&C
common stock

7,306,825

7,539,800

11,250,000

Fair market value
of each share
of each 25-share

292,273

301,592

450,000

r

Petitioner

r

Blockage and/or SEC
rule 144 discount

r

Discount or adjustment
attributable to ADDI&C's
built-in capital gains
tax

24,645,525

Net asset value of ADDI&C

49,490,424

r
r
r
,

Respondent's
Expert
Mr. Thomson

10 percent or
$7,004,320
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Respondent
-$0-

-0-

80,140,269

Minority discount

15 percent or
7,273,564

15 percent or
12,021,040

Lack-of-marketability
discount

35 percent or
14,425,901

23 percent or
15,667,423

Portion of lack-ofmarketability discount
attributable to
ADDI&C's built-in
capital gains tax

-0-

-0-

53,349,310

27,688,463

Fair market value of each
25-share block of ADDI&C
common stock

6,904,886

13,518,500

Fair market value of each
share of each 25-share
block of ADDI&C common
stock

276,195

540,740

Total dollar amount of
discounts or adjustments

J

-

-

with respect to the built-in gains issue, the opinion states:
We are convinced on the record in this case, and we
find, that, even though no liquidation of ADDI&C or sale
of its assets was planned or contemplated on the
valuation date, a hypothetical willing seller and a
hypothetical willing buyer would not have agreed on that
date on a price for each of the blocks of stock in
question that took no account of ADDI&C' s built-in
capital gains tax.
We are also persuaded on that
record, and we find, that such a willing seller and such
a willing buyer of each of the two blocks of ADDI&C
stock at issue would have agreed on a price on the
valuation date at which each such block would have
changed hands that was less than the price that they
would have agreed upon if there had been no ADDI&C's
built-in
capital
gains
tax
as
of
that
date.
Respondent's position to the contrary is inconsistent
with the record in this case. We have found nothing in
the following cases on which respondent relies that
requires us, as a matter of law, to alter our view: ~
y. commissioner, 87 T.C. 78 (1986); Estate of Andrews y.
commissioner, 79 T.C. 938 (1982); Estate of Piker y.
commissioner, 72 T.C. 1062 (1979); Estate of Cruikshank
y. commissioner, 9 T.C. 162 (1947); Estate of Luton y.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-539, supplemented by T.C.
Memo. 1996-181; Estate of Ford y. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1993-580, affd. 53 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1995);
Estate of Bennett y. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-34.

J

-

We note initially that one of the cases on which
respondent relies, Estate of Bennett y. Commissioner,
supra, involved a valuation date that preceded the
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine and did not
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involve a request by the taxpayer for a reduction in
valuing the stock interest in question for the capital
gains tax that would have been due upon liquidation of
the corporation whose stock was at issue, absent tax
planning to avoid that tax which was permissible as of
the valuation date in that case. Instead, the taxpayer
in the Estate of Bennett case asked the Court to reduce
the value of the stock interest in question there by the
"estimated costs of liquidation" which consisted of a
"discount for commissions", a "discount for losses on
liquidation", and a "discount for the costs of overhead
and sales costs".
Estate of Bennett y. Commissioner,
supra.
Turning to the remaining cases on which respondent
relies, it is significant to us that, except for Estate
of Luton y. Commissioner, supra, none of the cases on
which respondent relies indicates that any of the expert
witnesses who testified in those cases considered
corporate built-in capital gains tax as a factor in
appraising the respective stock interests at issue in
those cases.
In the Estate of Luton case, one of the
taxpayer's experts, but not respondent's expert, reduced
the asset value of each of the corporations at issue by
liquidation costs that included, inter alia, Federal and
State capital gains taxes that would have been incurred
on liquidation of those corporations. Estate of Luton v.
Commissioner, supra. In contrast, in the present case,
all of the experts for both parties are of the view that
ADDI&C's built-in capital gains tax must be taken into
account as a factor in ascertaining the fair market
value of each of the two blocks of ADDI&C stock in
question.
Except for Estate of Luton y. Commissioner, supra, and
Estate of Ford y. Commissioner, supra, the other cases
on which respondent relies (like Estate of Bennett y.
Commissioner, supra) involved valuation dates that
preceded the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
As we read all of those cases, including Estate of Luton
and Estate of Ford, the taxpayers requested the Court
for a reduction in valuing the respective stock
interests in question equal to the full amount of
capital gains taxes that would have been due upon
liquidation of the respective corporations whose stock
was at issue in those cases, absent tax planning to
avoid those taxes which was permissible as of the
respective valuation dates in those cas.es.
The Court
denied each of those requests for a reduction for the
full amount of such capital gains taxes where there was
no evidence as of those respective valuation dates that
a liquidation of the corporation in question or sale of
corporate assets was planned or contemplated or that the
full amount of such taxes could not have been avoided.
In the present case, petitioner and all of the experts,
including respondent's expert, believe, and we have
found, that, in determining the fair market value on the
valuation date of each of the blocks of stock at issue,
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it is necessary to apply a discount or adjustment
attributable to ADDI&C' s built-in capital gains tax
because that is what a hypothetical willing seller and
a hypothetical willing buyer would have done under the
facts
and circumstances
existing on that
date.
Petitioner adopts the view of petitioner's expert Mr.
Howard and argues that the full amount of such tax
should reduce ADDI&C's net asset value in making that
determination.
On the record before us, we reject
petitioner's position and Mr. Howard's opinion. On that
record, we find that, where no liquidation of ADDI&C or
sale of its assets was planned or contemplated on the
valuation date, the full amount of ADDI&C's built-in
capi tal gains tax may not be taken as a discount or
adjustment in determining the fair market value on that
date of each of the two blocks of stock in question,
even though we have found that as of that date it was
unlikely that ADDI&C could have avoided all of ADDI&C's
built-in capital gains tax, and the record does not show
that there was any other way as of that date by which
ADDI&C could have avoided all of such tax. See Ward v.
commissioner, 87 T.C. 78 (1986); Estate of Andrews y.
commissioner, 79 T.C. 938 (1982); Estate of Piper y.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1062 (1979).

-

-

Footnote 17 discusses two cases decided recently:
See Estate of Welch y. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1998-167, and Eisenberg y. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1997-483, which were decided after the parties filed
their briefs in this case and which involved valuation
dates that occurred after the repeal of the General
Utilities doctrine.
In neither of those cases was a
liquidation of the corporation in question or a sale of
its assets planned or contemplated as of the respective
valuation dates.
In valuing the respective stock
interests at issue in those cases, the taxpayers asked
the Court for a reduction equal to the full amount of
capital gains taxes that would have been due upon
liquidation of the respective corporations involved
there, absent tax planning to avoid those taxes which
was permissible as of the respective valuation dates.
In neither of those cases does the Court indicate that
any expert believed that such a reduction was warranted.
The Court denied the taxpayers' requests.
Two lessons are apparent.

-

..

One, valuation experts must consider built-in

gains explicitly as part of a discount analysis.

Two, valuation cases should be

approached either on a going concern basis -- with free cash-flow as the key
criterion of value -- or on a liquidation basis in which built-in gains are a key
component.
2.

Gift by Trustee.

The Second Circuit has reversed the Tax Court in

Saltzman y. commissioner, 131 F.3d 87 (2nd Cir. 1997).
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The primary issue before
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the court was whether the Trustee made a gift to his son when the trust exchanged
common stock for preferred stock of a lesser value, thus increasing the value of
the son's stock.

The court determined that no gift was made.

Section 288
provides:

of

the

Restatement

(Second)

of

Trusts

If the trustee in breach of trust transfers trust
property to a person who takes with notice of the
breach of trust, the transferee does not hold the
property free of the trust, although he paid
value for the transfer.
Comment (a) thereunder elaborates on the scope of the
rule as follows:
The interest of the beneficiary in the trust
property is not cut off by a transfer by the
trustee in breach of trust to a third person who
at the time of the transfer has notice that the
transfer is in breach of trust, although he paid
value for the transfer; and the beneficiary can
in equity compel the third person to restore the
property to the trust.
The third person holds
the interest which he acquires by the transfer
upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary of
the trust.
The is the law of New York.
See Renz V. Beeman, 589
F.2d 735, 744 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Albright V.
Jefferson County Nat'l Bank, 292 N.Y. 31, 40 (1944);
wendt V. Fisher, supra, 243 N.Y. at 444.
The alleged
gift from Arnold to Eric was imperfect or inchoate
rather than consummate.
In Burnet V. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933), the Court
held that the gift statute "is aimed at transfers of the
title that have the quality of a gift, and a gift is not
consummate until put beyond recall." Id. at 286. That
holding has been followed consistently.
See, e. g. ,
Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 181 (1943) ("The
separable interests transferred are not gifts to the
extent that power remains to revoke the trust or
recapture
the
property
represented
by
any
of
them[.] "(citing Burnet); Rev. Ruling 74-365.
Moreover, Burnet is applicable not only where the
grantor has expressly reserved the right to revoke the
conveyance but also where a right arises by indirection
or operation of law.
5 Bittker, Federal Taxation of
Income, Estates and Gifts Para(s) 122.3.1 (1984); ~
v, United States, 413 F.2d 1239, 1242-43 (5th Cir.
1969).
Commissioner v. Allen, 108 F.2d 961, 963 (3d
Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 680 (1940); Berger V.
United States, 487 F.Supp. 49, 52 (W.D. Pa, 1980).
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One who receives property as a result of a breach of
trust holds the property in constructive trust.
This
does make him a trustee as that term generally is used.
"In the case of a constructive trust, the duty is merely
to surrender the property." V Scott on Trusts section
462.1 at 3415 (3d ed. 1967), see also Coco y. Coco, 107
A.D.2d 21,24-27, appeal dismissed, 65 N.Y.2d 637
(1985) .
In the face of this duty, the transfer of
property by a trustee in violation of his fiduciary
obligations cannot be said to be final or consummate.
It therefore is not taxable as a gift.
3.

Gift Upon Trust Terminatign.

In PLR 9802031 the Service ruled that

a gift is made when the beneficiary of a trust allows the trust to be terminated.
The ruling states:
In the present case, the terms of the Decedent's
testamentary trust grant Spouse an interest in trust
income and principal.
Distributions of income and
principal are to be made at the discretion of the
trustee based on an ascertainable standard relating to
Spouse's needs for health, education, support, and
maintenance. The trust is to terminate at the death of
Spouse.

/

In the present case, the trustee and beneficiaries of
Trust have petitioned the court to terminate the trust
prior to the Spouse's death.
Section *** of the ***
Trust Code provides that, upon petition by the trustee
or beneficiary of a trust, a court may order that a
trust be terminated if the purposes of the trust have
been fulfilled.
Spouse holds an interest in the trust even though
distributions to Spouse are at the discretion of the
trustee.
The relinquishment of this interest through
the proposed early termination of the trust, will
constitute a transfer by Spouse for federal gift tax
purposes to the trust remaindermen. See, Rev. Rul. 67370. The value of the gift is the fair market value of
the interest relinquished by Spouse.
The value is
determined based on all relevant factors, such as the
projected needs of Spouse for health, education,
support, and maintenance for the remainder of his life.
The cited revenue ruling was summarized as follows:
In Rev. Rul. 67-730, 1967-2 C.B. 324, the decedent's
estate was entitled to receive the principal of an inter
vivos trust upon the death of the settlor, provided the
settlor, who survived the decedent, did not revoke the
trust, or otherwise amend the trust during the settlor's
lifetime.
The ruling concludes that the fair market
value of the decedent's interest in the trust is
includible
in
the
decedent's
gross
estate,
notwi thstanding that the estate's interest could be
divested at the discretion of the settlor subsequent to
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the decedent's death.
The ruling also holds that the
value of the interest would not necessarily be nominal.
4.

Gift Created

By

ReDOUPCina :tnterest in Trust.

PLR 9811044 considered

the effects of a child giving up rights to income and principal from a trust.
The trust terms were:
Under the terms of the Residual Trust, as amended, the
trustees have the sole discretion to pay the net income
to Child during her life and, with Child's express
consent, to or for the benefit of Child's issue without
any requirement that distributions be equal or made at
the same time. The trustees also have sole discretion
to distribute all or any part of trust corpus to or for
the benefit of Child for any worthy purpose, including
but not limited to, the purchase of a house, investment
in a business, hospital and other medical expenses, and
any emergency or disaster affecting Child.
Upon
Child's death, the trust corpus will be distributed
outright by right of representation to Child's then
surviving issue. If there are none, the corpus will be
distributed to any surviving issue of the Settlor.
During the term of the Residual Trust, the trustees may
make distributions to or for the benefit of Settlor's
spouse of all or any part of trust corpus to maintain
her in her accustomed standard of living; to meet any
expenses of illness, hospitalization, nursing care, or
surgery; or to care for her in any other type of
emergency reasonably requiring the use of funds.
The ruling determined that there would be a gift although of an amount that
must be determined by the district director:
Rev. Rul. 67-370, 1967-1 C.B. 324, holds that a
defeasible remainder interest in trust which is subject
to termination at the will of another is an interest in
property within the meaning of section 2033. The ruling
notes that the fair market value of the interest would
be affected by its possible divestment and would be
determined in accordance with the general rules for
valuation of property for estate tax purposes contained
in section 20.2031-1(b) of the Estate Tax Regulations.
The ruling also notes that the mere presence of the
possibility of divestment
does
not warrant
the
assignment of a merely nominal value to the defeasible
interest.
Similarly, in the instant case, Child has an interest in
the trust property although her right to receive any
distribution, either of income or corpus, is solely
within the discretion of the independent corporate
trustee.
The proposed renunciation by Child of her interest will
not satisfy the requirements for a qualified disclaimer
since it will not have been made within 9 months of the
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death of Settlor.
Therefore, such renunciation will
constitute a
gift
from Child to
the remainder
beneficiaries of the Residual Trust.
The value of the gift is a question of fact. However,
since the gift is not an absolute right to distributions
of income or principal, it cannot be valued by use of
the tables contained in section 2512. See Deal v.
Commissioner, 29 T.C. 730 (1958). Rather, the value of
the gift should be determined in accordance with the
general· valuation principles contained in section
25.2512-1.
Section 3.01(42) of Rev. Proc. 97-3, 1997-1 I.R.B. 85,
provides that the Service will not rule on actuarial
factors for valuing prospective or hypothetical gifts of
a donor under section 2512.
Such matters are solely
within the jurisdiction of the District Director upon
audit of the return.
5.

Purchase of BemniD4er Interest in OTIP.

...
I

-

Revenue Ruling 98-8 has held

that the purchase of a remainder interest in a QTIP trust by the surviving spouse
will constitute a gift of the property in the trust.

The IRS rationale is that

the purchase is a disposition.
The facts of the Ruling were these:
The decedent, D, died in 1993 survived by S, D's spouse.
Under the terms of D's will, a trust (the QTIP trust)
was established under which S was to receive all of the
trust income, payable at least annually, for S's life.
On S' s death, the remainder was to be distributed
outright to C, D's adult child.
S was not given a general power of appointment over the
trust property.
On the federal estate tax return filed for D's estate,
the executor made an election under section 2056(b) (7)
to treat the trust property as QTIP, and a marital
deduction was allowed to D's estate for the value of the
property passing from D to the QTIP Trust.
Subsequently, S, C, and the trustee of the QTIP Trust
entered into the following transaction:
(1) S acquired
C's remainder interest in the QTIP Trust; (2) S gave C
a promissory note in the face amount of x dollars (the
value of the remainder interest) for the remainder
interest; (3) the trustee distributed all of the QTIP
Trust assets (having a value of x + y dollars) to S; and
(4) S thereupon paid x dollars from those assets to C in
satisfaction of the promissory note.

j

At the conclusion of the transaction, the QTIP Trust was
terminated; S held QTIP Trust assets having a value of
y dollars (which was equal to the value of S's life
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interest in the trust); and C held assets having a value
of x dollars (which was equal to the value of the
remainder interest in the trust). S contended that the
transaction was not subject to gift tax because S
received full and adequate consideration (the x dollar
remainder interest in the QTIP Trust) in exchange for
the x dollar promissory note given by S to C.
The Ruling discussed the disposition argument as follows:
Under section 2519, if a surviving spouse disposes of
any part of the qualifying income interest, the spouse
is treated as making a gift of the remainder interest in
the underlying property (i. e., all interests in the
property
other
than
the
income
interest) .
Correspondingly, under section 2511, the disposition of
the income interest by the spouse is treated as a gift,
to the extent the income interest is transferred to
another for less than adequate consideration.
The term udisposition," as used in section 2519, applies
broadly to circumstances in which the surviving spouse's
right to receive the income is relinquished or otherwise
terminated, by whatever means.
See H. Rep. No. 201,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1981) that states:
The bill provides that property subject to a [QTIP
election] will be subject to transfer taxes at the
earlier of (1) the date on which the spouse disposes
(either by gift, sale, or otherwise) of all or part of
the qualifying income interest, or (2) upon the spouse's
death.
A commutation, which is a proportionate division of
trust property between the life beneficiary and
remainderman based on the respective values of their
interests is, in the context of a QTIP trust, a taxable
disposition by the spouse of the qualifying income
interest, resulting in a gift under section 2519 of the
value of the remainder interest. The commutation of the
spouse's
income interest
in the QTIP trust
is
essentially a sale of the income interest by the spouse
to the trustee (or the remainderman) in exchange for an
amount equal to the value of the income interest. Sales
and
commutations
are
expressly characterized as
dispositions in the applicable legislative history and
regulations.
Section
25.2519-1(g),
Example
2
(illustrating that the sale by the spouse of the
spouse's income interest to the trust remaindermen is a
disposition of the income interest); section 25.25191(f) providing that U[T]he sale of qualified terminable
interest property, followed by the payment to the doneespouse of a portion of the proceeds equal to the value
of the donee-spouse's income interest, is considered a
disposition of the qualifying income interest."
See
also, Estate of Noyotny v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 12
(1989), in which the surviving spouse and remainderman
divided
the
sale
proceeds
of
QTIP
property
proportionately on the basis of the respective values of
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their
interests;
the
court
indicated
that
the
commutation constituted a disposition by the spouse of
the income interest for purposes of section 2519 and was
thus subject to gift tax.
There is little distinction between the sale and
commutation transactions treated as dispositions in the
regulations and the transaction presented here, where S
acquired the remainder interest.
In both cases, after
the transaction the spouse's income interest in the
trust is terminated and the spouse receives outright
ownership of property having a net value equal to the
value of the spouse's income interest. Similarly, the
remainderman receives ownership of property equal in
value to the remainder interest. Thus, the transaction
in
the
instant
case
essentially
effectuates
a
commutation of S' s income interest in the trust, a
transaction that is a disposition of S's income interest
under section 2519. Therefore, under section 2519, S is
regarded as making a gift of x dollars, the value of the
remainder interest in the QTIP Trust. Section 25.25191 (f) .
The Ruling also stated that because spouse received something which was
alreadv

included

in

spouse's

estate

there

could

be

no

full

and

adequate

consideration.
This conclusion that S has made a gift is also supported
by an additional analysis.
S acquired an asset (the
remainder interest in the QTIP Trust) that is already
subject to inclusion in S's transfer tax bases under
section 2044. In analogous situations, the courts have
recognized that the receipt of an asset that does not
effectively increase the value of the recipient's gross
estate does not constitute adequate consideration for
purposes of the gift and estate tax.
See commissioner
y
Wemys s , 324 u. S . 303, 307 (1945), 1945 C. B . 416 ,
(UThe section taxing as gifts transfers that are not
made for 'adequate and full [money] consideration' aims
to reach those transfers which are withdrawn from the
donor's estate.")
A companion case to commissioner y. Wemyss, Merrill y.
324 u.S. 308 (1945), 1945 C.B. 418, and the cases
that preceded it, involved situations where A, an
individual, transferred property to B, A's spouse (or
future spouse), in exchange for B's relinquishment of
marital rights in A's property. The Court held that B's
relinquishment of the marital rights did not constitute
adequate and full consideration for A's transfer because
the assets subject to the marital rights were already
includible in A's taxable estate. The property subject
to dower and marital rights were already included in the
gross estate of the property owner. Thus, to conclude
that the relinquishment of dower and marital rights by
the spouse of the property owner constituted adequate
and full consideration for a transfer by the property
~,
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owner for gift tax purposes would effectively subvert
the legislative intent and statutory scheme of the gift
tax provisions. Merrill y. Fahs, at 311-312. See also,
~C~o~mm~l~'s~s.i~o~n~e~r~~y~.~B~r.i~sut~o~l, 121 F.2d 129, 136 (1st Cir.
1941) .

r

Likewise, in the present situation, property subject to
the QTIP election was intended to be subject to either
gift or estate tax.
S' s receipt of the remainder
interest does not increase the value of S' s taxable
estate because that property is already subject to
inclusion in S' s taxable estate under section 2044.
Rather, S's issuance of the note results in a depletion
of S's taxable estate that is not offset by S's receipt
of the remainder interest.
Thus, for estate and gift
tax purposes, S' s receipt of the remainder interest
cannot constitute adequate and full consideration under
section 2512 for the promissory note transferred by S to
C. As was the case in Merrill y. Fahs, any other result
would subvert the legislative intent and statutory
scheme underlying section 2056{b) (7). Therefore, under
section 2511, S has made a gift to C equal to the value
of the promissory note S gave to C.

r
r

r
r
r

The result would be the same if cash were used for the purchase or if only
part of the remainder interest were purchased:
In addition, a gift tax would be imposed under the above
alternative rationales even if S acquired only a portion
of C's remainder interest; e.g., S acquired 60 percent
of C's remainder interest.
If, under applicable state
law, such a transaction results in a partial termination
of the trust, S would be treated as disposing of part of
S's income interest in the trust, and the commutation
analysis would apply. See, e.g., Restatement (Second)
of Trusts section 340 (2) (1959).
See also, section
25.2519-1{g), Example 4, (illustrating the estate and
gift tax consequences of the disposition of a portion of
the spouse's income interest).
If the trust does not
terminate, S could nonetheless be treated as making a
transfer under sections 2511 and 2512 for less than
adequate and full consideration to the extent of the
value of the property or cash S transfers in exchange
for the partial remainder interest.

r
f

r

r
r

r

Further, the conclusion of this revenue ruling would be
the same if S transferred to C property or cash rather
than the promissory note.
The economic effect of the
transaction is identical, regardless whether S uses S's
own funds to finance the transaction or gives a
promissory note and discharge the note using some of the
QTIP Trust assets received in the transaction.
Thus,
the result is the same for transfer tax purposes.

r

r
r
r
r

6.

Gifts of Stock OptionS.

Rev. Rul. 98-21, 1998-18 I.R.B.1, discusses

the transfer of stock options and concludes that a

A-iSS

transfer will not be a

completed gift until the exercise is no longer conditional on the performance of
services.

The stock option plan outlined in the Ruling is perhaps not typical.
A is employed by Company.
Company has one class of
stock.
Company has a stock option plan under which
employees can be awarded nonstatutory stock options to
purchase shares of Company's stock. These stock options
are not traded on an established market.
The shares
acquired on the exercise of an option are freely
transferable, subject only to generally applicable
securities laws, and subject to no other restrictions or
limitations. Company grants to A, in consideration for
services to be performed by A, a nonstatutory stock
option to purchase shares of Company common stock.
Company's stock option plan provides that the stock
option is exercisable by A only after A performs
additional services.
All options granted under Company's stock option plan
expire 10 years from the grant date. The exercise price
per share of A's option is the fair market value of one
share of Company's common stock on the grant date.
Company's stock option plan permits the transfer of
nonstatutory stock options to a member of an optionee's
immediate family or to a trust for the benefit of those
individuals. The effect of such a transfer is that the
transferee (after the required service is completed and
before the option's expiration date) will determine
whether and when to exercise the stock option and will
also be obligated to pay the exercise price.
Before A performs the additional services necessary to
allow A's option to be exercised, A transfers A's option
to B, one of A's children, for no consideration.

The Ruling concludes:
The gift tax applies to a transfer of property by way of
gift, whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise,
whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the
property is real or personal, tangible and intangible.
Section 25.2511-1 (a) .
For this purpose, the term
property is used in its broadest and most comprehensive
sense and reaches "every species of right or interest
Protected by law and having an exchangeable value."
H.R. Reg. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1932); S.
Reg. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 39, (1932); both
reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 476, 524.
Some
rights, however, are not property. See e.g., Estate of
Howell y. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 224 (1950) (nonvested
pension rights were not property rights includible in
gross estate under section 811(c) of the 1939 Code);
Estate of Barr y. commissioner, 40 T.C. 227 (1963) acq.,
1964-1 C.B. 4 (death benefits payable at discretion of
board of directors who usually but not always, agreed to
payment, were in the nature of hope or expectancy and
not property rights includible in gross estate for
estate tax purposes) .
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Generally, a gift is complete when the donor has so
parted with dominion and control over the property as to
leave the donor no power to change its disposition,
whether for the donor's own benefit or for the benefit
of another. Section 25.2511-2(b).

r
r

In Estate of Copley y. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 17 (1950),
aff'd, 194 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1952), acq., 1965-2 C.B.
4, the petitioner entered into an antenuptial agreement
in which the petitioner promised to give the future
spouse a sum of money in consideration of the marriage
and in lieu of all the spouse's marital rights in the
peti tioner' s property.
The agreement became legally
enforceable under state law on the date of the marriage
in 1931. The petitioner transferred part of the sum of
money in 1936 and the rest in 1944. The court concluded
that a gift tax would have been due in 1931 if there had
been a gift tax law in effect at that time.

r
r

r

In Rev. Rul. 79-384, 1979-2 C.B. 344, a parent promised
to pay a child $10,000 if the child graduated form
college. Rev. Rul. 79-384 holds that the parent made a
gift on the day the child graduated from college, the
date when the parent's promise became enforceable and
determinable in value.

r

r

In Rev. Rul.
80-186, 1980-2 C.B. 280, a parent
transferred to a child, for nominal consideration, an
option to purchase real property for a specified period
of time at a price below fair value. Rev. Rul. 80-186
holds that the transfer is a completed gift at the time
the option is transferred provided the option is binding
and enforceable under state law on the date of the
transfer.

r
r

The Ruling's position is questionable.

Continued employment has been

r

determined in other contexts to be an act of independent significance.

r

authority:

r
r

r
r
r
r

Estate of DiMarco y. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 653

(1986).

The Ruling cites this

In the present case, Company grants to A a nonstatutory
stock option conditioned on the performance of
additional services by A.
If A fails to perform the
services, the option cannot be exercised.
Therefore,
before A performs the services, the rights that A
possesses in the stock option have not acquired the
character of enforceable property rights susceptible of
transfer for federal gift tax purposes.
A can make a
gift of the stock option to B for federal gift tax
purposes only after A has completed the additional
required services because only upon completion of the
services does the right to exercise the option become
binding and enforceable. In the event the option were
to become exercisable in stages, such portion of the
option that becomes exercisable at a different time is
treated as a separate option for the purposes of
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See

applying this analysis. In the event that B is a skip
person (within the meaning of section 2613 (a) ), the
generation-skipping transfer tax would apply at the same
time as the gift tax.
See Rev. Proc. 98-34, 1998-18,
which sets forth a methodology to value certain
compensatory stock options for gift,
estate,
and
generation-skipping transfer tax purposes.
Rev. Proc. 98-34, 1998-17 I.R.B.l, sets forth the proper method of valuing
stock options.

The standard method is referred to as the Black-Scholes method,

-

which is approved subject to certain parameters:
Taxpayers may determine the value of Compensatory Stock
Options for transfer tax purposes by using a generally
recognized option price model (for example, the BlackScholes model or an accepted version of the binomial
model) that takes into account as of the valuation date
the following factors:
(1) the exercise price of the
option; (2) the expected life of the option; (3) the
current trading price of the underlying stock; (4) the
expected volatility of the underlying stock; (5) the
expected dividends on the underlying stock; and (6) the
risk-free interest rate over the remaining option term.
In order to rely on this revenue procedure:
(1) the
taxpayer must use the factors determined in section 4.03
through 4.07 of this revenUe procedure; (2) each of the
factors used in applying the option pricing model must
be reasonable (for this purpose, the use of the factors
in section 4.03 through 4.07 of this revenue procedure
will be deemed reasonable); (3) the option pricing model
must be properly applied; (4) the company that granted
the option must be subject to FAS 123 in preparing its
financial statements for the fiscal year of the company
that includes the valuation date; (5) the underlying
stock must be common stock and must be the same stock
for which the expected volatility and expected dividends
were estimated by the company for purposes of FAS 123;
and (6) no discount can be applied to the valuation
produced by the option pricing model (for example, no
discount can be taken due to lack of transferability or
due to the termination of the option within a specified
number of days following termination of employment) .
7.

Cn1 mmey Gifts.

context of a CrummeY trust,

-

..
I

-

The IRS has again disallowed certain gifts in the
in TAM 9731004.

Of . interest is the

statement by the National Office:
The Service generally does not contest gift tax annual
exclusions for transfers subject to withdrawal powers
that are held by current income beneficiaries and
persons
with
vested
remainder
interests.
These
individuals have current or long term economic interests
in the trust and in the value of the corpus. It is
understandable that in weighing these interests, they
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decide not to exercise their withdrawal rights. However,
where nominal beneficiaries enjoy only discretionary
income interests, contingent rights to the remainder, or
no rights whatsoever in the income or remainder, their
non-exercise of the withdrawal rights indicates that
there was some kind of prearranged understanding with
the donor that these rights were not meant to be
exercised or that their exercise would result in
undesirable consequences, or both.
The facts which bothered the Service were these:
Trust #1 was established on December 28, 1981, with a
transfer of an interest in real property.
Under the
terms of Trust #1, B, the primary beneficiary and
daughter of the Donor, was to receive the income
realized by the trust on an annual basis during the life
of Donor. In the event that B died during the Donor's
life, the income of the trust was to pass equally to B's
surviving children, per stirpes, if any, or if none to
Donor's remaining children, per stirpes.
Each of the 16 individuals named in Exhibit B (a group
consisting of the Donor's children and their spouses,
and the Donor's grandchildren) had the non-cumulative
power to withdraw an amount specified at all times
during a one-year period commencing on the date of a
contribution to the trust.
Upon Donor's death, subject to the withdrawal powers,
the trustee was to distribute the trust property to B.
In the event B predeceased D , the trust property was to
pass equally to B's surviving children, per stirpes. In
the event B had no children surviving her, the trust
property was to pass equally to the Donor's remaining
children, per stirpes.
Because B's sons were entitled to income of Trust #1
only in the event that they survived B while the Donor
lived they had a contingent income interest in Trust #1.
Because B's sons were entitled to receive the corpus of
Trust #1 only in the event that the Donor died,
predeceased by B, the sons had a contingent remainder
interest in Trust #1.
Donor's other children, A, C, and D, had only remote
contingent income and remote contingent remainder
interests in Trust #1. In the event that B and all B's
children died, while the Donor survived, the Donor's
children were entitled to the income from Trust #1. In
the event that at the time the Donor died neither B nor
any of B's children survived, the trust corpus would
pass to the Donor's remaining children.
The children of A, C, and D had even more remote
contingent income and remainder interests in Trust #1
because they would receive income or corpus only if B,
all of B's children, and their own parent died before
the Donor. For example, A's children would receive
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income from the trust only if B, all of B's children,
and A died before the Donor. Similarly, the trust corpus
would pass to A's children only if at the time the Donor
died B, all of B's children, and A were deceased.
Neither the spouse of B nor the spouses of B's siblings,
(A C and D) had any interest in Trust #1 aside from his
or her withdrawal right.
The ruling concluded:
The substantive effect of all these trusts and all these
transfers was to carry out the Donor [sic] intention
that upon her death the farm property comprising the
corpus of the eight trusts would be transferred outright
in four approximately equal shares to the Donor's four
children. Such a purpose could not be accomplished if
any of the 15 or 16 individuals (other than the primary
beneficiary) had exercised his or her withdrawal right
to remove property from the trust.
In fact, none of the individuals ever exercised a
withdrawal right with respect to any of the ten
transfers to the trusts. The individuals (other than the
primary beneficiary of the trust) had only a contingent
interest, a remotely contingent interest, or no possible
interest in any property left in the trust upon the
expiration of the withdrawal rights. The children of the
primary beneficiary would receive trust property only if
their parent died before their grandmother. The siblings
of the primary beneficiary would receive trust property
only if the primary beneficiary and all the primary
beneficiary's children died before the siblings' mother.
The grandchildren of the Donor, other than those who are
children of the primary beneficiary, would receive trust
property only if the primary beneficiary, all the
children
of
the
primary
beneficiary,
and
the
grandchildren's parent died before their grandmother.
The spouses of the donor's children would never receive
any interest in the trust property.

...

The fact that none of the withdrawal rights was ever
exercised, even by those who had no other interests in
the trusts, leads to the conclusion that as part of a
prearranged understanding, all of the individuals (other
than the primary beneficiary) knew that their rights
were paper rights only, or that exercising them would
result in unfavorable consequences. There is no other
logical reason why these individuals would choose not to
withdraw the amount specified in each trust as a gift
which would neither be includible in their income nor
subject the Donor to the gift tax.
Having
considered
the
facts
and
circumstances
surrounding the creation, funding, and purpose of each
trust, we conclude that Donor did not intend to make
bona fide gifts of present interests to any of the
trusts' beneficiaries other than the primary beneficiary
of each trust.
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8.

Gifts by Guardian UDder Court Order.

The National Office in TAM

9731003 has disallowed certain gifts made under court order by the guardians for
an incompetent.

The facts described were as follows:

In February 1992, Nephew A and Nephew B (sons of Sibling
A) were appointed temporary guardians of the Decedent's
person and property. The appointment became permanent in
March 1992. In October 1992, the guardians filed a
"Motion to Implement Estate Planning" with the local
court. The principle purpose of the Motion was to
authorize the guardians to make gifts during the
Decedent's life in order to (1) reduce the potential
estate liability, and (2) increase the amount available
for the ultimate distributees. The guardians represented
in the motion that the Decedent had an estimated 1992
annual income of approximately $700,000 from annuities,
pensions and assets, including stocks, bonds, cash, and
cash equivalents.
They also
estimated that
the
Decedent's annual expenses for care,
support and
welfare, including federal and state income taxes, was
approximately $200,000.
The Motion sought authorization for the guardians to
make the following noncharitable gifts from the
Decedent's assets: (1) $200,000 each to Sibling A and
Sibling B, (2) $75,000 to each of the children of
Sibling A and Sibling B (totaling $600,000), (3) $10,000
to each of Sibling A and Sibling B's first line lineal
descendants and their spouses, if any, and their
children, if any, (totaling $310,000), and (4) tuition
payments for any lineal descendant of Sibling A and
Sibling B (total not to exceed $125,000).
An independent counsel appointed by the court reviewed
the motion and in a submission to the court on November
10, 1992, recommended that certain gifts be made. The
counsel confirmed that neither Sibling A nor Sibling B,
or any of their descendants, was in need of support and
that the sole reason for the gifts proposed by the
guardians was to reduce federal estate tax and state
inheritance tax liabilities.
The court issued an order on November 17, 1992,
authorizing the guardians to make the gifts recommended
by the independent counsel including the direct tuition
payments to lineal descendants of Sibling A and Sibling
B, not to exceed $125,000 annually. In addition, the
court authorized a one-time gift of $200,000 each to
Sibling A and Sibling B.
The issue was whether the gifts were proper under the substitution of
judgment doctrine under Maryland law.

The Service discussed the doctrine:

r

This doctrine, which has evolved over several hundred
years, essentially evokes the principle that a court can
substitute its judgment for that of an incompetent and

r
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do for the incompetent that which he probably would have
done for himself, if he was able. On this basis, the
court can order distributions from the incompetent's
estate for the benefit of others.

.J

In general,
courts have been willing to apply
substituted judgment only if there is a state statute
authorizing the court to make distributions for the
benefit of others. See Mazaroff, Comment, Substitution
of Judgment For Mentally Incompetent, 24 Md. L. Rev.
332, 335 (1964). Assuming such statutory authority
exists, then the question becomes whether the reason for
the transfers (e.g., support for those in need, estate
planning, etc.) is such that the court can authorize the
distribution under the statute.
New York appears to be one of the first states to extend
the application of the substitution of judgment doctrine
to allow the guardian to use "principal" in the same way
tha t the incompetent probably would have done, if
competent. In re Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 19
N.Y.S.2d 234 (1940); In re Bond, 198 Misc. 256,98
N.Y.S.2d 81
(1950). Several New York courts,
in
addressing the issue of authority to allow distributions
of principal
to reduce death taxes,
took into
consideration the relationship of the distributees to
the incompetent, the incompetent's testamentary plan,
prior distributions by the incompetent, and the future
needs of the incompetent. See In re Carson, 39 Misc.2d
544, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1962); In re Myles' Estate, 57
Misc.2d 101, 291 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1968). In In re Turner, 61
Misc.2d 153, 305 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1969), the court refused
to allow gifts of principal distribution to the
incompetent's children because the guardian failed to
establish that,
despite the tax advantages,
the
incompetent would have made the gifts if he was of sound
mind.
In California, the courts, pursuant to the state probate
code, have authorized transfers of property of the
incompetent for the purpose of avoiding estate or
inheritance
tax.
It
must
appear
from all
the
circumstances that the ward, if competent, acting as a
reasonably prudent person, would so plan his estate, and
there can be no substantial evidence of a contrary
intent. In re Guardianship of Christiansen, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 522 (1967). In determining what a reasonably
prudent person would do, the court took into account the
following factors: (1) the permanency of the ward's
condition; (2) the needs of the ward; (3) the ward's
testamentary plan; and (4) whether the donees were the
natural objects of the ward's bounty. See also, ~
~ , 118 N.J.Super. 436, 288 A.2d 303 (1972), where
the New Jersey court adopted the reasoning of
Christiansen. In both Christiansen and Trott, the gifts
were made
to
the persons who would
take
the
incompetent's property, either under the terms of the
incompetent's will or through intestacy.
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In In re Dupont, 194 A.2d 309 (Del. Ch. 1963), the
Delaware Chancery court held that it did have the power
to authorize estate planning gifts. The court concluded
that, while the Delaware statute conferred on the court
considerable latitude in managing the affairs of an
incompetent for his benefit, the court's power to
authorize distributions for the purpose of reducing
death tax liability was not unrestrained. The power must
be exercised in the incompetent's interest, taking into
account the ward's testamentary plan, the sufficiency of
the assets, and the prior actions of the ward, while
competent.
In some states, however, the courts have refused to
approve the gifts for the purpose of reducing death tax
liability. In In re Guardianship of Estate of Neal, 406
S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), the court addressed
the "prudent man" rule in the Texas statute, which
provided that "It is the duty of the guardian of the
estate to take care of and manage such estate as a
prudent man would manage his own property." The court
concluded that the "prudent man" rule authorized the
court to enter an order that would result in protecting
and preserving the estate, rather than giving away or
depleting it and, thus, held that, under Texas law, the
court had no power to authorize gifts from principal for
the purpose of reducing death tax liability.
A Florida court addressed this issue in In re
Guardianship of Bohac, 380 So.2d 550 (Fla. App. 1980).
In that case, the Florida statute specifically allowed
the guardian to make gifts to members of the ward's
family for estate planning. The court stated that gifts
provided for under the statute were predicated on the
court's determination that the ward would make the gifts
if she were competent. Since the donees were not close
relatives and the ward had never made gifts to them
while she was competent, the court concluded that the
requisite donative intent didn't exist and that the
trial court's refusal to authorize the gifts was valid.
With respect to Maryland, the ruling stated:
The Substitution of Judgment Doctrine has only been
addressed by a Maryland court in one case, Kelly y.
~ , 215 Md. 530, 137 A.2d 704 (1958). The court found
that there was no statutory authority in Maryland that
would allow a payment for support to an incompetent's
granddaughter,
who was not a
dependent of
the
incompetent. Accordingly, the court concluded that a
court of equity lacked jurisdiction to apply the
doctrine to allow distributions for the support of
persons not in the incompetent's household. As a result
of ~ , Art. 16, section 135A was enacted adopting the
doctrine to a limited extent.
That statute was
subsequently replaced. As noted above, the current
statute (Md. Est. & Trusts Code Ann., section 13-203)
grants the court "all power over the property" of the
ward "that he could exercise if not disabled .
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See also the discussion at M-2.
9.

0 •• of Actuarial Table..

The Fifth Circuit has again reversed the

-

Tax court in McLendon y. Commissioner, 135 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1998), this time
requiring the application of Rev. Rul. 80-80 to the private annuity transaction
entered into by McClendon some months before his death.

The IRS had attempted

to ignore Rev. Rul. 80-80, which provided that the actuarial tables under section
2512 must be used unless the change that the individual will live a year is so
remote as to be negligible.

The IRS conceded that when the private annuity was

entered into McClendon had a 10% change of surviving for one year.

The Fifth

Circuit held that 10% is clearly not so remote as to be negligible.

As to IRS

contention that it could ignore its own Revenue Ruling, the opinion states:
We note at the outset that the Tax Court has long been
fighting a losing battle with the various courts of
appeals over the proper deference to which revenue
rulings are due. Whereas virtually every circuit
recognizes some form of deference, the Tax Court stands
firm in its own position that revenue rulings are
nothing more than the legal contentions of a frequent
litigant, undeserving of any more or less consideration
than the conclusory statements in a party's brief.
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken definitively
on the subject, its recent jurisprudence tends to
support the view that the courts owe revenue rulings a
bit more deference than the Tax Court would have us
believe.
Still, revenue rulings are odd creatures
unconducive to precise categorization in the hierarchy
of legal authorities. They are clearly less binding on
the courts than treasury regulations or Code provisions,
but probably (and in this circuit certainly) more so
than the mere legal conclusions of the parties. Apart
from that, little can be said with any certainty, and in
the absence of a definitive statement from on high, the
Tax Court continues its crusade to ignore them in toto.
This bit of background explains a great deal with regard
to the posture of this case. In support of its general
position on deference, the Tax Court went to great
lengths to avoid applying Rev. Rul. 80-80 to McLendon's
situation. The earlier panel of this court noticed this
slight, and asked the Tax Court if it really wanted an
open confrontation on the issue. Sticking to its guns,
the Tax Court replied that it did. The result was the
instant appeal.

-

-

As it turns out, however, this case does not require us
to step squarely into the fray. Most questions of
deference to a revenue ruling involve an argument by the
taxpayer that a particular ruling is contrary to law.
Here, however, the argument to ignore or minimize the
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effect of Rev. Rul. 80-80 comes from the Commissioner,
the very party who issued the ruling in the first place.
In such a situation, this circuit has a well established
rule that is sufficient to resolve this case without
probing the penumbrae of the general deference question.
In Silco. Inc. y. United States, 779 F.2d 282, 286 (5th
Cir. 1986), we held that a taxpayer was entitled to rely
on the legal standard implied by two revenue rulings
extant at the time of his transaction, even though they
had been subsequently abrogated.
In reaching this
conclusion, we noted that:
Treas. Reg. section
601.601(e) provides that taxpayers may generally rely on
published revenue rulings in determining the tax
treatment of their own transactions, if the facts and
circumstances of their transactions are substantially
the same as those that prompted the ruling. Id. at 286.
Because the statute, regulations, and case law were less
than clear at the time of the taxpayer's transaction, we
found that the rulings "provide [d] the only insight
available to [the] taxpayer at the time of [his]
transaction
as
to
the
conceptual
approach
the
[Commissioner] would use," and that the Commissioner
acted improperly in subsequently applying a different
test to that taxpayer. Id. at 287.

r

r
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r

r
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stands for the proposition that the Commissioner
will be held to his published rulings in areas where the
law is unclear, and may not depart from them in
individual
cases.
Furthermore,
under
si lco
the
Commissioner may not retroactively abrogate a ruling in
an unclear area with respect to any taxpayer who has
relied on it.

r
r
r
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[Footnotes omitted]
For current transfers, the test is whether the decedent has a 50% chance
of surviving for one year, with the test being presumed met by the decedent
living for 18 months (overcome only by clear and convincing evidence) .
10.

Gifts

of

Limited

Partnership

Units

as

Present

:Interest

Gifts.
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(Turney P. Berry, Thomas E. Rutledge, January, 1998, in CCH LLC Advisor.)

r
r

another warning shot with respect to family limited partnerships, as well as to

The National Office of the Internal Revenue Service appeared to fire yet

family limited liability companies,
which

disallowed

interests.

annual

in Technical Advice Memorandum 9751003,

exclusions

for

transfers

of

limited

partnership

Th1S article argues that TAM 9751003 is probably wrong, can be easily

r

overcome even if it is correct, and therefore should not affect annual exclusion

r
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transfers of interests in well-drafted limited partnerships and limited liability
companies.

-

The Facts. or How We Got Here In the First Place
The facts of the TAM set forth a complicated series of transfers of assets
between family members and entities controlled by family members.
A widow, age 71, gave a building (Building #2) worth $110,000 to each of
11 family members on December 30, 1991.

On January 1, 1992 those family members

reallocated the ownership interests among themselves so that each of four "family
units" owned 25% of the building.

On September 24, 1992 the widow created an S

corporation of which she was sole shareholder and capitalized it with $9800.

The

next day she created seven trusts, one for each of her minor grandnieces and
grandnephews, each with $10.

On December 22, 1992 the widow formed the limited

partnership and on December 31, 1992 transferred a 94.77% interest in a rental
building

(Building #1)

interest

and

corporation.

to the partnership for a

transferred

the

remaining

interest

90.6% limited partnership
in

Building

#1

to

the

S
l

The S corporation in turn transferred its interest in the building

to the limited partnership in exchange for a 5% general partnership interest.

1

.III

Simultaneously, the four family units transferred their interests in Building #2
to the limited partnership in exchange for 1.1% limited partnership units, per
family unit, or 4.4% in total.
After the transfers

above,

the limited partnership had the

following

partners: the S corporation, a 5% general partner; the widow, a 90.6% limited
partner, and the grandnieces and nephews, collectively,

4.4% limited partners.

Next the widow gave limited partnership units totaling 29% to 35 family members
and trusts.

j

On March 10, 1993 another 42% of the widows units were given away
1

to

the

same

35

individuals

and

trusts.

In November

1993

the

widow

and

J

corporation made capital contributions to the partnership which increased the
widow'S limited partnership interest to 27.6%.

On January 1, 1994 the widow gave

her 27.6% interest to the 35 individuals and trusts.

Each time a gift was made,

certain family members made other gifts within a family unit.

In addition, the
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IRS noted that on March 10,

1993 the partners consented to the intra-family

transfers of December 31, 1992 and on January 1, 1994 the partners consented to
the intra-family transfers of March 10, 1993.

The applicable provisions of the

partnership agreement will be discussed below.

The widow claimed an annual

exclusion for the gifts to family members and trusts for the 1993 and 1994 gifts.
The Annual Exclusion Generally.
Code

§

2503(b)

(all references to the

Revenue Code of 1986 as amended to date)

"Code" will be to the Internal

provides for an exclusion from the

definition of taxable gifts under a certain amount,
interests in property".

Treas. Reg.

§

"other than gifts of future

25.2503-3(a) defines a future interest as

not only reversions and remainders but also "other interests or estates, whether
vested or contingent, and whether or not supported by a particular interest or
estate, which are limited to commence in use, possession, or enjoyment at future
date or time."

(See a discussion of another portion of that Regulation below.)

The Supreme Court discussed the meaning of future interest in Fondren y.
commissioner, 324 u.S. 18 at 20-21 (1945) stating: "The question is of time, not
when title vests but when enjoyment begins.

Whatever puts the barrier of a

substantial period between the will of the beneficiary or donee now to enjoy what
has been given him and that enjoyment makes the gift one of a future interest
within the meaning of the regulation."

Fondren involved gifts to various trusts.

Annual Exclusions in the Partnership Context.
Limited partnerships by definition have general partners and at least one,

I

r

r

and potentially more than one,

class of limited partner.

partners are established by applicable state law or,
partnership agreement.
minimum,

Generally,

The rights of the

more commonly,

by the

the rights of the limited partner,

at a

are restricted with respect to such things as the ability to compel

r

distributions, the ability to sell or gift the limited partnership interest, and

r
r

non-manager members in manager-managed LLCs, as well as to non-voting members in

,

r

the ability to otherwise manage the partnership assets.

LLCs with voting and non-voting interests.
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Similar limits apply to

The IRS takes the position that if the authority of the general partner is

J

overly broad, then the rights of the limited partner would be future in nature.
A gift of such limited partnership interests would not qualify for the gift tax
annual exclusion under Code § 2503(b).
the general partner's authority.

The issue for the IRS is the extent of

In particular the IRS is concerned with the

limited partner's right to receive distributions and to transfer the limited
partnership interest.
The Agreement in TAM 9751003.
The Service set forth the following provisions of

the limited partnership

agreement as being relevant to its ruling:
(1) CONCERNING DISTRIBUTIONS OF INCOME
Section 5.1: the General Partner may distribute funds of the partnership to the
partners at such times and in such amounts as the General Partner, in its sole
discretion, determines to be appropriate. Without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, the General Partner shall have complete discretion to retain funds
within the partnership for future partnership expenditures OR FOR ANY OTHER
REASON WHATSOEVER. [Emphasis supplied.]

-

-

(2) CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL/RETURN OF CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Section 3.2: [No right to withdraw or receive capital unless otherwise specified
in the agreement.]

J

Section 7.4: No Limited Partner shall be entitled to.
. the return of its
Capital Contributions except to the extent, if any, that distributions made
pursuant to the express terms of this Agreement may be considered as such by law
or upon dissolution and liquidation of the Partnership, and then only to the
extent expressly provided for in the Agreement and as permitted by law.
Section 7.4: No Limited Partner shall be entitled to
. withdraw from the
Partnership except upon the assignment by it of all of its Partnership Interest
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 10.2. [Emphasis supplied.]
(3) CONCERNING TRANSFERS OF THE INTERESTS

,
;~

Section 10.2: Except as provided in this Article to the contrary, no Limited
Partner's interest in the Partnership shall be assigned, mortgaged, pledged,
subjected to a security interest or otherwise encumbered, in whole or in part,
and any attempt by any Limited Partner to assign or otherwise encumber its
interest shall be void ab initio. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, [Donor]
may, at any time and from time to time
transfer and assign her interest in
the partnership by written instrument . . .

J

J

(4) CONCERNING SUBSTITUTION OF LIMITED PARTNERS
Section 10.3. No person may become a Substituted Limited Partner except an
assignee who complies with this Section 10.3. No assignee of a Partnership
Interest of a Limited Partner or any portion thereof shall have the right to
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become a Substituted Limited Partner unless all of the following conditions are
satisfied:
(a) the assignor executes a written instrument of assignment together with such
other instruments as the General Partner may deem necessary to effect the
admission of the assignee as a Substituted Partner;
(b) such instrument has been delivered to, received and approved in writing by
the General Partner; and (c) the Super Majority Vote of the Partners (which must
also include the vote of the General Partner) to such substitution has been
obtained, the granting or denial of which shall be within the sole discretion of
each Partner ..
A Super Majority Vote of the partners means (i) so long as Donor or her estate
is a limited partner, a vote of Donor, or her estate, together with the vote of
the partners holding at least 50 percent of the partnership interests held by
partners other than Donor or her estate, or (ii) if neither Donor nor her estate
is a limited partner, a vote of the partners holding at least 67 percent of the
partnerships interests.
Application of Section 2503(bl To TAM 9751003.
The IRS first looked at the limited partners' rights to receive income.
The TAM cited Commissioner

v, Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945) (gifts in trust to

minqrs where corpus was to be withheld until age 45 and although income could be
distributed for education, comfort and support of a minor, the Court found that
in fact no income was likely to be distributed); Maryland National Bank VI United
States, 609 F. 2d 1078 (4th Cir, 1980)

(gift of present right to receive income

from property which historically produced no income); and Calder V. Commissioner,
85 T.C. 713

(1985)

(no annual exclusion for gifts of artwork to a trust even

though the trustee could convert it into income producing property because there
was no indication the trustees intended to do so), summarizing their holdings as:
"a right to receive income is a present interest only if, at the time of the
gift, there is a requirement for a steady and ascertainable flow of income to the
donee. "
The limited partnership in question gave the general partner "complete
discretion"
whatsoever."

whether or not to distribute or retain income,

for

"any reason

The IRS concluded that the rights of the general partner were

outside the scope of a business purpose;

thus,

the

partnership overcame the

fiduciary duty which is generally imposed on a general partner which "clothes the
general partner with the authority to withhold income for reasons unrelated to
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the conduct of the partnership."

This effort to alleviate the general partner

J

of a fiduciary obligation to withhold distributions for reasons having nothing
to do with partnership and its business easily contrast with the usual rule of
fidelity to the limited partners.

See, e.g., USACafes, L.P. Litigation, 600 A.2d

I

.i}

43 (Del. ChI 1991); CALLISON, PARTNERSHIP LAW

AND

PRACTICE

§

j

21.07 (1997).

The IRS denied the annual exclusion for the principal portion of the gift
on similar grounds stating that an economic right requiring joint action with
others is a contingent interest regarded as a future interest, citing Ryerson V,
United States,

312 U.S.

405

(1941)

(trust corpus subject to joint power in

beneficiaries rather than sole power), Blasdel V. commissioner,
(5th Cir. 1973)

478 F. 2d 226

-

(distribution of income and corpus subject to majority approval

of beneficiaries and majority approval of a local bank), and Chanin V. United
States,

393

corporation).

F.

2d 972

(Ct.

CI

1968)

(gifts

of

stock into

a

closely-held

Absent a super-majority (including the general partner's vote) as

provided in Section 10.3 of the partnership agreement, the limited partnership
interests could not be

transferred nor

the capital of

the

limited partner

withdrawn until 2022.

Thus, the IRS concluded that only title to the limited

partnership

vested

interests

in

the

donees

and

they

J

lacked

the

necessary

"tangible and immediate economic benefit required under section 2503(b)" to be
a present interest.
Previous IRS Rulings.
In TAM 9131006, a Washington limited partnership was at issue and the IRS

...,

discussed, under Washington law, "that general partners have a fiduciary duty to
limited partners and that limited partners should be able to expect the highest
standard of conduct from general partners."
specifically that:
are not

(Citations omitted).

The IRS noted

"The decedent, as general partner, possessed no powers that

otherwise contained in the standard limited partnership agreement,

regardless of whether the partners are related or not."
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With respect to transfer restrictions, a limited partnership interest was
subject only to a right of

In the instant case, the gifts of the partnership
interests constituted outright gifts of ownership
interests in a business entity. Each donee received the
immediate use, possession and enjoyment of the subject
matter of the gifts, gifts because there were no
restrictions on the withdrawal of capital accounts in
the partnership agreement.
Put another way, the
decedent could not legally resist another partner's
demand for the repayment of his capital account. Thus,
as in Crummey,
each donee had the unrestricted,
immediate right to withdraw and enjoy his gift "as so
much cash put to his credit."
Id.
Accordingly, the
decedent made gifts of a present interest which
qualified for the annual exclusion from gift tax.

r
r

r
r

r
r
r
r
,

r
r
r
r
r

The Service determined, therefore,

that gifts of the ,limited partnership interests were present interests:

r

r

first refusal.

In Private Letter Ruling 9415007, the Service ruled similarly.

The general

partner was described as having "exclusive management control of the Partnership,
including full discretion to determine the amount and timing of distributions to
the partners ... " so long as any distributions were made in accordance with each
partner's interest in the partnership.
the general partner.

The Service cited the fiduciary duty of

Likewise in Technical Advice Memorandum 8611004, Oklahoma

law was cited as to the fiduciary duties of the general partner with the result
that the annual exclusion was allowed.
Somewhat similar is Revenue Ruling 76-360, 1976-2 C. B. 298, in which the
IRS determined that a gift of non-income producing stock was not a present
interest where the stock was subject to an agreement that the donees could
transfer the stock only to a few family members for two years after the gift was
made.
Is TAM 9751003 Correct?
There are at least two arguments that the determination made in TAM 9751003
is incorrect.

The first is that the partnership agreement in question did not

in fact overcome the fiduciary duty of the general partner.

The success of such

an argument is difficult to assess because the applicable state law is unknown.
Apparently the Service believes that adding the language "or for any other reason
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whatsoever" to a general grant of discretion transforms the discretion from being
subject to fiduciary duty into discretion which is not so bound.

Is fiduciary

duty really so easily overcome?

Some courts have required specificity in any

efforts

alter

the

fiduciary

duty

Gross,

563

F.2d 1057

(2nd cir.

to

contractually

Newburger Loeb

Co.

&

y.

i

..J

standards.
1977).

See.

e.g.,

Agreements

permitting self-dealing transactions and the deriving of personal benefits from
partnership property have been strictly construed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n,

822 F.2d 733

(8th Cir. 1986).

Froemming y. Gate City Fed
Other courts have said that

fiduciary obligations are not subject to modification by agreement.

See. e.g.,

Wartski y. Bedford, 962 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991); Konoyer Dey Corp y. Zeller, 635
A.2d 798 (Conn. 1994); Laboyitz y. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304 (Ill. 1990); Knopke y.
Knopke,

837 S.W.2d 907 (Mo App 1992).

A second argument comes from a close reading of the cases cited by the TAM.
Those cases deal with situations in which something which could be the gift of
a present interest was not because of the entity or medium through which it was
given.

For example, property into a trust or a corporation where the rights to

the property were limited by the trust or corporation.

In TAM 9751003, however,

the IRS determines that gifts of these particular limited partnership interests
could not,

under

any circumstances

(absent

agreement) give rise to an annual exclusion.

a

rewriting

of

j

the partnership

Is the Service really ruling that

what was given were the buildings owned by the partnership, with a partnership
wrapper that deprived the donee of any "present interest"?
version,

That is another

in effect, of the argument the Service has made with respect to the

valuation of limited partnership interests under a variety of theories -- steptransaction,

substance over

9723009, 9725002, 9750002).
test -- that is,

form,

section 2703,

(see,

e.g.,

TAMs

9719006,

Section 2703 is inapplicable to the present interest

cannot be used to justify ignoring the terms of the limited

partnership -- and the TAM did not make the other arguments.
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Of interest is what the Treasury Regulations themselves say about interests
in property that
Reg.

§

The term [future interest]
has no reference to such
contractual rights as exist in a bond, note (though
bearing no interest until maturity), or in a policy of
life insurance, the obligations of which are to be
discharged by payments in the future.
But a future
interest or interests in such contractual obligations
may be created by the limitations contained in a trust
or other instrument of transfer effecting a gift.

r
r

r
r
r

r
r
r
r

r
r
r

r
r

Treas.

25.2503-3(a) provides that:

r

r

have properties of a future interest, by definition.

The Regulation would seem clear that it must be the instrument of transfer
effecting a gift that creates the future interest, not the instrument creating
the property which is given.
Effect of the IRS Position in TAM 9751003.
Limited partnerships are formed for a variety of tax and non-tax reasons.
Generally those reasons require that the authority of the general partners
expanded and the rights of the limited partners be curtailed.

be

For example, the

ability of the creditors of a limited partner to obtain value from the limited
partner's

interest in the partnership is adversely affected if the limited

partner cannot compel the partnership to distribute cash
marketable property).
family members

to have

Likewise,

(or other readily

it is often undesirable for spouses or non-

the ability to become a

partner and

thus

transfer

restrictions are typically placed on the limited partnership interests.

For gift

tax valuation purposes the more the rights of the limited partners are restricted
the lower the fair market value of the interests (subject to the application, if
any, of Code

§§

2703 and 2704(b)).

Each advisor and client must determine the wisdom of ignoring the IRS
ruling position.

If compliance is determined to be advisable,

clear that the general partner must remain a
limited partner.

it would seem

fiduciary with respect to the

That would appear to be possible while continuing to give the

general partner the discretion needed to accomplish the other purposes of the
partnership.

Stated differently, if the general partner may distribute income

or allow transfers in its sole discretion, but remains subject to the fiduciary
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duty set

forth by applicable

state

law,

different from those of TAM 9751003.

the

facts

would be

substantially

May a fiduciary have sole discretion?

Arguably yes -- the general partner may not act arbitrarily or with malice, but
yet is not subject to any preset standard.
A few weeks

later,

PLR

9808010

concluded

partnership interests were completed gifts,

that

transfers

without discussion.

of

-

limited

The ruling

mostly dealt with section 2701, which applied. The Service refused to rule on the
application of section 2703 because that is "factual."
11.

Private Annuity.

In Estate of Suzanne W. Cullison y. Commissioner,

T.C.M. 1998-216, the court applied section 7520 to a private annuity entered into
on August 29, 1989, the date on which the deeds to the property sold for the
annuity were signed.
O.

The annuity agreement had been signed on December 23, 1988.

SECTZON 2518 - D;SCLAZHERS
1.

ACceptance of Benefits.

an advantage:

Taxpayers who live in the Fifth Circuit have

it consistently holds

for the taxpayer as evidenced by the

.J

reversal of the Tax Court in Estate of Monroe y. Commissioner, 124 F.3d 699 (5th
Cir.

1997).

The panel was divided 2-1.

The dissent states the facts most

directly:

J. Edgar Monroe, the decedent's husband, and Robert J.
Monroe, his nephew, solicited and obtained disclaimers
of specific bequests totaling $892,781 from twenty-nine
legatees under Mrs. Monroe's will. Within days of the
execution of the disclaimers, each disclaimant received
a check from Mr. Monroe for the amount of the disclaimed
legacy.
It is apparent, and the Tax Court so found,
that the disclaimers and subsequent checks were not
isolated events. They were part of a well-intentioned
plan to secure to the legatees the amount of their
bequests without diminution for the substantial taxes -in many cases, the tax haircut would have been seventyfive to eighty percent of the amount of the bequest -that would otherwise have been chargeable to those
bequests.
The legatees from whom disclaimers were
solicited were those who "had witnessed firsthand and
had felt" Mr. Monroe's generosity.
In soliciting the
disclaimers, Robert Monroe informed the legatees that
taxes would substantially reduce the amount of their
legacies and that Mr. Monroe was upset by the high
taxes.
Robert Monroe made a point of reminding the
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legatees that Mr. Monroe was a generous man.
Court found that:

The Tax

The
disclaimants
may
not
have
explicitly
negotiated with or bargained with Monroe or the
nephew for consideration in return for executing
their disclaimers. Each of the disclaimers other
than Tebo, however, was induced or, in some
instances, coerced, into executing a disclaimer.
Under these circumstances, the consideration for
their disclaimers was the implied promise that
they would be better off if they did what Monroe
wanted them to do than if they refused to do so.
Their disclaimers thus were not "unqualified" as
required by section 2518.
Tebo is an exception because we are persuaded by her
testimony that she voluntarily and without expectation
of anything in return renounced her legacy for personal
reasons . . .
In addition, petitioner has failed to persuade us that
Monroe's cash gifts to the 29 disclaimants were merely
part of a pattern of generosity that Monroe had engaged
in throughout his life.
These "gifts" were all cash
payments of specific and substantial amounts made to the
disclaimants shortly after they executed disclaimers.
The inference drawn from this targeted gift-giving is
that Monroe made them "in return" for the disclaimants'
renouncing their bequests and not from a "detached and
disinterested generosity." . . . Even if Monroe had no
legal obligation to compensate the disclaimants, they
anticipated, and received, payments from him that left
them in the same economic position as if they had
accepted the legacies in the first place.
The majority opinion discussed what

it believed the disclaimants had

received as a result of the transaction:
The real bone of contention is whether the disclaimers
were "unqualified", and whether unqualified has some
meaning beyond the possibilities carefully delineated in
the applicable Treasury Regulations.
None of the
written disclaimers articulates any kind of disabling
qualification, of course. Nevertheless, the Tax Court
and the Commissioner assert that because all but one of
the disclaimants "expected," because they were "induced"
or "coerced" by Monroe, that they would eventually
receive their bequests in the form of a gift or legacy,
their renunciations were "qualified" to the extent of
the expectation.
As the Tax Court later put it, a
disclaimer is not "unqualified" if it rests on an
"implied promise" that the disclaimant will be better
off executing the disclaimer than not doing so.
Further, according to the Tax Court, the "implied
promise" may exist even though the disclaimants did not
negotiate or bargain with Monroe for later recompense.
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We disagree with this interpretation of "unqualified."
It is inconsistent with a holistic reading of section
2518(b), contrary to the governing Treasury Regulations
and the Service's letter rulings, and intolerably,
unnecessarily vague.
Section 2518(b) described a covered disclaimer as one
which is "unqualified
but only if
[the
disclaimant] . . . has not accepted the interest or any
of its benefits." A "qualification," therefore, would
seem to depend on the tangible receipt of property,
i.e., the "interest or any of its benefits." That is
also the most sensible understanding of an unqualified
disclaimer. One who disclaims an interest in property
must do so without getting something in exchange; and
since property has been given up, it follows that a
"qualified disclaimer" would be one in which the
renunciation is not complete because property has been
kept or received in return.
The Commissioner and Tax Court would eliminate this
statutory symmetry by holding that a disclaimer of
property is "qualified" even though something less than
property, e.g. an "expectation" or "implied promise," is
received in return. While their reading would enhance
the government's ability to disqualify disclaimers, it
also rests on an incomprehensible subjective standard.
How likely is it, in tax terms, that people would
disclaim "a bird in the hand" purely altruistically?
Yet the clear inference to be drawn from the Tax Court's
approach to this case is that a "qualified disclaimer"
demands no less than disinterest in the "property or its
benefits." The court voided all of the disclaimers here
except that of Ms. Tebo, who acted solely for personal
reasons in executing a disclaimer. On the contrary, as
the Service's letter rulings indicate, a primary purpose
of the law authorizing qualified disclaimers is to
facilitate post-mortem estate tax planning and to
increase family wealth on the "expectation" that there
will thus remain more wealth to pass on to disclaimants
in the future.
Consequently, if the Tax Court's
subjective interpretation of "unqualified" disclaimer is
accepted, it undermines the very purpose for which the
provision was enacted.
It also ensures litigation in
virtually every disclaimer situation, because it can be
assumed that heirs and legatees
rarely execute
disclaimers for tax purposes without having had some
"expectations" or "inducements" based on conversations
with advisers on the prospective benefits of such a
course of action.
Not only does the statutory language conflict with the
Tax
Court's
interpretation
of
an
"unqualified
disclaimer," but the Treasury Regulations are also
incompatible with the "expectation" or "implied promise"
theory.
This is not to say that we are required to
enforce Treasury Regulations instead of the statute, but
rather,
that the regulations mirror the correct
understanding
of
the
statute
better
than
the
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Commissioner's and Tax Court's present positions. The
regulations set forth two situations in which a
disclaimer expresses a mere qualified refusal to accept
an interest in property: when the disclaimant accepts,
expressly or impliedly, the interest or any of its
benefits;
and
when
the
disclaimant
receives
"consideration" in return for executing the disclaimer.
Treas. Reg. section 25.2518-2(d) (1).
Consistent with
our interpretation, a disclaimant cannot purport to
disclaim, while taking actual advantage of the property
"or any of its benefits."
Further, the disclaimant
cannot accept "benefits" from the property by receiving
consideration in exchange for the disclaimer.
The
juxtaposition in the regulation between the "implied"
acceptance of the interest or any of its benefits and
the "consideration" that must be received in exchange
for a disclaimer is not accidental. One may impliedly
accept the benefits of property, for instance by
pledging it as security for a loan, and therefore act
inconsistently when making an alleged disclaimer.
On
the other hand, only by receiving "consideration" in the
classic sense does one receive "property" or any of its
benefits in exchange for executing the disclaimer. We
thus agree with the estate that to have accepted the
benefits of a disclaimed interest, the disclaimant must
have received actual consideration in return for
renouncing his legacy.
A disclaimant's mere expectation of a future benefit in
return for executing a disclaimer will not render it
"unqualified."
"Consideration," used deliberately in
the regulations, is a term of art.
See Philpot v.
Gruninger, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 570, 577, 20 L.Ed. 743
(1872); Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Wickham, 141 U.S. 564, 579,
12 S.Ct. 84, 88, 35 L.Ed. 860 (1891) (to constitute
consideration, promise "must have been offered by one
party, and accepted by the other, as one element of the
contract"). This is the way the regulations are written
and it is consistent with the Commissioner's letter
rulings, which are properly cited as evidence of how the
Commissioner has interpreted the law in the past. See
Transco Exploration Co., 949 F.2d at 840.
In each of
the three rulings cited above, the obvious expectation
that the disclaimant would be better off in the long-run
by renouncing his interest in favor of the decedent's
spouse did not violate the bar against acceptance of the
disclaimed interest or its benefits. See LTR 8701001,
LTR 9427030, and LTR 9509003, supra.
In one letter
ruling, the surviving spouse proposed to set up an inter
vivos trust calling for the same distributions at her
death as were provided in the trust established by the
decedent.
See LTR 9427030.
In each case, the
Commissioner cited the lack of an agreement between the
parties as to what the disclaimants were to receive in
the future. The Commissioner implicitly recognized the
distinction between the expectation that renouncing is
in the disclaimant's best interest and an expectation
that rises to the level of consideration.
The
charitable contribution cases also recognize this
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distinction.
See, e.g., Wardwell, 301 F.2d at 638
(UMotivation and personal expectation do not destroy the
reality and genuineness of a given transaction, even in
tax cases H ) . Thus, the question for each disclaimer is
whether the decision to disclaim was part of mutuallybargained-for consideration or a mere unenforceable hope
of future benefit, whether that unenforceable hope
springs from family ties, long-term friendship or
employment, or a generalized fear that benefits will be
withheld in the future absent execution of the
disclaimer.
A review

of

the

specific

facts

with

respect

to

each

disclaimer

J

is

interesting for its discussion of what the Fifth Circuit regarded as a "close
question:

H

Turning to an evaluation of the record relevant to each
disclaimer, we conclude that for the majority of the
disclaimants, the evidence as a matter of law does not
support a finding of any agreement that would amount to
consideration for the execution of the disclaimers. The
duty to defer to the Tax Court's findings of fact
applied only insofar as the Tax Court correctly applied
the law, which it did not do here.
And in any event,
wi th regard to most of the disclaimers, there is no
specific evidence other than that which only supports a
finding
that
the disclaimers were made without
consideration.
In addition to testimony indicating that they were made
no promises and that they understood that they were
giving up any right to claim something from Louise
Monroe's estate, many legatees testified to some
personal reason inconsistent with improper inducement or
coercion by Monroe. These are the disclaimers executed
by Clarence Landry,
ground keeper for 14 years
($14,350); John McDonald, butler/chauffeur for 12 years
($8,975); Marie Louise Conway, household employee for 19
Years ($9,430); Carol Monroe, ex-wife of Robert Monroe
($5,000); Edward Jameson, chauffeur for 27 summers in
Newport, Rhode Island ($5,000); Dorothy Fujii, the
Monroe's niece ($5,000); Beryl Fransen, Louise Monroe's
cousin ($75,000); Anthony Farris, a gardener at the
Monroe's
[sic]
Mississippi home
($5,000);
Miriam
Walmsley, daughter of the Monroes' closest friends in
New Orleans ($5,000); Joseph P. Monroe, Robert Monroe's
brother ($5,000); Joy Monroe, Joseph P. Monroe's wife
($5,000);
Beatrice de la Vergne,
distant cousin
($5,000); Robert Monroe ($5,000); Marjorie Monroe Colomb
($10,000), and Teche Bennett ($5,000).

J

~

J

J

There was no evidence about the disclaimer in the amount
of $5,000 executed by Airline Animal Hospital other than
the renunciation document itself. From the four corners
of the document, there is no reason to doubt that it was
executed voluntarily and without consideration.

A-178

J

r
r
r
r

r
r

r
r

r
r

r
r
r
r

r

r
r
r
r,

The remaining disclaimers involve at least some evidence
that Robert or Edgar Monroe may have gone further in
their representations than Robert Monroe testified was
his rehearsed presentation. Beginning with the largest
disclaimer, that of the Hayward family, including
Kathleen Hayward's renunciation of her interest in the
income from a $500,000 bond and her three children's
renunciation of their interest in the trust principal,
the Tax Court cited her testimony on cross-examination
that although Monroe "didn't state that" she would get
her disclaimed inheritance either during Monroe's
lifetime or in his will, she "sort of certainly assumed
that" she would.
Viewed in context, however, this
testimony furnishes no support for a finding of actual
consideration for executing disclaimers. First, each of
her adult children executed disclaimers of their
interests in the trust principal after being asked to do
so by their mother.
At a minimum, their disclaimers,
which represented the bulk of the $535,781 present value
of the bequest, warrants analysis separate from that of
Kathleen Hayward.
It is apparent that an adult's
decision to renounce a bequest at the simple request of
his mother, without any indication that he was promised
anything in return for the disclaimer, does not take a
disclaimer outside the strictures of section 2518(b).
Second,
turning to Hayward's statements,
we are
convinced that it would be error to conclude that her
assumption that Monroe would honor her aunt's request in
his will made her disclaimer in return for in implicit
promise from Monroe.
Hayward did not testify that
Monroe
explicitly
or
implicitly
created
this
expectation. In fact she testified that Monroe did not
say that he would give her anything, that she renounced
" [b]ecause my uncle was upset, and he is very important
to me, and I didn't like to see him like that," that she
understood, upon the advice of an attorney, that Monroe
was under no obligation to give her anything, and that
although she "probably would have been hurt" had Monroe
not remembered her in his will, it would not have made
a difference to her if she had not received the money
because "[she didn't] really need it."
Elizabeth Monroe Richardson, Monroe's niece with the
daughter who was ill with cancer, renounced her $5,000
bequest because "you don't go against Edgar if you ever
want anything from him."
This fear that she and her
daughter might not be the beneficiaries of future
support from Edgar if the bequest was not disclaimed
apparently arose from Richardson's prior dealings with
Monroe, because she did not testify that anything said
to her in the discussions about the disclaimer indicated
that Robert or Edgar Monroe explicitly or implicitly
threatened her with a loss of future support. Although
Richardson may have felt that irritating Edgar Monroe
might jeopardize his future support, this does not
invalidate the disclaimer any more than a generalized
expectation that Monroe would be generous in the future
if the bequest was renounced.
Absent some promise or
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agreement specifically related to renouncing the
bequest, an otherwise valid disclaimer should not be
invalidated.
Marilyn Monroe Wolf, a niece of the Monroes, testified
that Robert Monroe told her that because of estate
taxes, she would only receive $1,800 of the $5,000 left
to her. However "it would go to my uncle tax-free if I
did renounce, and that I would not be promised anything
in return for the renunciation; it was up to me if I
wanted to do that or not."
She decided to renounce
because the amount she would receive "was not a
significant amount to me, and since [Edgar Monroe] was
upset about it, I wanted to keep him happy, so I agreed
to do it." Wolf wanted to keep Monroe happy because "I
had an expectation that I or my sons would be in his
will, and I didn't want to do anything to interfere with
that." However, she testified that she was not promised
anything or "led to believe she would get anything" in
return for renouncing the bequest.
Wolf may have
believed that she had a greater likelihood of keeping
her family in Monroe's will by executing the disclaimer,
but her expectation was not created by any promise or
agreement made by Robert Monroe.
Accordingly, her
disclaimer, like that of Betsy Richardson, does not fall
outside the scope of section 2518(b).

i

Finally, six of the disclaimers present fact issues
which must be reconsidered by the Tax Court in light of
the correct standard.
Lawrence Lee's testimony, excerpted earlier, indicated
that although he felt that Monroe made no promises or
guarantees, Monroe did say that "he would take care of
it" or "take care of us [the household employees]." Lee
had worked for the Monroes for 40 years as of Louise
Monroe's death and renounced a bequest of $50,000 plus
his annual salary of $10,806. Lee was highly likely to
trust and rely on any implicit representation by Monroe.
This is a close case. Although Monroe made no specific
reference to a
gift or subsequent bequest,
the
circumstances of the representation require further
analysis based on the proper legal standard.

-

Judith Bazer, Monroe's great, great niece, who renounced
a $5,000 bequest, executed an affidavit at the request
of the I.R.S. agents. In the affidavit, she states that
Robert Monroe told her that "if we would give the money
back by executing the disclaimer, we would save on the
taxes and my uncle (J. Edgar Monroe) would see to it
that we get the full amount of our inheritance." Judith
Bazer also stated in the affidavit that when Monroe
later wrote her the $5,000 check, "it was accepted as a
gift, although I knew the true purpose of the check."
Judith Bazer also testified at trial that Robert Monroe
only told her that " [y]our uncle has taken care of you,
and he always will."

A-180

-

r
r
r
r

Rachel Bazer, who disclaimed a $5, 000 bequest, was
present when Robert Monroe spoke to her sister, Judith
Bazer, about renouncing.
Shane Bazer, great, great nephew of the Monroes,
testified that he was not promised anything in return
for his disclaimer of a $5,000 bequest.
However, the
Commissioner presented testimony from I.R.S. agent
Raymond Gregson that Shane Bazer had hold Gregson in a
prior interview that Robert Monroe said that Shane had
a better chance of receiving the full amount of the
bequest if he renounced.

r

Vivian Simmons, the Monroe's maid for four years, signed
an affidavit stating that Robert Monroe told her that
"if I would sign the disclaimer, J. Edgar Monroe would
see to it that I would get the full amount of money
willed to me from the estate."

r
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Donatilda Harris, the Monroe's cook for over 50 years,
testified that Robert Monroe asked her to renounce,
stating that "he would take care of us."
On crossexamination, Harris admitted telling I.R.S. agents on a
prior occasion that she was told at the time of her
disclaimer that she "could receive the money that you
were disclaiming from J. Edgar Monroe."
The Court's discussion of the step-transaction doctrine is fascinating as
well:
Finally, we disagree with the Commissioner's contention
that the Tax Court's decision should be affirmed on
substance-over-form or step-transaction grounds. While
the disclaimants, to varying degrees, may have thought
they would eventually receive something from Monroe,
even the actual amount of their legacy, the evidence
shows that most really believed they were, in fact,
giving up their legacy under Louise Monroe's will.
Several legatees sought outside counsel before making
their decision.
As long as there was no implicit
agreement that they would receive something from Monroe
in return for their disclaimers, the fact that the
legatees understood they were giving up their rights and
actually did, in a manner effective under Louisiana law,
give up their rights is sufficient.
There is no
evidence that any of the legatees who executed
disclaimers that we have held to be "qualified
disclaimers" under section 2518(b) believed they were
receiving their inheritance under Louise Monroe's will
when they received Edgar Monroe's gifts. Accordingly,
Monroe's subsequent gifts do not change the legitimacy
or legal effect of the legatee's renunciations.
The dissent's disagreement with the majority rests on what it believed was
too restrictive an interpretation of section 2518:
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To
summarize,
the
majority's
conception
of
a
disqualifying disclaimer possesses three, perhaps four,
distinguishing characteristics. First, disqualification
of a disclaimer requires the existence of explicit
negotiations or bargaining.
Second, the disclaimant
must receive property, as distinguished from a promise
of property, in exchange for the disclaimer. Third, the
property received must consist of "'consideration' in
the classic sense."
Majority Op. at 160.
Fourth,
because a check from Mr. Monroe in the full amount of
the disclaimed bequest received a few days after the
disclaimer would seem to constitute the kind of tangible
property consideration for the disclaimer that would
satisfy the second and third facets of the majority's
rule
but
somehow
does
not,
the
Majority's
characterization of disqualifying disclaimers may also
require that the disclaimant receive the tangible
property before the disclaimer. The estate argues for
this position, and the majority arguably accepts it.
All of these requirements result from an overly
restrictive and unwarranted reading of the statute.
Section 2518 of the Internal Revenue Code defines an
"unqualified disclaimer"
as
"an
irrevocable and
unqualified refusal by a person to accept an interest in
property but only if . . . such person has not accepted
the interest or any of its benefits." I.R.C. section
2518 (b) .
The two statutory rationales for the Tax
Court's decision represent a fair reading of the
statute. First, giving up the bequest "in return for"
a gift is akin to accepting the benefits of the bequest.
Second, a refusal to accept a bequest from Mrs. Monroe
"in return for" a gift from Mr. Monroe is not an
unqualified refusal. Contrary to the reading adopted by
the majority,
the statute makes no mention of
bargaining, tangible property, consideration or an
enforceable obligation, and there is no warrant in the
statute for compelling the Commissioner to litigate over
these matters when challenging a disqualification.
The majority supports its reading of the statute by
misreading Treas. Reg. section 25.2518-1(d) (1)
to
require that a disclaimant receive consideration in
exchange for the disclaimer. As the Commissioner points
out, the regulation describes several circumstances in
which a disclaimant is deemed to have accepted the
benefits of a legacy, the last among them (or, in the
words of the regulation, "in addition" to the other
circumstances listed in the regulation) being where the
disclaimant accepts consideration in return for the
disclaimer.
The regulation cannot fairly be read to
require consideration before disqualifying a disclaimer.
The majority likens the promise of gift or bequest
implied from Mr. Monroe's words and actions to a "mere
expectation" or unenforceable hope of future benefit and
rejects the implied promise along with the mere
expectation. As the private letter rulings make clear,
in the absence of an express or implied agreement, the
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mere expectation or hope that a disclaimant may one day
benefit from the disclaimed property (generally in the
form of an inheritance) is too speculative to form the
basis for disqualifying a disclaimer. But the crux of
the inquiry is whether there is an express or implied
agreement.
Based on all of the evidence before it,
including evidence of the words and deeds of Mr. Monroe
and Robert Monroe, as well as the legatee's agreement to
disclaim, the Tax Court reasonably deduced that an
implied agreement existed between Mr. Monroe and the
legatees. The Tax Court cannot fairly be read to have
based its decision on a U mere expectation" or hope of
future benefit on the part of the legatees.

r

r
r

The dissent objected as well to the fact-finding of the majority:
Finally, the majority opinion contains a great deal of
fact-finding, and the majority fails to acknowledge it
as such.
This case requires, first and foremost,
credibility determinations about the testimony of Robert
Monroe and the disclaimants, determinations properly
relegated to the Tax Court.
The Tax Court was not
required to accept that testimony at face value, nor was
it required to go through each piece of testimony and
say that the court did not credit it. The Tax Court's
opinion makes very clear that the court simply did not
credit much of what it heard. We overstep the bounds of
our authority as appellate judges when we go back
through an appellate record and make our own credibility
assessments about the witnesses'
testimony.
The
majority opinion errs in that respect.

r
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2.

Disclaimer of Tenancy By the Entireties Property.

Hennessy y. united States,

81 A.F.T.R.2d

~98-319

(S.D.

In Estate of

Ind. 1997),

the Court

determined that the disclaimer of property held in tenancies by the entirety was
invalid because it occurred more than nine months after the date on which the
property interest was created.
This result is reversed for disclaimers after December 31, 1997 by final
regulations issued by the IRS under section 2518.

T.D. 8744.

The effect of the

final regulations is set forth by the IRS:
Under
the
proposed
regulations,
the
one-half
survivorship interest in jointly-held property that was
unilaterally severable could be disclaimed within 9
months of the date of death of the first joint tenant to
die.
the proposed regulations do not extend the same
treatment to joint interests that are not unilaterally
severable (e.g., tenancies by the entirety), but the
preamble invited comments on this subject.
The comments received unanimously suggested that a
surviving joint tenant should be allowed to disclaim,
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within 9 months of the date of death of the first joint
tenant to die, his or her survivorship interest in a
tenancy, whether or not that tenancy is unilaterally
severable. The comments noted that parties purchasing
a residence often do not make an informed decision
regarding whether the residence should be held as joint
tenants or tenants by the entirety, and generally are
not aware that the decision to take title to the
property as either joint tenants with right of
survivorship or tenants by the entirety will affect the
ability to disclaim their interest in the property after
the death of the first joint tenant to die.

~

Accordingly, the final regulations allow the disclaimer
of jointly-held property that is not unilaterally
severable on the same basis as joint property that is
unilaterally severable. Thus, a surviving joint tenant
may disclaim the one-half survivorship interest in
property that the joint tenant held either in joint
tenancy with right of survivorship or in tenancy by the
entirety, within 9 months of the death of the first
joint tenant to die.
The rule also significantly
simplifies the disclaimer of jointly-held property,
eliminating certain special rules that were dependent on
the application of section 2515 to the creation of the
tenancy.
The proposed regulations provided rules regarding the
disclaimer of interests in joint bank accounts and
brokerage accounts, generally recognizing that the
creation of such accounts are not completed gifts under
certain circumstances. Comments noted that other kinds
of investment accounts, such as accounts held in mutual
funds, accord the parties rights
that are similar to
the rights of parties with respect to joint bank
accounts and brokerage accounts. Accordingly, the final
regulations have expanded the special rule with respect
to the disclaimer of jointly-held bank and brokerage
accounts to include jointly-held investment accounts
such as accounts held at mutual funds.
3.

Disclaim.r of JQint Property. linal Regulations.

forth final regulations under section 2518.

T.D.

8744 sets

Those regulations expand the time

during which disclaimers may be made:
JOINT PROPERTY -- (i) INTERESTS IN JOINT TENANCY WITH
RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP OR TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRETY.
Except as provided in paragraph (c) (4) (iii) of this
section (with respect to joint bank, brokerage, and
other investment accounts), in the case of an interest
in a joint tenancy with right of survivorship or a
tenancy by the entirety, a qualified disclaimer of the
interest to which the disclaimant succeeds upon creation
of the tenancy must be made no later than 9 months after
the creation of the tenancy regardless of whether such
interest can be unilaterally severed under local law.
A qualified disclaimer of the survivorship interest to
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which the survivor succeeds by operation of law upon the
death of the first joint tenant to die must be made no
later than 9 months after the death of the first joint
tenant to die regardless of whether such interest can be
unilaterally severed under local law and, except as
provided in paragraph (c) (4) (ii) of this section (with
respect to certain tenancies created on or after July
14, 1988), such interest is deemed to be a one-half
interest in the property.
(See, however, section
2518(b) (2) (B) for a special rule in the case of
disclaimers by persons under age 21.) This is the case
regardless of the portion of the property attributable
to consideration furnished by the disclaimant and
regardless of the portion of the property that is
included in the decedent's gross estate under section
2040 and regardless of whether the interest can be
unilaterally severed under local law.
See paragraph
(c) (5), Examples (7) and (8), of this section.
(ii) CERTAIN TENANCIES IN REAL PROPERTY BETWEEN SPOUSES
CREATED ON OR AFTER JULY 14, 1988.
In the case of a
j oint tenancy between spouses or a tenancy by the
entirety in real property created on or after July 14,
1988, to which section 2523(i) (3) applies (relating to
the creation of a tenancy where the spouse of the donor
is not a United States citizen), the surviving spouse
may disclaim any portion of the joint interest that is
includible in the decedent's gross estate under section
2040.
See paragraph (c)(5), Example (9), of this
section.
(iii) SPECIAL RULE FOR JOINT BANK, BROKERAGE, AND OTHER
INVESTMENT ACCOUNTS (E. G., ACCOUNTS HELD AT MUTUAL
FUNDS) ESTABLISHED BETWEEN SPOUSES OR BETWEEN PERSONS
OTHER THAN HUSBAND AND WIFE. In the case of a transfer
to a joint bank, brokerage, or other investment account
(e.g., an account held at a mutual fund),
if a
transferor may unilaterally regain the transferor's own
contributions to the account without the consent of the
other cotenant, such that the transfer is not a
completed gift under section 25.2511-1(h) (4),
the
transfer creating the survivor's interest in the
decedent's share of the account occurs on the death of
the deceased cotenant.
Accordingly, if a surviving
joint tenant desires to make a qualified disclaimer with
respect to funds contributed by a deceased cotenant, the
disclaimer must be made within 9 months of the
cotenant's death.
The surviving joint tenant may not
disclaim any portion of the joint account attributable
to consideration furnished by that surviving joint
tenant. See paragraph (c) (5), Examples (12), (13), and
(14), of this section, regarding the treatment of
disclaimed interests under sections 2518, 2033 and 2040.
The new examples are as follows:

r

Example (7).
On February 1, 1990, A purchased real
property with A's funds.
Ti tIe to the property was
conveyed to "A and B, as joint tenants with right of

r
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survivorship."
Under applicable state law, the joint
interest is unilaterally severable by either tenant. B
dies on May 1, 1998, and is survived by A. On January
1, 1999, A disclaims the one-half survivorship interest
in the property to which A succeeds as a result of B's
death. Assuming that the other requirements of section
2518(b) are satisfied, A has made a qualified disclaimer
of the one-half survivorship interest (but not the
interest retained by A upon the creation of the tenancy,
which may not be disclaimed by A).
The result is the
same whether or not A and B are married and regardless
of the proportion of consideration furnished by A and B
in purchasing the property.
Example (8).
Assume the same facts as in Example (7)
except that A and B are married and title to the
property was conveyed to "A and B, as tenants by the
entirety. "
Under applicable state law, the tenancy
cannot be unilaterally severed by either tenant.
Assuming that the other requirements of section 2518(b)
are satisfied, A has made a qualified disclaimer of the
one-half survivorship interest (but not the interest
retained by A upon the creation of the tenancy, which
may not be disclaimed by A).
The result is the same
regardless of the proportion of consideration furnished
by A and B in purchasing the property.
Example (9). On March 1, 1989, Hand W purchase a tract
of vacant land which is conveyed to them as tenants by
the entirety.
The entire consideration is paid by H.
H dies on June 1,
W is not a United States citizen.
1998. W can disclaim the entire joint interest because
this is the interest includible in H's gross estate
under section 2040(a). Assuming that W's disclaimer is
received by the executor of H's estate no later than 9
months after June 1, 1988, and the other requirements of
section 2518(b) are satisfied, W's disclaimer of the
property would be a qualified disclaimer.
The result
would be the same if the property was held in joint
tenancy with right of survivorship that was unilaterally
severable under local law.
Example (10).
In 1986, spouses A and B purchased a
personal residence taking title as tenants by the
entirety.
B dies on July 10, 1998.
A wishes to
disclaim the one-half undivided interest to which A
would succeed by right of survivorship. If A makes the
disclaimer, the property interest would pass under B's
will to their child C.
C, an adult, and A resided in
the residence at B's death and will continue to reside
there in the future.
A continues to own a one-half
undivided interest in the property. Assuming that the
other requirements of section 2518(b) are satisfied, A
may make a qualified disclaimer with respect to the onehalf undivided survivorship interest in the residence if
A delivers the written disclaimer to the personal
representative of B's estate by April 10, 1999, since A
is not deemed to have accepted the interest or any of
its benefits prior to that time and A's occupancy of the
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residence after B's death is consistent with A's
retained undivided ownership interest. The result would
be the same if the property was held in joint tenancy
with right of survivorship that was unilaterally
severable under local law.
Example (11).
Hand W, husband and wife,
state X, a community property state. * * *

reside in

Example (12). On July 1, 1990, A opens a bank account
that is held jointly with B, A's spouse, and transfers
$50,000 of A's money to the account. A and B are United
States citizens.
A can regain the entire account
without B's consent, such that the transfer is not a
completed gift under section 25.2511-1{h) (4). A dies on
August 15, 1998, and B disclaims the entire amount in
the bank account on October 15, 1998. Assuming that the
remaining requirements of section 2518{b) are satisfied,
B made a qualified disclaimer under section 2518 (a)
because the disclaimer was made within 9 months after
A's death at which time B had succeeded to full dominion
and control over the account.
Under state law, B is
treated as predeceasing A with respect to the disclaimed
interest. The disclaimed account balance passes through
A's
probate estate and is no longer joint property
includible in A's gross estate under section 2040. The
entire account is, instead, includible in A's gross
estate under section 2033. The result would be the same
if A and B were not married.
Example (13). The facts are the same as Example (12),
except that B, rather than A, dies on August 15, 1998.
A may not make a qualified disclaimer with respect to
any of the funds in the bank account, because A
furnished the funds for the entire account and A did not
relinquish dominion and control over the funds.
Example (14). The facts are the same as Example (12),
except that B disclaims 40 percent of the funds in the
account.
Since, under state law, B is treated as
predeceasing A with respect to the disclaimed interest,
the 40 percent portion of the account balance that was
disclaimed passes as part of A's probate estate, and is
no longer characterized as joint property.
This 40
percent portion of the account balance is, therefore,
includible in A's gross estate under section 2033. The
remaining 60 percent of the account balance that was not
disclaimed retains its character as joint property and,
therefore, is includible in A's gross estate as provided
in section 2040(b).
Therefore, 30 percent (1/2 x 60
percent) of the account balance is includible in A's
gross estate under section 2040{b), and a total of 70
percent of the aggregate account balance is includible
in A's gross estate. If A and B were not married, then
the 40 percent portion of the account subject to the
disclaimer would be includible in A's gross estate as
provided in section 2033 and the 60 percent portion of
the account not subject to the disclaimer would be
includible in A's gross estate as provided in section
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2040 (a), because A furnished all
respect to the account.
4.

Time for Disclaim'rs.

.

__ . _ - - _.. _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

of

the

funds

with

PLR 9818053 dealt with complicated facts.

The

IRS determined that a beneficiary of a trust could disclaim within nine months
of the release of a general power of appointment by a prior beneficiary, because
that release created the beneficiary's interest.

This was true even though the

trust had long been in existence.

4

The flavor of the facts can be inferred from the fact that the trust was
created in 1935 by the disclaimant and her husband, and the beneficiary releasing
the general power was their son.
5.

Disclaimer of Qualified Plan Benefits by Fiduciary.

disclaim IRA proceeds or qualified plan benefits?

May

a fiduciary

Such could be desirable where

the primary beneficiary is inappropriate in light of the circumstances at the
time the benefits are paid.

For instance, suppose benefits are needed to fill

a credit shelter trust on account of the increase in the permitted size of the
trust as the applicable credit amount increases.
In some instances tiered beneficiaries may be used.

A QTIP trust may be

named primary beneficiary and the surviving spouse secondary beneficiary.

If

beneficial, the trustee of the QTIP trust may disclaim the benefits, whereupon
the

surviving

spouse

may

roll

the

benefits

into

an

IRA

and name

another

beneficiary.
In Nickel y. Estes, 122 F.3d 294 (5th Cir. 1997), the court held that the
terms of a qualified plan governed rather than ERISA or Texas law.

The literal

language of the plan required the beneficiary to disclaim; the court held that
the plan did not allow a personal representative to disclaim on the beneficiary's
behalf even though a Texas statute allowed such.
have been different had the fiduciary,
beneficiary.

Presumably the result would

or an estate or trust,

been named as

The case points out the importance of reviewing plan and IRA

documents.

P.

SECTZONS 2601-2654 - GENEBATZQN-SKZPPZNG TRANSFER TAX
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1.

skipping transfer.

My executor shall payout of that portion of my probate
estate not required to satisfy any non-residuary
bequests
and
devises
under
this
will,
without
apportionment or claim for reimbursement:
(a)
The expense of my last illness and funeral, of
delivering and safeguarding bequests, and of the
administration of my estate, including fees and expenses
attributable to assets includible in my gross estate.

r

(b)

The Service determined:
In this case, Decedent's will does not direct by
specific reference the source of payment of the GST tax
resulting from the generation-skipping transfers.
Therefore, we conclude that under section 2603(b), the
GST tax imposed under section 2601 attributable to a
direct skip is charged to the property constituting the
direct skip. We also conclude that under section 2623,
the GST tax paid with respect to each direct skip
transfer should not be included in determining the
taxable amount of the direct skip because the GST tax
amount is not received by the transferee.

r
r
r
r

r
r

r

,..,

All my enforceable debts.

(c)
All federal and state death taxes (and any
interest and penalties) payable by reason of my death.

r

r

In TAM 9822001 the Service confronted a tax apportionment

clause that did not specifically refer to the GST:

r

r

Section 2603(b) provides that specific reference to

the GST must be made to override the payment of the tax from the generation

f

r

payment of G8T.

The estate also paid the GST late,

thus causing an interest expense.

However, the estate actually overpaid the tax, causing interest to accrue.
GST transfers were preresiduary bequests.

The

With respect to reduction of the

amount of the GST transfer on account of the interest, or vice versa, the Service
stated:
We note that there is no specific statutory language
allowing interest on the underpayment of taxes to reduce
the taxable amount of a direct skip GST. While sections
2621 and 2622 provide specific language allowing
deductions for administration expenses in determining
the taxable amount of taxable distributions and taxable
terminations respectively, section 2623 provides no
language permitting the deduction for interest on
underpayment of taxes on a direct skip GST.
In addition, section 2624(b) provides that direct skip
property included in the gross estate is valued on the
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date of the transferor's death (or alternative valuation
date). In other words, direct skip property included in
the gross estate is not valued on the date the
transferee actually receives the property even though
the property's value on the date of transferee receipt
may be different than its value for estate tax purposes.
Section 2624(b) directs that in the case of direct skip
property included in the gross estate, the property's
valuation for GST tax purposes is unaffected by any
earnings on the property or any appreciation in the
property's value occurring after the date of the
transferor's death.

-

We also believe that in determining the taxable amount
of a direct skip included in the gross estate, any
interest on the underpayment of taxes should be treated
in a manner similar to interest accruing on estate taxes
in calculating a marital bequest. See Rev. Rul. 93-48,
1993-2 C.B. 270
(post-death interest accruing on
deferred federal estate tax payable from a testamentary
transfer does not ordinarily reduce the date-of-death
value of the transfer). Any economic burden resulting
from the late payment of the tax is offset by the
economic benefit obtained from delaying the payment of
the tax. Because the beneficiary has the use of the tax
dollars from the date the tax payment is due until the
date of the tax payment, expenditures for interest which
enabled the beneficiary to retain use of the funds are
offset by the economic benefit resulting from retaining
the funds. Accordingly, we conclude that in determining
the taxable amount with respect to a direct skip
included in the gross estate, the amount passing to the
beneficiary should not be reduced by interest on
underpayment of taxes. See E. Peterson Marital Trust y.
Comm'r, 102 T.C. 709 (1994), aff'd on other issue, 78
F.3d 795 (2d. Cir. 1996) (interest accrued and payable on
a GST tax deficiency for a direct skip reduces the GST
taxable amount when the direct skip constitutes a
residual transfer of trust assets).
In addition,
we believe
overpayment
direct skip
2•

-

-

and in accordance with the above analysis,
any interest earned on an estate tax
does not impact the taxable amount of a
residuary bequest.

Chapge of J:Dvestgpt Policy Did not Affect Grancifathered Status.

PLR

9809030 allowed a Trustee to change trust investment policy without affecting the
trust's

grandfathered

status.

construing the instrument.

The

change was

pursuant

to

a

The ruling states:

The issue bearing on the retention of a trust's
grandfathered status for generation-skipping transfer
tax purposes is whether any changes to the trust will
alter the substantive provisions of the original trust
in a manner such that the trust will no longer be
considered to be the same trust that was exempt under
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court

order

j

-

-

r

r

section 1433(b) (2) (A)
of the Act.
In general,
modifications that change the quality, value or timing
of any of the powers, beneficial interests, rights or
expectancies originally provided for under the terms of
a trust will cause an exempt trust to lose its exempt
status.

r

r

In this case, the court merely construed the extent of
the powers granted to the Trustee under the terms of
Decedent's will. The Judgment issued by the court did
not change the quality, value, or timing of any
beneficiary's interest in the Trust and did not confer
any additional powers or beneficial interests upon any
of the Trust's beneficiaries. In addition, the Judgment
did not create any aqditional generation-skipping
transfers or increase the amount of any generationskipping transfers. Accordingly, neither the Trust nor
any distributions from the Trust will be subject to the
generation-skipping transfer tax, even if the Trustee
exercises discretion confirmed in Paragraph 1 of the
Judgment by distributing realized capital gains to the
income beneficiaries currently or within 65 days
following the last day of the year.

r
r
r
r
r
r
r

r,..

3.

Disclaimer of Amount of GST Exemption.

PLR 9822014 considered this

transaction:
Grantor died on June 30, 1997 and no distributions have
been made from the Trust since Grantor's death. Niece
1, Spouse 1, Niece 2, and Spouse 2 intend to disclaim a
portion of their respective interests in Trust.
Each
couple will disclaim all right, title, and interest in
a pecuniary amount of the respective trust for their
benefit. The amount each couple will disclaim will be
one-half of the Grantor's GST exemption available at
Grantor's death.
The executrixes of Grantor's estate
executor [sic] have represented that Decedent did not
use any of her GST exemption during her life and, hence,
$1,000,000 of the exemption is available to allocate to
any generation-skipping transfers at the Grantor's
death.

!

r
r

r

r

Under applicable state law, a disclaimant is treated as
predeceasing the decedent.
Under the terms of Trust,
the amount disclaimed will pass outright to the issue of
the respective niece, and therefore, $500,000 will pass
to the issue of Niece 1 and $500,000 will pass to the
issue of Niece 2. Niece 1 has four children and Niece
2 has one child.
All of these children have reached
their twenty-first birthday.
The executrixes of
Grantor's estate have represented that they will
allocate Grantor's available GST exemption equally to
each amount that will pass to each niece's issue.
The ruling held that the disclaimers were valid and that the decedent's
executor could allocate GST exemption to the disclaimed property.
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The same

result would have occurred had the amount of GST exemption been less

than

$1, 000,000.
4.

Deemed Reverse OTZP Election.

Who is the transferor of a marital

trust created prior to the GST effective date?

PLR 9823028 considers these

facts:
You represent that the decedent, a United States
Citizen, died testate on Date 1, survived by his spouse.
The decedent's will was executed on Date 2, and was
amended by codicil dated Date 3.
The marital trust
created under Article III of the decedent's will
provided the surviving spouse with a qualifying income
interest for life for purposes of section 2056(b) (7).
The executor of the decedent's estate elected on the
federal estate tax return, Form 706, to treat the
property as qualified terminable interest property
(QTIP) .
The executor did not make a reverse QTIP
election under section 2652(a) (3) to treat the decedent
as the transferor of the property for generationskipping transfer tax purposes.

J

You represent that no additions, constructive or
otherwise, have been made to the trust since the date of
the decedent's death.
You request that we rule that, because the decedent's
will and codicil were executed prior to October 22,
1986, and the decedent died before January 1, 1987, the
decedent is treated as if he had made a reverse QTIP
election under section 2652(a) (3) with respect to the
property in the marital trust, and transfers from the
trust will not be subject to the generation-skipping
transfer tax.

-

The ruling concludes:
Section 26.2601-1(b) (2) provides that the provisions of
Chapter 13 do not apply to any generation-skipping
transfer under a will or other revocable trust executed
before October 22, 1986, provided that the document in
existence on October 21, 1986, is not amended at any
time after October 21, 1986, in any respect which
results in the creation of, or an increase in the amount
of, a generation-skipping transfer, and the decedent
dies before January 1, 1987.
This paragraph also
provides that the rules contained in section 26.2601l(b) (1) (iii) apply to any will or revocable trust within
the scope of this paragraph.
In the present case,
the marital trust was not
irrevocable on September 25, 1985. The decedent's will
and codicil were executed prior to October 22, 1986, and
the decedent died before January 1, 1987.
It is
represented that
there have been no additions,
constructive or otherwise, to the marital trust since
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r

r

the decedent's death. Accordingly, we conclude that the
Will and codicil are within the scope of section
26.2601-1(b) (2) and therefore section 26.2601(b) (1) (iii)
applies to the marital trust created under the
decedent's Will. Thus, the decedent spouse is treated
as if he had made a reverse QTIP election under section
2652(a) (3) with respect to the property in the marital
trust. If there are no additions to the marital trust,
transfers from the trust will not be subject to the
generation-skipping transfer tax and the decedent will
be treated as the transferor of the property.

r
,

r,.
J,

r

,.
r
I

r
r

r
\

,,.
,.
I

r
r

r

,.
f

r
r

,.
I

5.

Partitioning Grapdfathered Trusts.

In PLR 9809049 the IRS approved

the partitioning of a grandfathered trust which had the following terms:
The Decedent died testate in 1968, survived by Spouse
and their two children, Child #1 and Child #2. Article
SEVENTH of Decedent's will established Trust, an
irrevocable trust, primarily for the benefit of Spouse
and the issue of Decedent and Spouse.
The original
co-trustees were Spouse, Child #1 and Child #2. Spouse
died in 1990, at which time Child #1 and Child #2 became
the co-trustees.
They continue to serve in that
capacity.
Under the terms of Trust, the entire income was to be
paid to Spouse during her life.
Spouse also had a
noncumulative right in each calendar year to demand and
receive from the principal the greater of $5,000 or 2
percent of the then current value of the principal.
After Spouse's death, the income is to be paid to Child
#1 and Child #2 in equal shares. At the death of the
first to die of Child #1 and Child #2, that child's
respective share of income will be paid equally to that
child's issue, per stirpes, until the termination of the
trust.
If either Child #1 or Child #2 dies without
issue, the income is to be paid to the surviving child.
In addition, the trustees have the discretion to pay
principal to Child #1, Child #2 and their issue for
support and maintenance. However, any such amounts paid
from principal must be charged as an "advance" against
the distribution ultimately to be received by or through
the payee.
The Trust will terminate at the death of the survivor of
Spouse, Child #1, and Child #2.
At such time, the
principal of the Trust is to be paid to the surviving
issue of Child #1 and Child #2, per stirpes.
During Spouse's life, the trustees paid her the entire
net trust income.
Since her death, the entire net
income has been paid in equal shares to Child #1 and
Child #2.
No distribution of principal has ever been
made. You represent that no actual additions have been
made to trust principal.
You also represent, as a
consequence of Spouse's power of withdrawal, that 2
percent of the value of the principal of Trust as of the
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...,
date of Spouse's death was included in Spouse's gross
estate for estate tax purposes.
The co-trustees propose to divide Trust into two
separate and equal trusts: Trust #1 for the benefit of
Child #1 and her issue and Trust #2 for the benefit of
Child #2 and her issue. Trust #1 and Trust #2 will be
administered under the terms set forth in Trust and will
contain equal shares of each asset currently held in
Trust. The entire net income of Trust #1 will be paid
to Child #1 during her life and, at her death, to Child
#l's surviving issue, per stirpes. Likewise, the entire
net income of Trust #2 will be paid to Child #2 during
her life and, at her death, to Child #2's surviving
issue, per stirpes. The trustees of each new trust will
be authorized to pay amounts from principal of that
trust to the respective child or her issue for support
or maintenance.
Any such amounts paid from principal
must be charged as an advance against the distribution
ultimately to be received by or through the payee.

J

Trust #1 and Trust #2 will terminate on the death of the
survivor of Child #1 and Child #2.
At that time the
principal of Trust #1 will be paid to the surviving
issue of Child #1, per stirpes, and the principal of
Trust #2 will be paid to the surviving issue of Child
#2, per stirpes.
If either Child #1 or Child #2 dies
without issue and is survived by the other child or, if
a deceased child's issue do not survive the other child,
the income of the deceased child's trust will be paid to
the surviving child and, upon termination of the trusts,
the principal of the deceased child's trust will be
paid, per stirpes, to the issue of the second child to
die.
Requiring principal distributions to be treated as advancements is unusual.
Was that an essential part of the GST determination?

The ruling states:

The partition of Trust into Trust #1 and Trust #2 along
family lines will not change the dispositive terms of
Trust. The dispositive terms of each separate successor
trust (Trust #1 and Trust #2) will be consistent with
the dispositive terms of Trust. Thus, the partition will
not result in any modification in a manner that will
change the quality, value and timing of the beneficial
interests under Trust or any powers,
rights,
or
expectancies originally provided under the terms of
Trust.
Therefore, the proposed partition of Trust into the two
separate successor irrevocable trusts will not be
construed as a modification after September 25, 1985,
that would subject the successor trusts to the
generation-skipping transfer tax.
A second ruling was requested -- that the division would not have an income
tax effect.

On that issue the ruling stated:

A-194

-

r
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An exchange of property results in the realization of
gain or loss under section 1001 if the properties
exchanged are materially different. Cottage Savings
Association v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991). There
is a material difference when the exchanged properties
embody legal entitlements "different in kind or extent"
or if they confer "different rights and powers." 499
U.S. at 565.

r

r

New York courts have authorized divisible shares of an
identified trust to be treated as separate trusts for
purposes of limiting a power of invasion where the
original trust document contains sufficient indicia of
the testator's intent to do so.
See, e.g., Matter of
Horner, 237 N.Y. 489 (1924) (severance to salvage trust
from violating the rule against perpetuities); Matter of
Tonetti, 53 Misc.2d 501 (Surr. Ct., Rockland Co. 1967)
(severance to protect testator's wife and to preserve
presumed intent to qualify wife's trust for the marital
deduction); Matter of Goldberg Irrevocable Trust, 159
Misc.2d 1107 (Surr. Ct., New York Co., 1994) (severance
to facilitate disparate investment goals of trust
beneficiaries) .

r
r
r
I

r

The essential question is whether, upon establishment of
the new trusts, Child #1 and Child #2 and/or their issue
will have different rights to trust income and principal
than they currently have. In this case it appears that
Child #1 and Child #2 and/or their issue will not have
different rights to trust income and principal than they
currently have.

r

r

Under the terms of the original Trust, Decedent directed
that the income be paid in equal shares to Child #1 and
Child #2 and that any discretionary distributions of
principal be charged as an "advance" against the
distribution ultimately to be received by or through the
payee.
New York law would allow the division of the
original Trust into separate trusts in this case and the
issue of Child #1 and Child #2 will not have materially
different entitlements.

r

r

r
r

r

Based on the analysis described above, the beneficiaries
will not have different legal entitlements as a result
of the proposed transaction and, thus, the original
Trust and the new trusts are not materially different.
The 2% of the trust that was included in the spouse's estate was not
grandfathered; spouse was the transferor.

6.

Proposed Legislative Change of the A.CPA.

The American Institute of

,

Certified Public Accountants has proposed a legislative change to the GST.

,.

following changes are proposed:

I

r
,.
}

I
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The

SUGGESTED CHANGES
AUTOIlATIC ALLOCATION OF GST EXEMPTION

This proposal would address the concerns described above
by making allocation of GST exemption automatic in cases
when most taxpayers would want an allocation to be made.
This proposal would take an approach similar to the
approach taken with section 453 of the Code on
installment sales, which previously required taxpayers
to make an affirmative election in order to use the
installment method of accounting. When it became clear
that installment reporting was almost always desired and
that many taxpayers were inadvertently failing to make
the election, the law was changed under section
453 (al (cl to provide an automatic election of the
installment sale treatment to all taxpayers unless the
taxpayer elects out under section 453(dl.
Similarly,
taxpayers and practitioners could elect out of the
automatic GST exemption allocation when they determine
electing out is appropriate, but electing out would be
more the exception than the rule.
The automatic
allocation of GST exemption would result in less burden
on the taxpayer and his or her tax return preparers.
Under the proposal, taxpayers can elect not to have the
automatic allocation rule apply.
This can be done in
the trust instrument, on an instrument of transfer or on
a gift tax return.
In addition,
the automatic
allocation rule will not apply to the following types of
trusts, unless the taxpayer elects to have the rule
apply.

-

A trust that would be includible in a nons kip
person's estate if the nons kip person died·
immediately after the transfer to the trust;
A trust that provides that more than 25% of the
trust corpus (il must be distributed to a nonskip person if he or she is living on a date or
dates or (iil will be subject to a general power
of appointment exercisable by a non-skip person
if he or she is living on a date or dates and if
it can be ascertained by actuarial standards that
there is more than a 50% probability that such
non-skip person, will be living on such date or
dates; or
A charitable lead annuity trust or a charitable
remainder trust.

-

-

The automatic allocation of GST exemption is simple and
fair.
It would reduce compliance costs and give the
average taxpayer the same benefits available to those
who have and can afford more sophisticated advisers.
RELIEF AND SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
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r

r

Regulation section 9100 relief would be allowed for
allocations of GST exemption, including those taxpayers
who made no election by reason of an inadvertent failure
to timely file the appropriate return, and also for
taxpayers who inadvertently missed opting out of the
automatic allocation. The allocation or election out of
the allocation would be treated as if made as of the
date of transfer.

r
r

The substantial compliance doctrine would be made
explicit.
Allocation of GST exemption would be
effective if the taxpayer demonstrates an intent to have
a zero including ratio for trust.
Evidence of that
intent would include all relevant facts, including but
not limited to correspondence or other documentation
relating to the creation of any generation-skipping
trust.

r

r

,.

SBVE:RANCE

t

The proposal would allow the severance of trusts into
two or more separate trusts. Allowing the severance of
a trust that has an inclusion ratio between zero and one
into two separate trusts, one with an inclusion ratio of
zero and the other with an inclusion ratio of one, on a
fractional basis, would result in shorter wills and
revocable trusts, less complicated and less expensive
estate
planning,
less
frequent
drafting
and
administration errors, and fewer trusts.

r
r

r
r
r
r
r
r

r

RETROACTIVE ALLOCATION

Late or retroactive allocations of the GST exemption
would be allowed when there is an unnatural order of
death.
For example, it would be allowed when a child
who is intended as the trust remainder beneficiary, dies
before his or her parent who created the trust.
Retroactive application is appropriate because the trust
was not primarily designed to benefit skip persons.
The effects of the proposal would be positive, particularly in allowing
severance of trusts that would have inclusion ratios of between one and zero into
separate trusts, one with a ratio of one and the other with a ratio of zero.

deemed allocation rules are complex and can be thought of as a mechanism for
reducing accountant and attorney malpractice when allocations are mistakenly not
made or made incorrectly.
Q.

SECTIONS 2701-2704 - SPEC.AL

VALUATiON ROLES

t

r
r
,.,

The
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1.

SPousal Annuity 'frust.

TAM 9741001

is another

example of

the

National Office's ruling position that the power in the grantor to revoke the
spouse's annuity interest has no value.
2.

oualified Personal aesidepce Trust.

In PLR 9741004 the Internal

Revenue Service approved the creations of a qualified personal residence trust
on the following facts:
Husband and Wife (taxpayers), residents of State X, are
married and have four adult children. The taxpayers own
fee simple title to Property, a parcel of property
located in Community, a town in State X.
Property
consists of two lots that are contiguous to each other.
Each lot consists of two acres. The first lot includes
the taxpayers' residence and the second lot is an
unimproved lot located behind the first lot. The first
lot includes an easement for a driveway over the access
"arm" to the second lot. The taxpayers have owned both
lots and have treated them as one residence for over 30
years.
It is represented that taxpayers have no
intention of selling the unimproved lot.
The taxpayers' residence, a large six-bedroom home,
includes two sets of additional rooms. Each set has a
separate entrance and includes its own bathroom and
kitchen area.
The taxpayers have allowed two
individuals to use these sets of rooms on a monthly
basis for a fee. One set of rooms has been occupied by
the same individual for 27 years.
The other set of
rooms has been occupied by another individual for 6
years. Neither individual is related to the taxpayers.
The taxpayers expect that these same individuals will
continue to occupy the sets of rooms.

j

-

The two sets of rooms consist of approximately 21
percent of the total square footage of the residence.
The taxpayers' residential portion,
including its
garage, and the rental portion constitute a single
building, and there is no way of dividing the two sets
of rooms from the residential portion.
The taxpayers propose to transfer their interests in
Property to two qualified personal residence trusts that
they will establish.
Husband will transfer his
undivided one-half interest in Property to Trust 1 and
Wife will transfer her undivided one-half interest in
Property to Trust 2.
Both trusts will be governed by
the laws of State X and the terms of each trust are
intended to satisfy the requirements of section 25.27025(c) of the Gift Tax Regulations.
The Service stated:
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In this case, parcels in proximity to Property generally
contain a similar amount of acreage.
Although the
Property consists of two contiguous lots, both lots have
been used as one residence by the taxpayers for many
years.
Because the minimum acreage requirement for
residences at that location is 2 acres and "each lot is
in excess of 2 acres, it appears that the zoning
requirements in the Community may allow subdivision of
Property into the two lots.
However, any sale of the
residence will result in the proceeds of the sale being
subject to the qualified annuity interest provisions of
the trust agreement.
The structures on the Property
consist only of a residence and an adjoining garage. In
addition, the. rental activity is secondary to the
primary use of the residence as a residence by the
taxpayers. Consequently, we conclude that Property, as
described
above,
is
reasonably
appropriate
for
residential purposes and, thus, constitutes a personal
residence
within
the
meaning
of
section
2702(a) (3) (A) (ii) and section 25.2502-5(c) (2).

r

r
r

r

r
r
r
r
r

Also of interest is the fact that the trusts were identical, except one had
a 10-year term and the other a 14-year term, including providing a trust for the
spouses at the end of each term.
3•

PuDding OPM' With Half Interests.

PLR 9818014 approved the creation

by husband and wife of identical QPRTs, each to own a one-half interest in the
couple's residence.

The IRS specifically did not rule on the value of the

interests.

4.

Discussion

of

Family

Limited

Partnerships.

Family

limited

r

partnerships continue to be invaluable tools for reducing estate taxes despite

r

particularly useful in situations involving marketable securities or real estate.

the negative publicity you may have heard or read in recent months.

In brief,

r

,.

a

family limited partnership works

r
r
,.
t

Assets are

contributed to the partnership by husband and wife or parent and child.

The

partnership has two kinds of units (units are to a partnership what stock is to
a

corporation):

voting units

(called "limited" units).

r

like this.

They are

(called "general" units)

and nonvoting units

A typical partnership might have 100 general units and

9900 limited units.

What are the purposes of a family limited partnership?
three purposes.

Generally there are

One is to create a vehicle for common management and control of
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assets.

The

assets

owned

by

a

partnership

are

managed

partnership units are owned by different family members.
valuable

together,

even

if

This can be especially

in real estate ownership, because having multiple owners of real estate

often presents administrative difficulties.

In addition,

in many instances a

family's securities are managed by a small number of managers; a partnership is

J

a good way to maintain that arrangement.
A second common purpose of a family limited partnership is to protect the
assets of the partnership from creditors, spouses, and, potentially, even the socalled black-sheep of the family.

A partnership limits the ability of the owners

of the limited units to dispose of the units or to spend the assets of the
partnership, and restricts the rights of creditors and spouses as well.
A third common purpose of a family limited partnership is to facilitate the
making of gifts from the senior generation in the family to the more junior
generations.

The gifts are typically made using limited partnership units.

This

effectively enables the control of the partnership to be separated from the
ownership of the equity in the partnership.

For instance, the senior generation

might give away all of the limited partnership units -- representing as much as
99% of the equity

-

while keeping all of the general partnership units

representing all of the control.

An important point about family.limited partnerships is that the value of
the limited units is typically discounted by appraisers because the limited units
Al though

each

partnership is different, typically the discount is between 35% and 50%.

The

have

no

influence

over

the management

of

the partnership.

...

effect of the discount is that more may be given away by the senior generation
outside of the gift tax system.
To

illustrate,

grandchildren.
that

is

suppose husband and wife have

three

children and six

Together, they are allowed to give $20,000 to each every year --

$20,000

for nine descendants,

which is

partnership units are used that are discounted 40%.

$180,000.

Suppose limited

The total value transferred

becomes $300,000 (because $300,000 discounted by 40% is $180,000).
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Even more dramatic results can be obtained when a donor uses his or her
$625,000 lifetime gift exemption.

Instead of giving away only $625,000, about

$1,040,000 of limited partnership units may be given away, assuming again a 40%
discount.
Documenting the discount with a

quality appraisal

disclosure on a timely filed gift tax return.

is

important as

is

If done properly such disclosure

gives the Internal Revenue Service only three years -- no more -- to challenge
the value of the limited partnership units.

Once that statute of limitations has

run the value of the gifts may not be reopened.

That is new law, as of August

5, 1997.
Naturally the Internal Revenue Service would like
partnerships to go away.
The most recent,

for

family

limited

Unfortunately all attacks on them thus far have failed.

last January, was an attempt to say that a gift of limited

r

partnership units is not a current gift at all (technically is not a "present

r

can be completely avoided by properly wording a partnership agreement.

r
r
r

r
r

r
r

interest" gift).

That position is almost certainly wrong, and the IRS position

President Clinton has also weighed in with proposals to eliminate family
limited partnerships.

Fortunately those ideas have gone nowhere in Congress.

(The President also wants to do away with Cruuuney trust trusts which is an
immensely unpopular idea.)
5.

SPOUle'I

Right

to Live

in Residepce After apM Term.

continues to issue favorable rulings in the QPRT area.

PLR 9827037 states:

In Rev. Rul. 70-155, 1970-1 C.B. 189, an elderly father
continued to live rent-free in a residence that he had
transferred to his son and daughter-in-law in accordance
with an understanding by all parties that the father
would retain use of the residence.
The ruling notes
that the donor's continued occupancy of a transferred
residence rent free until death is as much an economic
benefit as if the donor had rented the property and
obtained the income therefrom. Accordingly, the donor's
continued rent-free occupancy until death pursuant to
the understanding resulted in inclusion of the property
under section 2036. The ruling, however, notes that
continued occupancy under the facts of the ruling may be
distinguished from the case involving co-occupancy of
the donor and donee-spouse. Where the donor and donee
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are spouses, the co-occupancy does not of itself support
an inference of an agreement or understanding as to
retained possession or enjoyment by the donor.
See
Estate of Gutchess y. commissioner, 46 T.C. 554 (1966),
acq. 1967-1 C.B. 2, where the court held that the value
of a residence transferred from the donor spouse to the
donee spouse 11 years before the death of the donor
spouse is not includible in the gross estate of the
donor spouse under section 2036, even though the spouses
continued to reside in the residence until the donor
spouse's death. The court found that no agreement with
respect to the occupancy was implied from the fact that
the spouses continued to reside in the residence after
the transfer.

-

In the present case, the Settlor proposes to transfer
residential property to a trust for an 18-year term. If
the taxpayer survives the 18-year term, the property is
to pass to the Successor Trust. Under the terms of the
Successor Trust, Settlor's spouse is granted the right
to use and possess the residence during her lifetime.
At her death the property is to pass to the Settlor's
children. As set forth in Rev. Rul. 70-155 and Estate of
Gutchess, if the Settlor continues to live in the
residence with his spouse after the 18-year term and
then predeceases his spouse, no agreement with respect
to the Settlor's occupancy will be implied from the fact
that the Settlor and his spouse continue to reside in
the residence.

-

If the Settlor survives the 18-year term and continues
to use or possess the residence after the death of the
Settlor's spouse, the Settlor represents that he will
pay fair market value rental for the periods of time for
which he has use or possession of the property. If the
Settlor pays fair market value rental for these periods
of use or possession, assuming that there is no express
or implied understanding that the Settlor may retain use
of the property whether or not rent is paid, the
Settlor's continued use of the property will not result
in the inclusion of the property in the Settlor'S gross
estate under section 2036(a).

R.

SECTiON 6166 -- EXTENSiON OP TiME TO

Rental Real E.tate.

PAy

J

TAX

In PLR 9801009 the Service determined that a

corporation which owned rental real estate would qualify for section 6166.
facts accepted were these:
On Date 2, Decedent formed Corporation A, a real estate
management corporation, to manage and service his rental
real estate properties.
Decedent owned 92 percent of
the stock of Corporation A, and his wife owed the
remaining eight percent. Decedent personally operated,
managed,
maintained,
repaired
and
serviced
the
properties on a full-time basis until he became
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physically incapacitated shortly before his death.
Decedent was paid a monthly salary of $X by Corporation
A for his services.
For 29 years prior to his death,
Decedent had no other employment.
In the present case, extensive documentary evidence
substantiates that over the years the Decedent was
actively involved in the day-to-day operations of the
rental
real
estate
properties.
The
evidence
demonstrates that Decedent's responsibilities and
activities
included,
but
were
not
limited
to:
negotiating
and
renegotiating
leases,
screening
applicants, collecting rents, maintaining good tenant
relations, resolving complaints, personally performing
and/or supervising necessary repairs and periodic
maintenance projects, personally performing and/or
supervising improvements (such as roofing, pouring
concrete, and replacing drainage pipes), painting,
landscaping,
purchasing and hauling supplies and
materials needed to make repairs and improvements,
maintaining tools and equipment, maintaining books of
account, paying bills, paying property taxes, paying
insurance premiums, reviewing insurance coverage, making
bank deposits, maintaining required records, preparing
reports regarding rent control and permit matters, and
consulting with accountants concerning business and tax
matters.
Decedent was on call 24 hours and on weekends in case of
an emergency or if urgent repairs (such as a broken
water pipe, leaky roof, or blown fuse) were needed. The
Decedent used a 24-hour answering service to ensure that
he could be reached at all times.
On rare occasions,
certain specific jobs were performed by one of
Decedent's children or a contractor.
Decedent's son
often assisted his father in large jobs such as roofing
and drainage pipe repair. Decedent supervised all work
that he did not personally perform.
Decedent
continued to actively operate,
manage,
maintain, repair, service, and improve the properties
until he became physically incapacitated in late Month
2, Year 2.
On Month 1, Year 2, Decedent's son became
more involved in the operation and management of the
rental real estate properties because of his father's
deteriorating health. On Date 3, less than two months
before Decedent's death, Decedent engaged the services
of an unrelated management company to help manage
certain rental properties and Decedent's son managed the
remaining properties.
The facts reveal that this arrangement was intended to
be temporary. Decedent expected to recover and resume
personal management and service of the rental real
estate properties.
As late as the week before his
death, Decedent anticipated that he would soon be able
to resume management of the properties.
Even after
hiring the management company, Decedent insisted that
his son continue to oversee all of the properties
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because Decedent was concerned that the tenants might
not like the new arrangement and might move. Until the
time of his death, Decedent continued to ask his son
about the status of the properties and the tenants.
On Date 4, approximately two weeks prior to his death,
Decedent created a revocable trust, Trust A. The rental
real estate properties and other tangible personal
property were transferred to Trust A. Under the terms
of Trust A, Decedent was the sole beneficiary for his
life.
Upon Decedent's death, the trust provided that
certain tangible personal property would be distributed
to Decedent's wife and all remaining property (including
the renal real estate properties) would be distributed
equally to Decedent's children.
The ruling discussed the facts as follows:
As the above revenue rulings suggest, the level of
activity is the factor that distinguishes an "active
business"
from mere passive ownership of income
producing assets. In determining the level of business
activity carried on by a proprietorship, partnership
and/or corporation, the activities of its agents and/or
employees are taken into account.
The activities of
persons such as independent contractors or lessees who
are neither agents nor employees, on the other hand, are
not taken into account.
Under the facts presented, Decedent handled the day-today operation, management, maintenance, repair, service,
and
improvement of
the rental properties
(with
occasional assistance form his children or a contractor
under his supervision) until his physical incapacitation
immediately before his death. the level of Decedent's
activity was more than a mere owner managing investment
assets to obtain the rents ordinarily expected from
them. The Decedent's level of activity and services is
distinguishable from the level of activity in Rev. Ruls.
75-365 and 75-367.
In the present case, the level of
Decedent's activity more closely resembles that of Rev.
Rul. 75-366. Decedent's exclusive activity and concern
was the day-to-day operation, management, maintenance,
repair, service, and improvement of the rental real
estate properties.
Therefore, Decedent's level of
activity is sufficient to treat his interest in the
rental real estate properties and in Corporation A as
interests in a trade or business for purposes of section
6166 of the Code.
Decedent was personally, and through the activities of
his agents, actively involved in the trade or business
as of the time immediately before his death.
Shortly
before his death, Decedent engaged the management
company and his son as his agents to oversee the
properties because of his physical incapacitation. In
many cases, death will be preceded by a period of
incapacity which greatly reduces or even terminates the
active role of the individual in the business.
Given
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the purposes of section 6166 to reduce the consequences
to a small business resulting from the death of an
owner, it would be unreasonable to deny relief based on
the fact that shortly before death the Decedent became
incapacitated and could not participate in the trade or
business at the precise time of death.
Therefore,
Decedent's
delegation
of
certain
management
responsibilities shortly before his death because of
physical
incapacitation
does
not
preclude
a
determination that Decedent's interest in Properties 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 and Corporation A are
interests in a trade of business as of the time
immediately before his death.

r
r

r
r

The cited revenue rulings were summarized in this way:

,

Rev. Rul. 75-365, 1975-2 C.B. 471, holds that rental
commercial property, rental farm property, and notes
receivable included in decedent's gross estate do not
constitute an interest in a closely held business under
section 6166 where decedent maintained a fully equipped
business office, collected rental payments on the
properties, received payments no notes receivable,
negotiated leases, made occasional loans, and by
contract directed the maintenance of the properties.
Under these facts, decedent's relationship to the assets
was merely that of an owner managing investment assets
to obtain the income ordinarily expected from them.

r
r

r

Rev. Rul. 75-366, 1975-2 C.B. 472, holds that where a
decedent paid 40 percent of the expenses, received 40
percent of the crops, and actively participated in the
important management decisions of a tenant farm included
in the decedent's estate, the farm constitutes an
interest in a closely held business under section 6166.
Under these facts, the decedent made almost daily visits
to inspect and discuss operations and occasionally
delivered supplies to the tenants.

r
r
,

Rev. Rul. 75-367, 1975-2 C.B. 472, holds that land owned
by a decedent that was held for the purpose of building
homes, decedent's ownership of stock in a corporation
that built homes on such land, and a business office and
warehouse owned by the decedent and used by both the
corporation and decedent, qualify as an interest in a
closely held business under section 6166.
However,
eight homes built by the decedent's corporation that
were sold and later repurchased by the decedent, who
collected the rents, made the mortgage payments and made
the necessary repairs and maintenance to the homes in
order to maintain the condition and appearance of the
rental homes, were not an interest in a closely held
business because the decedent's relationship to the
properties was merely that of an owner managing
investment assets to obtain the rents ordinarily
expected from them.

r

r
r
r

r
r
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1.

Tax

ATp1nistration.

The taxpayer was awarded attorney's fees against

the IRS in Estate of Rao y. United States, 987 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. NY 1997) .

The

facts and result were set forth by the court:
According to the Internal Revenue Service, "Our goal at
the IRS is to protect your rights so that you will have
the highest confidence in the integrity, efficiency, and
fairness of our tax system."
See Complaint, Ex. K
("Your Rights as a Taxpayer"). Our goal at the federal
courts is (among other things) to help the IRS keep its
word.
A modest award of costs and attorneys' fees to
the prevailing plaintiff in this case may encourage such
confidence.
The underlying dispute traces back to December 28, 1989,
when the executrix of the Estate of Paul P. Rao, former
Chief Judge of the United States Court of International
Trade, filed a U.S. Estate Tax Return that disclaimed
any gift tax liability. Although the Government alleges
that a gift tax notice of deficiency was mailed to the
Estate on December 23, 1992, see Defendant's Memorandum
of Law at 7, the Estate maintains that such a notice was
never sent or received and that, accordingly, the Estate
did not become aware of the alleged deficiency in time
to raise a challenge in Tax Court within the 90-day
prescribed period. See 26 U.S.C. section 6213; see also
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Application
at 2.
When, however, the Estate received a notice of
tax due on May 21, 1993, see Complaint, Ex. H, the
Estate's representatives immediately sought to bring to
the attention of the IRS, both orally and in writing,
evidence not only of the non-receipt of the alleged
notice of deficiency but also of the inaccuracy of the
alleged deficiency itself. See Complaint, Ex. E. The
IRS's only response was to file a notice of intent to
levy on September 19, 1994, and a notice of a federal
tax lien on May 18, 1995.
See Complaint, Exs. L & O.
Again, plaintiff attempted with vigor and persistence to
bring the relevant facts to the IRS's attention, both
orally and in writing, see Complaint, Exs. M, P, & S,
only to be met, as the Government now concedes, with a
wall of silence.
See transcript of oral argument,
September 12, 1997.
Finally, in desperation, plaintiff filed suit in this
Court on May 12, 1997, claiming that the tax lien was
void.
Within less than two months, the IRS conceded
that it had made an error in assessing the deficiency,
and agreed to lift its lien, thus mooting the action.
See Stipulation & Order, July 16, 1997.
However, the
stipulation of dismissal expressly preserved plaintiff's
right to seek an award of attorneys' fees and costs, see
ids paragraph 2, and plaintiff thereafter moved for same
under 26 U. S.C. section 7430.
Having reviewed the
parties' papers and oral arguments, the court now grants
plaintiff's motion, finding that the plaintiff meets
each of the prerequisites.
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with respect to the requirement that the taxpayers have substantially
prevailed, the court held:
Plaintiff has also met the requirement that it have
"substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in
controversy, or
with respect to the most
significant issue or set of issues presented."
28
U.S.C. section 7430(c)(4)(A)(i)(I-II).
Such success
need not take the form of a final adjudication on the
merits; it is enough if the litigation produces
voluntary action by the defendant that affords the
plaintiff all or some of the relief that he sought
through a judgment.
See Association for Retarded
Citizens y. Thorne, 68 F.3d 547, 551 (2d. Cir. 1995).
See also Hewitt y. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987);
LaRouche y. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 71 n.4 (2d Cir. 1994);
Rose y. Heintz, 806 F.2d 389, 391 (2d Cir. 1986). From
the history of this case, as described supra, it is
obvious that the filing of this action was the catalyst
for the release of the lien, which in turn was the "most
significant issue . . . presented" to this court and the
entire relief requested.
Nonetheless, the Government -- making the kind of
argument that only a lawyer could love -- contends that
since the release of the lien was itself the result of
the plaintiff's convincing the IRS that the plaintiff
did not owe any gift tax at all, plaintiff has "really"
prevailed on an issue not involved in this case (indeed,
an issue over which the Court could not exercise
jurisdiction, see supra) and hence is not entitled to
attorneys' fees and costs. But to allow the Government
to evade payment of attorneys' fees and costs because
the reconsideration of the Estate's gift tax liability
prompted by this suit gave plaintiff not only the
specific relief that it requested in this action but
also the greater relief to which it was also entitled
would wholly undercut the policies of section 7430.
That the Government is reduced to such a doubtful
argument is not irrelevant to assessment of its further
contention that its claim that a notice of deficiency
was properly issued was "substantially justified,"
thereby precluding recovery of attorneys' fees and
costs. A substantially justified position must have a
reasonable basis in law and fact, see Pierce y.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563-65 (1988), and no such
reasonable basis exists where there has not been a
diligent investigation, see Nicholson y. C.I.R., 60 F.3d
1020, 1029 (3d Cir. 1995). Here, the fact that the IRS
-- having ignored plaintiff's repeated communications
for more than four years
completely accepted
plaintiff's position across-the-board within a few
months of the filing of this action, makes it abundantly
clear that no prior diligent investigation of this
matter was conducted by the defendant.
Moreover, the
Government's
reliance
on
the
presumption
of
administrative regularity that normally attaches to the
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mailing of forms such as a notice of deficiency, see
FolIum v. C.I.R., No. 97-4011, slip op, 191, 194 (2d
Cir. Nov. 3, 1997), is here misplaced, since the IRS's
studied refusal to respond to plaintiff's endless
efforts to apprise the IRS of the non-receipt of the
alleged notice serves
fully to rebut any such
presumption.
2.

Partnership Returns.

When a decedent was involved in a partnership

....,

there is a mechanism for opting out of the normal process of partnership income
tax audits.

Stated differently, partners normally may not challenge partnership

audits independently of the partnership; however, an estate may.

The mechanism

is discussed by the Tax Court in Estate of Callaway v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M.
1956 (1998):
The notices of deficiency at issue in this case,
so-called affected items notices of deficiency, were
issued to petitioners pursuant to the unified audit and
litigation procedures set forth in sections 6221 through
6233.
Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA), Pub. L. 97-248, sec. 402 (a), 96 Stat. 648.
Pursuant to the TEFRA provisions, which apply with
respect to all taxable years of a partnership beginning
afte:r: September 3, 1982, the tax treatment of any
partnership item generally is determined in a single
proceeding at
the partnership level.
Sparks v.
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1279, 1284 (1986); Maxwell v.
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 783, 789 (1986).
Partnership items include each partner's proportionate
share of the partnership's aggregate items of income,
gain, loss, deduction, or credit. Sec. 6231(a) (3); sec.
301.6231(a) (3)-1(a) (1) (i), Proced. & Admin. Regs.
Partnership items are distinguished from affected items
which are defined in section 6231(a) (5) as any item to
the extent such item is affected by a partnership item.
White v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 209, 211 (1990). The
first
type of affected item is a computational
adjustment made to record the change in a partner's tax
liability resulting from the proper treatment of
partnership
items.
Sec.
6231(a) (6);
White
v.
Commissioner, supra. Once partnership level proceedings
are completed, the Commissioner is permitted to assess
a computational adjustment against a partner without
issuing a deficiency notice. Sec. 6230(a) (1); N.C.F.
Energv Partners v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 741, 744
(1987); Maxwell v. Commissioner, supra at 792 n.9.
The second type of affected item is one that is
dependent upon factual determinations to be made at the
individual partner level.
N.C.F. Energy Partners v.
Commissioner, supra at 744. Section 6230 (a) (2) (A) (i)
provides that the normal deficiency procedures apply to

A-2G8

-

'j,

-

r
r

those affected items that require partner level
determinations.
For instance, additions to tax for
negligence
are
affected
items
requiring
factual
determinations at the individual partner level. N.C.F.
Energy Partners y. commissioner, supra at 745.

r
r

Congress has vested the Secretary with the authority to
prescribe exceptions to the unified partnership audit
and litigation procedures.
In particular, section
6231(c) (2) provides that, where the treatment of
partnership items will interfere with the effective and
efficient enforcement of the TEFRA provisions, the
Secretary may promulgate regulations whereby such
partnership items will be treated as nonpartnership
items. One such special enforcement area is described
in section 301.6231(c)-8T, Temporary Proced. & Admin.
Regs., 52 Fed. Reg. 6794 (Mar. 5, 1987), which provides:

r
r
r

Prompt assessment (Temporary). -- The treatment
of items as partnership items with respect to a
partner on whose behalf a request for a prompt
assessment of tax under section 6501(d) is filed
will interfere with the effective and efficient
enforcement. of
the
internal
revenue
laws.
Accordingly, partnership items of such a partner
arising in any partnership taxable year ending
with or within any taxable year of the partner
with respect to which a request for a prompt
assessment of tax is filed shall be treated as
nonpartnership items as of the date that the
request is filed.

r
I

r
r
r
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In sum, the partnership items of a partner on whose
behalf a request for prompt assessment of income tax is
filed under section 6501(d) shall be treated as
nonpartnership items as of the date that the request for
prompt assessment is filed.
The case itself involved jurisdiction over the estate -- denied -- and over
the decedent's spouse, which was upheld even though her role was solely as a
spouse filing jointly.
Experience suggests that a request for prompt assessment is rarely made.
Duty of Consistency. Marital Deduction.

3.

The estate of a surviving

spouse was precluded by the duty of consistency from excluding a "marital trust"
as part of the surviving spouse's estate where a marital deduction had been
claimed

in

the

Commissioner,

estate

109 T.C.

of
290

the

first

(1997) .

spouse

to

die.

Estate

of

y.

The opinion set forth the circumstances

surrounding the filing of the estate tax return for the first spouse:
1.

Letts

MARITAL DEDUCTION
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The Estate of James Letts, Jr., claimed a $1,317,969
marital deduction.
Of that amount, $317,705 was
attributable to assets passing to decedent as joint
tenant with the right of survivorship.
The remaining
$1,000,264 was for the Item II trust, which was
described on Schedule M as a "qualified marital trust."
The Estate of James Letts, Jr., did not state on its
return whether or not the Item II trust property was
terminable interest property.
The Estate of James
Letts, Jr., passed $1,317,969 to Decedent and paid no
estate taxes.
2.

..

RESPONSES BY THE ESTATE OF JAMES LETTS, JR., TO
THE INSTRUCTIONS ON LINE 4 OF PAGE 2 AND ON
SCHEDULE M OF THE ESTATE TAX RETURN IT FILED

On Page 2 of the return filed by the Estate of James
Letts, Jr., under "Elections by the Executor," the
following question appears on line 4:
"Do you elect to
claim a marital deduction for qualified terminable
interest property (QTIP) under section 2056 (b) (7)?" The
executor of the Estate of James Letts, Jr., placed an
"x" in the box for "No."
The instructions for line 4 say that if the gross estate
exceeds $500,000, the property for which the election is
being made must be listed on Schedule M and clearly
marked as "qualified terminable interest property." The
executor listed no property on Schedule M as QTIP.

-

The estate tax return for the Estate James Letts, Jr.,
did not include a copy of the will of James Letts, Jr.
James P. Letts, III signed the Federal estate tax return
for the Estate of James Letts, Jr.
It was filed on
September 8, 1986. Respondent did not examine or make
any adjustments to that return. The time to assess tax
against the Estate of James Letts, Jr., expired on
September 8, 1989, before decedent died.

-

The Estate of the surviving spouse argued that it and the first estate were
different taxpayers, thus no duty of consistency:
Petitioner contends that the duty of consistency does
not apply between decedent's estate and the Estate of
James Letts, Jr. We disagree.
The duty of consistency can bind a beneficiary of an
estate to a representation made on an estate tax return
if the beneficiary was a fiduciary of the estate.
Beltzer v. United States, supra; Cluck v. Commissioner,
supra at 333; LeFever V. commissioner, supra at 543;
Griffith V. United States, 27 AFTR 2d 71-436, 71-1 USTC
Par. 9280 (N.D. Tex. 1971); McMillan V. United States,
14 AFTR 2d 5704, 64-2 USTC par.
9720 (S.D. W. Va.
1964); accord Hess V. United States, supra. A husband
and wife can have interests so closely aligned that one
may be estopped under the duty of consistency by a prior
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representation of the other.
Cluck y. Commissioner,
supra at 333-336. The same can be true of the estates
of a husband and wife.
Whether there is sufficient
identity of interests between the parties to apply the
duty of
consistency depends
on
the
facts
and
circumstances of each case. Iq. at 335.

r
r

There is a sufficient identity of interests between the
Estates of James Letts, Jr., and of decedent to trigger
the duty of consistency. Decedent and James Letts, Jr.,
were married.
Their estates were a single economic
unit. Decedent's husband left his estate to decedent,
James P. Letts, III, and JoAnne Magbee; and decedent
left her estate to James P. Letts, III and JoAnne
Magbee.
Decedent was an executrix of her husband's
estate.
James P. Letts, III signed both estate tax
returns.
JoAnne Magbee is also a co-executor of, and
signed the estate tax return for, decedent's estate.

,

r
r

r
r
r
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The Estate also argued that the first estate had answered the QTIP question
"no," thus giving the IRS notice.

The court rejected the argument holding that

what the first estate had "told" the IRS was that the trust property was

~

terminable interest property.
The Estate of James Letts, Jr., included the value of
the Item II trust in the marital deduction. That estate
was entitled to claim the marital deduction for the
property only (1) if it was not terminable interest
property, or (2) if it was terminable interest property
for which a QTIP election was made.

r

The Estate of James Letts, Jr., clearly indicated that
the property was not QTIP.
James P. Letts, III, as
executor for the Estate of James Letts, Jr., answered
"No" to the question on line 4 of the return, "Do you
elect to claim a martial deduction for qualified
terminable interest property (QTIP) under section
2056(b) (7)?" Consistent with that answer, he did not
separately list any terminable interest property in
Schedule M. Thus, the estate eliminated one of the two
grounds stated above for deducting the value of the Item
II trust property as a marital deduction.
The only
other ground for including the value of the Item II
trust property in the marital deduction would be if the
Item II trust property was not terminable interest
property.
Thus, the Estate of James Letts, Jr.,
represented that the Item II trust property was not
terminable interest property.

r

r
r
r
r
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S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1997) allowed a decedent's heirs to sue the decedent's widow who

r
r
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KENTUCKY
1.

DEVELOPMENTS

Decedent's Heirs Suing Decedept's Widow. Priestly v. Priestly, 949

had been the decedent's attorney-in-fact and was administratrix of the decedent's
estate.

...

Of more interest, however, is the Court's discussion ofKRS 404.040.

That statute provides:
The husband shall not be liable for any debt or
responsibility of the wife contracted or incurred before
or after marriage, except to the amount or value of the
property he received from or by her by virtue of the
marriage; but he shall be liable for necessaries
furnished to her after marriage.
The Court stated:
In the trial court, appellants asserted that KRS 404.040
was unconstitutional as a gender-based classification in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. They relied upon Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1977) , and Wengler y.
Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 100 S.ct. 1540,
64 L.Ed.2d 107 (1980), and other decisions which have
invalidated gender-based classification statutes. The
factual predicate of appellants' claim in this regard
arises from the trial court's determination that certain
expenditures made by appellee during the period she
served as the decedent's fiduciary were for the purchase
of
"necessaries"
and
thus
were
not
improper
expenditures.

f

We
will
refrain
from
deciding
this
important
constitutional issue in this case.
The items in
question are bills and expenses generally associated
with operating a household, making home repairs, and
paying insurance premiums. Appellants' interest is, at
best, only indirect as the benefit to them would be
merely enhancement of the decedent's estate. While the
trial court characterized the expenses as "necessaries"
for benefit of appellee, there is significant ambiguity
associated with such expenditures in that they were
largely for maintenance of the family household.
Courts are not required to decide constitutional
questions whenever a party makes the suggestion.
Constitutional adjudication should be reserved for those
cases in which the issue is well-defined and advanced by
parties substantially affected by the controversy. The
constitutional question here would be more appropriately
asserted by a husband or wife adversely affected by the
statute than by children whose inheritance is only
modestly affected thereby.
On this issue, we will follow the doctrine of selfrestraint articulated in Craig y. Boren, ~ , which is
designed to minimize unwarranted intervention into
controversies where the applicable constitutional
questions are ill-defined and speculative. Accordingly,

...

...
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we decline
404.040.

to

decide

the

constitutionality

Will's validity in Ancillary Proceedina.

2.

S.W.2d 693

(Ky.

1997),

the Kentucky Supreme Court

of

KRS

In Marr y. Hendrix, 952
rendered an

interesting

decision about the determination of a Will's validity in an ancillary proceeding.
The will
domiciled.

had been admitted

to probate

in

Florida where

the

decedent was

The decedent also owned real property in Kentucky.

The decision

distinguished between "formality of execution" and testamentary integrity.
The facts set forth by the Court were these:
The testatrix, Mary Catherine Hendrix, after living most
of her life in Kentucky and at an advanced age, was
moved to Florida in 1988 by her daughter, Appellant
Betty Jo Marr. Hendrix died in 1990, after residing in
Florida for eighteen months.
Her last will and
testament, as well as a codicil thereto, were admitted
to probate by a Florida court. Appellant was appointed
executrix and proceeded to administer Hendrix's estate
in Florida in accordance with Florida laws. The Florida
court approved a final settlement in August 1991.
Apparently,
and based on admissions during oral
argument, the probate of the will in Florida only proved
satisfaction of the formalities in executing a will in
accordance with the requirements prescribed by the
statute.
These requirements relate to the writing,
signing, witnessing, and attestation of the will.
At the time of her death in 1990, Hendrix owned real
estate and personal property in Muhlenberg County,
Kentucky. In 1993, pursuant to KRS 394.150, Appellant
filed a petition in the Muhlenberg District Court for
ancillary administration of the Kentucky property of her
mother's estate.
Because the requirements of KRS
394.150 had been satisfied, the district court ordered
Hendrix's will admitted to probate in Kentucky in May
1993. In June 1993, pursuant to KRS 394.240, Appellees,
Hendrix's heirs at law, filed this action in the
Muhlenberg Circuit Court seeking to contest the validity
of the Florida will on the grounds that Hendrix lacked
the necessary testamentary capacity to execute a will
or,
alternatively,
that
the will
resulted
from
Appellant's undue influence.
The circuit court ruled
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and ordered
the will contest action dismissed.
In dismissing this action, the trial court accepted the
argument that KRS 394.120, KRS 394.150, and the Full
Faith and Credit
Clause
of
the
United
States
Constitution effectively preclude a person's contesting
the validity of a nonresident decedent's will, even in
ancillary proceedings regarding the decedent's property
located in this state, where the will was previously

A-213

.....
admitted to probate in the decedent's domiciliary state.
The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding
that KRS 394.240 is not limited to wills of Kentucky
residents.
The Court discussed the statutes and held:
KRS 394.120 and KRS 394.150 provide, in effect, that if
the will of a nonresident of Kentucky is executed in
accordance with the laws of the decedent's domicile, it
is valid as to real and personal property located in
this state, and it may also be admitted to probate in
Kentucky if certain other requirements are satisfied.
However, these statutes are concerned only with the
execution of the foreign will in accordance with the
laws of the testator's domicile; they contain no
language purporting to address the underlying validity
of such a will.
There are two aspects to the validity of a will -formality of execution and testamentary integrity. The
extent of the finding of validity in Florida related to
execution only.
The Florida court did not address
testamentary integrity.
Consequently, testamentary
integrity may be raised in Kentucky pertaining to real
estate located therein. Notwithstanding the language in
KRS
394.120
pertaining
to
the
validity
of
a
nonresident's will, KRS 394.150 also contemplates that
evidence may be admitted in ancillary proceedings in
Kentucky.

-

Moreover, consideration of the foreign wills' underlying
validity is not precluded by KRS 394.240. The language
of that statute permitting an aggrieved person to bring
an original action to contest a district court's action
"admitting a will to record" contains nothing to
indicate that it applies only to the wills of Kentucky
residents.

-

We do not interpret KRS 394.120 so broadly as to
preclude any and all challenges to the testamentary
capacity of a person devising real property in Kentucky.
We believe the more reasonable interpretation is that a
will probated in a foreign jurisdiction shall be valid
in Kentucky to the same extent that it has been proven
in the foreign jurisdiction.
Where there has been no
adjudication of the underlying validity of the will in
the foreign jurisdiction, such issue may be raised in
Kentucky pursuant to KRS 394.240.

-

Chief Justice Stephens dissented, joined by Justice Stumbo:
According to KRS 394.120:
The will of a person domiciled out of this state
at the time of his death shall be valid as to his
personal property and his real property in this
state, if it is executed according to the law of
the place where he is domiciled (emphasis added).
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In the case at bar, the will was probated in Florida,
the domicile of the testatrix, and found to be validly
executed in accordance with Florida law. Therefore, the
Kentucky court does not have jurisdiction to entertain
any action contesting the validity of the will.

r

r

While KRS 394.240 does not specifically indicate that it
applies only to those wills executed by Kentucky
residents, when read in conjunction with KRS 394.120 and
394.150, it is clear that it does not apply to the
validly executed will of a nonresident.

r

KRS 394.120 and KRS 394.150, along with the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution
precludes the contest of Marr' s will in any Kentucky
court. Accordingly if the will was properly probated in
Florida, and was valid in Florida we shall recognize its
validity in Kentucky.

r
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3.

E-401 has been issued.

Ethic. Opinion.

of this volume for text.

The opinion must be reviewed carefully before beginning

representation of a fiduciary.
represents

only

the

See Section F (page F-11)

In general, the opinion provides that a lawyer

fiduciary,

not

nor

the

represent

the

beneficiaries too, or to represent them later (after an estate is closed,

for

beneficiaries.

Where

the

the

entity

(estate

is

likely

to

attorney

or

want

to

trust)

instance), the representation must be specified and agreed to by the fiduciary.
4.

Retirament Plan Benefit., Diyorce.

on to overcome beneficiary designations.
beneficiary designations control.

Divorce decrees may not be relied

Under Kentucky law life insurance

See Hughes y. Scholl,

1995) i Ping y. Denton, 562 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1978).

rule for retirement plan benefits.

900 S.W.2d 606

(Ky.

Federal law provides the same

Hendon y. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co.,

1998 WL 199824 (6th Cir. 1998).

u.

MJ:SCELLANljotlS
1.

Section 212

-

Legal Pee•.

In TAM 9728002

the National Office

determined the legal fees incurred by a limited partner in suing the general
partners were deductible only under section 212,

and thus subject to the 2%

limitation, not under section 162 (as ordinary and necessary business expenses) .
The reason for the suit was described by the Service:
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The origin and nature of the claim in the taxpayers'
lawsuit is their investment in X.
The claims in the
lawsuit against the general partners of X arose from the
failure of the general partners to abide by the
agreements they made when they sold the limited
partnership interests in X. The lawsuit did not arise
out of the operation of X's real estate business
activi ty.
Thus, the settlement proceeds were not
profits in the sense of compensation for business
efforts.
Rather,
they were payment solely for
investment losses.
The legal and accounting fees and
costs were incurred by the taxpayers in connection with
litigating and negotiating a settlement of the claims
against the general partners of X.
Thus, they relate
directly to the taxpayers' purchase of their limited
partnership interest in X as an investment.
The TAM discusses the taxpayer's argument:
The taxpayers contend that legal and accounting fees and
costs incurred with respect to the litigation and
settlement of claims against the general partners are
deductible under section 162 rather than under section
212.
The taxpayers cite Kornhauser V. United States,
276 U.S. 145 (1928), as authority for this position. In
that case, the taxpayer incurred attorney fees in the
defense of a suit against him for an accounting that was
instituted by his former copartner.
The suit in
Kornhauser arose directly out of the conduct of the
partnership business. The Court held that the attorney
fees were deductible under a predecessor to section 162
because such expenses were directly connected with, or
proximately resulted from, the taxpayer's business. .Is;l.
at 153. The Court also note that it made no difference
whether the accounting was for services performed during
the existence of
the partnership or after its
termination because in both cases, as to the general
partner, the compensation constituted business earnings.
Kornhauser, 276 U.S. at 152.
Kornhauser, however, is distinguishable from the present
case because it deals with the expenses of a general
partner conducting a trade or business rather than the
expenses of limited partners investing in a trade or
business. A general partner, personally or through his
agent, participates in and is responsible for the active
management of the partnership's business activities.
Consequently, courts look only to the business policies
of the general partners, who manage the partnership
affairs, when determining the intent or profit motive of
a limited partnership. See Evans V. Commissioner, 908
F.2d 369, 373 (8th Cir. 1990) (the general partner's
intent and profit objective is determinative of whether
the proper profit motive exists); Estate of Freeland V.
commissioner, 393 F.2d 573, 584 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 845 (1968) (limited partner's tax
liability was governed by the purpose of the partnership
as established by the general partners); Taube V.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 464, 480 (1987) {profit objective
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determined by the intent of the general partners and the
promoters since it is these individuals who actually
controlled the partnership's activities). Thus, as held
in Kornhauser, a general partner may be considered to be
engaged in a trade or business.

r
r

A limited partner, on the other hand, is primarily an
investor who contributes capital and thereby acquires
the right to share in the business profits.
Eyans y.
Galardi,
546
P.2d
313,
320
(Cal.
1976) (en
banc) (describing the difference between limited partners
and general partners under the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act). A limited partner's relationship to
the partnership is detached and impersonal in character.
zg.; e.g., Estate of Meyer y, Commissioner, 503 F.2d
556,
558
(9th cir. 1974) (holding that a limited
partnership interest in rental real estate is of a
different
nature
and
character
than
a
general
partnership interest in rental real estate). A limited
partner is a passive investor who does not take part in
the management of the partnership's business; he
strictly limits his liability, thereby avoiding the
risks customarily attendant to trade or business
activities.
See, e.g., Woodruff y. Commissioner, 38
B.T.A. 739, 745 (1938), non-acq., 1939-1 C.B. 69
(distinguishing the interests of limited partners from
those of general partners).
Expenses incurred by a
limited partner are more like expenses incurred by a
shareholder because both a limited partner and a
shareholder
are
merely
investing,
rather
than
participating, in a trade or business.
A limited
partner's investment in a partnership is really no
different than holding corporate stock in that a certain
cash flow or return is expected from the efforts of
others.
As an investor, the limited partner merely
keeps records and collects income through managerial
attention to his investments. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 218,
cited in Whipple, 373 U.S. at 200.
Thus, Kornhauser
does not apply to the present case because the taxpayers
were not general partners and did not incur the expenses
in the conduct of the partnership trade or business.

r

r
r

r

r
r
r
,..,

r
r

This position may assist in reducing the value of the limited partnership
interest.
2.

Florida Ethics -- Representing spouses.

The Florida Bar Association

r

has issued Opinion 95-4 (May 30, 1997) which states that where husband and wife

r

of the conflict.

r
r
r

develop a conflict, the lawyer's duty is to withdraw but DQt disclose the source
The facts presented were as follows:

Lawyer has represented Husband and Wife for many years
in a range of personal matters, including estate
planning. Husband and Wife have substantial individual
assets, and they also own substantial jointly-held
property. Recently, Lawyer prepared new updated wills
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that Husband and Wife signed.
Like their previous
wills, the new wills primarily benefit the survivor of
them for his or her life, with beneficial disposition at
the death of the survivor being made equally to their
children (none of whom were born by prior marriage) .
Husband, Wife, and Lawyer have always shared all
relevant asset and financial information.
Consistent
with previous practice, Lawyer met with Husband and Wife
together to confer regarding the changes to be made in
updating their wills.
At no point since Lawyer first
started to represent them did either Husband or Wife
ever ask Lawyer to keep any information secret from the
other, and there was never any discussion about what
Lawyer might do if either of them were to ask Lawyer to
maintain such a separate confidence.
Several months after the execution of the new wills,
Husband confers separately with Lawyer. Husband reveals
to Lawyer that he has just executed a codicil (prepared
by another law firm) that makes substantial beneficial
disposition to a woman with whom Husband has been having
an extra-marital relationship.
Husband tells Lawyer
that Wife knows about neither the relationship nor the
new codicil, as to which Husband asks Lawyer to advise
him regarding Wife's rights of election in the event she
were to survive Husband.
Lawyer tells Husband that
Lawyer cannot under the circumstances advise him
regarding same. Lawyer tells Husband that Lawyer will
have to consider Lawyer's ethical duties under the
circumstances.
Lawyer tells Husband that, after
consideration, Lawyer may determine to withdraw from
representing Husband and Wife.
Lawyer further tells
Husband that, after consideration, Lawyer may determine
to disclose to Wife the substance of Husband's
revelation if Husband does not do so himself.
The Opinion deals with the key issue:
We now turn to the central issue presented, which is the
application of the confidentiality rule in a situation
where confidentiality was not discussed at the outset of
the joint representation.
A lawyer is ethically
obligated to maintain in confidence all information
relating to the representation of a client. Rule 4-1.6.
A lawyer, however, also has a duty to communicate to a
ciient
information
that
is
relevant
to
the
representation.
Rule 4.1.4.
These duties
of
communication and confidentially harmoniously coexist in
most situations. In the situation presented, however,
Lawyer's duty of communication to Wife appears to
conflict with Lawyer's duty of confidentiality to
Husband.
Thus, the key question for our decision is:
Which duty must give way? We conclude that, under the
facts presented, Lawyer'S duty of confidentially must
take precedence.
Consequently, if Husband fails to
disclose (or give Lawyer permission to disclose) the
subject information to Wife, Lawyer is not ethically
required to disclose the information to Wife and does
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not have discretion to reveal the information. To the
contrary, Lawyer's ethical obligation of confidentially
to Husband prohibits Lawyer from disclosing the
information to Wife.
The lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and
confidence.
Gerlach y. Donnelly, 98 So.2d 493 (Fla.
1957) .
Rule 4-1. 6 recognizes a very broad duty of
confidentiality on the part of a lawyer. Save for a few
narrow exceptions set forth in the rule, a lawyer is
prohibited from voluntarily revealing any "information
relating to the representation" of a client without the
client's
consent.
Rule
4-1.6.
The duty of
confidentiality
"applies
not
merely
to
matters
communicated in confidence by the client but also to all
information relating to the representation, whatever its
source"
and
"continues
after
the
client-lawyer
relationship has terminated." Comment, Rule 4-1.6.
It has been suggested that, in a joint representation,
a
lawyer
who
receives
information
from
the
"communicating client" that is relevant to the interests
of the non-communicating client may disclose the
information to the latter, even over the communicating
client's objections and even where disclosure would be
damaging to the communicating client. The committee is
of the opinion that disclosure is not permissible and
therefore rejects this "no-confidentiality" position.
The argument for a "no-confidentiality" approach -which is a departure from the usual rule of lawyerclient confidentiality -- is premised on two bases: (1)
that joint clients have an expectation that everything
relating
to
the
joint
representation
that
is
communicated by one client to the joint lawyer will be
shared by the lawyer with the other client (i.e., that
joint clients have no expectation of confidentiality
with the joint representation); and (2) that the law
governing the evidentiary attorney-client privilege sets
(or should set) the standard for the lawyer'S ethical
duties in the joint representation setting.
Both of
these foundations, in the committee's opinion, are
flawed.
Significantly, existing Rule 4-1.6(c) (I) allows the
joint clients' lawyer to share information received form
one client with the other client, without the need to
obtain consent from the communicating client, when such
disclosure is reasonably necessary to further the
interests of the joint representation.
Thus, a
presumption of "no confidentiality" is not needed to
facilitate representation of joint clients with a mutual
goal.
Rather, such a presumption would serve only to
permit the lawyer to reveal an adverse separate
confidence, against the communicating client's wishes
and outside the parameters of Rule 4-1.6. At that point
in time, it is clear that a conflict of interests has
arisen and any "community of interests" has been damaged
or destroyed. See Report of the Special Study Committee
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on Professional Responsibility prepared by the American
Bar Association Section of Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law, 28 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. L.J. 765, 776-77
(1994) (hereinafter
the
"Study
Committee
Report") ("Because these expectations [of joint clients]
may change, the lawyer must reassess these expectations
as the representation progresses.").

,\'

Furthermore, accurately predicting the expectations of
a typical client in a given situation is risky business.
See, e.g., Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74
Iowa L. Rev. 351 (1989).
This would seem to be
especially true concerning separate confidences imparted
by one joint client to the lawyer that are in some way
adverse to the other joint client.
Even commentators
who oppose maintaining the usual confidentiality rule in
the joint client setting acknowledge that client
expectations concerning confidentiality may be different
in the case of separate confidences that are adverse to
the non-communicating client than they are when the
communication clearly furthers the objectives of the
joint representation.
See, e.g., Study Committee
Report, at 788 ("Most [separate] confidences would not
be imparted if the client were mindful of the lawyer's
competing duty [of communication] to the other spouse.")
Collett, Disclosure, Discretion, or Deception: The
Estate Planner's Ethics Dilemma from a unilateral
Confidence, 28 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. L.J. 683
(1994) (hereinafter, Collett), at 684 ("Absent agreement
concerning the nature of the relationship, clients may
have different expectations concerning the lawyer's
obligation
to
maintain
individual
confidences.")
Moreover, a leading case in the area of attorney-client
privilege in joint representations states, "As between
joint clients, there can be no 'confidences' or
'secrets' unless one client manifests a contra~
intent. "
Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants,
ID&., 590 F.2d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
The committee is of the opinion that it would be
inadvisable to rely on such a speculative basis as
"joint client expectations" to justify altering the
usual lawyer-client confidentiality rule when applied to
joint representation situations.
This is especially
true where-confusion or misunderstanding on the part of
the clients may be minimized or eliminated by means of
a discussion between the lawyer and the clients at the
outset of the representation. See Collett, at 738-39.

.J

J

,

The Opinion rejects giving the lawyer discretion:
It has been argued in some commentaries that the usual
rule of lawyer-client confidentiality does not apply in
a joint representation and that the lawyer should have
the discretion to determine whether the lawyer should
disclose
the
separate
confidence
to
the
noncommunicating client.
This discretionary approach is
advanced in the Restatement, sec. 112, comment 1. This
result is also favored by the American College of Trusts
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and Estates in its commentaries on the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (2d ed. 1995) (hereinafter the
"ACTEC"
Commentaries").
The
Restatement
itself
acknowledges that no case law supports the discretionary
approach.
Nor do the ACTEC Commentaries cite any
supporting authority for this proposition.

r

r

The committee rejects the concept of discretion in this
important area.
Florida lawyers must have an
unambiguous rule governing their conduct in situations
of this nature. We conclude that Lawyer owes duties of
confidentiality to both Husband and Wife, regardless of
whether
they
are
being
represented
jointly.
Accordingly, ~nder the facts presented Lawyer is
ethically precluded from disclosing the separate
confidence to Wife without husband's consent.

r
r
r

r
r
r
r
,.,

The Opinion also held that lawyers need not advise spouses of potential
conflicts, although it may be helpful.
3.

Florida Intangibles

Tax.

Florida has amended its intangible tax to

provide that a trust does not have a Florida situs for intangible tax purposes
unless (1) all trustees are Florida residents, or (2) a majority of the trustees
are Florida residents

(if three or more),

or

(3)

if multiple trustees,

Florida trustee(s) have control or managemnet of the trust.
4.

Note

in

Diyorce

commissioner, 75 T.C.M. 2177
received more

Creates

(1998),

Deductible

Interest.

the

HB 4413 §25.
In

Armacost

y.

the court determined that where husband

than his half of community assets

and gave wife a

note as

compensation, the interest on the note is deductible as investment interest.

The

case points out the importance of tax planning in divorce and property settlement

r

matter.

r

1997),

r
r
r
r
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state Law - Other.

In Moeller y. Superior Court, 947 P.2d 279 (Cal.

the Court held that a

trustee cannot shield communications from its

5.

attorney by asserting the attorney-client privilege when the party requesting the
communications is the successor trustee.

The opinion states:

The powers of a trustee are not personal to any
particular trustee but, rather, are inherent in the
office of trustee.
It has been the law in California
for over a century that a new trustee "succeed[s] to all
the rights,
duties,
and responsibilities of his
predecessors."
(Fatjo y. Swasey (1896) 111 Cal. 628,
636, 44 P. 225; see also Baumann Yo Harrison (1941) 46
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Cal.App.2d 84, 93, 115 P.2d 530).
In accord is the
Restatement Second of Trusts section 196, page 431:
"The powers conferred upon a trustee can properly
be exercised by his successors, unless it is
otherwise provided by the terms of the trust."
California courts have explicitly adopted this rule as
the law of this state.
(See In re De La Montanya' s
Estate (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 322, 328, 188 P.2d 494;
Estate of Canfield 1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 443, 447, 181
P.2d 732).
The rule applies, of course, to powers
essential to effective administration of the trust.
(Rest.2d Trusts, § 196, com. b.) As discussed earlier,
the power to· assert the attorney-client privilege
follows from the trustee's power to hire an attorney in
order to obtain advice regarding administration of the
trust and to litigate to protect trust property.
The
trustee's power to assert that privilege thus is
certainly essential to its effective administration of
the trust.
Therefore, when a successor trustee takes
office it assumes all of the powers of trustee,
including the power to assert the privilege with respect
to confidential communications between a predecessor
trustee
and
an
attorney
on
matters
of
trust
administration.
The Court recognized that in some instances a trustee might want its own
personal counsel:
We recognize that, under the rule we adopt, a trustee
must take into account the possibility that its
confidential communications with an attorney about trust
administration may someday be disclosed to a successor
trustee. This is, however, not unfair in light of the
nature of a trust and the trustee's duties. A trust is
a fiduciary relationship with respect to property in
which the person holding legal title to the property -the trustee -- has an equitable obligation to manage the
property for the benefit of another -- the beneficiary.
(Estate of Shaw (1926) 198 Cal. 352, 360, 246 P.48;
Askew y. Resource Funding. Ltd. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d
402, 407, 156 Cal.Rptr. 208; Rest.2d Trusts, § 2.)
A
trustee must always act solely in the beneficiaries'
interest.
(§ 16002, subd. (a); Estate of Feraud (1979)
92 Cal. App. 2d 717, 723, 154 Cal.Rptr. 889.)
If the
trustee violates any duty owed to the beneficiaries, the
trustee is liable for breach of trust.
(§ 16400.) And
professional trustees like Sanwa are held to a higher
standard of care in discharging their legal duties than
are others.
(Coberly y. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 685, 689, 42 Cal.Rptr. 64.)
In a trust relationship, then, the benefits belong to
the beneficiaries and the burdens to the trustee. The
office of trustee is thus by nature an onerous one, and
the proper discharge of its duties necessitates great
circumspection.
Liability
to
beneficiaries
for
mismanagement of trust assets is merely one of the
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burdens
professional
trustees
presumably, an appropriate fee.

take

on

for,

Most importantly, the successor trustee inherits the
power to assert the privilege only as to those
confidential communications that occurred when the
predecessor, in its fiduciary capacity, sought the
attorney's advice for guidance in administering the
trust. If a predecessor trustee seeks legal advice in
its personal capacity out of a genuine concern for
possible future charges of breach of fiduciary duty, the
predecessor may be able to avoid disclosing the advice
to a successor trustee by hiring a separate lawyer and
paying for the advice out of its personal funds.

*****
In Talbot y. Marshfield, supra, 62 Eng. Rep. 728, the
residual legatees of a testamentary trust sought to
compel the trustees to produce two opinions of counsel.
Although Talbot
was
a
dispute
over
privileged
information between beneficiaries and trustees, a
subj ect we do not here address, the opinion nicely
articulates the distinction between a trustee consulting
an attorney as trustee to further the beneficiaries'
interests, and a trustee consulting an attorney in his
personal capacity to defend against a claim by the
beneficiaries:
The first
opinion [of counsel], the
production of which is sought, [was] respectively
stated and taken by the [trustees] to guide them
in the exercise of a power delegated to them by
the trusts of the will, and which, if exercised,
would affect the interests of the other cestuis
que trust.
The opinion was taken before
proceedings were commenced or threatened, and in
relation to the trust. Under these circumstances
it appears.
. that all the cestuis que trust
have a right to see that.
. opinion.
It was
contended that it was not taken for the benefit
of all the cestuis que trust; but all the cestuis
que
trust
have
an
interest
in
the
due
administration of the trust, and in that sense it
was for the benefit of all, as it was for the
guidance of the trustees in their execution of
their trust.
Besides, if a trustee properly
takes the opinion of counsel to guide him in the
execution of the trust, he has a right to be paid
the expense of so doing out of the trust estate;
and that alone would give any cestuis que trust a
right to see the . . . opinion. The other .
opinion, however, stands on a totally different
footing.
This was not to guide the trustees in
the execution of
their trust;
but,
after
proceedings had been commenced against them, they
took advice to know in what position they stood,
and how they should defend themselves in the
suit.
It appears
that the cestuis que
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trust have no right to see this .
opinion,
unless they can make out that the trustees can
charge the expense thereof on the trust funds.
As to this there is no proof; the trustees may
themselves have to bear the expense of this . . .
opinion, as having been stated and taken by them
as litigant parties with the cestuis que trust.
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APPENDIX A

PROCEDURE FOR TAXATION OF QTIP PROPERTY
[section 2056 (b)

m Property - see KRS 140.100 {4JJ

AT DEATH OF SURVIVING SPOUSE
- Kentucky Revenue Cabinet Announcement -

r

r
r

Since Kentucky statutes do not give direction as to the tax
rates and exemptions that should be used to calculate the
inheritance tax due for the QTIP in the second estate, the Kentucky
Revenue Cabinet had determined that the rates and exemptions in
effect at the date of death of the first spouse should be used in
computing the tax due in the second estate.

r

It was our position that the statutes were designed to
accomplish the same goal as the federal tax law. The federal law
postpones the tax until the death of the second spouse. To compute
the inheritance tax due on the QTIP in the second estate for each
beneficiary of the QTIP, the QTIP was combined with the
distributive share received from the first spouse's estate, if any.
The result of the tax due was reduced by any tax previously paid by
the beneficiary in the first spouse's estate.

r
r
r
r
r
r

r
r

Prior to the phase-out of the inheritance tax for class A
beneficiaries, this policy was not controversial because in most
cases the tax rates and exemptions in effect on the death of the
second spouse were the same as the tax rates and exemptions that
were in effect on the date of dea~h of the first decedent.
After such discussion and research with tax practitioners,
legal advisors and legislative research employees, the Inheritance
& Estate Tax Section has established a new policy concerning the
method of computing tax due when QTIP is included in the second
estate.
This policy is to use the tax rates and exemptions in
effect on the date of death of second spouse.
The taxing of QTIP is a complex and technical issue, however,
this new policy. is more in line with the intent of the General
Assembly to phase-out the inheritance tax for Class A beneficiaries
for decedents passing away after July 1, 1998.

r

r
r
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COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

6-98

REVENUE CABINET
,
FRANKFORT

40620

TO:

Personal Representatives, Financial Institutions,
Broker-Dealers, and Other Interested Persons

FROM:

L~nda

DATE:

June 5, 1998

.

.

\J).""

Sheets, Su~erv~sor ~ ~
Inheritance and Estate Tax Section

C'Q-+~

S1JBJi:CT: Inheritance Tax Lien Releases and Inventory of
Safe Deposit Boxes
Effective J:uly 1, 1998, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet (ItRC) will no lonqer
require that a person obt~in prior written consent (lien release) from the ARC
for the transfer of s;>ecific property owned by a resident or nonresident
decedent at death, nor will a representative of the KRC. be present at the
openinq of a safe deposit box for the purpose of inventoryinq the contents at
any time after the death of a person who had access to the box.
Pursuant to the authority qranted to the KRC in Chapter 140 of the Kentuc.t.cy"
Revised Statutes, this notice qrants a blanket lien release (consent) on ~l
property owned by any decedent as a result of his or her death or any interest
therein includinq, but not limited to, real estate, stocks, bonds, cash
accounts, trust funds, life insurance, e:l:;lloyee retire:nent accounts and trusts
of all types, safe deposit box contents, etc.
Also, financial or other institutions or persons rentinq safe deposit boxes or
similar receptacles may pe:mit access to any and all boxes without requirinq a
specifically written cons~~t or the presence ot the KRC or the local PVA prior
to enterinq the box after the death of. a person who had access to the box.
The above actions were taken as a result of the phase-out of the inheritance
tax on Class A be.~eficiaries and for the pu--pose of easinq the aCministratio~
of estates for personal representatives, bene:iciaries and oth~ affec-::e£.parties. More efficient ser~ices to the taxpayers of the Commonwealth will
result from these actions.
This document may be duplicated. and. used as verification that the inheritance
tax lien no lonqer exists on a decedent's property reqardless of the date of
death.
However,
it does not mean that persona1 representatives or
beneficiaries are relieved of any inheritance tax 1iability that they ~y owe
in their individua1 capacity.
Questions reqardi%1q this notice may be directed to ~da Sheets at {S02)564'
4810 or to Bruce McCutchen in the Division of Tax poliey·at (502)564-6843.
j

..J
APPROVED:

~~A-L<~
Sarah Jane Schaaf, Secreta...-y
Kentucky Revenue Cabinet
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ESTATE AND INHERITANCE TAX APPORTIONMENT
To Apportion Or Not: An Overview
Kelly S. Henry
Melony J. Lane
Ogden Newell & Welch
Whether to apportion estate and inheritance taxes (and if so, how) is a major consideration
for estate planners. If the issue oftax apportionment is not carefully considered and appropriately
resolved in the estate planning documents, a testator's intent may be inadvertently thwarted. This
outline is intendedto serve as a general overview oftax apportionment and important apportiomrient
considerations.

1.

TYPES OF APPORTIONMENT

A

Residual. Traditionally, taxes have been paid from the residuary probate estate
before looking to other types of dispositions (specific, demonstrative, or general).
While a simple "pay all taxes from the residue" tax clause may be the easiest to
administer, it will not always achieve the testator's intent.

B.

Inside Apportionment. A tax clause that apportions taxes among all beneficiaries
within a probate estate is called an inside apportionment clause. All beneficiaries
within an estate bear a proportionate share of the taxes, l'egardless of the type of
disposition or the class ofthe disposition.

c.

Outside Apportionment. Outside apportionment apportions taxes among the
beneficiaries ofthe non-probate property as well as the beneficiaries ofthe probate
estate, and provides that the recipient ofthe property pay the portion ofthe tax that
is attributable to the inclusion of the property in the taxable estate. Situations to
watch for include:

r

r

r
r

1.

the decedent retained an interest described in §§ 2036, 2037, and 2038:

r
r

r

r

property transferred for less than full and adequate consideration as to which

a.

a life interest;

b.

a prohibited form ofreversion;

c.

a prohibited degree of control over the use or enjoyment of income
or principal;

2.

annuities included in the decedent's estate under §2039;

3.

property included in the decedent's estate by reason ofjoint ownership with
rights of survivorship or tenants by the entirety (§2040);

r

r
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4.

general power of appointment property (§2041);

5.

life insurance proceeds as to which the decedent possessed incidents of
ownership within three years of decedent's death (§2042); and

6.

Qualified Tenninable Interest Property (QTIP) property included in the
decedent's estate under § 2044.

D.

Equitable Apportionment. Equitable apportionment clauses provide that the
dispositions generating estate tax deductions (such as marital and charitable
distributions) receive the whole benefit for the deduction, rather than allowing all
beneficiaries to benefit from the resulting deduction.

E.

Other Apportionment Considerations. Other apportionment considerations that
are closely related to equitable apportionment include:
1.

Rate Differentials - whether to apportion the benefit oflower estate tax rates
to the beneficiaries of the property producing the rate differential. (e.g.Special use valuation under §2032A and the potential for recapture.)

2.

Credits - whether to apportion the benefit of estate tax credits among the
beneficiary(ies) receiving the property which generated the credit or to allow .
all beneficiaries to benefit therefrom. (e.g.- §2013'previously taxed property
credit.)

3.

Temporal Interests - how to apportion taxes that are attributable to property
that is divided into temporal interests. (e.g.-life estates, tenns ofyears.)

4.

Multiple Entities - how to apportion taxes among the various estate planning
entities such as the probate estate, revocable trusts, irrevocable trusts, etc.

....
~,

-

-

FEDERAL RULES PERTAINING TO APPORTIONMENT

A

In General. The general federal rule for payment of death taxes is that the probate
estate bears the tax liability. This rule is set out in §220S which provides that the
beneficiaries of non-probate assets are entitled to reimbursement from the probate
estate for any death taxes that are paid from the non-probate property. Thus, the
executor has the ultimate responsibility for the payment of estate taxes.

B.

Reimbursement Provisions. Notwithstanding the general rule, unless the
decedent's estate planning documents state otherwise, there are four exceptions to
the general rule which allow the executor to seek reimbursement from the
beneficiary of particular types of assets for taxes generated by such property that
have been actualIy paid from the probate estate. It is important to note, however, that
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r

r

these are reimbursement provisions, and not apportionment provisions, which will
not resolve liquidity problems for a non-liquid probate estate.

r

1.

Life Insurance Proceeds - §2206 entitles the executor to reimbursement
from the named beneficiaries of proceeds of life insurance that are included
in the decedent's estate. The executor· is entitled to recover from each
beneficiary the proportion of the total taxes that the beneficiary's life
insurance proceeds bear to the taxable estate.

2.

Power of Appointment Property - Under §2207, the executor is entitled to
recover. a proportionate share of the estate taxes from the beneficiary of
property that was subject to the decedent's general power of appointment,
regardless ofwhether or not the decedent exercised such power.

3.

Qualified Tenninable Interest Property - §2207A also entitles a
decedent's estate to reimbursement from the beneficiaries ofproperty that is
included in the decedent's taxable estate as property for which the marital
deduction was previously allowed. Here, the estate is entitled to recover the
amount by which the taxes actually paid exceeds what the tax liability would
have been if the QTIP property had not been included in the decedent's
estate.

4.

Retained Interest - §2207B provides the estate a right of reimbursement
from the beneficiaries ofproperty which was included in the decedent's gross
estate by reason ofthe decedent's retained life interest as described in §2036.
However, §2207B does not apply to inclusion under §§2037 or 2038.

r
r

r
r

r
r
r
r

C.

r
r
r

r
r
r
r

r

ill.

Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes. Who bears the liability for generation-skipping
transfer taxes depends upon the type of transfer. §2603(a) provides that (1) the
transferee is liable for the tax imposed on a taxable distribution; (2) the trustee must
pay the tax imposed on a taxable termination; and (3) the transferor bears the liability
for taxes resulting from direct skips. However, §2603(a) is supplemented by
§2603(b) which provides on a basic level that generation-skipping transfer taxes be
paid from the property constituting the offending transfer. Thus, generation-skipping
transfer taxes are ultimately paid from the transferred property.

STATE LAWS RELATING TO APPORTIONMENT

A

Kentucky. Kentucky statutory law does not address apportionment of federal estate
taxes. Thus, federal estate tax apportiomnent is detennined by case law.
1.

General Rule - In the absence of a contrary provision in the decedent's wil~
federal estate tax will be apportioned among all persons interested in the
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estate, regardless ofwhether the interest arises from probate or non-probate
property. McKinnevv. Mt. SterlingNat'lB~ 220 S.W.2d 379 (Ky. 1949).
2.

J

Inside Apportionment - Apportionment is based on the share that each
person interested in the estate receives relative to the value of all interests in
the estate. Trimble v. Hatcher's Ex'rs, 173 S.W.2d 985 (Ky. 1943).

J

B.

3.

Outside Apportionment - The case law is unclear on this issue. But see
Trimble v. Hatcher's Ex'rs, 173 S.W.2d 985 (Ky. 1943), in which the court
apportioned federal estate tax to the beneficiaries of gifts made within two
years ofthe decedent's death.

4.

Right of Recovery - The executor may recover a proportionate share ofthe
estate taxes from the beneficiary ofnon-probate assets. Trimble v. Hatcher's
Ex'rs, 173 S.W.2d 985 (Ky. 1943).

5.

Equitable Apportionment - Dispositions which generate an estate tax
deduction receive the benefit from such deduction. Lincoln Bank & Trust
Co. v. Huber, 240 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1951).

6.

Apportionment of Kentucky Inheritance Tax - Inheritance tax is imposed
on each beneficiary's share ofthe estate (KRS 140.190 and 140.220).

Indiana. Indiana.1aws pertaining to the apportionment ofestate and inheritance taxes
may be found in Title 29, Article 2, Chapter 12 ofthe Indiana Code.
1.

General Rule - In the absence ofa contrary provision in the decedent's will,
federal estate tax will be apportioned among all persons interested in the
estate, regardless ofwhether the interests arise from probate or non-probate
property (Ind. Code Ann. § 29-2-12-2).

2.

Inside Apportionment - Apportionment is based on the share that each
person interested in the estate receives relative to the value of all interests in
the estate (Ind. Code Ann. § 29-2-12-4).

3.

Outside Apportionment - Recipients ofnon-probate assets included in the
decedent's net taxable estate pay a pro-rata share of the estate taxes (Ind.
Code Ann. § 29-2-12-4).

4.

Right of Recovery - The executor is entitled to recover from the recipient of
non-probate assets the recipient's proprotionate share ofthe estate taxes paid
from the probate estate (Ind. Code Ann. §§ 29-2-12-3 and 29-2-12-6).
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C.

5.

Equitable Apportionment - Dispositions which generate an estate tax
deduction receive the benefit from such deduction (Ind. Code Ann. § 29-122).

6.

Apportionment of Indiana Inheritance Tax - Inheritance tax is imposed
on each beneficiary's share ofthe-estate (Ind. Code Ann. § 6-4.1-2-1).

Florida. Florida laws concerning the apportionment ofestate taxes are contained in
Title XLIT, Chapter 733, Part vm ofthe Florida Statutes.
1.

General Rule - In the absence ofan unequivocal direction in the decedent's
will to the contrary, federal estate tax will be apportioned among probate and
non-probate assets (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 733.817(1)(e». To override this
statutory rule, the decedent's will must expressly refer to the statute or
expressly indicate that the estate is to bear the burden of the estate tax
attributable to property passing outside the will. Ferrone v. Soffes, 558 So.
2d 146, 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).

2.

Inside Apportionment - Beneficiaries of residuary bequests are primarily
liable for the payment of federal estate tax and share such liability
proportionally(Fla. Stat. Ann. § 733.817(1)(b), (c)(i». Recipients ofspeci:fic
or general bequests are liable for federal estate tax only to the extent that the
residue is insufficient to pay such tax (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 733.817(1)(a), (c)(i».

3.

Outside Apportionment - Recipients ofnon-probate assets included in the
decedent's net taxable estate are liable for their pro-rata share ofthe estate
taxes (Fla. Stat. Ann. §733.817(1)(e».

4.

Right of Recovery - The personal representative is entitled to recover from
the recipient of non-probate assets the proportionate amount ofestate taxes
attributable to such non-probate assets.
In addition, the personal
representative is required to pursue such recovery unless the court relieves
the personal representative from such duty. (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 733.817(3).)

5.

Equitable Apportionment - Case law has established that, with respect to
the marital deduction, dispositions which generate a marital deduction benefit
therefrom. Tarbox v. Palmer, 564 So.2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
However, there is no authority that dispositions which· generate other tax
deductions benefit from the deductions they generate.

6.

Temporal Apportionment - Federal estate t~es charged to temporal
interests will be paid from the trust principal and will not be apportioned
between temporary and remainder interests (Fla. Stat. Ann. §
733.817(1)(c)(ii), (e».

r

r
r
r
r
r

r
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IV.

OTHER PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
A

Here is a laundry list of other issues that should be considered during the estate
planning process:
1.

Partial QTIP Election - Consideration should be given to directing that the
increase in taxes caused by a less than full QTIP election be paid from the
non-elected portion ofthe trust. This is particularly important in situations
where the ultimate beneficiaries of the QTIP trust are different than the
beneficiaries of the credit she1tertrust or residual estate.
For example, assume that the decedent provides for the
surviving spouse in the form of a fixed bequest that will be
held in a QTIP trust the remainder of which will be
distributed in fee to the children of that marriage upon the
surviving spouse's death, and bequeaths the residual estate in
fee to the children of the first marriage. If a full QTIP
election is made, the QTIP property will eventually incur the
estate tax under §2207A However, if a partial QTIP election
is made, the residual estate beneficiaries may end up paying
the increased tax liability if such tax is not properly
apportioned to the non-elected property.

2.

Disclaimer - The concerns surrounding the possibility of a spouse
disclaiming property that o~herwise would have generated a deduction are
similar to those relating to a partial QTIP election. Here, you would
encounter the same concerns as for a partial QTIP election if a surviving
spouse disclaimed property that passes in default to beneficiaries other than
the residual beneficiaries, or ifthe disclaimer results in a generation-skipping
transfer and the payment of generation-skipping taxes are not adequately
provided for.

3.

Special Use Recapture - When planning for the use ofthe §2032A special
use valuation, the testator's intention should be ascertained regarding who
should bear the potential liability for recapture as well as who should receive
the benefit ofthe initial reduced valuation.

4.

Estate Tax Deferral (§6166) - Similar consideration should be given to
planning situations which involve the potential for deferral of estate taxes
relating to closely held business assets under §6166.
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5.

Gift Taxes Paid - Another potential problem involves the inclusion of gift
taxes paid within three years ofa decedent's death if the donees ofthe gifts
are different than the estate beneficiaries. Pay particular attention to
situations where the inclusion ofthe gift taxes paid grosses up the estate tax
to a level that exceeds the value ofthe probate estate, especially where the
estate beneficiaries are not the donees ofthe gifts.

6.

Generation Skipping Tax Exemption - Related to the allocation of

r
r

r
r

generation-skipping taxes is the allocation of a decedent's generationskipping tax exemption. An equitable allocation ofthe exemption may not
always achieve the testator's goals. Care should be taken to ascertain the
testator's intent regarding generation skipping taxes and the corresponding
exemption, particularly where the testator favors some beneficiaries over
others.

r

7.

testator's intention surrounds bequests of illiquid assets. For example,
consider a testator who devises a farm to child #1 (who farms the property)
and bequeaths the liquid assets to children #2 and #3. Does the testator
intend child # 1 to receive the farm free from estate tax liability? Does the
testator intend child # 1 to incur an equal share of the tax liability? If so,
where will the child obtain the funds with which to pay the taxes? Will child
# 1 be forced to sell a portion ofthe farm in order to pay the taxes?

r

r
r

r
r
r
r

Dliquid Assets - Another situation where it is important to specify the

B.

Coordination Amon~ Entities. Finally, tax payment provisions should be carefully
coordinated among all estate planning documents - testamentary and nontestamentary alike.

For comprehensive reading regarding estate tax apportionment, see Pennell, Jeffrey N., "Tax
Payment Provisions and Equitable Apportionment," Estate Planning in Dqnh, SB90 ALI-ABA 637
(June 15, 1997).

r
r
r
r
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APPENDIX A

J

SELECTED INDIANA STATUTES
WESTS ANNOTATED INDIANA CODE
TITLE 29. PROBATE
ARTICLE 2. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
CHAPTER 12. APPORTIONMENT OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAXES

J
29-2-12-2 Heirs and beneficiaries; charitable or marital deduction or exemption
Unless a decedent shall otherwise direct by will. the federal estate tax
imposed upon decedent's estate. shall be apportioned among all ofthe persons. heirs
and beneficiaries of decedent's estate who receive any property which is includable
in the total gross estate ofsaid decedent for the purpose ofdetermining the amount
of federal estate tax to be paid by said estate. Provided. that no part ofthe federal
estate tax shall be apportioned against property which, in the absence of any
apportionment whatsoever. would qualify for any charitable, marital or other
deduction or exemption, nor against recipients of such property on account thereof.

i

...
,1

29-2-12-1.5 "Will" defined
As used in this chapter, "will" includes a trust or other instrument governing
the distribution ofassets following an individual's death.

29-2-12-4 Method ofapportionment
The portion of such federal estate tax to be paid by each person, heir. or
beneficiary of said estate shall be determined by dividing the value of the property
received by such person, heir or beneficiary, which is included in the net taxable
estate. by the amount of the net taxable estate. and multiplying the result by the
amount ofthe total federal estate tax paid.

'1

.j

J

'I

.J
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FLORIDA APPORTIONMENT STATIJTE

r

WESTS FLORIDA STATUTES ANNOTATED
TITLE nll. ESTATES AND TRUSTS

r
r
r

r
r
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CHAPTER733.PROBATECODE:AD~nONOFESTATES

PART

vm. SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR DISTRIBUTION
Copr. C West Group 1998. All rights IeServed.
Curnmt through End of 1997 1st Reg. Sess.

733.817. Apportionment of estate taxes
<Text of section effective until Oct. I, 1998>
(1) Any estate, inheritance, or other death tax levied or assessed under the tax laws of this or any other state, political
subdivision, or countty or under any United States revenue act concerning any property included in the gross estate under
the law, including the tax levied by s. 4980A of the Internal Revenue Code, [FNl] but excluding taxes for which sources
of payment an: provided within SSt 2206,2207, and 2603 of the Intcmal Revenue Code, [FN2] shall be apportioned in the
following manner.
(a) If a part of the estate passed under a will as a devise to be satisfied by reference to a specific property or type of
property, fund, sum, or statutory amount or in any other nonresiduary form. exclusive of property over which the decedent
had a power of appointment as defined from time to time under the estate tax laws of the United States, the net amount of
the tax attributable to it shall be charged to and paid from the residuary estate without requiring contribution from persons
receiving the interests, except as otherwise directed by the governing instrument. In the event the residuary estate is
insufficient to pay the tax attributable to the interests, any balance of the tax shall be equitably apportioned among the
recipients of the interests in the proportions that the value of each interest included in the measure of the tax bears to the
total of all interests so included, except as otbcrwise d.irected by the gow:ming instrument.
.

r

(b) If a part of the estate passed under the will as a residuary interest, exclusive of property over which the decedent had
power of appointment, the net amount of tax attributable to it shall be equitably apportioned among the residuary
benefICiaries in the proportions that the value of the residuary interest of each included in the measure of the tax bears to
the total of all residuary interests so included, except as otherwise directed by the governing instrument. When a
residuary interest is a temporary interest, the tax attributable to it shall be charged to corpus and not apportioned between
temporary and remainder interests.

r

(c) If a part of the property concerning which the tax is levied or assessed is held under the terms ofany trust created inter
vivos, then, unless the governing instrument directs otberwisc:

r
r
r

r

r
r

1. If any portion of the trust is directed to pass or to be held in further trust by reference to a specific property, or type of
piOperty. fund, sum, or statutory amount, or in any other nooresiduary fann. the net amount of the tax attributable to that
portion must be charged to and paid from the corpus of the residuary shan: of the trust without requiring contribution from
the nonresiduary interest or the penODS receiving or benefiting from that interest. If the residuary portion of the trust is
insuffICient to pay the tax attributable to all nonresiduary interests. any balance of the tax must be equitably apportioned
among the recipients of those interests in the proportions that the value of each interest included in the measure of the laX
bears to the total of all interest so included.

2. The net amount of the tax directly attributable to the residuary shan: of the trust, if any, must be charged as follows:
the net amount of the tax attributable to each residuary temporary interest must be charged to that portion of residuary
principal that supports the temporary interest without apportionment, and the net amount of the tax attributable to the
balance of the residuary shan: must be equitably apportioned among the residuary beneficiaries, by charge to the corpus of
their interest in the proportions that the value of the residuary interest of each included in the measure of the tax bears to
the total of all residuary interests included.
(d) Real property or mobile home homesteads that an: exempt from. execution by law shall be exempt from
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apportionment of taxes. Persons taking an interest in the homesteads shall not be liable for apportionment of taxes on
account of the homesteads. The net amount of the tax attributable to homestead property shall be paid from other assets
of any trust or the estate subject to administration in the order as directed by the governing instrument or, absent this
direction, in the following order:
1. Property not disposed of by the will or trust.

-

2. Property passing as the residuary estate.
3. Property not specifically or demonstratively devised.

4. Property specifically or demonstratively devised.

(e) The balance of the net amount of the tax, including, but not limited to, any tax imposed concerning jointly held
properties passing by survivorship, property passing by intestacy, annuities not created under the will or an inter vivos
trust, and the tax imposed by s. 4980A of the Internal Revenue Code, shall be equitably apportioned among, and paid by,
the recipients and beneficiaries of the properties or interests, in the proportion that the value of the property or interest of
each included in the measure of the tax bears to the total value of all the properties and interests included in the measure
of the tax. except as otherwise directed by the governing instrument. With respect to a temporary interest not in trust, the
amount charged to the recipients or beneficiaries shall not be apportioned between temporary and remainder interests but
shall be charged to and paid out of the corpus of the property or fund, except as otherwise directed by the governing
instrument.
(f) Notbing herein contained shall be construed to require the personal representative or other conccmed fiduciary to pay
any estate, inheritance, or other death taxes levied or assessed by any foreign country, unless specific directions to that
effect are contained in the' will or other instrument under which the fiduciary is ,acting.

(2)(a) The net amount of tax attributable to the interests encompassed by any one of paragraphs (l)(a) through (e) shall
be the part of the net amount of the tax as finally determined, with interest on it, as the value of interests included in the
measure of the tax and included in the paragraph bears to the amount of the net estate, except that, in the case of an
inheritance or similar tax, the tax that is imposed on each benefICiary's interest, as determined under the law of the state,
country, or political subdivision then under consideration. shall be deemed the tax attributable to the interest.
(b) As used in this section, the term:

1. "Net estate" means the gross estate, as defined by the estate, inheritance, or death tax laws of the particular state,
country, or political subdivision whose tax is being apportioned, less the deductions. other than the specific exemption.
allowed. AU proportions based on net estate shall be determined without regard to any diminution in deductions resulting
from the charge ofany part of the tax to a deductible interest.

2. "Included in the measure of the tax" means each separate tax that an interest may incur and in determining the
proportion that each interest bears to the total value of all interests included in the measure of each tax. only interests
included in the measure of that particular tax are considered. The ram docs not include any property or interest, whether
passing under the will or not, to the extent the property or interest is exempt or is initially deductible from the gross estate.
without regard to any subsequent diminution of the deduction by reason of the charge of any part of the tax to the property
or interest.
'

3. "Value" means the pecuniary worth of the interest involved as finally determined for purposes of the tax then under
consilkration, without regaItl to any diminution of it by reason of the charge of any part of tax.
4. "Governing instrument" means a will. a UUSt agreement, or any other dcx:ument controlling the devolution of an asset at
the death with respect to which the tax is being levied, but a direction in the will or such other instrument for the payment
of tax in a manner different than that provided for herein is effective to aUcx:ate and pay tax only from assets the
devolution of which is subject to control under that instrument, except that a will direction to pay tax from a trust of which
the testator was the grantor and which was revocable by the grantor until the date of the grantor's death. is effective if a
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contrary direction is not contained in the trUst agreement
S. "Temporary interest" means an interest in'income or an estate for a specific period of time or for life or for some other
period controlled by reference to extrinsic events.

(c) Except when the governing instrument otherwise provides. in the event a credit is given under the estate tax laws of
the United States for any taxes paid to other countries or political subdivisions. the credit shall be apportioned under this
section among the recipients of interests finally charged with the payment of the foreign tax in reduction of any United
States estate tax chargeable to the recipients or interests. whether or not the United States estate tax is attributable to the
foreign interests. Any excess of the credit shall be applied in reduction of the part of United States estate tax chargeable
to residue. and any excess of the credit over the United States estate tax chargeable to residue shall be apportioned ratably
among those persons or interests finally charged with the balance of the payment of United States estate tax.
(d) A direction against apportionment under this section may be explicit or implicit from the terms of the governing
instrument, but must be clear and unequivocal; provided. however. that an implicit direction against apportionment is not
SuffICient to avoid the apportionment under state or applicable federal law unless the, court also fands that the testator
considered and made a deliberate and informed decisioo about the burden of taxation.
(3) Unless otherwise directed by the governing instrument, the tax shall be paid by the personal representative out of the
estate. or if a personal representative is not acting under appoinanent, by a person receiving or holding the interests
included in the measure of the tax. In all cases in which any property required to be included in the gross estate does not
come into the possession of the personal representative. he or she shall recover.
(a) From the fiduciary in possession of the corpus of the trUst or of property subject to the power of appoinanent in cases
in which property of a trUst created inter vivos or property subject to a power of appoinanent is included in the gross
estate; and
(b) In all other cases. from the recipient or beneficiaries of property or interests with respect to which the tax is levied or

assessed.
the proportionate amount of the tax payable by the fiduciary or persons with which they are chargeable under the
provisions of this act, unless relieved of the duty as provided in subsection (6). 1bis subsection shall not authorize the
recovery of any taxes from any company issuing insurance included in the gross estate. or from any bank. trUst company.
savings and loan association. or similar institution with respect to any account in the name of the decedent and any other
person that passed by opetation of law on the decedent's death. If the fiduciary brings an action to recover a share of tax
apportioned to an interest oat within his or her control. the judgment he or she obtains may include costs and reasonable
attorney's fees.

(4) No personal representative or other fiduciary shall be required to transfer any property until the amount of any tax due
from the transferee is paid or. if the apportionment of tax has not been determined. until adequate security is furnished for
the payment The fiduciary shall not be required to distribute assets that he or she reasonably anticipates may be
necessary to pay any state or federal taxes.
(5) After the amount of all estate. inheritance. and death taxes is finally determined. the personal icptesentative or other
fiduciary shall petition for an order of apportionment and shall give formal notice of the petition and the hearing to all
interested persons. The personal representative shall be entitled. and it shall be his or her duty. except as provided in
subsection (6). to attempt to effect apportionment as determined by the order. and the apportionment shall be prima facie
correct in proceedings in any court or jurisdiction.1he personal representative shall oat be required to seek collection of
any portion of tax aaributable to any interest not within his or her control until after entry of the order.
(6)(a) A personal representative or other fiduciary who has the duty under this section of collecting the apportioned tax
from persons interested in the estate may be relieved of the duty to collect the tax by an order of the court fmding:
1. That the estimated court costs and attorney fees in collecting the apportioned tax from a person interested in the estate
will approximate the amount of the recovery.
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2. That the person interested in the estate is a resident of a foreign country other than Canada and refuses to pay the
apportioned tax on demand.
I

3. That it is impracticable to enforce contribution of the apportioned tax against any person interested in the estate in
view of the improbability of obtaining a judgment or the improbability of collection under any judgment that might be
obtained. or otherwise.

.J

(b) The f1duciary shall not be liable for failure to attempt to enforce collection if the attempt would in fact have been
economically impracticable. Nothing in this section sballlimit the right of any person who is charged with more than the
amoWlt of the tax apportionable to him or her to obtain contribution from those who sball Dot have paid the full amOWlt of
the tax apportionable to them. and that right is hereby confeIred.

(c) If a fiduciary obtains an order described above, the share of tax to which it refers sball be paid from·assets of the
estate in the order provided by s. 733.805. Any apportioned tax that is Dot collected shall also be paid from assets in the
same order.
-

eROI
(FNl) 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980A.
(FN2) 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 2206. 2207, and 2603.

<For text of section effective Oct 1,1998, see § 733.817, post>
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<Text of set:tion effective Oct. I, 1998>
(1) Forpurposcs of this section:

(a) "Fiduciary" means a person other than the personal representative in possession of property included in the measure
of the tax who is liable to the applicable taxing authority for payment of the entire tax to the extent of the value of the
property in his possession.
(b) "Governing instrument" means a will, trust agreement, or any other document that controls the transfer of an asset on
the occmrence of the event with respect to which the tax is being levied.

(c) "Gross estate" means the gross estate, as determined by the Internal Revenue Code [FNl] with respect to the federal
estate tax and the Florida estate tax, and as sucb concept is otherwise detenni1'led by the estate, inheritance, or death tax
laws of the particular state, country, or political subdivision whose tax is being apportioned.
(d) "Included in the measure of the tax" means that for each separate tax that an interest may incur, only interests included
in the measure of that particular tax are considered. The term "included in the measure of the tax" does Dot include any
interest, whether passing under the will or not, to the extent the interest is initially deductible from the gross estate,
without regard to any subsequcut diminution of the deduction by reason of the charge of any part of the applicable tax to
the interest. The term "included in the measure of the tax" does not include interests or amounts that are not included in
the gross estate but are included in the amount upon which the applicable tax is computed, sucb as adjusted taxable gifts
with respect to the federal estate tax. H an election is required for deductibility, an interest is not "initially deductible"
unless the election for deductibility is allowed.
(e) "Int.emal Revenue Code" means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended from time to time.
(f) "Net tax" means the net tax payable to the particular state, country, or political subdivision whose tax is being
apportioned, after taking into account all credits against the applicable tax except as provided in this section. With respect
to the federal estate tax, "net tax" is determined after taking into account all credits against the tax except for the credit for
foreign death taxes.

(g) "Nooresiduary devise" means any devise that is Dot a residuary devise.
(h) "Nonresiduary interest" in connection with a trust means any interest in a trust which is not a residuary interest.

(i) "Recipient" means, with respect to property or an interest in property included in the gross estate, an heir at law in an
intestate estate, devisee in a testate estate, beneficiary of a trust, beneficiary of an insurance policy, annuity, or other
contractual right, surviving tenant, taker as a result of the exercise or in default of the exercise of a general power of
appointment, person who receives or is to receive the property or an interest in the property, or person in possession of
the property.
(j) "Residuary devise" has the meaning set forth in s. 731.201(30).
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(Ie) "Residuary interest," in connection with a trust, means an interest in the assets of a trust which remain after provision
for any distribution that is to be satisfied by reference to a specific property or type of property, fund, sum, or statutory
amount

J

(1) "Revocable trust" means a trust as defined in s. 731.201(33) created by the decedent to the extent that the decedent
bad at his or her death the power to alter, amend, or revoke the trust either alone or in conjunction with any other person.

(m) "State" means any state, territory, or possession of the United States. the District of Columbia. and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(n) "Tax" means any estate tax. inheritance tax. geneI3tion skipping transfer tax. or other tax levied or assessed under the
laws of this or any other state. the United States. any other counay. or any political subdivision of the foregoing. as finally
determined. which is imposed as a result of the death of the decedent, including. without limitation. the tax assessed
pursuant to s. 4980A of the Internal Revenue Code. The term also includes any interest and penalties imposed in addition
to the tax. Unless the context indicates otherwise. the term "tax" means each separate tax.
(0) "Temporary interest" means an interest in income or an estate for a specific period of time or for life or for some other
period controlled by reference to extrinsic events. whether or not in trust

(P) "Tentative Florida tax" with respect to any property means the net Florida estate tax that would have been attributable
to that property if no tax were payable to any other state in respect of that property.
(q) "Value" means the pecuniary worth of the interest involved as finally detemlined for purposes of the applicable tax
after deducting any debt, expense. or other deduction chargeable to it for which a deduction was allowed in detcmlining
the amount of the applicable tax. A lien or other encumbrance is not regarded as chargeable to a particular interest to the
extent that it will be paid from other interests. The value of an interest shall not be reduced by reason of the charge
against it of any part of the tax.
(2) An interest in homestead property shall be exempt from the apportionment of taxes if such interest passes to a person
to whom inures the decedent's exemption from forced sale lDlder the State Constitution.

(3) The net tax attributable to the interests included in the measure of each tax shall be detemlined by the proportion that
the value of each interest included in the measure of the tax bears to the total value of all interests included in the measure
of the tax. Notwithstanding the foregoing:
(a) The net tax attributable to interests included in the measure of the tax by reason of s. 2044 of the Internal Revenue
Code [FN2] shall be detemlined in the manner provided for the federal estate tax in s. 2207A of the Intcmal Revenue
Code. [FN3] and the amount so determined shall be deducted from the tax to determine the net tax attributable to all
remaining interests included in the measure of the tax.
(b) The foreign tax credit allowed with respect to the federal estate tax shall be allocated among the recipients of interests
finally charged with the payment of the foreign tax in =iuction of any federal estate tax chargeable to the recipients of the
foreign interests. whether or not any federal estate tax is attributable to the foreign interests. Any excess of the foreign tax
credit shall be applied to reduce proportionately the net amount of federal estate tax chargeable to the remaining
recipients of the interests included in the measure of the federal estate tax.

(c) The reduction in the Florida tax on the estate of a Florida resident for tax paid to other states shall be allocated as
follows:

\

1. If the net tax paid to another state is greater than or equal to the tentative Florida tax attributable to the property subject
to tax in the other state. none of the Florida tax shall be attributable to that property.

..J

2. If the net tax paid to another state is less than the tentative Florida tax attributable to the property subject to tax in the
other state. the net Florida tax attributable to the property subject to tax in the other state shall be the excess of the amount
of the tentative Florida tax attributable to the property over the net tax payable to the other state with respect to the

...1
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3. Any remaining net Florida tax shall be attributable to property included in the measure of the Florida tax exclusive of
property subject to tax in other states.
4. The net federal tax attributable to the property subject to tax in the other state shall be determined as if it were located
in the state.
(d) The net tax attributable to a temporary interest. if any, shall be regarded as attributable to the principal that supports
the temporary interest.
(4)(a) Except as otherwisc effectively directed by the governing instrument. if the Internal Revenue Code including. but
not limited to. ss. 2032A(c)(S). 2206, 22f17. 2207A. 2207B. and 2603 of the Internal Revenue Code [FN4] applies to
apportion fed=al tax against recipients of certain interests. all net taxes. including taxes levied by the state attributable to
each type of in~t, shall be apportioned against the recipients of all interests of that type in the proportion that the value
of each interest of that type included in the measure of the tax bears to the total of all interests of that type included in the
measure of the tax.
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not affect allocation of the reduction in the Florida tax as provided in this section
with respect to estates of Florida residents which are also subject to tax in other states.

(5) Except as provided above or as otherwisc. directed by the governing instrument, the net tax attributable to each
interest shall be apportioned as follows:
(a) For property passing under the decedent's will:

1. The net tax attributable to nonresiduary devises shall be charged to and paid from the residuary estate whether or not
all interests in the residuary estate are included in the measure of the tax. If the residuary estate is insufficient to pay the
net tax attributable to all nonresiduary devises. the balance of the net tax attributable to nonresiduary devises shall be
apportioned among the recipients of the nonresiduary devises in the proportion that the value of each nonresiduary devise
included in the measure of the tax bears to the total of all nonresiduary devises included in the measure of the tax.
2. The net tax attributable to residuary devises shall be apportioned among the recipients of the residuary devises
included in the measure of tax in the proportion that the value of each residuary devise included in the measure of the tax
bears to the total of all residuary devises included in the measure of the tax.

(b) For property passing under the terms of any trust other than a trust created in the decedent's will:

r
r

1. The net tax attributable to nonresiduary interests shall be charged to and paid from the residuary portion of the trust,
whether or not all interests in the residuary portion are included in the measure of the tax. If the residuary portion of the
trust is insufficient to pay the net tax attributable to all nonresiduary interests. the balance of the net tax attributable to
nonresiduary interests shall be apportioned among the recipients of the nonresiduary interests in the proportion that the
value of each nonresiduary interest included in the measure of the tax bears to the total of all nonresiduary interests
included in the measure of the tax.

r

2. The net tax attributable to residuary interests shall be apportioned among the recipients of the residuary interests
included in the measure of the tax in the proportion that the value of each residuary interest included in the measure of the
tax bears to the total of all residuary interests included in the measure of the tax.

r
r
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(c) The net tax attributable to an interest in homestead property which is exempt from apportionment pursuant to
subsection (2) shall be apportioned against the recipients of other interests in the estate or passing under any revocable
trust in the following order:

1. Class I: Recipients of interests not disposed of by the decedent's will or revocable trust which are included in the
measure of the federal estate tax.
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2. Class II: Recipients of residuary devises and residuary interests that are included in the measure of the federal estate
tax.

3. Class ill: Recipients of nonresiduary devises and nonresiduary interests that are included in the measure of the federal
estate tax. The net tax apportioned to a class, if any, pursuant to this paragraph shall be apportioned among the recipients
in the class in the proportion that the value of the interest of each bears to the total value of all interests included in that
class.
(d) In the application of this subsection, paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) shall be applied to apportion the net tax to the
recipients of the estate and the recipients of the decedent's revocable trust as if all recipients, other than the estate or trusts
themselves, were taking under a common instrument.
(e) The net tax imposed under s. 4980A of the Internal Revenue Code [FNS] shall be apportioned among the recipients
of the interests included in the measure of that tax in the proportion that the value of the interest of each bears to the total
value of all interests included in the measure of that tax.
(f) The net tax that is not apportioned under paragraphs (a), (b), and (c). including, but not limited to, the net tax
attributable to interests passing by intestacy, joindy held interests passing by survivorship. insurance, properties in which
the decedent held a reversionary or revocable interest, and annuities. shall be apportioned among the recipients of the
remaining interests that are included in the measure of the tax in the proportion that the value of each such interest bears
to the total value of all the temaining interests included in the measure of the tax.

(g) If the colU1 finds that it is inequitable to apportion interest, penalties. or both. in the manner provided in paragraphs
(a)-(f), the COlU1 may assess liability for the payment thereof in the lIWUler it finds equitable.
(h)l. To be effective as a direction for payment of tax in a manner different from that provided in this section, the
governing instrument must direct that the tax be paid from assets that pass pursuant to that governing instrument, except
as provided in this section.

2. If the decedent's will provides that the tax shall be apportioned as provided in the decedent's revocable trust by specific
reference to the trust, the direction in the revocable trust shall be deemed to be a direction contained in the will and sball
control with respect to payment of taxes from assets passing under both the will and the revocable trust.
3. A direction in the decedent's will to pay tax from the decedent's revocable trust is effective if a contrary direction is not
contained in the trust agn:emcnt.
4. For a direction in a governing instrument to be effective to direct payment of taxes attributable to property not passing
under the governing instrument from property passing under the governing instrument, the goveming instrument must
expressly refer to this section. or expressly indicate that the property passing under the governing instrument is to bear the
burden of taxation for property not passing under the governing instrument. A direction in the governing instrument to
the effect that all taxes are to be paid from property passing under the ~g instr1UDC11t whether attributable to
property passing under the governing instrument or otherwise shall be effective to direct the payment from property
passing under the governing instrument of taxes attributable to property Dot passing under the governing instrument.

S. If there is a conflict as to payment of taxes between the decedent's will and the governing instrument, the dcccdcnt's
will controls. except as follows:
a. The governing instrument shall be given effect with respect to any tax remaining unpaid after the application of the
decedent's will.
b. A direction in a governing instrument to pay the tax attributable to assets that pass pursuant to the governing
instrument from assets that pass pursuant to that governing instrument shall be effective notwithstanding any conflict with
the decedent's will, unless the tax provision in the decedent's will expressly overrides the conflicting provision in the
governing instrument.
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(6) The personal representative or fiduciary shall not be req~ to transfer to a recipient any property in possession of
the personal representative or fiduciary which he or she reasonably anticipates may be necessary for the payment of taxes.
Further, the personal representative or fiduciary sball not be required to transfer any property in possession of the
personal representative or fiduciary to the recipient until the amount of the tax due from the recipient is paid by the
recipient. If property is transferred before final apportionment of the tax, the recipient shall provide a bond or other
security for his apportioned liability in the amount and form prescribed by the personal representative or fiduciary.
(7Xa) The personal representative may petition at any time for an order of apportionment If no administration has been
at any time after 90 days from the decedent's death any fiduciary may petition for an order of apportionment
in the court in which venue would be proper for administration of the decedent's estate. Formal notice of the petition for
order of apportionment shall be given to all interested persons. At any time after 6 months from the decedent's death, any
recipient may petition such court for an order of apportionment.
c~

(b) The court sball determine all issues concerning apportionment

If the tax to be apportioned has not been finally

detenDined. the court shall determine the probable tax due or to become due from all interested persons, apportion the
probable tax, and retain jurisdiction over the parties and issues to modify the order of apportionment as appropriate until
.

after the tax is finally determined.

(8Xa) If the personal representative or fiduciary does not have possession of sufficient property otherwise distributable to
the recipient to pay the tax apportioned to the recipient, whether under this section, the Internal Revenue Code, or the
governing instrument, if applicable, the personal representative or fiduciary shall recover the defICiency in tax so
apportioned to the recipient:
1. From the fiduciary in possession of the property to which the tax is apportioned, if any; and
2. To the extent of any deficiency in collection from the fiduciary, or to the extent collection from the fiduciary is excused
pursuant to subsection (9) and in all other cases, from the recipient of the property to which the tax is apportioned, unless
relieved of this duty as provided insubsecti.on (9).
(b) In any action to recover the tax apportioned, the order ofapportionment shall be prima facie correct.

(c) In any action for the enforcement of an order of apportionment, the court sball award taxable costs as in chancery
actions, including reasonable attorney's fees, and may award- penalties and interest on the unpaid tax in accordance with
equitable principles.
(d) This subsection shall not authorize the recovery of any tax from any company issuing insurance included in the gross
estate. or from any bank, trust company, savings and loan association. or similar institution with respect to any account in
the name of the decedent and any other person which passed by operation of law on the decedent's death.
(9Xa) A personal representative or fiduciary who bas the duty under this section of collecting the apportioned tax from
recipients may be relieved of the duty to collect the tax by an order of the court finding:
1. That the estimated court costs and attomey's fees in collecting the apportioned tax from a person against whom the tax
bas been apportioned will approximate or exceed the amount of the recovery;
2. That the person against whom the tax has been apportioned is a resident of a foreign country other than Canada and
refuses to pay the apportioned tax on demand; or
3. Thlit it is impracticable to enforce contribution of the apportioned tax against a person against whom the tax has been
apportioned in view of the improbability of obtaining a judgment or the improbability of collection under any judgment
that might be obtained, or otherwise.
(b) A personal representative or fiduciary shall not be liable for failure to attempt to enforce coUection if the personal
representative or fiduciary reasonably believes it would have been economically impracticable.
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(10) Any apportioned tax that is not collected shall be reapportioned in accordance with this section as if the portion of
the property to which the uncollected tax had been apportioned had been exempt
(11) Nothing in this section shall limit the right of any person who bas paid more than the amount of the tax
apportionable to such person, calculated as if all apportioned amounts would be collected. to obtain contribution from
those who have not paid the full amount of the tax apportionable to them, calculated as if all apportioned amounts would
be collected. and that right is hereby conferred. In any action to enforce contribution, the court shall award taxable costs
as in chancery actions. including reasonable auomey's fees!

(12) Nothing herein contained sball be.coostrued to MquUe the personal representative or fiduciary to pay any tax levied
or assessed by any foreign COlDltry, unless specific di!ections to that effect are contained in the will or other instrument
under which the personal representative or fiduc:iaIy is acting.
eROI
{FNl] 26 U.s.c.A. § 1 et seq.
{FN2] 26 U.s.c.A. § 4980A.

j

[FN3] 26 U.s.CA. § 2044.
{FN4] 26 U.s.CA. § 2207A.

(FNS] 26 U.s.c.A. §§ 2032A(c)(S), 2206, 2207, 2207A. 2207B, 2603.

<F'or text of section effective until Oct. 1,1998. sec § 733.817. ante>
CREDIT(S)

II

.J

1998 Electronic Update
CROI Amended by Laws 1997, c. 97-102, § 1026, elf.1uly 1, 1997. Laws 1997, c. 97-240, § 9, eff. Oct 1, 1998.
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APPENDIX C

1998 KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY
LEGISLATION AFFECTING WILLS AND ESTATES

Stephen A. Watkins; Chair, Kentucky Bar Association Trust and Estates Section

Living Will Organ Donation-HD 529
Rep. Bob Helringer sponsored HB 529, which adds statutory language permitting a Living Will
to authorize organ donations and other anatomical gifts for medical and educational uses. The
law offers a suggested form incorporating the new language. It also refers to KRS 311.185,
which provides:
The following persons may become donees ofgifts ofbodies or parts thereoffor the purposes
stated:
(1) Any hospital, surgeon, or physician, for medical or dental education, research, advancement of
medical or dental science, therapy, or transplantation; or
(2) Any accredited medical or dental school, college or university for education, research,
advancement ofmedical or dental science, or therapy; or
(3) Any bank or storagefacility, for medical or dental education, research, advancement ofmedical
or dental science, therapy, or transplantation; or
(4) Any specified individualfor therapy or transplantation needed by him.

The statutory form is adequate for most purposes, but some clients will make a distinction between
the permissible uses of anatomical gifts. Some clients may find organ donation acceptable, but
won't want to become ''the man in the pan" at some medical school. A bequest of the body for
medical school purposes is ordinarily part of a Last Will, which should be coordinated with this
language. Other clients may want to modify the language to prohibit all anatomical gifts.
An alternative form is provided in the materials. The anatomical gift section of this form adds a
requirement to consult with the family and spells out the particular uses. It should be useful if the
client moves or visits another state.

We also put the same anatomical gift language in our long durable power ofattorney form.

Marriage Does Not Revoke Last Will-HB 313
Professor Richard V. Wellman, Executive Director of the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform
Probate Code, spoke in favor of HB 313, acting as a consultant to the AARP. HB 313 was
sponsored by Rep. Rob Wilkey. Prior to HB 313, marriage would revoke any last will and
testament of the parties, except for certain circumstances. Professor Wellman argued that the prior
law contravened the intent of most people, as reflected in the Uniforrn Probate Code. HB 313 now
provides that marriage will not revoke a last will. Presumably, a spouse's right to elect against a
will and take a statutory share offers adequate protection to surviving spouses. Obviously, however,
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marriage is an event requiring full review of an estate plan.

Uniform TOD Security Registration Act-HB 314
HB 314, sponsored by Rep. Rob Wilkey is another AARP provision. HB 314 incorporates into
Kentucky law the Uniform TOD Security Registration Act, which is also part of the Uniform
Probate Code. Kentucky securities dealers who spoke on behalfof its passage supported HB 314.
HB 314 facilitates having securities or security accounts in a form that avoids probate. This form of
ownership is optional for the issuer. The security or account is transferred to a designated
beneficiary upon death of the owner-like a POD checking account Section 2 of the new law
forces co-owners to hold as joint tenants with rights of survivorship rather than as tenants in
common, and the designated beneficiary takes only after the death of all co-owners. Section 5 gives
the language necessary to create a TOD beneficiary form of ownership. Section 6 clarifies that the
beneficiary is revocable by the owner or owners without the beneficiary's consent. Section 7
specifies that ifthere is more than one beneficiary, they take as tenants in common until the security
or security account is divided. Ifno beneficiary survives, the owner is the estate of the owner (or the
estate of the last to die of the co-owners). Section 8 offers protection to issuers who permit
beneficiary form ownership. Section 10 permits contingent beneficiaries, including a designation of
"LDPS" to have "lineal descendants per stirpes" take as substitutes for a named beneficiary who is
deceased.

i'
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Transfer of Property on Death-HB 165
HB 165 was drafted and supported by the Legislative Committee of the KBA Trust & Estate
Section. There are three distinct parts of the law, representing adoption of three separate uniform
codes.
.

HB 165, Sections 1 to 9-Uniform Simultaneous Death Act
Kentucky had an outdated version of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. Under the old law,
litigators fought to show that one or another person breathed the last breath. To the contestants,
there was never a true simultaneous death; never was there 'no sufficient evidence" of the true
order of deaths. This bill updates Kentucky law and provides a better resolution of this issue where
it is not resolved in a governing instrument like a last will or trust. The new language simply
requires an objective test: clear evidence ofsurvival by 120 hours. The concept is to specify enough
time for death to occur if it is likely following a mutual accident, but not so long as to delay aid for
a designated beneficiary who needs it. This is a default provision that can be overridden by specific
language in a will or trust or other document.

....I

HB 165, Section lo-Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act
Kentucky had an outdated version of the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act. This bill
updates Kentucky law. This is an important provision given the proliferation of Living Trusts in
Kentucky as elsewhere. It is intended to avoid malpractice traps such as signing the trust before the
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will, failing to have a trust corpus (the $1 bill), or of having to sign a new will if the trust is
amended after the will is signed.

r

HB 165, Section II-Uniform Non-Probate Transfers at Death

r

Kentucky had an outdated version of the Unifonn Non-Probate Transfers Act. This bill updates
Kentucky law, adding specific reference to many types of assets that did not exist or were not
common when the old law was drafted.
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Disclaimer of Inheritanc&-HB 166
This is another legislative provision drafted and supported by the Legislative Committee of the
KBA Trust & Estate Section. It was primarily intended to remove a federal estate tax disadvantage
for Kentucky residents. A Kentucky case held that where joint real property is held with rights of
survivorship, one owner cannot unilaterally transfer his or her share and thereby sever the
survivorship rights. This is contrary to common law in Kentucky and other jurisdictions. The
Kentucky Court felt, however, that co-owners with survivorship rights create those rights as a
mutual promise or bargain to one another and that it is unfair to pennit them to "change the deal"
unilaterally. The common law rule treated the survivorship rights not as inalienable property rights,
but as a convenient way for the owners to designate a beneficiary. The common law view pennits a
tenninally ill co-owner to transfer his or her interest so as to change the "beneficiary" of his or her
part ofthe property.
Apart from the property rights questions, the Kentucky case had unanticipated tax effects. A
subsequent federal case disallowed a disclaimer of jointly owned property for estate tax purposes
because of this Kentucky limitation on severing the tenancy. The federal law was recently changed
to permit disclaimers by ignoring State law restrictions such as Kentucky's. Since this was the
primary focus of the provision, the Section representatives attempted to stop passage of HB 166 to
permit further review. HB 166 passed despite these efforts of its drafters. Personally, however, I
favor the balance struck by the HB 166 as to the non-tax issues. The common law rule that a single
co-owner can sever the survivorship rights unilaterally is restored except for the principal residence
ofspouses.

Litigation Over Inheritanc&-HB 61
This is another legislative provision drafted and supported by the Legislative Committee of the
KBA Trust & Estate Section. There are two distinct sections to the bill. A third section, dealing
with the limitations period for substituting parties in litigation, was stricken from the law at the
drafters' request because the KBA Board of Governors wanted more input from the litigation bar.

HB 61, Section I-Hearing to Determine Interests in Property
KRS 391.050 gives Kentuckians an alternative procedure to an Affidavit of Descent to resolve title
issues. A Kentucky court case (Sirls v. Jordan, 625 S.W.2d 106) held that bona fide purchasers of
real estate took subject to the rights of an undisclosed heir even in light of a proper Affidavit of
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Descent. While title insurance companies offer some protection in this situation, business ventures
will be helped by providing a binding hearing procedure to better protect all the parties to a
transaction. HB 61 adds language expressly providing that the procedure is binding on all parties,
whether known or unknown.

HB 61, Section 2-Limitation of Actions Clarification
Section 2 provides that claims against the personal representative and distributees of a decedent's
estate are barred after two years from the order of discharge of the personal representative except in
cases of fraud. Fraud is well-defined legally. The prior statutory language included an exception for
"misrepresentation, or inadequate disclosure" which was not well defmed and which was too broad.

j

.J

Legal Representatives (Durable Powers of Attomey)-HB 60
This is another legislative provision drafted and supported by the Legislative Committee of the
KBA Trust & Estate Section. Several sections of the bill as drafted were stricken by the House
Judiciary Committee.
With our aging population, durable powers of attorney are becoming an even more important estate
planning tool to guard against temporary or pennanent disability. This bill clarifies current law on
durable powers of attorney and resolves certain related problems.
HB 60 defines a "durable power of attorney" whereas prior law had no defInition. There should be
improved acceptance of Kentucky durable powers because the law not expressly provides that
passage of time does not affect them unless specified in the instrument Resistance by financial
institutions and others to "stale" powers of attorney is a serious problem causing delays and
frustration.
Section I also resolves a conflict between a Living Will and the attorney-in-fact's authority to make medical
decisions. A wife who signed a Living Will stating her "abhorrence for tube feeding" and prohibiting it was
forced onto tube feeding after her husband consented using a power of attorney dated after the Living Will.
He then died and the nursing home refused to remove the feeding tube. Under the new law, a courtappointed fiduciary would be bound by the Living Will. An attorney-in-fact is not expressly bound by a
Living Will, but may be by implication. To be safe, the power of attorney should state that the attorney-infact must follow any Living Will directions.
Some durable powers of attorney are "springing" in that they only become effective if disability actually
occurs. The new law provides a clear definition of disability for the limited purpose of effectiveness of the
power where the document fails to do s~a failure common in ,short-form powers.
HB 60 should also encourage people to act as attorneys-in-fact by offering them and third parties legal
protection if they act without notification of termination of the power of attorney by death or revocation.
This will simplify the process for things like real estate closing involving the use of powers ofattorney.
The parts of HB 60 stricken by the House Judiciary Committee would have resolved issues arising when a
court appoints a guardian or conservator while an agent is acting under a durable power of attorney. The
stricken language would have expressly permitted nomination of a guardian or conservator within a durable
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power of attorney, and would have permitted the attorney-in-fact to continue to serve, accounting to the
court-appointed fiduciary who could revoke or amend the power of attorney. In the absence of a nomination
by the disabled person, the attorney-in-fact would have been first in line for appointment as court-appointed
fiduciary absent good cause. Since these parts of the bill are not part of the new law, case law permits a
court to override the attorney-in-fact choice ofthe disabled person. Hopefully, however, judges will exercise
their discretion reasonably, since they must still "give due respect" under KRS 387.300 to the attorney-infact in picking a fiduciary.

r
r
r

r

r
r
r
r

r
r
r
r
r

r
r
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HOUSE BILL 60

Kentucky General Assembly
1998 Regular Session
AN ACT relating to legal representatives.

...

Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
SECTION 1. A NEW SECTION OF KRS 311.621 TO 311.643 IS CREATEDTO
READ AS FOLLOWS:

If. following the execution of an advance directive under KRS 311.623. a court of the
grantor's principal domicile appoints a fiduciary charged with the care and protection
of the grantor's person. the fiduciary shall be bound by the terms of the grantor's
advance directive. If the advance directive designates a surrogate to make health care

J

decisions for the grantor. the surrogate may continue to act.
Section 2. KRS 386.093 is amended to read as follows:
(J)

As used in this section. "durable power of attorney" means a power ofattorngy
by which a principal designates another as the principal's attorngy in fact in
writing and the writing contains the words. "This power ofattorngy shall not be .

J

affected by subsequent disability or incapacity oUhe principal. or lapse oftime".
or "This power of attorney shall become effective upon the disability or
incapacity of the principal". or simIlar words showing the intent ofthe principal
that the authority conferred shall be exercisable notwithstanding the principal's
subsequent disability or incapacity. and.· unless it states a time of termination.
notwithstanding the lapse oftime since the execution oUhe instrument.
(2)

-

All acts done by an attorngy in fact under a durable power ofattorney during any
period of disability or incapacity ofthe principal have the same e[fect and inure
to the benefit of and bind the principal and the principal's successors in interest
as ifthe principal were competent and not disabled. Unless the instrument states

.J

a time of termination. the power is exercisable notwithstanding the lapse of time
since the execution oUhe instrument.
(3)

The death ofa principal who has executed a written power orattorney. durable or
otherwise. does not revoke or terminate the agency as to the attorney in fact or
Page I of4
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other person, who. without actual knowledge o(the death o(the principal. acts in
good faith under the power. Any action so taken, unless otherwise invalid or

r

unenforceable, binds successors in interest o(the principal.

,

r

(4)

power of attorney that is not a durable power does not revoke or terminate the

r

r
r
r
r

r
r

r
r
r

r
r
r
f

r

The disabilitv or incapacitv oUhe principal
who has previously
e.ucuted a written
.
.

ageney as to the attorney in fact or other person, who, without actual knowledge
ofthe disability or incapacity ofthe principal, acts in good faith under the power.
Any action so taken. unless otherwise invalid or unenforceable. binds the
principal and the prinCipal's successors in interest.
(5)

I(the power ofattorney is to become effective upon the disability or incapacity of
the principal, the principal may specify the conditions under which the power is
to become effective and may designate the person. persons. or institution
responsible for making the determination of disability or incapacity. If the
principal fails to so specify, the power shall become e(fective upon a written
determination by two

(2)

physicians that the principal is unable, by reason of

physical or mental disability. to p;udently manage or care for the principal's
person or property, which written determination shall be conclusive proof of the
attorney in fact's power to act pursuant to the power of attorney. The two (2)
physicians making the determination shall be licensed to practice medicine[\Vhen
a priacipal elesigaates another his attorney ia fact or agent by a power of attorney ia
writing aBel the vYriting coataias the worels "This power of attorney shall Hot be
affecteel by the elisabilit)' of the principal," or "This power of attorney shall become
effective apon the elisability of the priacipal," or similar l,J,'orels showing the iatent of
the principal that the authorit)' conferreel shall be exercisable notv.1thstaneling his
elisability, thea the amhority of the attorney ia fact or agent is exercisable by him as
provieleel ia the power on behalf of the principal eotwithstaBelieg later elisability or
iecapacit)' of the principal at law or later oocertaiety as to whether the priecipal is
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dead or alive. All aets done ay the attorney in faet or agent, p\:H'saant to the po-wer
dwg afty period of disaaility or

in~ompetense or

l:lflsertainty as to whether the

prineipal is dead or alive, have the same effeet and in\:H'e to the aenefit of and aind
the prineipal or his heirs, devisees ~d personal representative as if the prinsij>al
were alive, eompetent and not disaaled. If a fidaeiary is thereafter appointed ay the
eowt fer the prineipal the por.ver of the attorney in faet shall therel:lpon terminate
aHd he shall aeemmt to the eoart's appointed fiaasiary].
Section 3. KRS 387.530 is amended to read as follows:
(1)

A petition for a determination of partial disability or disability and the appointment

..J

of a limited guardian, guardian, limited conservator, or conservator may be filed by
any interested person or by an individual needing guardianship or conservatorship.
The petition shall set forth the following:
(a)

The name and address of the respondent;

(b)

The date of birth of the respondent, if known;

(c)

The nature and degree of the alleged disability of the respondent;

(d)

The

facts

and

reasons

supporting

the

need

for

guardianship

or

conservatorship;
(e)

A description and approximation of the value of the respondent's financial
resources, including government benefits, insurance entitlements, and

-

anticipated yearly income, if known;
(f)

The names and addresses ofthe respondent's next of kin, ifknown;

(g)

The name and address of the individual or

f~cility,

if any, having custody of

the respondent;

(h)

The name, address and interest of the petitioner;f-anEij

(i)

The name and address of the petitioner's attorney, if any; and

OJ

The name and address ofanv person or entity appointed bv the respondent
as respondent's attorney in fact under a durable power of attorney, as
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defined in subsection CD of Section 2 of this Act. or as respondent's
surrorate to make health care decisions under an advance directive.
(2)

The petition shall be accompanied by a verified application of the person or entity
desiring appointment as limited
conservator. The

applic~tion

g~ardian,

shall state the name, address and qualifications of the

applicant and his relationship to the respondent. If it is propose.d that a standby
limited guardian, guardian, limited conservator, or conservator be designated, the
petition shall also be accompanied by the application of the person or entity desiring
to be so designated. Additional petitions may be filed prior to the date of the
hearing by other persons desiring appointment.

r
r
r

r
r
r
r
r

r

r
r

guardian, limited conservator,or
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HOUSE BILL 61

Kentucku General AssemblY
1998 Regular session
AN ACT relating to civil actions.

Be it enacted by tlte General Assembly oftJ~e Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 1. KRS 391.035 is amended to read as follows:
(1)

It[\\rfiefle~'er] real or personal property passes by the laws of intestate succession,.or

under a will to a beneficiary not named in thefst:tefit will. proceedings may be had in
the District Court to determine the persons entitled to thefst:teflt property.
(2)

(a)

If an estate is in process of administration the executor, administrator1 or any
person claiming an interest in the property may file a motion in the District
Court where admI'nistration is in process. If there is no pending administration
or administration has been dispensed with, any person claiming an interest in
the property may file a motion in the District Court of the county in which the
decedent last resided or:..lt[ ifl tke eveflt] the decedent was not a Kentucky
resident, in the District Court of the county in which the property, ·or the .
greater part thereof, is located;

(b)

The motion shall set forth all of the facts known to the movant relating to the

il

J

matter, including the names, ages:. and addresses of all persons who are or may
be entitled to share in thefst:teflt property and their relationship to the decedent
or to the class of beneficiaries entitled to share. The motion shall also describe
the property under consideration and an estimate of its value;
(c)

The motion shall be served in a manner authorized by the Rules of Civil
Procedure for the initiation of a civiraction and shall set forth the place and
time:. ffiwhich shall not be less than twenty (20) days from the date of
service:.ffi when the motion will come on for hearing.

J

(3)' Upon the hearing on the motion any person claiming an interest in the property may

introduce proof in support of his claim and the court may entertain the admission of
any other relevant evidence to aid the court in determining the persons entitled to
share in the property.
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(4)

agesJ, and addresses of the persons

en~itled

to share in the property are set forth and

the proportionate interest of each. The ;udgment shall be conclusive evidence of

r

r

After hearing all the evidence the court shall enter judgment in which the names,

the facts determined therein as against all parties. whether. known or unknown.
to the proceeding.
(5)

In a case where some or all of the property is real property[estate] located in this

r

stateJ, a certified copy of the judgment shall be recorded in the office of the

r

judgment shall be conclusive evitlence of the facts determined therein as against

r
r

r
r
r
r
r

r
r

r
r
r
r

appropriate county clerk in lieu of the affidavit required by KRS 382.120. The

all parties. whether known or unknown. to the proceeding.
(6)

Any party may at any time prior to judgment institute an adversary proceeding in
Circuit Court pursuant to KRS 24A.120(2).

(7)

Any aggrieved party may no later than thirty (30) days from the date of the·
judgment, institute an adversary proceeding in Circuit Court pursuant to KRS
24A.120(2).

(8)

Any unknown defendants before the court by constructive service alone shall be
entitled to the protection afforded by Civil Rule 4.11.

(9)

No proceedings under this section shall be conducted by or before a commissioner of
the District Court.
Section 2. KRS 396.205 is amended to read as follows:

Notwithstanding any other statute to the contrary. no cause of action on any claim not
otherwise barred by the provisions ofKRS 396.011 and subsection (1) ofKRS 396.055,
or any other applicable statute of limitations, shall be brought against the personal
representative or against any distributee after the expiration of two (2) years from the date
of the order of discharge of the personal representative. The foregoing limitation shall not
preclude an action by any claimant against the personal representative or any distributee
for fraud[. misrepreseAtatioA or iAadequate disclosure related to tke settiemeAt of tke
decedeflt's estate].
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HOUSE BILL 165
Kentucky General Assemblu
1998 Regular session

j

AN ACT relating to disposition of property at death.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
SECTION 1.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 397 IS CREATED :f0

READ AS FOLLOWS:

As used in this chapter. unless the context requires otherwise:
(J)

-

"Co-owners with right ofsurvivorship" means and includes joint tenants. tenants
bv the entireties. and other co-owners of property or accounts held under
circumstances that entitle one (1) or more to the whole oUhe property or account
on the death oUhe other or others:

(2)

J

"Governing instrument" means a deed. will. trust. insurance or annuity policy,
account with payment on death (POD) designation. pension. profit-sharing.
retirement. or similar benefit plan. instrument creating or exercising a power of
appointment or a power of attorney, or a donative. appointive. or nominative

.J

instrument ofany other type; and
(3)

"Payor" means a trustee. insurer. business entity. employer. government.
governmental agency, subdivision. or instrumentality, or any other person
authorized or obligated by law or a governing instrument to make payments.
SECTION 2.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 397 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:

-

Except as provided in Section 6 of this Act. if the title to property, the devolution of
property. the right to elect an interest in property. or the right to exempt property.
homestead. or family allowance depends upon an individual's survivorship oOhe death
of another individual. an individual who is not established by clear and convincing
evidence to have survived the other individual by one hundred and twenty (120) hours
is deemed to have predeceased tire other individual. This section shall not apply if its
application would result in a taking oUntestate estate by the state.
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SECTION 3.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 397 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:

r

Except as provided in Section 6 of this Act, for purposes of a donative provision ora

r

evidence to have survived an event, including the death of another individual, bv one

r

r
r

governing instrument, an individual who. is not established bv clear and convincing

hundred and twenty 020} hours is deemed to have predeceased the event.
SECTION 4.

READ AS FOLLOWS:

Except as provided in Sectioh 6 o(this Act:
0)

and twenty (120) hours, one-half(1a) oOhe property shall pass as ifone

r

r
r
r

co-

(1)

had

had survived by one hundred and twenty (120) hours.
(2)

If there are more than two

(2)

co-owners and it is not established by clear and

convincing evidence tltat at least one (n of them survived the others by one
hundred and twent}' (120) hours, the property shall pass in the proportion that

r
r
r
r

(2)

survived bv one hundred and twenty (120) hours and one-half(1a} as i(the other

r

r

lfit is not established bv clear and convincing evidence that one (1) oftwo

owners with right of survivorship survived the other co-owner bv one hundred

r
r

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 397 IS CREATED TO

each bears to the whole number ofco-owners.
SECTION 5.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 397 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:

In addition to the rules ofevidence in courts ofgeneral jurisdiction, for the purposes or
Sections 1 to 7 o(this Act only, the following rules relating to a determination ofdeath
and status shall apply:
0)

Death shall be deemed to occur when the requirements of KRS 446.400 have
been met.

(2)

A certified or authenticated copy ofa death certificate purporting to be issued by
an official or agency oOhe place where the death purportedly occurred shall be
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prima facie evidence ofthe fact. place. date. and time of death and the identity of
the decedent.
(3)

A certified or authenticated

COPy

-

of any record or report of a governmental

agency. domestic or foreign. that an ~ndividual is missing, detained. dead. or alil!e
shall be prima facie evidence of the status and of the dates. circumstances. and
places disclosed
by the record
.
. or report. .
(4)

In the absence ofprima facie evidence ofdeath under subsection

(2)

or (3) oUhis

section. the fact of death shall be established bv clear and convincing evidence.
including circumstantial evidence.
(5)

An individual whose death is not established under subsection

(2). (3).

this section and who is absent for a continuous period ofseven

(7)

or

(4)

-

of

years. during

j

4

which the individual has not been heard fro';". and whose absence is not
satisfactorily explained after diligent search or inquiry. shall be presumed dead.
His or her death shall be presumed to have occurred at the

~nd

of the period

unless there is sufficient evidence for determining that death occurred earlier.
(6)

In the absence of evidence disputing the time of death stipulated on a document
described in subsection
subsection

(2)

or

(3)

(2)

or

(3)

of this section. a document described in

of this section that stipulates a time of death one hundred

and twenty OlO) hours or more after the time of death of another individual.
however the time of death of the other individual is determined. establishes by
clear and convincing evidence that the individual survived the other individual by
one hundred and twenty 02D) hours.
SECTION 6.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 397 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:

Survival by one hundred and twenty OlO) hours is not required if:
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0)

(2)

lan:uage

dealing

explicitlv

with

The governing instrument expressly indicates that an individ,!al is not requireito
survive an event. including the death of another individual. bv any specified
period or expressly requires the individual to survive the event for a stated period.
but survival ofthe event or the specified period shall be established by clear and

,r

r

instrument contains

operable under the facts ofthe case;

r
r
r

governing

simultaneous deaths or deaths in a common disaster and that language is

r

r

The

convincing evidence;
(3)

The imposition ofa one hundred and twenty

(20)

hour requirement of survival

would cause a nonvested property interest or a power ofappointment to be invalid
under the Rule Against Perpetuities. but survival shall be established by clear and
convincing evidence; or
(4)

The application ofa one hundred and twenty (20) hour requirement to multiple
governing instruments would result in an unintentional failure or duplication of

adisposition. but survival shall be established by clear and convincing evidence.

r
r

r
r
r
r
r

SECTION 7.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 397 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:

0)

(a)

A payor or other third party shall not be liable for havin: made a payment
or transferred an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary
designated in a governin: instrument who. under this chapter. is not
entitled to the payment or item of propertv, or for having taken any other
action in good faith reliance on the beneficiary's apparent entitlement
under the terms ofthe governing instrument. before tlte payor or other third
party received written notice of a claimed lack of entitlement under this
chapter. A payor or other third party shall be liable for a pavment made or
other action taken aOer the pavor or other third party received written
notice ofa claimed lack ofentitlement under this chapter.

r
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fb)

Written notice ofa claimed lack of entitlement under paragraph fa) of this
subsection shall be mailed to the payor's or other third party's main office
or home by registered or certified mail. return receipt requested, or served
upon the payor or other third party in the same

manne~ as

a summons in ·a

civil action. Upon receipt of written notice of a claimed lack of entitlement
under this chapter. a payor or other third party shall pay any amount owed.
or transfer or deposit any item of property held by it. to or with the court

-

-

-

having jurisdiction of the probate proceedings related to the decedent's
estate, or if no proceedings have been commenced. to or with the court
having jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to the decedent's estate
located in the county of the decedent's residence, The court shall hold the
funds or item of property and. upon its determination under this chapter,
shall order disbursement in accordance with the determination. Payments.
transfers. or deposits made to or with the court shall discharge the payor or
other third party from all claims for the value ofamounts paid to or items of
property transferred to or deposited with the court.
(2)

A person who purchases property for value and without notice. or who receives a
payment or other item of property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally
enforceable obligation. shall not be obligated under this chapter to return the

...

-

payment, item ofproperty, or benefit and shall not be liable under this chapter for
the amount ofthe pal'ment or the value oft/Ie item of property or benefit, But a
person who. not for value, receives a payment, item of property. or any other
benefit to which the person is not entitled under this chapter shall be obligated to
return the payment, item of property. or benefit or shall be personallv liable for
the amount of the payment ofthe value of the item of property or benefit. to the
person who is entitled to it under this chapter,
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r

(3)

respect to a payment. an item of property. or any other benefit covered by this

r

chapter. a person who. not for value. receives the payment. item of property; or
any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this chapter shall-be

r
r

r
r
r
,

r
r

r

r

If this chapter. or any part of this chapter. is preempted by federal law with

obligated to return the payment. item ofproperty, or benefit or shall be personally
liable for the amount of tlte payment or the value of the item of property or
benefit. to the person who would have been entitled to it were this chapter. or part
oOhis chapter, not preempted.
SECTION 8.

READ AS FOLLOWS:

This chapter shall be applied and construed to eQ'ectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the law with respect to the subject oOhis chapter among states enacting it.
SECTION 9.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 397 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:

This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (199]).
SECTION 10.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 394 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:

(1)

A wm may validly transfer property to the trustee ofa trust:
fa)

r

Established during the testator's lifetime by the testator, by the testator and
one

(1)

or more other persons, or by one

(1)

or more other persons,

including a funded or unfunded lite insurance trust, although one

r

r

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 397 IS CREATED TO

(J)

or

more persons other than the trustee "ave reserved any or all rights of
ownership oUhe insurance contracts; or
fb)

Established at the testator's death by the testator's transfer to the trustee, if

r

the trust is identified in the testator's wm and its terms are set forth in a

r

after the execution oOhe testator's wm or in another individual's wm ifthat

r
r

written instrument. other than a wm. executed before. concurrently with. or
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other individual has predeceased the testator. regardless of the existence.
size. or character ofthe corpus ofthe trust.
(2)

A transfer referred to in subsection

(n

o(this section shall not be invalid because

the trust is amendable or revocable. or because the trust was amended after the

-

-

execution oft/Ie will or the testator's death.
(3)

Unless the testator's will provides otherwise. property transferred to a trust in
accordance with subsection

of this section shall not be held under a

(J)

testamentary trust ofthe testator but shall become a part ofthe trust to which it is
transferred. The property shall be administered and disposed of in accordance
with the provisions of the governing instrument setting fortlt the terms of the
trust. including any amendments to it made before or after tlte testator's death.
(4)

-

-

Unless the testator's will provides otherwise. a revocation or termination of the
trust before the testator's death shall cause the devise or bequest to lapse.

(5)

This section shall be effective for any devise or bequest made by wills ofdecedents
dying on or after the e(fective date ofthis Act.

(6)

This section shall be construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform
the law ofthose states that enact it.

(7)

This section may be cited as the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act.
Section 11. KRS 391.360 is amended to read as follows:

(1)

A written provision for a nonprobate transfer on death[.\r1y of the follo\¥i:ng

-

provisioes] in an insurance policy, contract of employment, bond, mortgage,
promissory note, certified or uncertified securitv account agreement, custodial

agreement. deposit agreement, compensation plan. pension plan, individual
retirement plan. employee benefit plan. trust[ agreement], conveyance. deed of
gift. marital property agreement. orf-aerl other written instrument of a similar
nature is[effeetive as a eoHtraet, gift, eoeveyanee, or trust is deemed to eel

-

nontestamentary. These written provisions shall include. but not be limited to,
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r
written provisions which provide that:[, and

r

(a)

same time. or atterf-as] the instrument is execute!l[ or subsequeatly];

(b)

[That any ]Money due or to become due under the instrument shall cease to be
payable in the event of the death of the promisee or the promissor before
payment or demand; or

(c)

r

r

paid after the decedent'sf-his} death to. a

instrument or in a separate writing, including a will, executed before. at the

r

r

b~

person whom[ designated by] the decedent designatesf--iaj either in the

r
r

r
r
r

[That ]Money or other benefits[ theretofore] due to, controlled1 or owned by' a
decedent before death shall

r

r

391.300 to 391.355 does not

im:alidate the instrument or any provision;]

r

r
r
r
r
r

~S

[That ]Any property. controlled bv or owned bv the decedent before death.
which is the subject of the instrument shall pass to a personE designated by]
the decedent desifnatesf-in] either in the instrument or in a separate writing,
including a will, executed before. at the same time. or aOerf-as] the
instrument is executedE or subsequently].

(2)

[Nothing in ]This section shall not limitE limits] the rights of creditors under other
laws of this state.
Section 12. The following KRS sections are repealed:

394.075 Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act.
397.010 No sufficient evidence of survivorship.
397.020 Survival of beneficiaries.
397.030 Joint tenants or tenants by the entirety.
397.040 Insurance policies.
397.050 Chapter not retroactive.
397.060 Chapter does not apply if decedent provides otherwise.
397.070 Uniformity of interpretation.
397.080 Short title.
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Section 13. An act done before this Act's effective date in any proceeding and any
accrued right shall not be impaired by Sections 1 to 7 of this Act. If a right is acquired,
extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period of time that ·has
commenced to run by the provisions of ~y statute before this Act's effective date, the

...

-

provisions shall remain in force with respe.ct to that right, notwithstanding Sections 1 to 7
of this Act.
Any rule of construction or presumption provided in Sections 1 to 7 of this Act
shall not apply to instruments executed and multiple-party accoWlts opened before this
Act's effective date.
The provisions of Sections 1 to 7 of this Act shall not apply to persons who die
prior to the effective date of this Act.

;i!

-
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HOUSE BILL 166
Kentucku General Assemblu
1998 Regular session

AN ACT relating to property.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 1. KRS 381.120 is amended to read as follows:
Joint tenants may be compelled to make partition, and when a joint tenant dies, the joint
.

'.

~

tenant'sflHsl part of the joint estate, real or personal, shall descend to the joint
tenant'sflHsl heirs, or pass by devise, or go to the joint tenant'sflHs} personal

r

representative, subject to debts, curtesy, dower!. or distribution.

r

ill KRS 381.120 shall not apply to any estate which joint tenants hold as executors or

Section 2. KRS 381.130 is amended to read as follows:

trustees, nor, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section. to an estate

r

r
r

,,.

conveyed or devised to persons in their own right, when it manifestly appears, from
the tenor of the instrument, that it was intended that the part of the one dying should
belong to the others, neither shall it affect the mode of proceeding on any joint .
contract or judgment.
(2)

fa)

r

r
r

Except as provided in paragraph fb) of this subsection. one

(J)

or

more joint tenants of real property may partition their interest in the
real property during their lifetime by deed or other instrument.

r
r
r
r
r

1.

2.

The deed or other instrument shall express the intent of the joint
tenant to partition the joint tenant's interest in the real property and
shall be recorded at the office ofthe county clerk in the county where·
the real property or any portion-ofthe real property is located.

3.

The partitioning shall be effective at the time the deed or other
instrument is recorded.

fb)

Residential real property that is owned exclusively by husband and wife as
joint tenants with a right ofsurvivorship and actually occupied by them as a
principal residence shall not be partitioned as provided in paragraph fa) of
this subsection.
Page I
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The deed or other instrument shall convert the partitioning joint tenant's
interest in the real property into a tenanc;y in common with the remaining
joint tenants. [(there are two (2) or more nonpartitioning joint tenants.·the
interests ofthe nonpartitioning. joint tenants in relation to each other shall
be governed pursuant to the terms oOhe instrument creating the interest.

,

Section 3. KRS 394.610 is amended to read as follows:

0)

As used in this section. the "legal representative ofa living person" includes the
person's conservator. limited conservator. guardian. limited guardian. and
attorng-in-fact.

ill A living person, or the legal representative of a living[an ineapaeitated or proteeted]

-

person, who is an heir, next of kin, devisee, legatee, joint tenant. person succeeding
to a disclaimed interest, beneficiary under a testamentary instrument, or appointee
under a power of appointment exercised by a testamentary instrument, may disclaim
in whole or in part the right of succession to any property or interest therein,
including a future interest, by filing a written disclaimer under. KRS 394.610 to

-

-

394.670. The right to disclaim shall survive the death of the person having it and
may be exercised by the personal representative of such person's estate without

authorization of the court having jurisdiction over the estate of the person. The

-

instrwnent shall::

@lftBl

Describe the property or interest disclaimedifd

{Q!~

Declare the disclaimer and extent thereofifd and
Be signed by the disclaimant.

(3)

No disclaimer by a living person's legal representative. except for the person's
attorng-in-fact. shall be made unless the court having jurisdiction of the estate
ofthe disabled. incapacitated. or protected person has authorized the disclaimer.
No disclaimer by the person's attorney-in-fact shall be made unless the
instrument governing the attornev-in-(act's authority expressly authorizes a
disclaimer.
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HOUSE BILL 313
Kentucku General Assembly
1998 Regular session

r

r
r
r

r
r
r

r
r
r
r
r

r
r

AN ACT relating to wills.

Be i1 enacted by tlte General Assembly oftlte Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 1. KRS 394.090 is amended to read as follows:
A[E,>'ery] will shall not be revoked by the marriage of the person who made the will£;,
exeept:
(1)

A will made in exereise of a power of appointment '.vileR the estate thereby
appointed woald not, in deRulit of saeh appointment, pass to the heir, personal
representathte, or next of kin of the person who made the will;

(2)

A will that expressly PIT9¥ides that it is inteRded that a sabsequeRt marriage shall
not revoke the will;

(3)

A '.tAll that expressly provides for the person who later beeomes the spouse of the
deeeased and is married to the testator OR the date of death].
Section 2. KRS 394.080 is amended to read as follows:

No will or codicil, or any part thereof, shall be revoked, except:
(1){ As provided iR KRS 394.090;
~

By subsequent will or codicil;

m~

By some writing declaring an intention to revoke the \\ill or codicil, and

executed in the mann~r in which a will is required to be executed; or

W{(4)1

By the person who made the will, or some person in his presence and by his

direction, cutting, tearing, burning, obliterating, canceling, or destroying the will or
codicil, or the signature thereto, with the intent to revoke.

r

r

Page I of I

r
r

A-267

HOUSE BILL 516 (Excerpt)
Kentucky General Assemblu
1998 Regular session
- amenclln, KRS 287.235 - Common Trust Fund Not Separate Entity For Tax Purposes-

Section 31. KRS 287.235 is amended to read as follows:

-

ill Common trust funds shall not be considered as an entity for income or other ta,,<
purposes, nor shall investment in such fund make taxable any property which is
otherwise exempt therefrom; and for purposes of taxation, the status of the common
trust fund and of each participant therein shall be determined as though there were
no common fund and as though each participant was the owner of its proportionate
share of every asset held in the common fund. The bank or trust company

-

maintaining said fund shall file a report of said fund with the property valuation
administrator as of the ad valorem ta,,< date and shall file annually such income tax
information as may be required by the Revenue Cabinet.
(2)

'Notwithstanding subsection OJ of this section. if a common trust fund transfers

-

substantially all of its assets to one 0) or more regulated investment companies
in exchange solely (or stock in the company or companies to which such assets·
are transferred and such stock is distributed by sue" common trust fund to the
participants in such common trust fund in a transaction H,'hic" would qualify
under Section 5840,) ofthe Internal Revenue Code of1986. as amended. for the

-

nonrecognition of gain or loss of such transfer or distribution bi' the common
trust fund. then· no gain or loss shall be recognized for Kentucky income tax
purposes by the common trust fund by reason ofsucl, transfer or distribution or
by the participants in such common trust fund by reason ofsuch e:cchange.
Section 32. The following KRS sections are repealed:

-

287.061 Application for approval-- Hearing.
287.205 When national bank may act as fiduciary.
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HOUSE BILL 708
Kentucku General Assemblu
1998 Regular session

AN ACT relating to the use of information technology.
Be it enacted by the GeneralAssembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:

SECTION 1. KRS CHAPTER 369 IS HEREBY ESTABLISHED AND A NEW
SECTION CREATED TO READ AS FOLLO\VS:
Sections 1 to 3 of this Act shall be construed consistent with what is commercially
reasonable under the circumstances and to effectuate the following~ purposes:
(1)

To facilitate and promote on-line state government services;

0)

To facilitate the flow of authorized electronic records within state government,
between the public and private sectors, and between private sector entities,' and

r

(3)

r

READ AS FOLLOWS:

r
r
r
r

r
r

r
r
r

r

To promote public confidence in the integrity and reliability ofelectronic records.

SECTION 2.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 369 IS CREATED TO

For purposes of Sections 1 to 3 of this Act, unless the context expressly requires.
otherwise:
(1)

"Electronic" means relating to or by means of electrical. digital. magnetic.
optical, electromagnetic. or any other form ofteclmologv that entails capabilities
similar to these technologies:

(2)

"Electronic record" means any digital representation of data or information
generated, communicated. received. or stored by electronic means for use in an
information system or for transmission from one information svstem to another,'

(3)

-

"Electronic signature" means an electronic identifier whose use is intended by
the person using it to have the same force and effect as tlte use of a manual
signature and containing the following characteristics:
fa)

It is unique to the person using it.'

fb)

It is capable of verification: and

fd

It is under the sole control ofthe person using it: and
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(4)

"Record" means information that is inscribed, stored, or otherwise fL'Ced on a
tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is
retrievable in perceivable [orm.

SECTION 3.

A NEW SECTION .OF KRS CHAPTER 369 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

Sections ]·to 3 ofthis Act do not apply to:
fa)

Anv situation in which' their application would be inconsistent with the
express intent oUhe parties to a written document;

fb)

-

-

-

Any legal requirement governing the creation or e.'Cecution o[any document
that serves to convey rights and obligations under a will or trllst;

fd

Any legal requirement governing the conveyance of any interest in real
property,·

fd)

Any legal requirement governing the creation or transfer of an v negotiable
instrument or any instrument establishing title or an interest in title.

(2)

Nothing in Sections 1 to 3 ofthis Act shall be construed to:
fa)

Require a recipient or any other person asked to reb; on an electronic

-

-

record or an electronic signature to accept the electronic record or
electronic signature or to respond to or act upon an electronic record or

...
j

electronic signature, unless the parties have freely and voluntarily agreed to
the lise ofan electronic record or electronic signature prior to transmission;
fb)

Preclude the recipient of an electronic record or an electronic signature
from establishing the conditions under which the recipient will accept the
electronic record or electronic signature, unless the parties have freely and
voluntarily agreed to the conditions under which the recipient would accept
the electronic record or electronic signature prior to transmission,· or

fc)

Require a state or local governmental entity or agency to accept an

-

electronic record or electronic signature, unless the entity or agency has
Page2of7
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agreed to accept the electronic record or electronic signature in advance of
transmission and the manner and medium of transmission is acceptable to
the entity or agency.
If all parties to a private sector transaction agree to tlte llse of an electronic
record or an electronic signature. or. in dealings wit" a state or local
govemmental entity or agency. if that entity or agency agrees to accept an
electronic record or an electronic signature.'
fa)

Information. records. and electronic signatures shall not be denied legal
effect. validity. or enforceability solelv on the grounds tltat they are in
electronic. duplicate. or imaged form.

fb)

Where a statute or administrative refiulation requires a manual signature.
or provides for certain consequences if a document is not manually signed.
an electronic sifinature shall have the same force and effect as the use ofa .
manual signature.

fd

Where a statute or administrative regulation requires information to be
"written." or "in writing," or provides for certain consequences ifit is not.
that statute or administrative regulation shall be satisfied bv an electronic
record.

fd)

Where a statute or administrative regulation requires information to be
presented or retained in its original form. or provides consequences for the
information not being presented or retained in its original form. that statute
or administrative regulation shall be satisfied by an electronic record if
there exists reliable assurance as to the intefiriry of the data or the
information from the time when it was first generated to its final form. as
an electronic record or otherwise.

Section 4. KRS 61.950 is amended to read as follows:
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(1)

The commission shall meet at least four (4) times each year and report its findings
no less than semiannually to the Legislative Research Commission and the
Governor. All reports of the commission shall be made available to the general
public. In addition, the commission, upon
the call of its officers,
.
. may hold meetings

-

at any time it deems necessary.
(2)

The commission's roles and duties shall include the following:
(a)

Providing overall leadership, policy direction, strategic planning, and

...
I

coordination of information resources management for the executive branch
of state government and public universities;
(b)

Formulation of a five (5) year statewide information resources management
plan, to be updated every two (2) years, from long-range information
resources management plans submitted by agencies of the executive branch,
including the public universities, as the commission may require;

(c)

Defining, maintaining, and publishing a timely information resources
management architecture relating to the management of information resources
by executive branch state agencies, and implementing processes and
procedures to ensure compliance with the information resources management
architecture;

(d)

Coordinating, through policy and interagency agreements and monitoring, an

-

appropriate program of training and education for executive branch state and .
local agencies regarding strategic iiUormation systems planning, and the
selection and use of information technologies to facilitate effective
information resources management, appropriate employee skill building, and
career development;
(e)

Promoting executive level awareness, support, and involvement with
information resources management throughout the executive branch of

...

government;

\
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r
r
r

(0

agency five (5) year strategic infonnation resources plans, and forwarding
those plans with findings and recommendations to the agency head, the
Governor's Office for Policy

r
r
r

r

an~

Management, and the Legislative Research

Commission for use during the preparation and enactment of the biennial
budget. Commission review shall be based upon the extent to which the plan
is compliant with statewide infonnation resources standards, policies and
guidelines; is suited to supporting the mission of the agency; and furthers
implementation

r
r
r

Reviewing and approving or disapproving, in whole or part, executive branch

ot statewide initiatives identified in the statewide

plan. As

part of the review process, the commission shall monitor and evaluate the
progress of the current plan and the executive branch agency's use of
infonnation technologies and shall include its assessment of these activities in
the findings and recommendations;
(g)

Identifying and assessing opportunities for multiagency development and use
of infonnation resources, or the development of executive branch agency

r

projects \vhich would improve the quality and availability of infonnation.

r
r

branch agencies to evaluate the opportunities as alternatives to their own

r
r
r

r
r

r

When identifying these opportunities the commission may require executive

plans, and may forward these fmdings as provided in paragraph (0 of this
subsection;
(h)

Maintaining supportive relationship and coordinating activities \\ith the
adjunct Communications Advisory Council provided for in KRS 61.955 and
61.957, and the Geographic Infonnation Advisory Council established by
Executive Order 92-1049, October I, 1992, as necessary to ensure
coordination and implementation of unified, comprehensive, statewide
strategies involved with, or affected by, infonnation technology;
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....
(i)

Establishing and maintaining relationships with other planning organizations
as necessary to ensure coordination and implementation of comprehensive
statewide strategies involved with, or affected by, information technology;

(j)

Reviewing and recommending to the Department of Personnel and other
associated agencies appropriate job classifications related to information
resources management, to include bo.th technical and managerial positions;

(k)

Establishing and maintaining an information dissemination service or
clearinghouse for:

1.

-

Current practices of state agencies regarding information resources
management;

(1)

2.

Emerging and advancing information resources technologies;

3.

Information resources vendor performance in the public sector;

4.

Technical resources in the Commonwealth; and

5.

Elements of the information resources management architecture;

Establishing and maintaining research and development capacity for
beneficial applications of information resources technology for the state's
J

j

public sector, which includes:

..J

1.

-

Conducting research on current and emerging information resources

t

,I

technologies and their potential to enhance govenunental services; and
2.

Sponsoring and evaluating pilot projects to assist with the successful

J

adoption by other state agencies;
(m) Fostering and encouraging the interest and cooperation of the state
information resources

technology

community

for

improvement

and

enhancement of public services delivery;
(n)

Serving as catalyst for information technology _advancements in the public
sector;
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r
r

(0)

machine readable public

(p)

r

Recommending procedures and legislation to ens,:re the privacy .of

individual privacy.
(3)

Nothing in KRS 61.940, 61.945, or this section shall be construed to alter .or
diminish the provi$ions of KRS 171.410 to 171.740 or the authority conveyed by
these statutes to the Archives and Records Commission and the Department for
Libraries and Archives.

(4)

The commission may promulgate necessary administrative regulations for the .
furtherance of this section. including administrative regulations establishing

electronic signature standards ror the executive branch orstate government.
(5)

The commission may establish committees or work groups composed of
commission and noncommission members as necessary to advise the commission in

r
r
r

by state agencies, citizens, and businesses;

individuals, with particular emphasis on the potential for InvasIon of

r
r

record~

and

r

r
r

Recommending procedures and legislation to improve the accessibility of

carrying out its responsibilities, duties, and powers. Persons connected with the
automated information and communications resources industries, as specified in
KRS 61.945, may panicipate on committees or work groups, but shall not have a
vote.
(6)

The commission may adopt bylaws and operating policies necessary for its efficient
and effective operation.

r

r
r

r
r
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Explanation Of This Course Outline
This course outline contains excerpts from the pre-publication manuscript of a book
being published by the RIA Group of Warren. Gorham & Lamont later this year (1998).
The title of the book will be "Estate Taxation Of Farms and Other Qualified
Family-Owned Businesses Under Sections 2032A and 2057." The authors are
Robert M. Bellatti and his associate. Shari L. West.
AIl references in the course outline are to this book unless otherwise specifically stated.
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THE ESTATE TAX DEDUCTION FOR QUALIFIED
FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESS INTERESTS: SECTION 2057
Robert M. Bellatti
Bellatti & Barton
Springfield, Illinois
A.

What is §2057?
1.

It Replaces §2033A Retroactively to

1, 1998

The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ("1997 Act") added
§2033A to the Internal Revenue Code, effective for estates of
decedents dying after December 31, 1997. The Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 ("1998 Act") was
agreed to by the Conference Committee on June 24, 1998 and passed
by the House of Representatives on June 25, 1998. It is expected
that the Senate will pass the conference bill in the week of July
6 and that the President will sign it a few days thereafter. The
1998 Act (H.R. 2676) contains technical corrections to the 1997
Act, and one of those "technical corrections" repeals §2033A
retroactively so that it will not have ever been in effect, and
replaces it with new §2057 of the Internal Revenue Code, effective for estates of decedents dying after December 31, 1997.
2.

§2057 is

Ve~

Similar to §2033A

§2033A provided for an estate tax value exclusion for
certain Qualified Family-Owned Business Interests ("QFOBI's").
§2057 instead provides an estate tax deduction for those QFOBI's
(see §2057(a)(1». There are some very important ramifications
from changing the §2033A value exclusion to a §2057 deduction,
but the two sections are otherwise almost identical, except for
several other "technical corrections" made to §2033A when it was
converted to §2057 by the 1998 Act.
3.

Maximum §2057 Deduction Fixed At $675,000

One of the controversial and complicated aspects of the
§2033A value exclusion was the variable dollar amount limitation
on the maximum exclusion, depending upon the year of the decedent's death. That limitation was designed so that the combined
maximum amount of the §2010 applicable exclusion amount and the
§2033A exclusion would always be $1,300,000, but the §2033A
maximum value exclusion amount declined from $675,000 in 1998 to
$300,000 in 2006 and thereafter, as the §2010 applicable exclusion amount increased from $625,000 in 1998 to $1,000,000 in 2006
and thereafter. This became politically unacceptable when it was
realized after §2033A was enacted that the estate taxes on
.
QFOBI's would actually increase after 1998 as part of the §2033A
value exclusion (saving estate taxes at the estate's top tax rate

r

r
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brackets) was gradually converted into the applicable credit
(saving estate taxes at the estate's bottom tax rate brackets).
§2057 adopted a very simple solution to this "political
problem" by fixing the maximum amount of the §2057 deduction
permanently at $675,000 (see §2057(a)(2», and also fixing the
applicable exclusion amount for estates electing §2057 at
$625,000 (see §2057(a)(3)(A».
The above discussion assumes that an estate electing
§2057 includes QFOBI's in its gross estate having a Chapter 11
value of $675,000 or higher. If the Chapter 11 value of the
QFOBI's is less than $675,000, then the §2057 deduction is limited to the value of the QFOBI's (less than $675,000) and the
estate's applicable exclusion amount is increased by the amount
that the value of the QFOBI's is less than $675,000, but the
applicable exclusion amount cannot exceed what it would be if the
estate had not elected §2057 (see §2057(a)(3)(B».

J

.J

..

For example, if the estate's QFOBI's have a Chapter 11
value of $500,000 and the decedent died in 2003 when the applicable exclusion amount is $700,000, then the applicable exclusion
amount could only be increased from $625,000 to $700,000, even
though $500,000 is $175,000 less than $675,000. However, if that
same decedent had lived another year, then the applicable exclusion amount could be increased from $625,000 by the $175,000
($675,000 - $500,000) amount to $800,000, because in 2004 the
applicable exclusion amount for an estate not electing §2057 will
be $850,000.

J

All of the above discussion assumes that none of the
decedent's applicable exclusion is used on lifetime gifts.

J

4.

Estate Tax Savings From S2057 Election

Since the §2057 value deduction maximum amount is now
fixed at $675,000, this means that at a 55% top estate tax rate
an estate will always be able to reduce estate taxes by $371,250
(55% of $675,000) as a result of the §2057 election, and the
maximum offset reduction in estate tax savings from the reduced
applicable credit will be zero for estates of decedents dying in
1998 and increase to $143,750 for decedents dying in 2006 and
thereafter, meaning that the net maximum §2057 estate tax savings
at a 55% estate tax bracket will decline from $371,250 in 1998 to
$227,500 in 2006 and thereafter, as shown in the following table:

J
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~
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Applicable
Exclusion
Without
S2057

Applicable
Credit
Without
S2057

1998
$ 625,000
650,000
1999
675,000
2000
675,000
2001
700,000
2002
700,000
2003
850,000
2004
950,000
2005
$1,000,000
2006
and after

$ 202,050
211,300
220,550
220,550
229,800
229,800
287,300
326,300
345,800

Year
of
Death

5.

Credit Lost
by §2057
(excess over
$202(050)
$

0
9,250
18,500
18,500
27,750
27,750
85,250
124,250
143,750

Taxes
Saved
Net
by §2057
Taxes
Deduction Saved by
(55%)
S2057
$371,250
371,250
371,250
371,250
371,250
371,250
371,250
371,250
371,250

$371,250
362,000
352,750
352,750
343,500
343,500
286,000
247,000
227,500

Implications For Lifetime Use of Applicable Exclusion
for Gifts

If a decedent has made lifetime taxable gifts of
$1,000,000 using all $1,000,000 of applicable exclusion and
$345,800 of applicable credit in 2006, and then the decedent dies
in 2007 and the estate receives a maximum $675,000 §2057 deduction, the estate will have to pay estate tax on $375,000 of the
lifetime taxable gifts because the estate's applicable exclusion
amount is reduced to $625,000 by the §2057 election, but no
delinquent gift taxes will be owed because of the decedentdonor's use of that $375,000 of applicable exclusion for gift tax
purposes.

if
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ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR S2057
1.

Residency

§2057(b)(l)(A) requires that the decedent must have
been a citizen or resident of the United States on the decedent's
date of death.
2.

Period of OWnership

§2057(b)(l)(D)(i) requires that "during the 8-year
period ending on the date of the decedent's death there have been
periods aggregating 5 years or more during which such interests
were owned by the decedent or a member of the decedent's family".
The reference to "such interests" in §2057(b)(l)(D)(i) must refer
to "the qualified family-owned business interests described in
paragraph (2)" which appears in §2057(b)(l)(C)(i), because that
is the only prior place that the word "interests" is described in
§2057(b)(l). §2057(b)(2) provides that "the qualified familyowned business interests described in this paragraph are the
interests which -

r
r
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(A) are included in determining the value of the
gross estate (without regard to this section), and
(B) are acquired by any qualified heir from, or
passed to any qualified heir from, the decedent (within
the meaning of section 2032A(e)(9»".
a.

§1031 and §1033 Transactions

§2057(i)(3)(J) provides that rules similar to
relating to treatment of replacement property
acquired in §1031 or §1033 transactions shall apply for all
purposes of §2057.
§203~A(e)(14)

§203~A(e)(14) provides that as to any "qualified
replacement property" owned by the decedent at the date of death,
any period during which there was ownership, qualified use, or
material participation with respect to the "replaced property" by
the decedent or any member of the decedent's family shall be
treated as a period during which there was such ownership, use or
material participation (as the case may be) with respect to the
qualified replacement property. §203~A(e)(14)(C)(i) defines
"qualified replacement property" as any real property which is
acquired in an exchange which qualifies under §1031 or the
acquisition of which results in the non-recognition of gain under
§1033, provided that such acquired property is used for the same
qualified use as the replaced property was being used for before
the acquisition. §203~A(e)(14)(C)(ii) defines "replaced property" as being either the property transferred in the exchange
which qualifies under §1031 or the property compulsorily or
involuntarily converted (within the meaning of §1033).
§203~A(e)(14)(B) provides that the "tacking" permitted by
§203~A(e)(14) shall not apply to the extent that the fair market
value of the qualified replacement property (as of the date of
its acquisition) exceeds the fair market value of the replaced
property (as of the date of its disposition).

...

In summary, the 5 out of 8 year prior to death ownership requirement will not disqualify assets acquired in §1031 or
§1033 transactions in the 8 year period prior to death, if the
"tacking" permitted by §2057(i)(3)(J) results in satisfaction of
the 5 out of 8 year prior to death ownership requirement.
b.

COkPorate, partnership and Trust Transactions

It should be noted that neither the §2057 statute or
the Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act make any specific
provisions for corporation or partnership transactions that might
occur during the 8 year period prior to death. §2057(i)(3)(L)
does provide that for all purposes of §2057 rules similar to
§203~A(g) (relating to application to interests in partnerships,
corporations and trusts) shall apply. §2057 regulations should
permit tacking of periods of ownership and material participation
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when such transactions have occurred in a manner similar to
Treas. Reg. §20.2032A-3(f)(1)(d), but should not limit such
tacking to only tax-free transactions. There have been some
favorable rulings in connection with such transactions during the
recapture period under §203ZA (see !6.03(5) and (9)(a», and the
§2057 regulations should include provisions similar to those
rulings.
c.

Purchases From Non-Family Members

The 5 out of 8 year prior to death required ownership
by the decedent or the decedent's family will preclude business
assets purchased from non-family members within 5 years prior to
the decedent's death from being QFOBI's which qualify for the
§2057 deduction and will also preclude such purchases from being
used to help the decedent's estate meet the 50% requirement to
qualify other assets for the §2057 deduction (see !10.02(5».
3.

Interest in Business Must Pass To or Be Acquired By
Oualified Heir From Decedent

Before going through the sometimes complicated analysis
of whether the QFOBI characterizations rules are satisfied and
the sometimes even more complicated analysis of whether the
estate's 50% requirement is satisfied, it should first be determined whether the requirement of §2057(b)(2)(B), which requires
that those interests "are acquired by any qualified heir from, or
passed to any qualified heir from, the decedent (within the
meaning of section 2032A(e)(9)", is met.
a.

"Passing To or Acquired By"

§203ZA(e)(9) provides that "property shall be considered to have been acquired from or to have passed from the
decedent if -

r
,,.

(A) such property is so considered under section
1014(b) (relating to basis of property acquired from a
decedent),

r
r

(C) such property is acquired by any person from a
trust (to the extent such property is includable in the
gross estate of the decedent)."

(B) such property is acquired by any person from
the estate, or

The most important thing to understand about
§203ZA(e)(9) is that it not only permits the "passing to" requirement to be satisfied by a gift to a qualified heir by the
decedent's will or living trust, but it also permits the "passing
to" requirement to be satisfied by a post mortem transaction
Whereby the qualified heir purchases the decedent's business

r

r
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...
interest from the decedent's estate or living trust, even though
the will or trust disposes of the business interest in a manner
that does not satisfy the "passing to qualified heir" requirement. In the interpretations of §203~A(e)(9) under §203~A, it
has been held that a post mortem transaction must be executed by
the time the estate tax return is filed in order to take advantage of this method of satisfying the "passing to" requirement.
b.

10 Year Employee Is A Qualified Heir

§2057(i)(1) provides that for all purposes of §2057,
the term "qualified heir" has the meaning given to such term by
§203~A(e)(1) and it also includes "any active employee of the
trade or business to which the qualified family-owned business
interest relates if such employee has been employed by such trade
or business for a period of at least 10 years before the date of
the decedent's death".
This latter portion of the qualified heir definition
under §2057, which does not apply for purposes of §203~A, means
that under a normal buy-sell arrangement between the decedent and
a non-family member key (10 year) employee funded by life insurance on the decedent owned by the key (10 year) employee, if all
the other §2057 requirements are satisfied the decedent's estate
can sell the decedent's intarest in the business to the key
employee at its estate tax value, the decedent's heirs can get
the benefit of the estate tax savings from §2057 even though they
received "full value" from the estate's sale to the key employee,
and the estate will have no capital gain on the sale because
under §l014 the estate's basis in the business interests is not
reduced by the §2057 election (see il0.04(1) and i15.01). Note
that the same result can be reached even if there was no buy-sell
agreement in place at the decedent's death, as long as the sale
to a 10 year employee is completed prior to the time the estate
tax return is filed. Note also that the 10 year employee must
sign the §2057 agreement to be filed with the estate tax return
and agree to be personally liable for the §2057 recapture tax
(see il0.06(2) and !16.02). Understandably, the employee may
negotiate some concessions as to the sale price and/or terms
before signing that §2057 agreement. Even so, the net benefit of
this transaction and the §2057 estate tax savings to the decedent's heirs could still be very significant.
c.

J

;

J

"Family Member" Definition

§203~A(e)(1), which is incorporated by reference into
the §2057(i)(1) definition of "qualified heir" for all purposes
of §2057, states that "the term 'qualified heir" means, with .
respect to any property, a member of the decedent's family who
acquired such property (or to whom such property passed) from the
decedent. If a qualified heir disposes of any interest in
qualified real property to any member of his family, such member
shall thereafter be treated as the qualified heir with respect to
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such interest." Presumably, the last sentence of §203-'.A(e) (1)
will be interpreted in the §2057 context to refer to "the QFOBI
for which §2057 was elected" .rather than "qualified real property" •
To determine who are the "members of the decedent's
family" referred to in §2032A(e)(1) for purposes of identifying
who are "qualified heirs" for purposes of §2057, and to determine
what "member of the family" means for all other purposes under
§2057 as directed by §2057(i)(2), the definition of "member of
the family" in §203-'.A(e) (2) is to be used. §203-'.A(e)(2) states
that "the term 'member of the family' means with respect to any
individual, only (A) an ancestor of such individual,
(B) the spouse of such individual,
(C) a lineal descendant of such individual, of
such individual's spouse, or of a parent of such individual, or
(D) the spouse of any lineal descendant described
in subparagraph (C).
For purposes of the preceding sentence, a legally adopted child
of an individual shall be treated as the child of such individual
by blood." Presumably, all of the cases and rUlings as to this
definition under §203-'.A will be applicable for purposes of S2057
(see 1[1.02(7».
The application of S2032A(e)(2) in defining who the
decedent's qualified heirs are for purposes of S2057, in addition
to the 10 year employees, results in the following persons also
being eligible to be considered qualified heirs of the decedent
for all purposes of §2057:

i

(A) the decedent's ancestors,

r

(B) the decedent's spouse,

I

r-

(C) all of the decedent's lineal descendants, all
of the lineal descendants of the decedent's spouse, and
all of the lineal descendants of the decedent's parents, and

,..

(D) the spouses of all of the lineal descendants
referred to in (C).

r

r
r
r

For purposes of determining all of the above relationships,
relationship created by legal adoption are to be treated the same
as blood relationships.
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d.

Oualified Heirs Who Are Not U.S. Citizens

§2057(g)(1) provides that if a qualified heir is not a
citizen of the United States, any interest under §2057 passing to
or acquired by such heir will be treated as a QFOBI only if the
interest passes or is acquired (or is held) in a "qualified
trust". §2057(g)(2) defines a "qualified trust" as a trust which
is organized under and governed by, the laws of the United States
or a State, and, except as otherwise provided in regulations,
with respect to which the trust instrument requires that at least
1 trustee of the trust be an individual citizen of the United
States or a domestic corporation.
The only exception to the qualified trust ownership
rule for a qualified heir who is not a citizen of the U.S. is
stated in §2057(g)(1), where it refers to §2057(i)(3)(F) as being
an exception, if applicable. §2057(i)(3)(F) refers to
§2032.A (c) (5 ) •
§2032.A(c)(5) provides that "the qualified heir shall be
personally liable for the additional tax imposed by §2032.A(c)
with respect to his interest unless the heir has furnished bond
which meets the requirements of §2032.A(e)(11)". §2032.A(e) (11)
provides that the qualified heir has to make written application
to the Secretary of the Treasury for determination of the maximum
amount of the additional tax which may be imposed by §2032.A(c)
with respect to the qualified heir's interest. The Secretary of
the Treasury is required to respond to the application within 1
year, notifying the qualified heir of such maximum amount. The
qualified heir then can get discharged from personal liability
for any additional tax imposed by §2032.A(c) by furnishing the
Secretary of the Treasury with a bond in such amount and for such
period as is required by the Secretary.
The statement about this issue in the Conference
Agreement for the 1997 Act is that the only alternative to using
a qualified trust for a non-citizen qualified heir is to provide
"other security arrangements that meet the satisfaction of the
Treasury Secretary".
e.

The §2057(e)(3)(C) Rule for Attributing Ownership
of Interests OWned by Trusts to Trust Beneficiaries

The second sentence of §2057(e)(3)(C) states that a
person shall be treated as a beneficiary of a trust only if the
person has a present interest in the trust. It is not clear what
this sentence means or why it is located in §2057(e)(3)(C), and
the Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act provides no explanation
of what is intended by this sentence. The first sentence of
§2057(e)(3)(C) provides that an interest owned by an entity is
deemed to be owned proportionately by the owners of that entity.
Thus, the second sentence would appear to be intended merely to
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provide that a business interest owned by a trust will be deemed
to be owned proportionately by the persons who have "present
interests" in the trust.
In all likelihood, what is meant by "present interest"
is actually a "current interest", as opposed to a future interest, not "present interest" as that term is used in §2503(c).
Perhaps it will be interpreted similarly to §2652(c)(1), under
which a person is deemed to have an interest in property held in
trust only if he or she has a current right to either income or
principal distributions or is a permissible current recipient of
income or principal distributions.
It is also likely that this sentence in §2057(e)(3)(C)
is intended to facilitate qualification for §2057 and avoidance
of the §2057 recapture tax and to simplify the administration and
application of §2057 to QFOBI's held in trust for the government
and taxpayers by clarifying that at any given time only the
present interest beneficiaries, and not the future or remainder
interest beneficiaries, need to be considered. This will need to
be clarified by regulation, since many interests in many familyowned businesses are owned by trusts.
For a more complete analysis of the "passing to"
requirement, including the "successive interest" rule, special
considerations with respect to interests in the business passing
from the decedent to a trust and the potentially adverse consequences of a redemption of the decedent's shares of stock upon
the decedent's death, see !5.04 and Chapter 16.
4.

Decedent's Interest in Business Must Be a Qualified
Family-Owned Business Interest ("QFOBI")

Only a QFOBI as defined in §2057(e) is eligible for the
§2057 deduction. There are several specific exclusions from
QFOBI characterization under §2057(e)(2), a general "trade or
business" requirement for QFOBI characterization under
§2057(e)(1), rules regarding minimum percentages of ownership of
business entities owned by more than one family for characterization as a QFOBI under §2057(e)(1) and rules for determining how
entities are owned under §2057(e)(3) for purposes of applying the
other requirements for characterizations as a QFOBI.

r

The process for applying those rules to a particular
set of facts to determine whether a particular interest is a
QFOBI can be briefly summarized as follows:

r

a. Be sure that the interest is not specifically
excluded from QFOBI characterization by §2057(e)(2) (that it is
not an interest in a "foreign business", that it is not a "marketable security", and that it is not an interest in an entity
which receives more than 35% of its adjusted gross income in the

r

r

r
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form of income of the kind described as personal holding company
income - unless it is a bank or a building and loan association).
b.

,

Be sure that it is an interest in a "trade or

business" •
c. Determine whether a portion of the interest in the
trade or business is excluded from QFOBI treatment because it is
attributable to assets owned by the trade or business which
produce personal holding company income or which are cash or
marketable securities in excess of the reasonable day to day
working capital needs of the trade or business.
d. Determine whether decedent and members of decedent's family (§2032A(e)(2) definition) own a sufficient percentage of the trade or business:
(1)
prietorship;

J

Decedent must own 100% if it is a sole pro-

(2) Decedent and his family must own 50% of any
entity which carries on the trade or business, unless 2
families own 70% of the entity or 3 families own 90% of the
entity, in either of which cases the decedent and his family
then only have to own 30% of the entity.

J

e. If the trade or business is carried on by an entity
which has more than one type of equity ownership or which is part
of a tiered entity ownership structure, then the complicated
rules regarding ownership in §2057(e)(3) must be applied to
determine whether the QFOBI percentage ownership and type of
income characterization requirements have been satisfied.

.J

In many cases the only real issue under the QFOBI
characterization rules will be whether the interest is in a
"trade or business". The 1998 Act amended §2057 in two places to
try to clarify that the decedent does not have to personally use
the QFOBI in a trade or business, as long as a family member uses
that QFOBI in a trade or business. At the end of §2057(e)(1) the
following sentence was added:
"For purposes of the preceding sentence, a
decedent shall be treated as engaged in a
trade or business if any member of the decedent's family is engaged in such trade or
business."

j

-

And at the end of §2057(e)(2) the following new sentence was
added:
"In the case of a lease of property on a net
cash basis by the decedent to a member of the
decedent's family, income from such lease
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shall not be treated as personal holding
company income for purposes of subparagraph
(C), and such property shall not be treated
as an asset described in subparagraph
(D){ii), if such income and property would
not be so treated if the lessor had engaged
directly in the activities engaged in by the
lessee with respect to such property".
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See Appendix A for an example of a worksheet which
might be used to determine whether the decedent's interest in a
business is a QFOBI for purposes of §2057.
5.

The 50% Reguirement For The Decedent's Estate

By far the most complicated and difficult §2057 requirement is the 50% requirement for the decedent's estate. It
is extremely complicated to just explain how to compute the
percentage, and it will be very difficult in many cases to obtain
all of the gift information necessary to compute the percentage
with complete accuracy including all of the data the statute
purports to require. It is anticipated that taxpayers and the
IRS will have to settle for less than complete accuracy in many
situations.

I
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It will be mandatory for the IRS to provide a complete
worksheet for computing the percentage with detailed explanations
of the information required in each line of the worksheet.
Ideally, this will be on the part of the Form 706 which must be
completed for each §2057 election, just as Schedule A-l is now
required for each §203~A election. perhaps the §2057 election
can be on a new Schedule N as part of Form 706.
It is hard to even describe or refer to this test in a
brief manner. It is not correct to refer to it as being a
requirement that the value of the QFOBI assets be 50% of the
value of the estate, since both the numerator and the denominator
of the fraction must be adjusted for lifetime gifts, as well as
for decedent's debts and other factors. Indeed, one of the real
traps for the unwary will be failure to thoroughly research all
of the lifetime gifts of QFOBI to family members made by a
decedent in a case where the value of the QFOBI owned by the
decedent at death is less than 50% of the decedent's adjusted
gross estate computed without taking into account lifetime gifts.
The research as to lifetime gifts by the decedent is
made particularly difficult because of the fact that it cannot be
limited to just reviewing all of the decedent's gift tax returns.
a.

The Fraction Specified in the Statute

§2057{b){1){C) states that the sum of (A) the "adjusted
value of the QFOBI described in §2057{b){2)", which is defined in

B -11

§2057(d), plus (B) the amount of the gifts of QFOBI determined
under §2057(b)(3), must exceed 50 percent of (C) the adjusted
gross estate, which is defined in §2057(C). It would seem that
nothing could be easier than computing this 50% requirement,
because the fraction which must be greater than 50% can be
summarized as:
A + B.

-

C

unfortunately, this apparent simplicity is very misleading,
because the process of computing each of the factors (A, B and C)
in the fraction according to the specifications in the statute is
very complicated, and sometimes the information required by the
statute is not going to be available.
b.

The Numerator of the Fraction

As explained above, the numerator of the fraction
consists of two factors specified in the statute, referred to
above as A and B. A is the "adjusted value of the QFOBI described in §2057(b)(2)", which is defined in §2057(d). B is the
amount of the gifts of QFOBI determined under §2057(b)(3).
(1)

S2057(d):

Factor A in the Numerator

§2057(b)(1)(C)(i) provides that Factor A in the numerator of the 50% fraction is "the adjusted value" of the QFOBI's
"described in paragraph (2)". §2057(b)(2) describes QFOBI's
which are included in determining the value of the decedent's
gross estate and meet the "passing to" requirement explained in
!10.02(3). §2057(d) specifies how "the adjusted value" of a
QFOBI is to be computed, and is summarized in Appendix B.
(2)

S2057(b)(3):

J

.iii

J
,

j

li

i

j

Factor B in the Numerator

§2057(b)(3) specifies how the amount of the gifts of
QFOBI's to be included in the numerator of the 50% fraction under
§2057(b)(1)(C)(ii) is to be computed, and is summarized in
Appendix C.
It should be noted that there is no provision in the
statute that states when the decedent's gifts of QFOBI interests
are to be valued for purposes of the above computation. The
Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act states that they are to be
valued as of the date of the gift. In many cases it will be
difficult to determine the date of gift values, especially for
gifts which did not require the filing of a Form 709 because of
the §2503(b) gift tax annual exclusion.

I

d

J

J

The parenthetical clause "(other than the decedent's
spouse)" which appears under the continuously held language near
the end of §2057(b)(3)is confusing. It would be possible to
argue that by putting the parenthetical clause where it is in the
statute, it was intended to mean that the spouse did not have to
continuously hold the gifts of QFOBI received from the decedent
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in order to include those gifts in the numerator. However, the
Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act states the numerator is not
to include gifts of QFOBI made by the decedent to the decedent's
spouse. The General Explanation of the 1997 Tax Laws by the
Joint Committee on Taxation ("Blue Book") is identical to the
Conference Agreement in this respect. Furthermore, gifts to a
spouse will never be taken into account under §2001(b)(1)(B) or
excluded by §2503(b) because of the unlimited marital deduction,
so they are not included in the numerator of the fraction by
§2057(b)(3) in any event.
c.

The Denominator of the Fraction:
Gross Estate"

"The Adjusted

§2057(c) specifies how the "adjusted gross estate" for
all purposes of §2057, which includes for being the denominator
of the fraction to determine the 50% test, is to be computed, and
is summarized in Appendix D.
d.

Planning To Meet the 50% of Adjusted Gross Estate
Requirement
(1)

Gifts To A Spouse

Perhaps the biggest trap for the unwary in planning to
meet the §2057 50% of adjusted gross estate requirement for a
married couple is the treatment of gifts to a spouse in the
statutory definitions of the numerator and denominator of the
fraction which determines whether the 50% requirement is met. As
described above, in computing Factor B in the numerator of the
fraction (the amount of lifetime gifts of QFOBI's to family
members), gifts of QFOBI's to a spouse are not included. On the
other hand, in computing the denominator of the fraction all
gifts of non-QFOBI assets from the decedent to the decedent's
spouse within 10 years prior to the decedents death are included,
except de minimis (1) gifts. There is nothing in the statute or
legislative history for §2057 which defines "de minimus" for this
purpose.
While the statute seems to indicate that the date of
gift value of all assets transferred from a decedent to the
decedent's spouse within 10 years of the decedent's death are
included in the denominator, apparently the Treasury Department
is going to interpret the words "other transfers" in
§2057(c)(2)(A)(ii) to mean other than gifts of QFOBI's referred
to in §2057(c)(2)(A)(i), even though those gifts by definition
cannot refer to gifts of QFOBI's to a spouse. Even though this
interpretation of the statute is questionable, it is much more
helpful to taxpayers than if the statute was more accurately
interpreted as requiring inclusion in the denominator of the date
of gift value of all transfers of all types of assets from the
decedent to the decedent's spouse within 10 years prior to the
decedent's death.
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There is no policy consideration which justifies this
trap for the unwary in the statute, and in fact it seems to
violate the unlimited marital deduction policy which has been
part of federal tax law since 1981. Technical corrections
legislation should include gifts of QFOBI to spouses in the
numerator and denominator of the fraction, but no other gifts to
spouses in the denominator, or should eliminate all transfers to
spouses from both the numerator and denominator.
(2)

Gifts of OFOBI To Other Family Members

Except for gifts to spouses as described above, gifts
of QFOBI to other family members generally will not cause a
failure to meet the 50% requirement, since they are brought back
in to both the numerator and denominator of the fraction, unless
the QFOBI's appreciate substantially in value from the date of
gift to the date of death, in which case the "lost appreciation"
in the gift QFOBI's will make the percentage determined by the
fraction smaller than if the gifts had not been made.
(3)

Other Annual Exclusion Gifts To Family Members

J
_

1

Without exception annual exclusion gifts of non-QFOBI
assets to any persons and charitable gifts of non-QFOBI assets
will help the donor's estate meet the §2057 50% requirement
because they will reduce the denominator of the fraction.
(4)

Sales of OFOBI's

QFOBI's should not be sold if the §2057 50% requirement
is a concern, because such sales reduce the numerator of the
fraction and do not decrease the denominator of the fraction.
(5)

Gifts Within 3 Years Prior to Death

Gifts in excess of gift tax annual exclusion amounts
within 3 years prior to the donor's death will not make it easier
to meet the §2057 50% requirement, because such gifts do not
change the numerator or denominator of the fraction (compared to
not making the gifts). In fact, if the gifts are QFOBI gifts to
family members, such gifts may make it harder to meet the 50%
requirement if the QFOBI appreciated from the date of gift to
date of death, because of the IIlost appreciationII (compared to
not making the gifts).
(6)

J

Gifts of Non-OFOBI Assets to Spouse

Gifts of non-QFOBI assets to a spouse, even if made
within 10 years of the donor spouse's death, may help the donor
spouse's estate meet the 50% requirement (compared to not making
such gifts) if those assets appreciate from the date of gift to
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the date of death, because the appreciation will be removed from
the denominator of the fraction.
(7)

Gifts of Life Insurance Policies

Gifts of life insurance policies by the donor more than
3 years prior to the donor's death will help the donor's estate
meet the §2057 50% requirement by reducing the denominator of the
fraction by the difference between the proceeds of the policy and
the interpolated terminal reserve value of the policy at the date
of gift.
(8)

Purchase of OFOBI

The purchase of QFOBI's from family members will
immediately help the purchaser's estate meet the §2057 50%
requirement if the family members have owned the purchased
QFOBI's for at least 5 years. The purchase of QFOBI's from nonfamily members will only help meet the 50% requirement if the
purchaser lives for 5 years after the purchase.
(9)

Gifts of Non-OFOBI Assets in Excess of Annual
Exclusions More than 3 Years Prior to Donor's
Death

Gifts of non-QFOBI assets in excess of annual exclusion
amounts more than 3 years prior to the donor's death help meet
the §2057 50% requirement because they reduce the denominator of
the fraction.
(10) Incurring Debt
Incurring debt against a qualified residence for which
the interest paid is deductible for income tax purposes under
§163(h)(3), debt to pay educational and medical expenses and up
to $10,000 of other debt (all as described in §2057(d)(2» will
help the debtor's estate meet the §2057 50% requirement because
such debt does not reduce the numerator of the fraction and does
reduce the denominator of the fraction. All other debt makes it
more difficult to meet the §2057 50% requirement because it
reduces both the numerator and denominator of the fraction. In
particular, other debt which is also not for the acquisition of
QFOBI makes it more difficult to meet the 50% requirement because
its reduction of the numerator is not offset by adding QFOBI to
the numerator. And remember, a purchased QFOBI cannot be included in the numerator until it has been owned within the family
for 5 years. This is different than the 50% requirement under
§203~A, where a purchased farm can immediately help meet that 50%
test.

,.
I

r
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(11) Life Insurance Payable to Business Entity
If life insurance proceeds are payable to a business
entity as a result of the decedent's death, and those proceeds
are not needed for the reasonable day to day working capital
needs of the business, then the portion of the decedent's interest in the entity attributable to those proceeds is excluded from
Factor A in the numerator by §2057(e)(2)(D)(i), as described in
111.02(4). If those proceeds also increase the value of the
business, then they increase the denominator of the fraction for
determining the 50\ test. Thus, such life insurance proceeds may
not help the decedent's estate meet that 50% requirement, and
could make it more difficult to meet that requirement.
6.

The Material Participation Requirement

a.

Generally The Same As The S2032A Material Participation Requirement

§2057(b)(1)(D)(ii) provides that in order for an estate
to be eligible to elect the §2057 deduction for a QFOBI, during
the 8-year period ending on the date of the decedent's death
there must have been periods aggregating 5 years or more during
which there was material participation (within the meaning of
§2032A(e)(6» by the decedent or a member of the decedent's
family in the operation of the business to which the QFOBI
relates.
§203~A(e)(6) states that "material participation shall
be determined in a manner similar to the manner used for purposes
of paragraph (1) of §1402(a) (relating to net earnings from selfemployment)." The §203~A regulations on material participation
(published in 1980) are found at Treas. Reg. §20.2032A-3.

b.

Date of Retirement and Disability Rules Like
S2032A

§2057(i)(3)(A) provides that rules similar to
(relating to decedent's who are retired or disabled)
shall apply for purposes of §2033A. §203~A(b)(4) provides
generally that if the material participation requirement is not
met by the decedent or his family during the 8 years prior to
death, then that requirement may be satisfied during the 8 year
period prior to the date on which the decedent became disabled
for a continuous period ending at decedent's death or on which
the decedent started receiving old age Social Security benefits
for a continuous period ending at decedent's death.
§203~A(b)(4)

c.

Active Management By Certain Surviving Spouses
Like S2032A
.

§2057(i)(3)(B) provides that rules similar to
(relating to special rules for surviving spouses)

§203~A(b)(5)
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shall apply for purposes of §2033A. §2032A(b)(S) provides
generally that if a surviving spouse receives property from the
first spouse to die and that property was eligible for §203£A
valuation in the first estate, whether §203£A was elected in the
first estate or not, then for purposes of determining whether
that property is eligible for §203£A valuation in the surviving
spouse's estate, active management by the surviving spouse in the
operation of that property shall be deemed to be material participation by the surviving spouse.
"Active management" is defined in §203£A(e)(12) as lithe
making of the management decisions of a business (other than the
daily operating decisions) ". It is not a significantly lower
standard of involvement in the business than the material participation requirement, at least compared to material participation
by or for a landlord under a farm crop share lease.
d.

f
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What Level of Involvement Will Satisfy The Material Participation Reguirement?

The Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act states that
"material participation" for purposes of §20S7 "is defined as
under present-law §203£A (special use valuation) and the regulations promulgated thereunder. See, e.g. Treas. Reg. §20.203£A-3.
Under such regulations, no one factor is determinative of the
presence of material participation and the uniqueness of the
particular industry (e.g., timber, farming, manufacturing, etc.)
must be considered. physical work and participation in management decisions are the principal factors to be considered. For
example, an individual generally is considered to be materially
participating in the business if he or she personally manages the
business fUlly, regardless of the number of hours worked, as long
as any necessary functions are performed."
An analysis of some of the §203£A material participation rules applicable to §20S7 non-farm businesses is provided in
Chapter 13, and a complete discussion of the §203~A material
participation requirement is provided in Chapter 3.
C.

THE S20S7(f) ADDITIONAL ESTATE ("RECAPTURE") TAX ON QUALIFIED HEIR
1.

The Imposition of the Recapture Tax

§20S7(f)(l) imposes "an additional estate tax if,
within 10 years after the date of the decedent's death and before
the date of the qualified heir's death" one of four specified
recapture events occurs. As under §203~A, if the decedent
creates successive interests in more than one qualified heir in
the same QFOBI, the 10 year recapture period is not shortened by
the deaths of qualified heirs unless all of the qualified heirs
with successive interests in the same QFOBI die within 10 years
after the decedent's death. The only exception is that if the

,

r
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successive interests are in a marital trust, QTIP or otherwise,
then the IRS in Letter Ruling 9038016 has taken the position
under §203~A that the death of the surviving spouse within 10
years of the death of the predeceased spouse does terminate the
§203~A recapture period with respect to the §203~A election made
in the predeceased spouse's estate.
2.

j

J

Each Qualified Heir Personally Liable For Pro-Rata Part
of Recapture Tax

§2057(f)(1) does not state on whom the recapture tax is
imposed, and one might assume it is imposed on the decedent's
estate, since it is called an "additional estate tax". However,
§2057(i)(3)(F) states that rules similar to §203~A(c)(5) (relating to liability for tax; furnishing bond) shall apply for
purposes of §2057.
§203~A(c)(5) provides that "the qualified heir shall be
personally liable for the additional tax imposed by this subsection with respect to his interest unless the heir has furnished
bond which meets the requirements of subsection (e)(ll)."
§203~A(e)(11) is discussed in !10.02(3).

j

The Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act provides the
following example to illustrate how each qualified heir is
personally liable for his or her respective portion of the
recapture tax.
Thus, for example, if a brother and sister inherit
a qualified family-owned business from their father,
and only the sister materially participates in the
business, her participation will cause both her and her
brother to meet the material participation test. If
she ceases to materially participate in the business
within 10 years after her father's death (and the
brother still does not materially participate), the
sister and brother would both be liable for the recapture tax; that is, each would be liable for the recapture tax attributable to his or her interest.
3.

j

I

j

The Four "Recapture Events"

The four generic "recapture events" specified in
§2057(f)(1) are as follows:
a.

Failure to Meet Material Participation Requirement

§2057(f)(1)(A) imposes the §2057 recapture tax if the
material participation requirements in §203~A(c)(6)(B) are not
met with respect to the QFOBI which was acquired (or passed from)
the decedent.

J

...I
'1
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§203ZA(c)(6)(B) provides that:
(B) during any period of 8 years ending after
the date of the decedent's death and before the
date of the death of the qualified heir, there had
been periods aggregating more than 3 years during
which (i) in the case of periods during which
the property was held by the decedent, there
was no material participation by the decedent
or any member of his family in the operation
of the farm or other business, and
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(ii) in the case of periods during which
the property was held by any qualified heir,
there was no material participation by such
qualified heir or any member of his family in
the operation of the farm or other business.
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(1)

Cash Renting By Qualified Heirs to Their
Family Members Permitted

The Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act also provides
that "if a qualified heir rents qualifying property to a member
of the qualified heir's family on a net cash basis, and that
family member materially in the business, the material participation requirement will be considered to have been met with respect
to the qualified heir for purposes of this provision".
(2)

Active Management Sufficient For Certain
Qualified Heirs

§2032A(c)(7), which is made applicable to §20S7 by
§20S7(i)(3)(G), also provides an exception to the material
participation for a qualified heir who:
(A)

is the surviving spouse of the decedent,

(B)

has not attained the age of 21,

(C)

is disabled (within the meaning of subsection (b)(4)(B», or

(D)

is a student.

"Active management" Qy the qualified heirs described in (A) or
(D) or for the qualified heirs described in (B) or (C) is deemed
to meet the material participation requirement for those heirs.
"Active management" is defined in §2032A(e)(12) as "the
making of the management decisions of a business (other than the
daily operating decisions)". It is not a significantly lower
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standard of involvement in the business than the material participation requirement, at least compared to material participation
by or for a landlord under a farm crop share lease.
(3)

....

Who Must Materially Participate When OFOBI
Passes To a Trust?
J

By analogy to Letter Rulings 9022007 and 9043044 in
which the IRS held that only the income beneficiaries of a trust
holding §203ZA farmland have to meet the §2032A(c) qualified use
and material participation requirements, only the income beneficiaries of a trust should be required to meet the §2057(f)(1)(A)
material participation requirements (or "family members" of the
income beneficiaries).
Perhaps the second sentence of §2057(e)(3)(C) referred
to in !11.07 above also provides some support of the interpretation in the preceding paragraph, although it appears in a part of
the statute titled "Rules Regarding OWnership". However, that
part of the statute does provide that it is applicable for all
purposes of §2057. Also see B(3)(e) above in this outline.
b.

....
!!

j
J

.....

Disposition of QFOBI By Qualified Heir

§2057(f)(1)(B) imposes the §2057 recapture tax if "the
qualified heir disposes of any portion of a QFOBI (other than by
a disposition to a member of the qualified heir'S family or
through a qualified conservation contribution under section
170(h»".
(1)

j

...

J

Tricky Definition of "Family Members"

Great care must be taken to closely follow the family
member definition in §2032A(e)(2) to determine whether a disposition is to a family member of the qualified heir. Not every
family member of the decedent is a family member of every qualified heir. Not every qualified heir is a family member of all
the other qualified heirs. A nephew is a family member of an
uncle, but an uncle is not a family member of a nephew! See
!1.07 for a complete analysis of the §203ZA(e)(2) definition of
"family member". Also see B(3)(c) above in this outline.
§2057(i)(3)(O) provides that rules similar to
§6166(g)(1)(B), (C) and (D) (relating to acceleration of paYment)
shall apply for all purposes of §2057. The exact application of
those provisions to §2057 will need to be clarified by regulations, and probably expanded by analogy to interests in entities
other than corporations. Perhaps these provisions could also be
applied to also permit pre-death tacking of periods of ownership
and material participation for purposes of meeting the §2057
eligibility requirements.
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(2)

51031 and 51033 Transactions

§2057(i)(3)(M) provides that rules similar to make
(relating to special rules for involuntary conversions
of qualified real property) and §203~A(i) (relating to exchanges
of qualified real property) shall apply for all purposes to
§2057. This means that a qualified heir who disposes of a QFOBI
in a transaction which qualifies for income tax purposes as a
§1031 or §1033 transaction will not be deemed to have made a
disposition for purposes of §2057(f)(1).
§203~A(h)

(3)

Corporate, Partnership and Trust Transactions

§2057(i)(3)(L) provides that rules similar to Section
(relating to application to interests in partnerships,
corporations and trusts) shall' apply for all purposes of §2057.
This should mean that the §203~A rulings which do not treat many
such transactions as dispositions for §203~A purposes should be
applied to also not treat such transactions as dispositions for
§2057 purposes.
203~A(g)

(4)

Sales and Dispositions In Ordinary Course of
Business

One of the two changes made to the Senate Report by the
Joint Committee on Taxation when it drafted the Conference
Agreement for the 1997 Act was to add the following exception to
§2057 recapture tax treatment of a disposition of certain types
of qualified family-owned business assets:
The conferees clarify that a sale or disposition, in the ordinary course of business, of
assets such as inventory or a piece of equipment used in the business (e.g. the sale of
crops or a tractor) would not result in recapture of the benefits of the qualified
family-owned business exclusion.
While this statement in the Conference Agreement makes good
sense, it also means that in some businesses where these types of
assets make up a significant portion of the value of the QFOBI,
there will be an opportunity over time to sell down the value of
the business gradually without paying §2057 recapture tax.
It would seem wise for Treasury to permit partial §2057
elections, so that taxpayers could voluntarily exclude the value
of these assets from the §2057 election, which would keep those
assets free of the §2057 lien and would also protect the government's interests by having a full §2057 recapture tax liability
and lien security apply to other types of "more permanent" assets
for which §2057 would be elected.
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(5)

Cessation of Trade or Business Use of QFOBI
Is a Disposition

§2057(f)(3) provides that "a qualified heir shall not
be treated as disposing of an interest described in subsection
(e)(l)(A) by reason of ceasing to be engaged in a trade or
business so long as the property to which such interest relates
is used in a trade or business by any member of such individual's
family". §2057(e)(1)(A) describes a QFOBI which is "an interest
as a proprietor in a trade or business carried on as a proprietorship". Presumably, the application of §2057(f)(3) is limited
to proprietorships because a QFOBI which is an interest in an
entity described in §2057(e)(1)(B) allows the activities of even
non-family member employees of the entity to meet the trade or
business requirement for the entity.
§2057(f)(3) is the only statutory provision which
indicates that there is really a separate trade or business
requirement which must be satisfied by qualified heirs during the
10 year period after the decedent's death, and cessation of trade
or business use of the QFOBI constitutes what is really a fifth
type of recapture even under §2057(f)(1), although technically
§2057(f)(3) characterizes that cessation as one type of disposition under §2057(f)(l)(B). Even §2057(f)(3) imposes this fifth
type of recapture event by implication, rather than by direct
statement.
(A)

j

....

....1

j

Exception: Trade or Business Use of
QFOBI in Proprietorship By Family Member
of Qualified Heir and Not By Qualified
Heir Is Not a Disposition

As explained above, §2057(f)(3) specifically provides
that a family member's use of property in a trade or business is
deemed to satisfy the trade or business requirement for a qualified heir if the property was owned by the decedent as a proprietor of a proprietorship. Therefore, the qualified heir's failure to use such property in a trade or business is not a disposition and not a §2057(f)(1) recapture event.
(B)

Exception: Cessation of Trade or Business By Entity in Which Qualified Heir
Has a OFOBI Is Not a Disposition (1)

Since §2057(f)(3) technically only applies to QFOBI's
in proprietorships described in §2057(e)(1)(A), it can be argued
that cessation of trade or business use is only a recapture event
for QFOBI's in proprietorships, and not for QFQBI'S in entities
described in §2057(e)(l)(B). This would mean that an entity
could cease to carry on a trade or business without causing
imposition of recapture tax, as long as no §2057(f)(1) recapture
event occurs.
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This could be important if the qualified heirs receive
QFOBI's in an entity from the decedent, and the entity cash rents
its assets to a family member of the qualified heirs.
§2057(f)(3) would not apply in this situation to allow attribution of the family member's trade or business use to the qualified heirs, so it would be important to interpret §2057(f)(3) as
only implying a trade or business requirement for proprietorships
and not for entities. As described above, the Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act would allow the family member tenant's
activities to be attributed to the qualified heirs for purposes
of the §2057(f)(1)(A) material participation requirement, even if
the qualified heirs' QFOBI's were in an entity, so it would be
inconsistent to impose recapture tax in those circumstances
because the entity itself was not using the property to which the
QFOBI relates in a trade or business.
(C)

Exception:

The 2 Year Grace Period

§2057(i)(3)(G) provides that rules similar to
§203ZA(c) (7) (relating to no tax if use begins within 2 years;
active management by eligible qualified heirs treated as material
participation) shall apply for all purposes of §2057. It is not
completely clear how the 2 year grace period for commencing
qualified use under §2032A is to be applied for purposes of
§2057, since §2057 has no qualified use requirement. The Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act states that "as under present-law
section 2032A, however, the 10-year recapture period may be
extended for a period of up to two years if the qualified heir
does not begin to use the property for a period of up to two
years after the decedent's death". Apparently, this 2 year grace
period relates to the trade or business requirement for qualified
heirs which is implied by §2057(f)(3), as described above, and
not to the material participation requirement (see C(4) in this
outline below).

c.

Oualified Heir Loses U.S. Citizenship

§2057(f)(1)(C) imposes the §2057 recapture tax if "the
qualified heir loses united States citizenship (within the
meaning of section 877) or with respect to whom an event described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 877(e)(1) occurs,
and such heir does not comply with the requirements of" §2057(g).
The Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act explains that "a
qualified heir who loses u.S. citizenship may avoid such recapture by placing the qualified family-owned business assets into a
trust meeting requirements similar to a qualified domestic trust
(as described in present law sec. 2056A(a), or through certain
other security arrangements", which is basically what the statute
provides in §2057(g).

B-~

d.

principal Place of Business Moves Outside u.s.

§2057(f)(1)(D) imposes the §2057 recapture tax if "the
principal place of business of a trade or business" of the QFOBI
ceases to be located in the united States. This suggests that if
a QFOBI involves ownership of more than 1 trade or business, and
the principal place of any 1 of the trades or businesses ceases
to be located in the U.S., then recapture tax is imposed with
respect to the entire QFOBI.
4.

Computation of Amount of Recapture Tax

§2057(f)(2)(A) provides that the amount of the additional estate tax imposed by §2057(f)(1) shall be equal to (i) the "applicable percentage" of the adjusted tax
difference attributable to the QFOBI, plus
(ii) interest on the amount determined under (i) at the
underpaYment rate established under §6621 for the period beginning on the date the estate tax liability was due under Chapter
11 and ending on the date such additional estate tax is due.

-

1
•
....

The "applicable percentage" referred to in
§2057(f)(2)(A)(i) is determined under the §2057(f)(2)(B) table as
follows:
If the event described in
§2057(f)(1) occurs in the
following year of material
participation:

The applicable
percentage is:

1 through 6

100

7

80

8
9

40

10

20

60

Apparently the "year of material participation" in the heading in
the above table is a mistake, and should refer to "year after
decedent's death", because the 2 year grace period which is
incorporated by §2057(i)(3)(G)'s reference to §203~A(c)(7) does
not apply to the §203~A material participation requirement, but
instead applies to the §203~A qualified use requirement. The
best analysis to use to apply §203~A(c)(7)(A) to §2057 is to say
that the §2057(f)(3) implied trade or business requirement for
proprietorships is more analogous to the §203~A qualified use
requirement than is the §2057 material participation requirement,
and therefore the 2 year grace period from §203~A(c)(7)(A)
applies to the §2057(f)(3) trade or business requirement, and not
to the §2057 material participation requirement.

J

B - 24

r

r
r
r
,

r
r

r
r

r
r

,

r
r
I

r
r

Further, it would be better to follow the approach of
by saying that any part of the 2 year grace
period actually used extends the §20S7(f)(1) and §20S7(f)(2)(B)
year periods, rather than to try to state the basic year provisions in §20S7(f)(2)(B) to refer to a grace period which may not
even be applicable (the best interpretation appears to be that
there is no §20S7 2 year grace period for material participation
and no §20S7 2 year grace period for commencement of trade or
business use by an entity if the QFOBI is in an entity, because
there is no trade or business requirement for such an entity).
Under this approach the heading in §20S7(f)(2)(B) should be
interpreted as meaning "If the event described in paragraph (1)
occurs in the following year after the date of the decedent's
death". This interpretation is also necessary to make
§20S7(f)(2)(B) consistent with the basic imposition of the
recapture tax by §20S7(f)(1), which describes the recapture
period as being "within 10 years after the date of the decedent's
death" •
§203~A(c)(7)(A)(ii)

The "adjusted tax difference attributable to the QFOBI"
referred to in §20S7(f)(2)(A)(i) is defined in §20S7(f)(2)(C).
§20S7(f)(2)(C)(i) provides-that the adjusted tax
difference attributable to a "QFOBI" is the amount which bears
the same ratio to the adjusted tax difference with respect to the
estate (determined under clause (ii» as the value of each
interest bears to the value of all "QFOBI's" described in subsection (b) (2) •
§20S7(f)(2)(C)(ii) provides that "the term adjusted tax
difference with respect to the estate" means "the excess of what
would have been the estate tax liability but for the election
under this section over the estate tax liability", and that "the
term estate tax liability means the tax imposed by section 2001
reduced by the credits allowable against such tax. II
The effect of the rules set forth in §20S7(f)(2)(C) is
that the apportionment of the §20S7 recapture tax liability among
qualified heirs is to be based on the value of the QFOBI's
received by each qualified heir compared to the total value of
all QFOBI's received by all qualified heirs.
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It should be noted that there is apparently no provision similar to §203~A(c)(2)(A)(ii) applicable to computing the
§20S7 recapture tax, which means that the value of the QFOBI at
the time a recapture event occurs does not enter into the computation of the amount of the §20S7 recapture tax. At least the
§20S7 statute refers to no such provision.

s.

Computation of Amount of Partial Recapture Tax

If there is a partial §20S7 recapture event, meaning
that the recapture event does not involve all of the QFOBI's for
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which §20S7 was elected, then the method provided in
§20S7(f)(2)(C) is used to determine the amount of §20S7 partial
recapture tax. This is true whether the recapture event is
"partial" in the sense that one of three qualified heirs disposes
of all of their QFOBI's to a non-family member, or whether one
qualified heir disposes of one-third of that heir's QFOBI's to a
non-family member. Basically, the amount of §20S7 recapture tax
payable with respect to either such type of partial disposition
is the same portion of the maximum potential §20S7 recapture tax
as the portion which the value of the QFOBI's disposed of (or
otherwise subject to recapture) is of the total value of all of
the QFOBI's for which §20S7 was elected, using the estate tax
values of the QFOBI'sto determine such portion.
Since the §20S7 recapture tax liability is apportioned
pro rata to all of the QFOBI's for which §20S7 is elected, based
upon estate tax values of the QFOBI's, the §20S7(f)(2)(C) partial
recapture tax computation method is simpler than the §203~A
partial recapture tax computation method in §203~A(c)(2)(B).
Under §203~A, the total §2032A value reduction for an estate
cannot be apportioned to the various §2032A properties just based
on the estate tax value of those properties determined without
§203~A, because the §203~A valuation method often produces a
different proportion of value reduction for different properties
being valued under §203~A in the same estate. Therefore,
§2032A(c)(2)(B) requires the computation of the §203~A value
reduction proportion to compute the partial §203~A recapture tax.
The Form 706-A is defective because it ignores this aspect of
computing the §203~A recapture tax.
However, the §20S7 recapture tax liability is apportioned pro rata among the QFOBI's for which §20S7 is elected
based on the estate tax values of the QFOBI's, so it is really
not necessary to compute the amount of §20S7 deduction for each
QFOBI. All that is necessary is to know the estate tax value of
each QFOBI. In that respect, the Form 706-A is correct under
§20S7, even though it is incorrect for §203~A for which it was
designed. See !6.02(3).
On the other hand, there will be difficulties in
applying the §20S7(f)(2)(C) method for computing the §20S7
recapture tax, because it requires being able to determine the
estate tax value of each QFOBI which is subject to §20S7 recapture tax. That determination is not difficult in the §203~A
context because only real estate can be valued under §2032A and
the real estate which is subject to a §203~A recapture event can
always be traced to real estate that was valued under §203~A on
the estate tax return. However, §20S7 can be elected for assets
other than real estate, and it is going to be difficult in some
cases to determine the estate tax value of the assets SUbject to
a §20S7 recapture event for purposes of computing the §20S7
recapture tax.
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§2057(i)(3)(C) provides that rules similar to
§203~A(c)(2)(D)

(relating to partial disposition) shall apply for
all purposes of §2057. However, because §2057 has no provision
comparable to §203~A(c)(2)(A)(ii), §203~A(c)(2)(D)(i) cannot be
applied for purposes of §2057, and because §203~A(c)(2)
(D)(ii) is really redundant and unnecessary if §2057(f)(2)(C) is
applied correctly (a "portion of an interest" is no different
than just using a smaller "interest" when applying
§2057(f)(2)(C), the reference to §203~A(c)(2)(D) in
§2057(i)(3)(C) is totally unnecessary for computing a partial
recapture tax under §2057.
6.

The Conference Agreement For The 1997 Act

The Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act provides the
following explanation of how the §2057 recapture tax is to be
computed:
If a recapture even occurs with respect to
any qualified family-owned business interest
(or portion thereof), the amount of reduction
in estate taxes attributable to that interest
is determined on a proportionate basis. For
example, if decedent's estate included $2
million in qualified family-owned business
interests and $1 million of such interests
received beneficial treatment under this
proposal, one-half of the value of the interest disposed of is deemed to have received
the benefits provided under this proposal.
This explanation is very confusing. It seems to suggest that a
partial §2033A (now §2057) election is possible. Otherwise, how
could only $1,000,000 out of $2,000,000 of QFOBI's in an estate
"receive beneficial treatment" under §2033A? Apparently, this
paragraph out of the Senate Report which was adopted in the
Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act without revision should
have been revised to reflect the Conference's reduction of the
Senate's $1,000,000 §2033A maximum value exclusion down to
$675,000. Apparently, the wording "receive beneficial treatment"
was an unclear wording of what was intended to be said, which
apparently was that "$1,000,000 of the $2,000,000 of QFOBI's was
excluded from the value of the gross estate by the §2033A election" •
In any event, apparently this statement in the Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act meant that in computing the
amount of §2033A recapture tax payable when a QFOBI or an asset
owned by the trade or business for which the §2033A election was
made is subject to a recapture event (by disposition or otherwise), a fraction of that QFOBI or asset will be deemed to
represent the §2033A value exclusion for purposes of computing
the §2033A recapture tax payable as a result of that recapture
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event. The numerator of the fraction will be the total amount of
value excluded from the decedent's gross estate by the §2033A
election, and the denominator will be the estate tax value of all
of the QFOBI's in the decedent's gross estate determined without
§2033A.

-

In the example given in the Conference Agreement, if
the decedent died in 1998, the fraction should have been
$ 675,000 = 34%, instead of $1,000,000 = 1/2, if in fact the
$2,000,000
2,000,000
above explanation of that language in the Conference Agreement is
correct.

-

This interpretation of the language in the Conference
Agreement for the 1997 Act would have produced different results
in computing the §2033A recapture tax than the method specified
in the statute in §2033A(f)(2)(A)(i), which is the method used
for computing the §203~A recapture tax under §203~A(c)(2)(B).
Usually, when the statute and the Conference Agreement conflict,
the statute prevails.

~

The only way to resolve this conflict between the
§2033A statute and Conference Agreement is to follow the statute
and say the Conference Agreement is just wrong, or to say that
the Conference Agreement is actually, after all, describing how
the §2033A recapture tax should be computed after a partial
§2033A election is made. That is the only way to give meaning to
both the statute and the Conference Agreement, without saying
either one is wrong. The Blue Book contains the same example,
which appears to strengthen the argument that it is not a mistake, but rather an explanation of how to compute the §2033A
recapture tax after a partial election.
Even though the 1998 Act's conversion of the §2033A
value exclusion into a §2057 deduction makes most of the above
analysis inapplicable (the example in the Conference Agreement
for the 1997 Act clearly is not applicable to computing the
recapture tax for the §2057 deduction), the analysis is still
relevant as to the Congressional intent in 1997 to allow §2033A
partial elections, which still should be authority for allowing
§2057 partial elections.
7.

Due Date for S2057 Recapture Tax

-

§2057(i)(3)(E) provides that rules similar to
(relating to due date) shall apply for all purposes

§203~A(c)(4)

of §2057.
§2032A(c)(4) provides that "the additional tax imposed
this subsection shall become due and payable on the date which
6 months after the date of the disposition or cessation
referred to in paragraph (1)11.

~y
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This means that the S2057(f) additional estate tax
("recapture tax") becomes due and payable 6 months after the date
the recapture event specified in S2057(f)(1) occurs.
8.

Interest on §2057 Recapture Tax

The S2057 recapture tax principal amount includes
interest from the due date of the estate tax (9 months after the
decedent's death) to the due date of the recapture tax (6 months
after the S2057 recapture event) computed at the underpaYment
rate established under S6621, as provided in S2057(f)(2)(A)(ii).
Apparently, this means that even if the S2057 recapture tax is
paid prior to its due.date, the principal amount of that tax will
be computed to include interest accrued to that due date.
Apparently, the reason for including this interest in
the S2057 recapture tax principal amount is that S2057 gives
qualified heirs a "full" basis for income tax purposes in the
QFOBI (not reduced by any part of the S2057 deduction), whereas
S1016(c) requires qualified heirs to pay such interest on the
S2032,A recapture tax in order to receive a "full" basis in the
qualified real property (not reduced by the S2032,A value reduction) after a S2032A recapture event.
As explained in Revenue Ruling 81-308, interest on the
§2032,A recapture tax accrues at the §6621 underpaYment rate after
the due date for the §2032,A recapture tax. Presumably, interest
on the §2057 recapture tax will also accrue at the §6621 underpaYment rate after the due date of the §2057 recapture tax.
9.

Statute of Limitations on Assessment of §2057 Recapture
Tax

§2057(i)(3)(K) provides that rules similar to §2032,A(f)
(relating to statute of limitations) shall apply for all purposes
of §2057.

r

§2032,A(f) provides as follows:

r

(F) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.- If qualified real
property is disposed of or ceases to be used for a
qualified use, then-

r
r
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(1) The statutory period for the assessment
of any additional tax under subsection [2032,A](c)
attributable to such disposition or cessation
shall not expire before the expiration of 3 years
from the date the Secretary is notified (in such
manner as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe) of such disposition or cessation (or if
later in the case of an involuntary conversion or
exchange to which subsection [2032,A](h) or (i)
applies, 3 years from the date the Secretary is

r
r
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notified of the replacement of the converted property or of an intention not to replace or of the
exchange of property, and
(2) Such additional tax may be assessed
before the expiration of such 3-year period notwithstanding the provisions of any other law or
rule of law which would otherwise prevent such
assessment.
The key concept here is that unless some notice of a recapture
event is given to the IRS which a court deems to be sufficient to
start the statute of limitations running against the IRS, the IRS
can assert personal liability for §203~A recapture tax liability
against the qualified heir, or perhaps even against the qualified
heir's legal successors, 50 years or more after the original
decedent's death!
Undoubtedly the IRS will publish a form similar to Form
706-A to use to report §20s7 recapture events and file with
paYment of the §20s7 recapture tax.
10.

-

....
I

Special Lien For §20s7 Recapture Tax

§20s7(i)(3)(P) provides that rules similar to §6324B
(relating to special lien for additional estate tax) shall apply
for all purposes of §20s7.

...l

Letter Ruling 8228003 states that when a qualified heir
dies and there can no longer be any §203~A(c) additional estate
tax due, the District Director can exercise his discretion and
issue a certificate of discharge of lien.
See also !14.04 for an explanation of how the amount of
the lien is usually computed by the IRS.
Since §20s7 can be elected for QFOBI's with respect to
non-real estate assets, it remains to be seen how a §20s7 lien
will be imposed on such assets. The §20s7 lien is not an inchoate lien like the general estate tax lien under §6324i instead,
like the §203~A lien under §6324B(c)(1) which incorporates by
reference the §6166 lien rule of §6324A(d)(1), the §20s7 lien
must be filed by the IRS. presumably, the §20s7 lien will be
filed by the IRS just before it issues an estate tax closing
letter which accepts a §20s7 election made on Form 706, just like
it has filed §2032A liens.

....
'I

Hopefully, the IRS will only file a §20s7 lien against
non-real estate assets after prior consultation with the estate's
representative and a determination that such filing is absolutely
necessary to protect the government's legitimate security interest in being able to collect the §20s7 recapture tax if a §20s7
recapture event occurs. In this respect the §20s7 lien procedure
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should be more similar to the §6166 lien procedure under §6324A
than to the §203ZA lien procedure under §6324B, which is to
automatically file the §203ZA lien against all real estate valued
under §203ZA.
The §6166 lien is only filed when an estate is closed
prior to the making of the final tax paYment under the §6166
election and the estate's representative wishes to be discharged
from personal liability for the tax paYments remaining due after
the estate is closed. In that context the §6166 lien is negotiated between the IRS and the estate's representative as to the
amount and the collateral, and under §6324A(d)(3)(C) the §6166
lien is subordinate to real property construction or improvement
financing and even to a farm operating line of credit.
The §2057 lien should not have to be filed against all
of the family-owned business property. Instead, it should be
filed only against enough assets to secure the amount of the
potential §2057 recapture tax, and such assets should be selected
to assure the least commercial interruption of the family business.
When the QFOBI is an interest in an entity which owns
the business assets, one might think that the lien would be on
the interest in the entity, and not on the business assets owned
by the entity. However, under §203ZA when the qualified real
property has been owned by an entity in which the decedent had an
interest, the lien has been filed against the real estate owned
by the entity and not against the decedent's interest in the
entity.
D.

"OTHER TAX CONSEOUENCES" OF §2057 ELECTION

The "other tax consequences" of a §2057 election are
described in Chapter 15. A very brief summary of those other tax
consequences is as follows:
1.

Income Tax Basis Consequences of §2057 Election

The §2057 election does not reduce the qualified heir'S
income tax basis under §1014.
2.

GST Tax Consequences of §2057 Election

The §2057 election will be disregarded for all purposes
of Chapter 13, including the allocation of the decedent's GST
exemption and the computation of any direct skip GST tax imposed
at the decedent's death as to which the decedent is the transferor. This will greatly complicate tax formula drafting in
estate plans for clients who may wish to utilize §2057, GST
planning, and marital deduction formula planning (see H(8) in
this outline below).

r
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3.

S2032A Consequences of S2057 Election

It is clear that an estate can elect to have both
and §2057 apply if the estate meets the eligibility
requirements for both sections.

-

In determining whether the §203~A 50% and 25% tests are
met if §2057 is also elected, fair market values are to be used
in the numerator and denominator of the fraction for each test
(those tests are determined without applying either §203~A or
§2057).

-

In determining whether the §2057 50% test is met if
is also elected, the §203~A values of the QFOBI assets are
to be used in the numerator of the fraction, and the denominator
of the fraction is reduced by the §2032A value reduction for the
estate.

,

§203~A

§203~A

If an estate is eligible for the elections under both
sections and makes both elections, the §2032A value reductions
are applied first, and then the §2057 deduction applies to the
§203~A value of the QFOBI assets which are also §2032A qualified
real property, as well as to the fair market value of other QFOBI
assets.
4.

S6166 Consequences of S2057 Election

The numerator and denominator of the §6166 fraction
which determines both the eligibility for §6166 and the amount of
estate tax payable under §6166 are not reduced by the §2057
deduction. Oddly, this means that the §2057 election does not
decrease the percentage of the estate tax payable in installments, even though it reduces the estate tax value of the business assets!
5.

S303 Consequences of S2057 Election

The numerator and denominator of the §303 fraction
which determines eligibility for §303 is not reduced by the §2057
deduction.
6.

Marital Deduction Consequences of S2057 Election
a.

In General

(1) There are no adverse consequences of the
§2057 election or the §2057 recapture tax as to the eligibility
of QFOBI's for the marital deduction or the valuation of QFOBI's
for purposes of the marital deduction.
(2) The valuation of QFOBI's for purposes of the
marital deduction is not reduced by the §2057 deduction or the
potential §2057 recapture tax.
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(3) There are no adverse gift tax or eligibility
for estate tax marital deduction consequences relating to the
executor's discretion to make the §2057 election, even if the
executor is the surviving spouse.
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b.

Most Marital Deduction Formula's will Automatically Adjust to 52057

If §2057 is elected, it reduces the amount of the gross
estate for purposes of computing the federal estate tax. Therefore, the §2057 deduction reduces dollar for dollar the amount of
marital deduction which is needed to reduce the federal estate
tax to zero or to whatever amount of tax is desired in the estate
of the first spouse to die. This means that under any typical
marital deduction formula which provides that the marital gift is
to be the smallest amount necessary to produce the lowest possible total of federal estate tax and state death taxes computed by
reference to the §2011 credit, the amount of the §2057 value
exclusion will automatically be included in the "bypass" or nonmarital deduction part of the disposition.
For example, if the fair market value of the gross
estate is $1,500,000, which includes $800,000 of QFOBI's for
which a §2057 election can be made, if there are no deductions
available other than the marital deduction, if there have been no
lifetime gifts which have "used up" unified credit, and if the
will contains a typical pre-§2057 marital deduction formula gift
of the type described in the preceding paragraph, then the
following computations show the fair market value amounts allocable to the "marital" and "bypass" trusts with and without a §2057
election if the decedent dies in 1998:
Without 52033A
Gross Estate

$1,500,000
(875,000)

Formula Allocation to
Marital Trust or residue
to Marital Trust
Residue or Formula Allocation
to Bypass Trust
*

$

625,000

With 52033A
$1,500,000*
(200,000)

$1,300,000*

These fair market values are each reduced by $675,000 for
tax purposes because of the $675,000 §2057 deduction, meaning that the estate tax value of the gross estate is
$825,000 and of the Bypass Trust is $625,000. The applicable exclusion amount for estates of 1998 decedents is
$625,000, so there are no estate taxes, whether §2057 is
elected or not.

One observation to make about marital deduction formula's after 1997 is that they should not refer to any specific
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dollar amounts to be allocated to the bypass part of the estate,
since the applicable exclusion amount increases in all but 2
years from 1998 to 2006. Another observation is that the formula
needs to refer to state estate taxes computed with respect to the
§2011 credit, in addition to federal estate taxes, or else the
formula could result in some state estate taxes being payable,
which is generally not intended. A final observation is that the
formula should not refer to §2010 or the unified credit, the
applicable credit or the applicable exclusion amount if §2057
might be elected.
As long as the above guideline~ are followed, it does
not matter, as far as.the amounts allocated to the marital and
bypass trusts with or without a §2057 election, what type of
marital deduction formula is used; a pecuniary marital lead (true
pecuniary or 64-19), a pecuniary exemption equivalent lead, or a
fractional will each produce the above results. There is no
taxable gain (with respect to the §2057 deduction) resulting from
using a QFOBI to fund a pecuniary amount because the income tax
basis of the QFOBI is not reduced by the §2057 election.
c.

DECIDING WHETHER TO MAKE THE §2057 ELECTION

If an estate includes one or more QFOBI's and the
estate meets all of the §2057 eligibility requirements described
in i10.02, then it must be decided whether the estate should make
a §2057 election on Form 706 (as described in i10.06) if that
election will save estate taxes. Before making this decision,
several very important questions need to be seriously considered
and discussed with the qualified heirs who will have to sign the
§2057 agreement if the §2057 election is made. Those questions
should include the following:
1.

-

Non-Tax Considerations Arising From §2057 Reduction of Amount of Marital Deduction Needed For Tax
Pu:r:poses

Finally, it should be noted that in estate plans where
the bypass trust is not for the benefit of the surviving spouse
there may be a non-tax concern about letting the §2057 deduction
reduce the amount allocated to the marital trust in the manner
shown in the above example. One way to address that concern
would be to provide that to the extent the bypass trust exceeds a
certain amount or a certain fraction of the fair market value of
the gross estate, that excess amount would be held in a separate
trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse.
E.

-

-

J

Are the qualified heirs fairly certain that they
want to retain the QFOBI in family ownership for
at least 10 years after the date of the decedent's
death?
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2.

will each of the qualified heirs be able to meet
the material participation requirements for at
least 7 years after the date of the decedent's
death (5 years out of each 8 year period), either
directly or through a family member of that qualified heir?

3.

Will the QFOBI continue to be an interest in a
"trade or business" with respect to each qualified
heir, either directly through a family member of
that qualified heir, for 10 years after the date
of the decedent's death?

4.

Is the estate tax savings which results from the
§2057 election sufficient to justify any "cost"
incurred by the qualified heirs or their family
members for doing (or not doing) things in order
to avoid the §2057 recapture tax?

5.

Does
tion
fied
rata

6.

If the answer to 5 is "No", can some agreement be
worked out after the decedent's death among the
heirs to eliminate this "unfairness"?

7.

Will the business be able to operate in "normal"
fashion with its assets subject to the §2057 lien
described in 114.117

8.

Are the consequences of the §2057 election on
other tax provisions (as described in Chapter 15)
acceptable?

r
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the estate tax savings from the §2057 elecbenefit the same persons who are the qualiheirs who will be personally liable for pro
portions of the §2057 recapture tax?

If the answer to all of the above questions (or all except
question 5) is "Yes", then the executor will probably want to
make the §2057 election on Form 706 if the qualified heirs will
sign the §2057 agreement.
F.

MAKING THE S2057 ELECTION ON FORM 706
1.

The Election

§2057(b)(1)(B) provides that §2057 will not apply to an
estate unless "the executor elects the application of this
section and files the agreement referred to in subsection (h)".
§2057(i)(3)(H) provides that rules similar to
§2032A(d)(1) and (3) (relating to election; agreement) shall
apply for purposes of §2057.

r
r
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a.

Late Filing May Not Be Fatal, If Election Made on
First Filed Return

§2032.A(d)(1) provides that "the election under this
section shall be made on the return of tax imposed by section
2001" (Form 706). It goes on to provide that "such election
shall be made in such manner as the Secretary shall by regulation
prescribe. Such an election, once made, shall be irrevocable".
Presumably, this means that the §2057 can be made on a late filed
Form 706, as long as it is made on the first Form 706 filed on or
after the due date (including any extension thereof), which is
the rule for making §2032.A elections.
Hopefully, the IRS will soon publish a new Form 706
which includes a new Schedule on which to make the §2057 election
and detailed instructions related thereto. Hopefully, that
Schedule will be even more complete and detailed with respect to
the §2057 election than Schedule A-1 is for the §2032.A election.
b.

-

-

Defective Elections Curable Under Newly Liberalized §203~A(d)(3)

§2032.A(d)(3) provides as follows:
(3) MODIFICATION OF ELECTION AND AGREEMENT TO BE
PERMITTED-The Secretary shall prescribe procedures
which provide that in any case in which the executor
makes an election under paragraph (1) (and submits the
agreement referred to in paragraph (2» within the time
prescribed therefor, but (A) the notice of election, as filed, does
not contain all required information, or
(B) signatures of 1 or more persons required
to enter into the agreement described in paragraph
(2) are not included on the agreement as filed, or
the agreement does not contain all required information,
the executor will have a reasonable period of time (not
exceeding 90 days) after notification of such failures
to provide such information or signatures.
Hopefully, this provision will make it possible for §2057 elections not to undergo the horrible history of defective §2032.A
elections, which could have been avoided if the above provisions
had been enacted in the early years after 1976, instead of on
August 5, 1997. It appears that especially prior to the pUblication of a comprehensive §2057 election schedule by the IRS as
part of a revised Form 706, any reasonable attempt to make the
§2057 election and file a §2057 agreement should be sufficient to
enable the estate to take advantage of the opportunity to provide
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any supplemental information or signatures within a reasonable
period after an IRS request therefor. Nevertheless, the §2057
election and agreement filed with Form 706 should be as complete
as possible.
c.

Once Made, Election is Irrevocable

§2032A(d)(1) provides that once the §203~A election is
made, it is irrevocable. For this reason, it will usually not be
a good idea to file the Form 706 making the §2057 election much
before its due date, since §2032A(d)(1) is also applicable to
§2057 elections.
d.

What If More Than One Return Filed Before Due
Date?

Although there is no regulation, case or ruling which
specifically addresses this issue, it would appear by analogy to
the temporary regulations under §2032 (Treas. Reg. §301.91006T(b)(1», which are based on statutory language in §203~(d)(1)
that is virtually identical to the statutory language in
§203~A(d)(1), that if more than one tax return is filed before
the due date, the last return filed on or before the due date
will be considered the first and only return filed for purposes
of the §2057 election. Although there is no explicit authority
on this issue as to §203~A elections, it appears that the analogy
to §203~ is a good one and it is understood that in practice this
has been the position of the IRS. It is believed that the IRS
will take the same position as to §2057 elections when more than
one estate tax return is filed on or before the due date.
e.

Filing The Return Late is Sometimes Not a Problem

If an estate does not owe any estate taxes, then there
is no penalty or interest payable as a result of filing an estate
tax return late. This means that if an executor is certain that
no estate tax will be due under any circumstances, for example,
because of a formula marital deduction provision in the decedent's will, then the executor can just wait until the documents
necessary for the §2057 election are available and then file the
first estate tax return late with the §2057 election.
f.

Getting Extension of Time to File Return

If an executor does not want to file the estate tax
return making the §2057 election late, and all of the §2057
election documents are not available by the due date for the
estate tax return, then the executor has several alternative ways
of applying for extensions of time to file from the IRS.

r

r
r
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(1)

Form 4768

One alternative is filing a Form 4768 asking for the
maximum one time 6 month extension of time to file Form 706,
which is routinely granted by the IRS. It is best to file this
Form 4768 within five or six months after the decedent's death,
but as long as it is filed on or prior to the 9 month due date,
it will usually be granted. One disadvantage of this alternative
is that the estimated amount of estate tax which will be payable
on the Form 706 must be filed with Form 4768. Of course, if a
§6166 election will be made, then only the estimated amount of
estate tax not deferrable under §6166 has to be paid with Form
4768.
(2)

Revenue Procedure 92-85

Another alternative is to carefully follow the procedure described in Revenue Procedure 92-85, 1992-2 C.B. 490, as
modified by T.D. 8680 filed with the Federal Register on June 26,
1996, to obtain an automatic 12-month extension of time to file
the §2057 election if an audit has not commenced. Although this
technique does not specifically apply to §2057, it must be
assumed that this technique will also be available for §2057
elections.
(3)

-

Treas. Reg. S301.9100-1(a)

A third alternative would be to apply for an extension
of time to file the §2057 election for reasonable cause under
Treas. Reg. §301.9100-1(a), by carefully following all of the
requirements under that regulation. Examples of this alternative
for §203~A elections are described in Letter Ruling 9612010 and
Technical Advice Memoranda 9204005 and 9215003, and it must be
assumed that this technique will also be available for §2057
elections.
2.

The Agreement

§2057(h) provides that "the agreement referred to in
this subsection is a written agreement signed by each person in
being who has an interest (whether or not in possession) in any
property designated in such agreement consenting to the application of subsection (f) with respect to such property". §2057(f)
imposes the §2057 recapture tax. presumably, the IRS will
develop a form of the agreement it wishes to be used for this
purpose, and that form will be published as part of the new Form
706 Schedule to be used to make the §2057 election, just as the
form of the §203~A agreement is Part 3 of Schedule A-1 on pages
10 and 11 of Form 706.

-
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a.

Similar To S203±A Agreement

Presumably, the IRS will publish regulations as to who
must sign the §2057 agreement which are similar to Treas. Reg.
§20.203~A-8(c), except that the portions of that regulation which
have been held invalid by the courts should be revised or deleted.
See !9.09 for a detailed explanation of the §203~A
agreement, most of which will be equally applicable to the §2057
agreement.
b.
§203~A

Some Differences From S2032A Agreement

=

The §2057(h) agreement does appear to differ from the
agreement in some respects.
(1)

Property Must Be Designated in Agreement

§2057(h) requires that the property to which such
agreement applies must be designated in the agreement, and states
that when the qualified heir signs the agreement the consent to
the application of the §2057(f) recapture tax will only apply to
the property designated in the agreement. This suggests that a
partial §2057 election can be made by only designating part of
the decedent's QFOBI's in the agreement. Nothing in §2057
specifies what QFOBI's must be designated in the agreement.
Further, the §2057 lien can only be recorded as to property
designated in the agreement. For this purpose, it is not clear
whether the decedent's interest in the business entity (the
t1QFOBItI) should be designated in the agreement, or instead
whether the particular business assets owned by the entity which
are to be subject to the lien should be designated in the agreement.
(2)

Not Clear Whether All Oualified Heirs Have to
Sign Agreement

If only some of the heirs receiving fractional interests in the QFOBI from the decedent sign the agreement, perhaps
that will result in another type of §2057 partial election.
Alternatively, it appears literally possible under the §2057
statute for a business interest passing to a qualified heir to
meet the QFOBI definition to qualify for the §2057 deduction even
if the qualified heir does not sign the agreement.
(3)

Regulations Needed

Obviously, the §2057 regulations will have to answer
many questions about who must sign the §2057 agreement and what
property must be designated in it.

r

r
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3.

...

Protective Election

§2057 does not make any mention of protective elections. Neither does §203~A. However, Treas. Reg. §20.203~A-8(b)
establishes a very liberal protective elective procedure for
§203~A election, although in the years since 1980 when the §203~A
regulations were published, the IRS has shown signs of being much
more restrictive in administering S203~A protective elections in
several technical advice memoranda, and it may well be that in
the process of considering whether to permit §2057 protective
elections the Treasury Department will revise the §203~A protective election regulation. See !9.10 for a complete discussion of
the §203~A protective election and the current status of that
technique.
4.

Partial Election

-

One of the most controversial and important issues
under §2057 is whether the statute and the legislative history
(Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act) will "permit" the Treasury Department to authorize partial §2057 elections. Policy
considerations and administrative convenience and simplification
considerations mitigate very heavily in favor of allowing partial
§2057 elections, and there is a basis in both the statute and the
Conference Agreement for finding that Congress intended that
§2057 partial elections could be made. Hopefully, the Treasury
Department in its initial published guidance on §2057 will
determine that partial §2057 elections can be made and describe
how to make a §2057 partial election.
a.

Policy Considerations

The policy considerations are based on the purpose of
§2057, which is to relieve qualified family-owned businesses from
some of their estate tax burden, in other words to help qualified
family-owned businesses survive. One consideration that flows
from this purpose and favors the allowance of partial §2057
elections is to allow businesses to decide which of its assets
should be encumbered with the §2057 recapture restrictions and
lien and which assets should be free of those encumbrances.
Allowing an estate to elect §2057 as to some assets and not as to
others would be consistent with that policy consideration.
Another policy consideration which flows from the
purpose of helping qualified family-owned businesses is to allow
families to determine which family members should materially
participate in the business in the next generation, rather than
requiring all of them to materially participate because of the
tax law. Because of the restrictive nature of the family member
definition in §203~A(e)(2) which applies for purposes of §2057,
it will be desirable in some estates not to elect §2057 on the
business interests left to some heirs while electing it on the

...
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business interests left to other heirs. Again, allowing §2057
partial elections is consistent with this policy consideration.
Finally, it will help family businesses to be able to
elect §2057 on only enough QFOBI to produce the optimal tax
results, and allowing §2057 partial elections will do that.

b.

Administrative Convenience and Simplification

The considerations of administrative convenience and
simplification for both the government and taxpayers mitigate
even more heavily in favor of allowing §2057 partial elections.
For taxpayers the ability to elect §2057 on only the more fixed
and permanent assets of the business will greatly simplify
compliance with the §2057 recapture period requirements and
living with the §2057 lien on those assets, instead of also
having more transitory assets such as accounts receivable,
inventory, small equipment and other assets also subject to those
requirements and the lien. The government will also find it much
easier to have the §2057 lien apply only to the more permanent
assets, and it will also be able to more effectively collect the
§2057 recapture tax from those assets, because the Conference
Agreement for the 1997 Act states that "a sale or disposition, in
the ordinary course of business, of assets such as inventory or a
piece of equipment used in the business (e.g., the sale of crops
or a tractor) would not result in recapture of the benefits of "
§2057. Unless estates are allowed to exclude these types of
assets from the §2057 election, the government will have a
terrible time trying to police transactions involving these
assets for 10 years and to determine which transactions involving
those assets are in the "ordinary course of business". Further,
the government might even not be able to fUlly collect §2057
recapture tax with respect to these assets in some cases because
of the language in the Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act and
how the recapture tax is computed under the method of
§2057(f) (2) (C).
It would also greatly simplify the compliance with
§2057 for many families if §2057 could be elected only as to the
business interests passing to the heirs who are actively involved
in the business, and the government would certainly find it
simpler to be involved with fewer qualified heirs.
c.

Statutory Basis

Fortunately, given the high desirability of permitting
§2057.partial elections, there is a basis in both the statute and
the Conference Agreement for the 1997 Act for finding that
Congress intended partial elections to be permissible. In the
statute, §2057(h) states that the §2057 agreement must be signed
by "each person in being who has an interest • . • in any property designated in such agreement". The words "any property"
must refer to partiCUlar business assets and not to the interests
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of the qualified heirs in the business, in the context of that
sentence in the statute. If it was not possible to exclude some
of the business assets from the §2057 election, why would it be
necessary to identify particular business property in the agreement? It should be possible to make a §2057 partial election
just by not including some of the business property in the §2057
agreement, based on this reading of §2057(h).
d.

The Conference Agreement

There is also a basis for finding that Congress intended for §2057 partial elections to be possible because of the
last paragraph in the .Senate Report in the Conference Agreement
for the 1997 Act, which is analyzed in !14.06. Basically, either
that paragraph is referring to a §2057 partial election or it is
an incorrect explanation of how the §2057 recapture tax works.
See C(6) above in this outline.
e.

Treasury Should Allow Partial Elections Without
Artificial Restrictions

Hopefully, the Treasury Department will publish procedures for making a §2057 partial election in the initial guidance
it publishes under §2057, because there are strong reasons why
such elections should be allowed and there is a basis in the
statute and the Conference Agreement for finding that Congress
intended §2057 partial elections to be allowed.
In considering §2057 partial elections, the Treasury
Department should remember the reaction of the courts when it
tried to be too restrictive in allowing §203~A partial elections.
§20.203~A-8(a)(2) in the §2032A Final Regulations provides that
if any of the decedent's property is to be valued under §203~A,
the executor must elect §203~A valuation on sufficient property
to satisfy §203~A(b)(1)(B) (the 25% test for qualifying for
§2032A). However, in Miller v. U.S., 88-1 USTC !13,757 (March 9,
1988) the federal district court for the Central District of
Illinois held that portion of the Final Regulations to be invalid, and the government did not appeal and has apparently
acquiesced in that decision. The Service's analysis in Revenue
Ruling 87-122 and General Counsel Memorandum 39680 are superseded
and invalidated by the Miller case.
G.

~

_

-

,
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...

DRAFTING FOR S2057

Drafting for §2057 is sometimes inconsistent with
otherwise good estate planning techniques. Thus, drafting for
§2057 requires balancing other estate planning considerations
against the requirements of §2057.
This balanci~g requires consideration of many factors:
the particular clause ln question, the client's desires, the
likelihood that §2057 will be elected, the size of the client's
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estate, the percentage of the client's estate which consists of
QFOBI for which §20S7 might be elected, personal drafting preferences and other considerations.
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The three special problem areas in §20S7 drafting are:
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1.

Avoiding the §20S7 recapture tax;

2.

The successive interest rule; and

3.

Tax payment clauses.

Besides the three special problem areas in §20S7
drafting, there are other drafting considerations which are
related to the §20S7 election. For example, the drafting attorney should consider using a "bootstrap" clause providing that the
document should be interpreted so as to permit the §20S7 election
and the avoidance of a recapture tax. Both of these aspects of
the clause should explicitly permit the fiduciary to intentionally elect to incur a recapture tax or not to elect §20S7 in the
first instance.
The three special problem areas in §20S7 drafting are
extremely analogous to those same special problem areas in §203~A
drafting, which are discussed in detail in !S.02, !S.04 and
!S.OS. The discussion of those problem areas in §203~A drafting
in Chapter S is applicable by analogy to those same problem areas
in §20S7 drafting.
Chapter 16 provides a detailed discussion of various
issues that arise when QFOBI's for which §20S7 is elected pass
from the decedent to a trust for the benefit of qualified heirs
instead of outright to qualified heirs.
H.

ESTATES WHICH MAY BE ELIGIBLE TO ELECT EITHER OR BOTH 52032A
AND 520S7
1.

In General

There are many farm estates which should be able to
qualify for both the §203ZA value reduction and the §20S7 deduction. There are several special concerns to consider when doing
estate planning for such clients. Some of those special concerns
are as follows:
a.

will Both Elections be Needed?
(1)

If not, which one should be made?

(2)

If so, how much estate tax can be saved by
electing both?

B - 43

b.

c.

d.

Can The Percentage Eligibility Requirements be Met
For Both Sections If Maximum Elections Are Made
Under Both Sections?
(1)

If not, can less than maximum elections be
made under one or both sections to achieve a
combined result which is better than just one
of the maximums?

(2)

If not, which section should be elected if
the maximum election under one is the only
thing possible or is as good as the best
combined election?

Can The Other Pre-Death Eligibility Requirements
Be Meet For Both Sections?
(1)

Material Participation for both?

(2)

Ownership for both?

(3)

Qualified Use for

(4)

Trade or business for §2057?

§203~A?

Can The Recapture Taxes Be Avoided Under Both
Sections?
(1)

No dispositions to non-family members of
qualified heirs under both sections?

(2)

Material participation by qualified heirs or
their family members under both sections?

(3)

No cessation of qualified use by qualified
heirs under §203~A?

(4)

Continuance of trade or business by qualified
heirs or their family members under §2057?

e.

What Type of Marital Deduction Formula Should Be
Used If Both Sections Might Be Elected?

f.

What Type of GST Formula's Should Be Used If Both
Sections Might Be Elected?

g.

(1)

For the client who is not married?

(2)

For clients who are married?

-

...
.J

...

...

Drafting concerns under both sections:
(1)

IISuccessive interest ll rule
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Avoiding recapture taxes

(3)

Fairly balancing allocation of estate tax
savings from both elections with recapture
tax liability under both sections

The following portions of this outline will discuss most of the
above special concerns.
2.

Maximum Potential Estate Tax Savings From Combined
Maximum Elections Under Both §2032A and §2057

-

a.

For the Client Who Is Not Married

For a client who is not married, who dies in 1998, who
has sufficient assets, and who can meet the eligibility requirements for both §2032A and §2057 even if maximum elections are
made under both sections, the following fair market value amount
of assets can be transferred at death without estate taxes if
maximum elections are made under both §203ZA and §2057:
Gross Estate
§2032A Value Reduction
§2057 Value Deduction
Taxable Estate
Tentative Tax
Applicable Credit
Estate Taxes

Gross Estate
Tentative Tax
Applicable Credit
Estate Taxes

o

$2,050,000
$ 805,300
(202,050)
$ 603,250

This is the amount of estate tax savings from the combined
maximum election under both sections - $603,2501
b.

For Clients Who Are Married

For married clients who can structure their asset
ownership perfectly and have "perfect" tax formula will or trust
documents, it will be possible to pass $4,100,000 of farm assets
to succeeding generations without paying any estate taxes,
thereby saving $1,206,500 of estate taxes by making maximum
elections under both sections in both estates, if both spouses
die in 1998.
Even larger farm estates can benefit from the new 2%
interest rate under §6166 and pay the approximate $850,000 of
estate taxes (if half is paid for each estate) on an additional

r,
rI

$2,050,000
(750,000)
(675,000)
$ 625,000
$ 202,050
(202,050)

If neither §203ZA nor §2057 was elected, then the estate taxes
would be computed as follows:

r
r

(2)
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$2,000,000 of farm assets (if each spouse owns $3,050,000) over
14 years at a 2% interest rate.

J

It is fair to say that the 1997 Act has gone a long way
toward eliminating the federal estate tax on all but the very
largest farm estates. However, it is even more important than
ever before that very sophisticated farm estate planning be done
for every si~ificant farm estate in order to take advantage of
these very complicated estate tax savings provisions.
3.

The Marital Deduction Formula For Married Clients Whose
Estates May Elect Either or Both §2032A and §2057

--

As explained in !10.0a, it does not matter too much
which marital deduction formula is used for a §2057 estate, as
long as the pecuniary marital lead 64-19 formula is not used.
However, it is crucial that the pecuniary marital lead date of
funding fair market value formula be used in estates for which a
§203~A election may be made, so that same formula is the one
formula that should always be used when both §203~A and §2057 may
be elected. The reason that this formula must be used whenever a
§203~A election may be made is explained in great detail in
!5.03.
The marital deduction formula referred to in the
preceding paragraph which should be used when either or both
§203~A and §2057 may be elected is:
As of the date of death, the trustee shall divide and
allocate the trust property, including property to which the
trustee may be entitled under my will or from any other
source, remaining after providing for the allocations and
payments contemplated above (referred to below as "net trust
property") as follows:
a. If my spouse is living at my death, the
trustee shall establish out of "eligible marital deduction property" (defined below) a separate trust named
for my spouse and shall allocate to that trust the
smallest pecuniary amount, if any, which if allocated
to that trust would result in the lowest possible total
of federal estate tax and state death taxes (but only
those state death taxes which are estate taxes computed
by reference to the credit allowable under Internal
Revenue Code §2011 or successor provisions) payable
from all sources by reason of my death.
b. After providing for the establishment of the
trust named for my spouse, if any, the trustee shall
allocate the balance of the net trust property to a
separate trust named the "Family Trust".
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c. "Eligible marital deduction property" means
that part of the net trust property which is included
in my gross estate for federal estate tax purposes and
as to which, if so included, it is possible, by election or otherwise, to obtain a federal estate tax
marital deduction with respect to such included property.
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d. The "smallest pecuniary amount" described in
subparagraph (a) above shall be determined as if a
federal estate tax marital deduction is allowed for
property allocated to the trust named for my spouse, is
not allowed for property allocated to the Family Trust,
and, in all other respects, after giving effect to the
exercise or proposed exercise of tax elections. The
words used to describe the smallest pecuniary amount
shall not be construed as requiring any particular
exercise of any tax election.

r
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e. Each item of net trust property allocated in
kind to the trust named for my spouse pursuant to
SUbparagraph (a) above shall be valued for purposes of
satisfying the pecuniary amount described in that
subparagraph at the value of such item at the actual
date of allocation to such trust.
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4.

S2032A Value Reduction Does Leverage $1,000,000 GST
Exemption

The GST exemption available to each transferor (client)
is $1,000,000. The exemption can be allocated to lifetime gifts
or to transfers at the death of the transferor.
A very important issue concerning allocation of the GST
exemption at the farm client's death is whether the $1,000,000 is
allocated based on the §203~A value or the fair market value of
the assets involved in the generation-skipping transfer.
Internal Revenue Code §2642(b)(2)(A) specifies that Chapter 11
values shall be used in determining the applicable fraction (the
mechanical way that the GST exemption is allocated by §2642(a».
If §203~A is elected, then the Chapter 11 value is the §203~A
value.
Therefore, each farm client can leave as much as
$1,750,000 in fair market value of §2032A farmland in a generation-skipping transfer fully sheltered from GST tax by the
client's $1,000,000 (Chapter 11 §203~A value) GST exemption. A
married couple could leave up to $3,500,000 in such transfers
that would not be subject to estate tax or GST tax at the deaths
of their children.

r
r
I
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The GST final regulations published on December 27,
1995 have confirmed that §203~A valuation does leverage the GST
exemption in this manner. See !8.02.
5.

..J

S2057 Value Deduction Does Not Leverage $1,000,000 GST
Exemption

The §2057 value deduction is disregarded for all
purposes of the generation-skipping transfer ("GST") tax under
Chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code.

....1

..
it
j

In particular, for purposes of allocating GST exemption
at the transferor's death to QFOBI's SUbject to a §2057 election,
the Chapter 11 value of the QFOBI determined without regard to
§2057 has to be used. This creates some additional complexity in
designing GST tax formula allocations in will and trust documents. It is also a disadvantage of electing §2057 compared to
electing §203~A, because §203~A values can be used for purposes
of allocating GST exemption.
§2057 also has no effect on the computation of GST tax
payable as a result of a direct skip occurring at the death of
the transferor, whereas §2032A values can be used in such computation.
6.

J
..J

-

S2032A-GST Tax Formula For the Unmarried Client

If a §203~A election may be made, the tax formula to
use to allocate the largest possible amount of the unmarried
client's assets to trusts sheltered from GST tax and estate tax
at the deaths of the first generation beneficiaries (client's
children, nieces, nephews, etc.) is as follows:
The trustees (or executors) shall set apart out of the
net trust property (or residue of my estate) a pecuniary amount equal to the excess, if any, of the value of
the net trust property (or residue of my estate) as
finally determined for federal estate tax purposes in
my estate over the "GST exempt amount" defined below,
and the trustees (executors) shall allocate said pecuniary amount to equal separate primary trusts named,
respectively, for
The trustees (executors) shall allocate the balance of the net trust
property to equal separate exemption trusts named,
respectively, for
• Each item of net trust
property (or of the residue of my estate) allocated in
kind to the primary trusts created above shall be
valued for purposes of satisfying the pecuniary amount
described above at the value of such item at the actual
date of allocation to any of such trusts. The "GST
exempt amount" means the unused portion of my GST
exemption (as described in Internal Revenue Code Section 2631) remaining after all allocations of such ex-
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emption before or after my death other than to the
exemption trusts created above.
The primary trusts referred to above are trusts over
which the first generation beneficiaries (children, nieces,
nephews, etc.) have inter vivos and/or testamentary general
powers of appointment, making the primary trusts subject to
estate tax and not GST tax at the deaths of those beneficiaries.
If desired, outright gifts of the formula amount could be made to
those beneficiaries, instead of allocating that amount to primary
trusts.
By having the formula structured as above, the §203~A
value reduction will all be allocated to the exemption trusts
rather than the primary trusts, thereby making it possible to
allocate as much as $1,750,000 of fair market value farmland with
a §2032A value of $1,000,000 to the exemption trusts which will
be wholly exempt from GST tax by allocation of the client's
$1,000,000 GST exemption to those trusts.
Treas. Reg. §26.2642-2(b)(3) and (4) of the GST final
regulations permit non-§2032A property to be allocated to the
exemption trusts under this type of formula without losing the
benefit of leveraging the GST exemption with §203~A values.
7.

GST Formula For Unmarried Client Whose Estate May Elect
Either or Both §2032A and §2057

-

For the unmarried client whose estate may elect either
or both §203~A and §2057, the formula which should be used is as
follows:
The trustees (or executors) shall set apart out of the
net trust property (or residue of my estate) a pecuniary amount equal to the excess, if any, of the value of
the net trust property (or residue of my estate) as
finally determined for federal estate tax purposes in
my estate over the "GST exempt amount" defined below,
and the trustees (executors) shall allocate said pecuniary amount to equal separate primary trusts named,
respectively, for
The trustees (executors) shall allocate the balance of the net trust
property to equal separate exemption trusts named,
respectively, for
• Each item of net trust
property (or of the residue of my estate) allocated in
kind to the primary trusts created above shall be
valued for purposes of satisfying the pecuniary amount
described above at the value of such item at the actual
date of allocation to any of such trusts. The "GST
exempt amount" means the unused portion of my GST
exemption (as described in Internal Revenue Code Section 2631) remaining after all allocations of such ex-
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emption before or after my death other than to the
exemption trusts created above.
If the estate of an unmarried client who dies in 1998
makes maximum elections under both §203~A and §2057 with such a
GST formula in the will or trust document, the maximum fair
market value which could be sheltered by such an estate in a GST
exempt trust would be $1,750,000 ($750,000 + $1,000,000).
8.

GST Formulas For Married Clients Whose Estates May
Elect Either or Both S2032A and S2057

-

When doing estate planning for married clients who want
to do GST planning and whose estate may elect either or both
§203~A and §2057, it is necessary to include second formulas
in
both the marital deduction and the bypass parts of the estate so
that whichever part needs to be divided into GST exempt and nonGST exempt shares or trusts (depending upon whether the §2057
election is made or not) can be so divided. If such clients may
only elect §203~A and definitely will not elect §2057, then the
type of GST formulas described and fully explained in !8.03(2)
should be used. However, if the estates of such clients may
elect either or both §203~A and §2057, then a second formula
needs to be added to divide the bypass part of the estate (Family
Trust) into GST exempt and non-GST exempt shares or trusts, or
perhaps even more tailored formula provisions will be needed or
desirable.

-

-

-

It appears that the following tax formula will produce
the best possible results for married clients whose estates may
elect either or both §2032,A and §2057:
As of the date of my death, the trustee shall
divide and allocate the trust property, including property
to which the trustee may be entitled under my will or from
any other source, remaining after providing for the payments
contemplated above (referred to below as "net trust property") as follows:
(a) If my wife, __________________ , is living
at my death:
(1) The trustee shall establish out of
eligible marital deduction property a
separate share referred to as the "marital share" and shall allocate to that
share the smallest pecuniary amount, if
any, which if allocated to the marital
share would result in the lowest possible total of federal estate tax and
those state death taxes computed by
reference to the credit allowable under
Internal Revenue Code Section 2011 pay-
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able from all sources by reason of my
death. The trustee shall establish the
balance of the net trust property as a
separate share named the "residuary
share".
(2) The trustee shall set apart out of
the residuary share a pecuniary amount
equal to the excess, if any, of the
value of the residuary share as finally
determined for federal estate tax purposes in my estate over the "GST exempt
amount '.' defined below, and the trustee
shall allocate said pecuniary amount to
a separate trust named "Family Trust B".
(3) The trustee shall allocate the
balance of the residuary share to a
separate trust named "Family Trust A".
(4) The trustee shall set apart out of
the marital share a pecuniary amount
equal to the excess, if any, of the
smallest pecuniary amount described in
(1) of this subparagraph over the
amount, if any, of the "GST exempt
amount" defined below which is not allocated to Family Trust A, and the trustee
shall allocate said pecuniary amount to
a separate trust named the "Primary
Marital Trust".
(5) The trustee shall allocate the
remaining balance of the marital share
to a separate trust named the "GST Exempt Trust".
(b) If my wife,
, predeceases me, the trustee shall set apart out of the
net trust property a pecuniary amount equal to the
excess, if any, of the value of the net trust
property as finally determined for federal estate
tax purposes in my estate over the GST exempt
amount, and the trustee shall allocate said pecuniary amount to equal separate primary trusts
named, respectively, for
-:---:-~~-:------The trustee shall allocate the
balance of the net trust property to equal separate exemption trusts named, respectively, for
(c) If my wife is living at my death, I
intend that the Primary Marital Trust and GST
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Exempt Trust shall be eligible to qualify for the
federal estate tax marital deduction in my estate,
and the provisions of this instrument shall be
construed liberally to effect my intent. Therefore, despite any other provisions of this instrument, (i) if necessary to be eligible to qualify
for the federal estate tax marital deduction in my
estate (without regard to whether an election to
so qualify is made), on the death of my wife the
trustee shall pay all accrued or undistributed
income of such trusts to her estate, and (ii) no
right, power or discretion granted to the trustee
or any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity
by the terms of this instrument or by law shall be
exercised or exercisable in a manner which would
cause such trusts (or any property allocated to
such trusts) not to qualify or not to be eligible
to elect to qualify for such deduction.
(d) The "smallest pecuniary amount"
described in subparagraph (a)(l) above shall be
determined as if a federal estate tax marital
deduction is not allowed for property allocated to
Family Trust A and Family Trust B and is allowed
for property allocated to the Primary Marital
Trust and the GST Exempt Trust and, in all other
respects, after giving effect to the exercise or
proposed exercise of tax elections. The words
used to describe the smallest pecuniary amount
shall not be construed as requiring any particular
exercise of any tax election.

...

J

(e) Each item of net trust property allocated in kind to the marital share pursuant to subparagraph (a)(l) above shall be valued for purposes of satisfying the pecuniary amount described
in that subparagraph at the value of such item at
the actual date of allocation to such share.
(f) Each item of net trust property allocated in kind to Family Trust B pursuant to subparagraph (a)(2), to the Primary Marital Trust pursuant to subparagraph (a)(4) or to the primary
trusts named for
pursuant to
subparagraph (b) above shall be valued for purposes of satisfying the pecuniary amounts
described in those subparagraphs at the value of
such item at the actual date of allocation to any
of such trusts.
(g) For purposes of this instrument, the
following definitions shall apply:

...
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"Eligible marital deduction property" means that
part of the net trust property with respect to
which a federal estate tax marital deduction can
be obtained by election or otherwise.
"GST exempt amount" means the unused portion of my
GST exemption (as described in Internal Revenue
Code Section 2631) remaining after all allocations
of such exemption before or after my death other
than to the GST Exempt Trust and Family Trust A.
The trustee may rely conclusively on the certification of the executor as to the amount of such
unused portion.
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If both spouses die in 1998 leaving estates which make
maximum §2032A and §20s7 elections and will and trust documents
that use the-optimal formulas, then the maximum fair market
value which they could shelter in GST exempt trusts would be
$3,500,000 (2 x $1,750,000).
9.

§2032A Conseguences of §20s7 Election

--

§203~A was not amended to refer in any way to a §2033A
election when §2033A was enacted or when §2033A was converted to
§20s7.

The Conference Agreement regarding §2033A when it was
enacted stated that §2033A was being "provided in addition to •••
the special-use provisions of section 203~A".
Nothing in §2033A (new §20s7) indicates that both
and §2033A cannot be elected as to the same estate and
even the same property.
§203~A

Nothing in either §2032A or §20s7 specifically refers
to how the two elections relate to each other if both elections
are made by the same estate.
§203~A(a) provides that if §203~A valuation of qualified real property is elected, then for all purposes of Chapter
11 the value of that property shall be its value determined under
§2032A.

a.

Effect of §20s7 Election on §2032A 50% and 25%
Reguirements
(1)

On Numerator of §2032A 50% and 25% Fractions

For purposes of the 50% and 25% qualification requirements under §203~A(b)(1)(A) and (B), §203~A(b)(3)(B) provides
that the values to be used in computing the numerators of both
fractions are to be the values determined for purposes of Chapter
11 without regard to §203~A. If §20s7 is elected, then for
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purposes of the §203~A 50% and 25% requirements, the Chapter 11
values of the QFOBI's for which the §2057 value deduction is
elected are determined without regard to the §2057 deduction.
(2)

On Denominator of S2032A 50% and 25% Fractions

To determine the denominator of the fractions for both
the 50% and 25% qualification requirements under §203~A(b)(1)(A)
and (B) for an estate which also elects §2057, §203~A(b)(3)(A)
provides that the value of the gross estate to be adjusted to
determine the denominator is the value of the gross estate
determined without regard to §203~A. The §2057 value deduction
reduces the taxable estate, not the gross estate, so the §2057
election does not have any effect on the denominators of the
fractions which determine whether the §203~A 50% and 25% qualification requirements are met.
b.

J

Effect of S2032A Election on S2057 50% Requirement
(1)

On Numerator of S2057 50% Fraction

In meeting the §2057 50% requirement, qualified real
property which is valued under §203~A and which is also a QFOBI
for purposes of §2057 is to be valued at its §2032A value.
§2057(d) clearly states that the value of the QFOBI is its value
for purposes of Chapter 11 determined without regard to §2057,
meaning that it is determined with regard to §203~A.
(2)

.J

On Denominator of S2057 50% Fraction

To determine the denominator for purposes of the §2057
50% of adjusted gross estate requirement for an estate which also
elects §203~A valuation, §2057(c) provides that the "adjusted
gross estate" is to be determined by making adjustments to "the
value of the gross estate" (the gross estate is reduced by the
§2032A value reduction), so the §203~A value reduction of the
denominator does "help" the estate to meet the §2057 50% requirement, but not as much as using the §203~A values in the numerator
of the fraction "hurts" in trying to meet that requirement.
c.

Conclusions

To carry out the clear intent of Congress, technical
corrections legislation should be enacted which amends §2033A(c)
and §2033A(d) so that the values to be used in both the numerator
and denominator of the §2033A 50% requirement fraction are
"values for purposes of Chapter 11 determined without regard to
§203~A and without regard to §2057", since the Conference Agreement stated that an estate could make both elections, and it is
hard to believe Congress intended that by making one of those
elections the qualification requirements for the other election
would not be met.
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d.

(1) EXamPle 1 For example, if a farm estate (of
a decedent who dies in 1998) which otherwise meets the requirements of both §203~A and §2057 consists of farmland with a fair
market value of $1,750,000 and a §2032A value of $1,000,000, and
$300,000 of non-farm assets, then under the above analysis the
§203~A and §2057 percentage requirements would be computed as
follows if both §2032A and §2057 are elected to the maximum
extent possible (assuming no adjustments to any of the numerators
or denominators are applicable):
(A)

r

r
r
r

r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r

§2032A 50% Test

Farm Assets (FMV)
Gross Estate (FMV

r
r

Examples

(B)
§203~A

=

1,750,000

2,050,000

=

85%

§2032A 25% Test

The results of this test are the same as under the
50% test above.
(C)

§2057 50% Test

OFOBI (with §2032A)
Gross Estate (with §2032A)

=

1,750,000 -

=

1,000,000

1,300,000
(D)

750,000

2,050,000 - 750,000

=

77%

Computation of Estate Taxes

The estate meets all the percentage requirements to
elect both §2032A and §2057, and the estate taxes on this estate
would be computed as follows:
Gross Estate
§2032A Value Reduction
§2057 Value Deduction
Taxable Estate
Tentative Tax
Applicable Credit
Estate Taxes

$2,050,000
(750,000)
(675,000)
$ 625,000
$ 202,050
(202,050)

o

(2) Example 2 If the facts in the preceding
example are altered to be that the estate consists of farmland
with a fair market value of $1,425,000 and a §203~A value of
$675,000, and $625,000 of non-farm assets, then the percentage
requirements would be computed as follows:
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(A)

S2032A 50% Test

Farm Assets (FMV)
Gross Estate (FMV
(B)

=

= 1,425,000
2,050,000

70%

S2032A 25% Test

The results of this test are the same as under the
S2032A 50% test above.
(C)

S2057 50% Test

OFOBI (with S2032A)
Gross Estate (with §203ZA)

1,425,000 -

=

=
(D)

750,000

2,050,000 - 750,000
675,000
1,300,000.

=

52%

Computation of Estate Taxes

The estate meets all the percentage requirements to
elect both §203ZA and §2057, and the estate taxes on this estate
would be computed as follows:
$2,050,000
(750,000)
(675,000)
$ 625,000
$ 202,050
(202,050)

Gross Estate
§203ZA Value Reduction
§2057 Value Deduction
Taxable Estate
Tentative Tax
Applicable Credit
Estate Taxes

o

(3) Example 3 If the facts in the preceding
example are altered to be that the estate consists of farmland
with a fair market value of $1,325,000 and a §203ZA value of
$575,000, and $725,000 of non-farm assets, then the percentage
requirements would be computed as follows:
(A)

S2032A 50% Test

Farm Assets (FMV)
Gross Estate (FMV
(B)
§203~A

= 1,325,000
2,050,000

=

65%

S2032A 25% Test

The results of this test are the same as under the
50% test above.
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(C)

,..

OFOBI (with S203~A)
Gross Estate (with §203~A)

r

r
r

r
r
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(D)

= 44%

$2,050,000
(750,000)
$1,300,000
$ 469,800
(202,050)
$ 267,750

(4) Example 4 If in the preceding example the
estate had only elected §203~A valuation of enough farmland to
reduce the §2032A value of the farmland from its $1,325,000 fair
market value down to $725,000 (a $600,000 §203~A value reduction), then the estate could have met the percentage requirements
for electing both §2032A and §2057, computed as follows:
(A)

S2032A 50% Test

Farm Assets (FMV)
Gross Estate (FMV
(B)
'§203~A

= 1,325,000

2,050,000

=

65%

S2032A 25% Test

The results of this test are the same as under the
50% test above.
.(C)

52057 50% Test

OFOBI (with S2032A)
Gross Estate (with §203~A)

=

r
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1,325,000 -

600,000

2,050,000 - 600,000
=

r
r
r

575,000
1,300,000

Computation of Estate Taxes

Gross Estate (FMV)
§2032A Value Reduction
Taxable Estate
Tentative Tax
Applicable Credit
Estate Taxes

r

r
r

750,000

2,050,000 - 750,000

In this example, the estate fails to meet the §2057 50%
requirement because it made the maximum $750,000 value reduction
election under §2032A. As a result the estate taxes on this farm
estate would be computed as follows:

r
r

1,325,000 -

=

=

r

r

S2057 50% Test

725,000
1,450,000

= 50%

(D)

Computation of Estate Taxes

In this last example, the estate meets all the percentage requirements to elect both §203~A and §2057, and the estate
taxes on this estate would be computed as follows:
Gross Estate
§203~A Value Reduction
§2057 Value Deduction
Taxable Estate
Tentative Tax
Applicable Credit
Estate Taxes
Even though there are still $56,000 of estate
farm estate, that is a large improvement over
estate taxes which would have been due if the
value reduction was elected, causing complete
for the §2057 value exclusion.
10.

$2,050,000
(600,000)
(675,000)
$ 775,000
$ 258,050
(202,050)
$
56,000
taxes due on this
the $267,750 of
maximum §2032A
disqualification

J

-

J
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Choosing Between §2032A and §2057

There will be some estates, in almost all cases farm
estates, which can meet the eligibility requirements for both
§203~A and §2057.
Some estates will be able to meet all of those
requirements even if both §203~A and §2057 are actually fully
elected on Form 706, while other estates cannot elect both and
still meet the percentage requirements of both, at least if a
"maximum" election is attempted under both sections. The percentage requirements are very complicated and tricky if both
sections are elected, as explained in !17.09.
If an election under only one section is possible
because of the percentage requirements, or necessary to eliminate
or sufficiently reduce the estate taxes, then which section
should be elected? This is a much more difficult question than
it might at first seem to be. The factors that should be considered in making this decision should include the following:
a.

The §2057 recapture tax is much worse than the
§2032A recapture tax, because §2057 requires interest -to be paid on the recapture tax all the way
back to the original estate tax due date, and
§2032A does not. That interest cannot be computed
with §6166 interest rates and is not deductible on
any tax return.

b.

The §2057 election will not reduce the basis of
the QFOBI assets for income tax purposes by the
amount of the §2057 value deduction, whereas the
income tax basis of the qualified real property is
reduced by the §203~A value reduction for that
property.
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c.

The §2032A election can clearly be made on particular tracts of real estate and not on others, and
does not apply to non-real estate business assets
at all, whereas it appears that the "majority
view" at this time is that a partial §2033A election is not possible, and that all business assets
with respect to the QFOBI, including all real
estate and all non-real estate assets of the business (except perhaps inventory or a piece of
equipment used in the business which is sold in
the ordinary course of business), will be subject
to the §2057 recapture tax lien for 10 years after
the date of the decedent's death.

d.

At this point in time, the consequences of a
§2032A election, while sometimes being onerous and
complicated, are at least known with some certainty, whereas the consequences of a §2057 election are not only onerous and complicated, but
they are also in many cases unknown or uncertain
at this time. Many of the unknown or uncertain
consequences should be clarified by further technical corrections legislation and regulations, but
in the meantime there is a lot that is unknown or
uncertain about the consequences of a §2057 election.

e.

§2032A values can clearly be used for GST transfers which occur at the death of the decedent and
of which the decedent is the GST transferor, both
for purposes of allocating GST exemption (determining a trust's GST inclusion ratio) and for
purposes of computing the GST direct skip tax on
such transfers payable as a result of the decedent's death, whereas the §2057 value deduction
cannot be taken into account for such GST purposes.
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11.

Structuring Asset ownership and Gifting Considerations
in S2032A - S2057 - Marital Deduction - GST Planning
a.

Effective Use of Unified Credits, S2032A Value
Reductions, S2057 Value Deductions and GST Exemptions

r
r
r

For the unmarried client, there is obviously no special
asset ownership consideration.

r
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(1)

Unified Credits

For married clients, it is important for each spouse
(or the spouse's trust) to separately own sufficient assets to
use all of that spouse's available unified credit if that spouse

is the first to die, or at least enough of that credit so that
the surviving spouse's taxable estate will be less than the
unified credit exemption equivalent. It is desirable to be sure
that each spouse has enough assets for this purpose taking into
account §2032A valuation and/or §2057 value deduction, which
should be elected on the first estate to maximize use of the
first spouse's unified credit.
(2)

S2032A Value Reductions and S2057 Value Deductions

There is not much to do with an unmarried client's
asset ownership here,other than to retain assets for which
§2032A and/or §2057 can be elected and gift other assets if any
lifetime gifts are to be made.
For married clients who own substantial amounts of
assets for which §2032A and/or §2057 can be elected, the §2057
value deduction amount and the $750,000 §2032A value reduction
for each spouse should be effectively used, no matter which
spouse dies first. This will require each spouse to separately
own enough farmland to use the full $750,000 §2032A value reduction and/or the maximum §2057 value deduction, or at least enough
so that the other spouse's $750,000 §2032A value reduction limit
and/or §2057 value deduction limit will not be exceeded if the
other spouse is the second to die. In dividing farmland between
the spouses, the §2032A and §2057 percentage requirements mentioned in !17.11(2) must be remembered.
(3)

J

-

.
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i

GST Exemptions

There is not much planning to do with an unmarried
client's asset ownership, other than to retain §2032A assets if
lifetime gifts are being made, so that §2032A valuation at the
client's death will maximize the amount of property covered by
the client's GST exemption. §2057 will not leverage the GST
exemption, as explained in !17.05.
For married clients, it is desirable to have each
spouse own enough assets to fully use each spouse's GST exemption
(taking into account §2032A values if applicable) no matter which
spouse dies first, or at least to be sure that the surviving
spouse's assets will not exceed the surviving spouse's GST
exemption unless the first spouse's assets also equal or exceed
the first spouse's GST exemption.
(4)

J

Inter Vivos OTIP Trust

An inter vivos QTIP trust may be a helpful solution to
accommodate the non-tax concerns of a spouse who owns most of the
property in a farm family and is reluctant to transfer assets
outright to the other spouse to achieve the tax benefits described above.
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To create an inter vivos QTIP trust, the donor spouse
transfers assets to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of the
donee spouse with a child or independent third party as trustee.
A gift tax return is filed by the donor spouse for the calendar
year in which the trust is created to elect QTIP treatment so
that the property transferred to the trust qualifies for the gift
tax marital deduction.
The donee spouse is the income beneficiary of the QTIP
trust for life, and at the death of the donee spouse the property
passes to the beneficiaries of the donor spouse as designated in
the trust with little or no power given to the donee spouse to
alter that disposition.
until fairly recently it has appeared that there was a
significant disadvantage of using the inter vivos QTIP trust
because it was thought that the donor spouse could not retain the
right to receive any benefits from the trust property if the
donor spouse survived the donee spouse, which would mean that
none of the trust would qualify for marital deduction on the
donee spouse's Form 706 if the donee spouse dies first. However,
Treasury regulations now specifically indicate that it is permissible for the donor spouse to receive at least an income interest
after the donee spouse's death, without causing §2036 inclusion
of all of the trust on the donor spouse's Form 706. Treas. Reg.
§25.2523(d) and (f) Examples 9, 10 and 11.
At the death of the donee spouse, all of the trust
property is included on that spouse's federal estate tax return
pursuant to the QTIP election made on the gift tax return filed
by the donor spouse when the trust was created. Thus, if the
donee spouse dies before the donor spouse, the property in the
trust can effectively utilize the donee spouse's unified credit,
§2032A value reduction, §2057 value deduction and GST exemption.
b.

Meeting S2032A And/Or S2057 Percentage Requirements

In structuring asset ownership between married clients
and advising on gifting for married and unmarried clients, the
§2032A and §2057 percentage requirements must be understood and
remembered.
For an unmarried client, the only available techniques
to help meet the §2032A and §2057 percentage requirements are to
gift away non-farm assets (perhaps even using unified credit)
and/or to buy farm assets. While property cannot be valued under
§2032A or be a QFOBI under §2057 unless it has been owned by the
decedent's family for at least 5 years prior to the decedent's
death, it can immediately help to meet the §203~A 50% test so
that other assets can be valued under §2032A.
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For married clients, the same techniques mentioned
above for the unmarried client are available, plus by shifting
asset ownership between the spouses it may be possible to qualify
both estates or one estate for §2032A and/or §2057 elections,
instead of having only one estate or neither estate qualify for
§2032A and/or §2057 elections. However, §2057 has a special 10
year rule applicable to transfers between spouses which must be
remembered when doing this type of planning for married clients.
c.

Making Annual Exclusion Gifts

To the extent other assets are available for making
annual exclusion gifts, interests in assets for which §2032A
and/or §2057 can be elected should not be used for such gifts.
However, if no other assets are available for making such gifts,
then interests in those assets should be gifted as long as no
problems are thereby created for meeting the §2032A and/or §2057
50% and the §2032A 25% requirements later at the donor's death.
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APPENDIX A

r

WORKSHEET TO DETERMINE VALUE OF A QFOBI UNDER §2057(e)

r

·One of these worksheets must be completed for each separate
business in which the decedent had an interest to determine if
that interest can be characterized as a QFOBI under S2057.
1.

Is the principal place of business outside u.s.?

2.

Has stock or debt of business been a "marketable
security" within 3 years prior to decedent's
death?

3.

If the business is not a bank described in S581
or a building and loan association described
in S7701(a)(19), did more than 35\ of the
adjusted gross income of the business in its
tax year during which decedent died consist
of income of the type defined as "personal
holding company income" under S543(a)?

r
r

4.

Is the business a "trade or business" as
required under S2057(e)?

5.

r

Did the decedent and members of the
decedent's family own at least 50\ of
all classes of equity ownership of the
business at the decedent's death and
at least 5 of the 8 years prior thereto?

6.

If the decedent and members of the decedent's
family owned at least 30\ but did not own
50\ of all classes of equity ownership of
the business at the decedent's death and for
at least 5 of the 8 years prior thereto,
did the members of 2 families own at least
70\ of all such classes or did the members
of 3 families own at least 90\ of all
such classes?

r
r

r
r

r

r
r
r
r
rf

r
r

If the answer to any of questions 1, 2 or 3 above is "Yes", then the
decedent's interest in the business cannot be a QFOBI.
If the answer to question 4 above is "No", then the decedent's
interest in the business cannot be a QFOBI.
If the answers to both of questions 5 and 6 above is "No", then the
decedent's interest in the business cannot be a QFOBI.
7.

Value of Decedent's Interest In Business
Which Is Not Denied QFOBI Characterization
From Answers To six preceding Questions
(Determined With Discounts and With
S203~A)

8.

9.
10.

$-----

Percentage of Business Assets Which
Consist of Cash and Marketable Securities
in Excess of Reasonable Day to Day Working
Capital Needs and Assets Which Produce
Income of the Type Defined as "Personal
Holding Company Income" under S543(a)
or "Foreign Personal Holding Company
Income" under S954(c)

%

Percentage Equal to 100\ Minus Percentage on Line 8

%

Line 7 Value Multiplied By Line 9 Percentage
(QFOBI Value of Decedent's Interest In
Business For S2057 Deduction Purposes)
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APPENDIX B
WORKSHEET TO DETERMINE FAOiJ'Olt A IN' NUMERATOR OF FRACTION
FOR 50% OF ESTATE REQUIREMENT

r

r
r

Aggregate Value of QFOBI's included in the
gross estate and acquired by or passing to
qualified heirs (sum of portions of amounts
on lines 10 of Appendix A worksheets which
were acquired by or passed to qualified heirs):

r

The Excess of:

r

All amounts deductible under
§2053(a)(3) and (4) [Schedule
K debts and liens on Form 706]:

Minus

over the sum of:

r

r

r

r,.
t

r

(A) All indebtedness on any
qualified residence of
decedent for which
interest was deductible
under §163(h)(3):

(

)

(B) All indebtedness for
which proceeds used to
pay educational or
medical expenses of
decedent, decedent's
spouse or decedent's
dependents as defined
in §152:

(

)

(C) All indebtedness of
decedent not described
in A or B, but not in
excess of $10,000:

(

)

r

Excess of Schedule K Debts
and Liens over (A + B + C)
J.

r

Adjusted Value of QFOBI
(Factor A in Numerator)

(

r

r
r
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APPENDIX C

r

WORKSHEET TO DETERMINE FACTOR B IN NUMERATOR OF FRACTION
FOR 50% OF ESTATE REQUIREMENT

r

r
r

The sum of

(i)

r

r

r
r

r
r

r
r

Amount of all gifts of QFOBI
from decedent to members of
decedent's family (other than
decedent's spouse) continuously
held by decedent's family members
from date of gift to date of
decedent's death and included
as taxable gifts on line 4
of Form 706, valued at date
of gift

Plus

(ii) Amount of all gifts
described above not included
on line 4 of Form 706
because of §2503(b) gift tax
annual exclusion, valued at
date of gift

Amount of Gifts of QFOBI Includable
In Numerator (Factor B in Numerator)
(i + ii)

r
r
r

r

r
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APPENDIX D

r

WORKSHEET TO DETERMINE DENOMINATOR OF FRACTION
FOR 500Ji, OF ESTATE REQUIREMENT

r

r
,

r
r

r

r
r

r
r

r

Value of Gross Estate (Form 706, page 1, line 1)
Minus
All amounts deductible under §2053(a)(3) and
(4) [Schedule K debts and liens on Form 706]
Plus
The Excess of
(A) The sum of
(i) The amount of gifts of QFOBI includable in
numerator (Factor B)

plus
(ii) The amount of transfers of non-QFOBI assets
from decedent to decedent's spouse within
10 years prior to decedent's date of death
(other than de minimis (?) transfers),
valued at date of transfer

plus
(iii) The amount of gifts not included in (i)
or (ii) from decedent within 3 years prior
to decedent's death (other than gifts to
decedent's family excluded by §2503(b»,
valued at date of gift

r
r
r

Over

r

Adjusted Gross Estate For §2057
(Denominator)

(B) The sum of the amounts described in (i),
(ii) and (iii) which are otherwise
includable in gross estate, valued at
date of gift or transfer

r
I

r
r

(
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APPENDIX E

SECTION 2033A (2057) AS AMENDED BY SECTION 6007(b) OF H.R. 2676
(INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998)
PER CONFERENCE REPORT RELEASED ON JUNE 24. 1998

(Deletions are stNck thr9ygh; additions are double-underlined.)

r
I

r
r

SEC. 29~~A 2057. FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESS EXCLUSION INTERESTS.
(~ b: GeIERAL. Is tae ease af IB esmte af a EleeeEleat te ·..Aues dHs sessaR applies, tlie valHe ef@!e gFess
esmte ssaU Rat iBelHEle tlie lesser af

(1) tae aajY5teEi 'lalHe af tlie ElHalifieEl family awaeEl eHsiBess iBterests af@!e EleeeEleRt a@!ef'l'.ise
iBelYEliele is tlie estate, ar

r

(2) tlie eKeess af 'I,JOO,OOO aver tlie applieaele eneMieR arBaYBt YBEler seesaR 20IO(e) wi@!
resJlest ta SHeB esmte.
.

r

(al GENERAL RULE,-

I

I

r

(t)

ALLOWANCE OF PEPUCTtON,-For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001. in the case of

an estate of a decedent to which this section applies, the value of the taxable estate shall be detennined by
de4uscting from the value of the pyss estate the a<1justed value of the Qualified family-owned business
interests of the decedent which are described in subsection (b)(2),
(2) MAXIMUM PEDUCTION,-The

deduction allowed by this section shall not exceed $675,000,

(3) COORDINATION WITH UNlFIEP CREPIT,-

r

r
r

(AlIN GENERAL.-Except as provjded in subparawph CBl. if this section glies to
estate, the aP11licable exclusion amount under section 2010 shall be $625,000,

an

(B) INcREASJ; IN UNIFIEP CREPIT IF PEpUCTION IS LJ;SS THAN $675,000, If the dedusction
allowed by this section is less that $675 000, the amount of the applicable exdusion amount under
section 20 I0 shall be increased Cbut not above the amount which would apply to the estate without
regard to this section) by the excess of $675,000 over the amount of the deduction allowed.

(b) ESTATES TO WHICH SECTION APPLlES.(1) IN GENERAL.-This section shall apply to an estate if(A) the decedent was (at the date of the decedent's death) a citizen or resident of the
United States,

(B) the executor elects the application of this section and files the agreement referred to
in subsection (h),

,r

(C) the sum of(i) the adjusted value of the qualified family-owned business interests described
in paragraph (2), plus
(ii) the amount of the gifts of such interests determined under paragraph (3),

,.

r
rI

exceeds SO percent of the adjusted gross estate, and
(0) during the 8-year period ending on the date of the decedent's death there have been
periods aggregating 5 years or more during which(i) such interests were owned by the decedent or a member of the decedent's
family, and
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(ii) there was material participation (within the meaning of section 2032A(e)(6»
by the decedent or a member of the decedent's family in the operation of the business to
which such interests relate.
.

(2) INCLUDIBLE QUALlFIEO'FAMILY-oWNEO BUSINESS INTERESTS.-The qualified family-owned
business interests descnoed in this p~graph are the interests which(A) are included in determining the value of the gross estate (widie'llt regard te th:is
sesaaa), and
(B) are acquired by any qualified heir from, or passed to any qualified heir from, the
decedent (within the meaning ofsection 2032A(e)(9».

-

(3) INCLUDIBLE GIFTS OF 1NTERESTS.-The amount ofthe gifts of qualified family-owned business
interests determined under this paragraph is the eKeess af

EArtBe sum of~ £Al the amount of such gifts from the decedent to members of the decedent's
family taken into account under 5'Il8sec:tion 2001(b)(I)(B) • plus
~

au the amount of such gifts otherwise excluded under section 2503(b),

to the extent such interests are continuously held by members of such
family (other than the decedent's spouse) between the date of the gift
and the date of the decedent's death,-eveP
(a) die ameuftt sf sueR gifts €fem tee' deeedeat ts memBers af tee deeedeat's family
atftePV'Ase iftelHded ift tee 8f9SS estate.
.

(c) ADJUSTED GROSS EsTATE.-For purposes of 'this section, the term "adjusted gross estate" means the
value ofthe gross estate (determiBeEl·....~9'1lt regard t9 tBis seetiea)
(1) reduced by any amount deductlole under paragraph (3) or (4) ofsection 2053(a) • and
(2) increased by the excess of(A) the sum of(i) the amount ofgifts determined under subsection (b)(3), plus
(ti) the amount (if more than de minimis) of other transfers from the decedent to
the decedent's spouse (at the time of the transfer) within 10 years of the date of the
decedent's death, plus
(iii) the amount of other gifts (not included under clause (i) or (ti» from the
decedent within 3 years of such date, other than gifts to members of the decedent's
family otherwise excluded under section 2503(b) • over

(B) the sum of the amounts descn"bed in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) of subparagraph (A)
which are otherwise includt"ble in the gross estate.
For purposes of the preceding sentence. the Secretary ~y provide that de minimis gifts to persons other than
members ofthe decedent's family shall not be taken into account.
(d) ADJUSTED VALUE OF THE QUALIFIED FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESS INTERESTS.-For purposes of this
section, the adjusted value of any qualified family-owned business interest is the value of such interest for purposes
of this chapter (determined without regard to this section), reduced by the excess of(1) any amount deductible under paragraph (3) or (4) ofsection 2053(a), over

-

(2) the sum of(A) any indebtedness on any qualified residence of the decedent the interest on which is
deductible under section 163(h)(3) ,plus
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r
r
r
r
r
,

r
r
r

r
r

r
r

r
r
r
rr

r

r

(B) any indebtedness to the extent the taxpayer establishes that the proceeds of such
indebtedness were used for the payment of educational and medical expenses of the decedent, the
decedent's spouse, or the decedent's dependents (within the meaning of section 152), plus
. (C) any indebtedness not descnbed in subparagraph (A) or (B), to the extent such
indebtedness does not exceed 10,000.
(e) QUALIFIED FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESS INTEREST.(1) IN GENERAL.-For purposes of this section, the term "qualified family-owned business
interest" means-

(A) an interest as a proprietor in a trade or business camed on as a proprietorship, or
(B) an interest in an entity carrying on a trade or business, if(i) at least(I) 50 percent of such entitY is owned (directly or indirectly) by the
decedent and members of the decedent's family,
(II) 70 percent ofsuch entity is so owned by members of 2 families, or
(III) 90 percent of such entity is so owned by members of 3 families,

and
(ii) for purposes of subclause (II) or (llI) of clause (i), at least 30 percent of such
entity is so owned by the decedent and members of the decedent's family.

For purposes of She preceding sentence. a decedent shaH be treated as engaged in a trade Qr business if any
member Qfthe decedent's family is engaged in such trade Qr business.
(2) LIMITATlON.-Such term shall not include-

(A) any interest in a trade or business the principal place of business Qf which is not
located in the United States,
(B) any interest in an entity, if the stock or debt of such entity or a controlled group (as
defmed in section 267(f)(1» of which such entity was a member was readily tradable on an
established securities market or secondary market (as defmed by the Secretary) at any time within
3 years of the date of the decedent's death,
(C) any interest in a trade or business not descn'bed in section 542(c)(2) , if more than 35
percent of the adjusted ordinary gross income of such ,trade or business for the taxable year which
includes the date of the decedent's death would qualify as personal holding company income (as
defmed in section 543(a) withQut regard to paragraph (2)(5) thereQf) if sucb trade or business
were a cQrporatiQn.
(0) that portion of an interest in a trade or business that is attn'butable to-

(i) cash or marketable securities, or both, in excess of the reasonably expected
day-ta-day ~orking capital needs of such trade or business, and
(ii) any other assets of the trade or business (other than assets used in the actiYe
conduct of a trade or business descn'bed in section 542(c)(2», which produce, or are held
for the production of, personal bolding companY income ef wlHea is deseaeed i:R seetiee
~ (as defined in subparampb (en or income descn'bed in section 954(c)(l)
(determined without regard to subparagraph (Al thereof and by substituting "trade or
business" for "controlled foreign corporation").

In the case of a lease of property on a net cash basis by the decedent to a
member of the decedent's family, income from such lease shall not be treated
as personal bolding company income for purposes of subparagraph (e), and such
ro ert shall not be treated as an asset described in sub ara ra h (D)(ii),
i
1ncome an property would not be so treated if the lessor had engaged
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directly in the activities engaged in by the lessee with respect to such

-

property.

....
I

(1) IN GENERAL.-There is imposed an additioDal estate tax if, within 10 years after the date of the
decedent's death and before the date of the qualified heir's death(A) the material participation requirements described in section 2032A(c)(6)(B) are not
met with respect to the qualified falnily-owned business interest which was acquired (or passed)
from the decedent,

..

'

(B) the qualified heir disposes of any portion of a qualified family-owned business
interest (other than by a disposition to a member of the qualified heir's family or through a
qualified cons~rvation contribution under section 17O(h»,
(C) the qualified heir loses United States citizenship (within the meaning of section 877)
or with respect to whom an event descnoed in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 877(e)(1)
occurs, and such heir does not comply with the requirements of subsection (g), or
(D) the principal place of business of a trade or business of the qualified family-owned
business interest ceases to be located in the United States.
(2) AOOmONAL ESTATE TAX.(A) IN GENERAL.-The amount of the additional estate tax imposed by paragraph (1)

shall be equal to(i) the applicable percentage of the adjusted tax difference attributable to the
qualified family-owned business interest (as EletefRlifteEll:lBeer Riles similar te the Riles
ef seeBeR 2QJ2A(e)(2)(B), plus
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(ii) interest on the amount determined under clause (i) at the underpayment rate
established under section 6621 for the period beginning on the date the estate tax liability
was due under this chapter and ending on the da~e such additional estate tax is due.
(B) ApPLICABLE PERCENTAGE.-For purposes of this paragraph, the applicable
percentage shall be determined under the following table:

Ifthe event described in
paragraph (1) occurs in
thefollowing year of
material participation:

r
r
r,

1 through 6 ••••......••.•••••.•••...•..••.••...•.....•.•.•..•.••.........•..•••.•...........• 100

7
8

(C) ADJUSTED TAX PIFfEBENCE,-For purposes ofsubparagraph CA}-

mIN

QENERAL.-The 'adjusted tax difference attributable to a Qualified familyowned business interest is the amount whicb bears the same ratio to the aQiusted tax
difference with teSl)cct to the estate (determined under clause
as the Me of such
interest bears to the value of all qualified family-owned business interests descnped in
subsection (b)C21.

om

r
r
r

r
r

80

60
9 •.••••••.•••.•••••.••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••.•••••.•.••••.••.••••••••••••••.•.••.•..•.••••••••.40
10......•.•...••••••••...•••.•...•...••.•••••.•...•.•.•..........••.•••......•.•.....................20

r
r

The applicable
percentage is:

<ij) ADJUSTED TAX QlFFEBENCE WITH RESPECT TO THE ESTATE. For purposes of
cc1ause CD. the term "adiusted tax difference with reSl)ect to the estate" means the excess
of what wQUld have been the ~state tax liability but for the election under this section
over the estate tax liabilitv. For purposes of this clause. the term "estate tax liabjIity"
means the tax imposed by section 2901 reduced by the credits allowable against such tax.

mUse IN TBADe OR BUSINesS By fAMILY MEMBERS. A Qualified heir shall·not be treated as
disposing of an interest descuped in subsection Cel( 1)CA) by reason of Ceasing to be engaged in a trade or
business so long as the property to which such interest relates is used in a trade or busjness by any member
Of such indjyidual's family,
(g) SECURlTY REQUIREMENTS FOR NONCITIZEN QUALIFIED HEIRS.(1) IN GENERAL.-Except upon the application of subparagraph (F) ~ of subsection (i)(3), if
a qualified heir is not a citizen of the United States, any interest under this section passing to or acquired by
such heir (including any interest held by such heir at a time descnbed in subsection (t)(I)(C» shall be
treated as a qualified family-owned business interest only if the interest passes or is acquired (or is held) in
a qualified trust.
(2) QUALIFIED TRUST.-The term "qualified trust" means a trust(A) which is organized under, and governed by, the laws of the United States or a State,

r
r
r
r

and

(B) except as otherwise provided in regulations, with respect to which the trust
instrument requires that at least 1 trustee of the trust be an individual citizen of the United States
or a domestic corporation.
(h) AGREEMENT.-The agreement referred to in this subsection is a written agreement signed by each
person in being who has an interest (whether or not in possession) in any property designated in such agreement
consenting to the application of subsection (1) with respect to such property.
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(i) OTHER DEFINt110NS AND APPUCABLE RULES.-For pUIpOses of this section(1) QUALIFIED HEIR.-The term "qualified heir"(A) has the meaning given to such term by section 2032A(e)(I}, and

(B) includes any active employee of the trade or business to which the qualified familyowned business interest relates if such employee has been employed by such trade or business for
a period of at least 10 years before the date of the decedent's death.

-

(2) MEMBER OF THE FAMILY.-The term "member of the family" has the meaning given to such
term by section 2032A(e)(2).
(3) APPUCABLE RULES.-Rules similar to the following rules shall apply:
(A) Section 2032A(b}(4) (relating to decedents who are retired or disabled).

-

(B) Section 2032A(b)(S) (relating to special rules for surviving spouses).
(C) Section 2032A(c)(2)(O) (relating to partial dispositions).
(0) Section 2032A(c)(3) (relating to only 1 additional tax imposed with respect to any 1
portion).

(E) Section 2032A(c)(4) (relating to due date).
.

-

-_..

.-

(F) Section 2032A(c)(S) (relating to liability for tax; furnishing of bond).
(G) Section 2032A(c)(7) (relating to no tax if use begins within 2 years; active
management by eligible qualified heir treated as material participation).
(II) P~graphs (1) and (3) ofsection 2032A(d) (relating to election; agreement).

(1)' S~ction 2032A(e}(10) (relating to ·community property).

(J) Section 2032A(e)(14) (relating to treatment of replacement property acquired in
section 1031 or 1033 transactions).
(K) Section 2032A(f) (relating to statute of limitations).

CLl

Section 2Q32ACg) (relating to application to interests in partnerships. corporations.
.

and trusts),

Subsections (b) and (j) ofsection 2Q32A.

(M)
~

account).

00 Section 6166(b)(3) (relating to farmhouses and certain other structures taken into
-

EM) £Q1 Subparagraphs (B), (C), and (0) of section 6166(g)(I} (relating to acceleration
of payment). ~

ill Section 6324B (relating to specia1lien for additional estate tax).

-

-

-

-

-
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APPENDIX F

CONFERENCE AGREEMENT ON SECTION 203M (2057) AMENDMENTS IN
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998

TITLE VI. TAX TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS

r
r
r

House Bill
. The House bill contains technical. clerical and confonning amendments to the Ta,<payer
Rehef Act of 1997 (the "1997 Act") and other recently enacted legislation. The provisions
generally are effective as if enacted in the original legislation to which each provision relates:
Senate Amendment

I

The Senate amendment is the same as the House bill. with the fonowing modifications
additions, and deletion:
'

r

6. Estate and Gift Tax Provisions of the 1991 Ad

r
r

r

The Senate amendment modifies the provisions ofthe House bill to: (1) clarify the
effective date for the generation-skipping exemption: (2? coordinate the uni.fied credit ~d the
qualified family-owned business exclusion: and (3) clanfy the rules governmg revaluation of
gifts. The Senate amendment also adds provisions that: (1) clarify the phaseout range fO,r the 5·
percent sunax to phase out the benefits of the unified credit and graduated rates; (2? claf1~ that
interests eligible for the family-owned business exclusion must be p~sed to a qu.ahfied helr; (3)
clarify the "trade or business" requirement for the family-owned busmess e~cluslOD; (4) co~ven
the family-owned business exclusion into a deduction: (5) make other techmcal changes to ltems
cross-referenced in the family-owned business provision; and (6) clarify the treatment of postmortem conservation contributions.
-CONFERENCE AGREEMENT

r
r

r
r
r
f

,.
I

3. Estate and Gift Tax Provisions or the 1997 Ad
Phaseout fanae for the 5-percent surtax to phase out the benefits of the unified credit and
graduated rates.-The conference agreement does not include the provision in the Senate
amendment clarifying the phaseout range for the 5-percent surtax 19 phase out the benefits of the
unified credit and graduated rates.
Qualification for an estate tax deduction for Qualified family-owned business interest in
the case of cash leases by decedent to family member.-The conference agreement clarifies that
an interest in property will not be disqualified. in whole or in part. as an interest in a familyowned business where the decedent leases that interest on a net cash basis to a member of the
decedent's family who uses the leased propeny in an active business. The rental income derived
by the decedent from the net cash lease in those circumstances is not treated as personal holding
company income for purposes of Code section 2057.
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APPENDIX G

SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON SECTION 2033A AMENDMENTS
IN H.R. 2676 AS RELEASED ON APRIL 22. 1998

3. Conversion of qualified family-owned business exclusion into a
deduction (sec. 6007(b)(1)(A) of the bill, sec. 502 of the 1997
Act, and redesignated sec. 2057 of the Code)
Present Law
The qualified family~owned busin'ess provision in the 1997 Act
provides an exclusion from estate taxes fOI: certain qualified familyowned business ,interests. It is unclear whether the provision provides an exclusion of value or an exclusion of property from the estate, and thus it is unclear how the, new provision interacts with
other provisions in"the Internal Revenue Code (e.g., sees. i014,
2032A, 2056, 2612; and 6166). '
'
,
,

,

, Explanation ofProvision
, The provision converts the qualified'family:-owl1ed btisiJ:le~s exclusion into a deduction,and redesignates section' 2Q;33A a~ 'section
2057. Except as provided below, 'the requirements. of. the' qualified
family-owned business provision otherwise remajn unchanged. The
qualified family-owned business deduction is not available fqr generation-skipping transfer taX purposes.
'
Effective Date
The provision is eff~ctive With respect 'io estates of decedents
dying after Dece:m~er ~ 1, ),997. ",
4. Coordination between unified credit and family-owned 1?tisiness
, provision (sec. 6007(b)(l)(B)' and 6007(b)(4) of the bill, sec. 502
of the 1997 Act,' and redesignated sec. 2057(a) of the Code)
Present'Law
The 1997 Act effectively increased 'the amount of lifetini~ 'gifts
and transfers at death that are exempt from unified estate arid gift
tax from $600~000 to'· $1,000,000"over the: period ,1997 'to 2006,
through increases in an individual's unified' credit~ In addition, the
1997 Act provided a limited" exclusion for certain family-owned
business interests. The exclusion' for 'family-owned business interests may be taken only to the extent that the exclusion for familyowned business interests, plus the amount effectively exempted by
the unified credit, does not exceed $1.3 million. As a result, for
years after 1998, the maximum amount of exclusion for familyowned business interests is reduced by increases in the dollar
amount of transfers effectively exempted through the unified credit.
Because the structure of the 1997 Act increases the unified credit
over time (until 2006) while decreasing over the same period the

r
r
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benefit ()f .the closely-held business exclusion, the estate tax on es.tates with family-owned businesses increases over time until 2006.
This increase in estate tax results from the fact that increa'ses in
the unified credit provide a benefi.t at the decedent's lowest estate
tax brackets, while the exclusion for family-owned businesses provides a benefit at the decedent's highest estate. tax brackets,.

Explanation' of Provision
Under the provision, if an executor ,elec~ to utilize the qualified
family-owned business. deduction, the .estate tax liability i~ calculated as 'if the estate were allowed a maximum qualified familyowned business deduction of $675,000 and an'applicable exclusion
amount under section 2010 (i.e., the amount exempted by the unified credit) of $625,000, regardless of the ,year in .which the decedent dies.lfth~ estate.mcludes less than $675,000 of qualif1ed family-owned business interests, 'the applicable exC1usion~mourit is increased on a dollar·Jor-dollar basis, but ohly up to the. appli~able
exclu~ionamountgenerally available for .the year of death.· .
For example,' assume the decedent dies in 2005, when the applicable exclusion amount under section 2.010.is $800,000. If the estate includes qualified family-owned business interests valued at
$675,000 or more, the estate tax liability is calculated as if the estate were. al1~w.ed a qualified family-owned business.deduction of
$675,000, and the applicabl.e exclusion'amount under section 2910
is limited.. to $625,000. If the estate'incl~des qualified fami1y-owne~
business .ip.terests,~f $500,000 or less, all of..the ~ualified fa~ily
owned business .interests' could be deducted from the estate,' and
the' applicable exclusion amount under'section 20io is $800,000. If
the estate includes qualified family-owned business interests valued between $500,000 and '$675,000, all of the qualified familyowned business interests could be deducted from the estate, and
the applicable'exClusion amount under,section 2010 is cal~ulated as
the excess of $1.3 million over the amount of qualified familyowned business interests.' (F.or example, if the qualified familyowned 'business interests were valued 'at $600,000, the applicable
exclusion amount under section 2010 is $700,000.)
If a recapture event occurs with respect to any qualified familyowned business interest, the total amount of estate taxes potentially ~ubject to recapture is calculated .as the difference between
the actual amount' of estate tax. liability for the estate, and the
amount. of estate taxes that would have been owed had the qualified fanilly-owned business election not been :made.

....

Effective Date
The provision is effective for decedents dying after December 31,
1 9 9 7 . '
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5. Clarification of businesses eligible for family-owned business provision (sec. 6007(b)(2) of the bill, sec. 502 of the 1997 Act, and
redesignated sec. 2057(b)(3) of th~ Code)
Present Law

In order to be eligible to exclude from the gross' estate a' portion
of the value of a family-owned business, the sum of (1) the adjusted
value of family-owned business interests includible in thedecedent's estate, and (2) the amount of gifts of family-owned business
interests to family members of the decedent that are not included
in the decedent's gross estate,. must exceed 50 percent of the decedent's adjusted gross estate.
Explanation" of Provision

The provision clarifies the formula for determining; the amount
of gifts of family-owned business interests made to members of the
decedent's family that are. not otherwise includible in the decedent's gross estate.
Effective Date

.

The provision is effective with respect to decedents dyinlZ after
December 31, ·1997.
'
,

'6~ 'clarification 'of "trade or business" requirement. for family-own~d
business provision (sec. 6007(b)(5) of the bill, -sec. 502 of the
Act, and redesignated secs. 205~(~}(1) and ~05.7(O of th~ C~de}
Present Law

A qualified family-owne~ business· interest is defin~d: as any, interest in a trade or business that meets. ~eJ:iain·req4irements-e.g.,
the decedent and members ~f his family must own certain percentages of the. trade or. business; the decedent or mem~ers of his family' must have ~aterially participated-in the trade or; business for
five of the' eight years· preceding' the' .decedent's' death;' and the
qualified heir or members of 4is family must materially participate
in the trade or business for at least five years of any eight-year period within 10 years following the decedent's death..
Explanation of prov,is.ipn..
The provision clarifies that an indi~dual's:'interest in -property
used in a trade or business.,m~y qualify for. the qualified familyowned business provision as "long"as such property is used ill a
trade or btisines~ by the individual- or.· a' member 'of the individual's
family. Thus, for example, if a brother and sister inherit farmland
upon their father's death, and the' sister cash-leases her portion to
her brother" who is. engaged 'in the trade or· business of farming,
the ."trade or business" requirement is satisfied with respect to both
the, broth.er'·and the .sister. Similarly, if a father cash-leases farmland to his SQn, and the' son·materially~participates in the trade or
business of farming the landfor at least.five of the eight' years pre~
ceding his father's death, the pre-death'material participation and
"trade or business" requirements are satisfie4 with respect to the
father's interest in the farm.
.
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Effective Date
The provision is effective with 'respect to estates of decedents
'
dying ,after Dece~be~ 31, 1997. ,.
7. Clarification that interests eligible for family-owned business
provision must be passed to a qualified heir (sees. 6007{b)(1){B)
of the bill, sec. 502 of the Ac~,. and redesignated sec. 2057(a)(1)
of the 'Code)
, '

-

Present Law,
The 1997 Act provided a new exclusion for qualified familyowned business interestS. One' of the'requirements for the exclusion
is that such' interests must pass to a "qualified heir," which ineludes members of the decedent's family and any individual who
has been actively' employed by the trade or business for at least 10
years prior to the date of the decedent's death.
....
Explanation ofPT:ovision
.' The provision clarifies that qualified family-owned business interests must pass to a qualified heir in order to 'qualify for the ,deduction. For this purpose, if all beneficiaries of a trust are qualified
heirs (and in such other circumstances' as the Secretary of the
Treasury may provide), pro~rty!assing ~o the'trust may be treated as having passed to a qualifie heir; . '.
.
Effective Date
.. The· provision is effective with respeCt to' estates of decedents
dying after December 31, 19~7.··'
'.

8. Other modifications to the qualified family-owned business rrovision (sees. 6007(bX3), 6007(b)(6), and 6007(b)(7) of the bil ,·sec.
502 of the 1997 Act, and redesignated sec. 2057 of the Code)
Present Law
The qualified family-owned business provision incorporates by
cross-reference several other provisions of the Code, including a
number of provisions in section 2032A and the personal holding
company rules of section 543(a). '
Explanation of Provision
.
:The provision modifies section 2033A(g) (relating to the security
requirements for noncitizen qualified heirs) by deleting the crossreference to section 2033A(iX3XM), which does not appear to be appropriate. The provision also makes rules similar to those set forth
in section 2032A(h) and (i) (relating to conversions and exchanges
of property under sections 1031 and 1033) applicable for purpo~es
of section 2033A. Finally, the provision clarifies that, in identifyIng
assets t~t produce (or are held for the production of) incom~ of a
type .described i~ section 543(a), section 543(a) is .applied. WIthout
regard to section 543{a)(2){B) (the dividend requirement for corporate entities).
.

Effective Date
The provision is effective with respect to estates of decedents
dying after December 31, 1997.
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APPENDIX H

CONFERENCE AGREEMENT ON SECTION 2033A
AS ENACTED BY THE TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 1997

3. Estate tax eXclusion for qualified family-owned businesses (sec. 401 of the Senate
amendment)
.
Present Law

There ar~ no speci.al.estate ·taX. rules for qualified family-owned businesses. All taxpayers
are allowed ~ umfied credIt 10 comput1Og the taxpayers estate and gift tax. which effectively
exempts a total of$600,OOO in cumulative taxable transfers from the estate and gift tax (sec.
20 IO~. An ~ecutor also may e~ee:t, under section 2032A. to value certain qualified real propeny
us~d 10 farming or another qualIfying closely-held trade or business at its current use value,
rather than its highest and best use value (up ammmum reduction of5750.000). In addition.
an ~xecu~o~ may elect to pay the Federal estate tax attributable to a qualified closely-held
busmess m Installments over. at most, a 14-year period (sec. 6166). The tax attributable to the
first SI.OOO.OOO in value of a closely-held business is eligible for a special 4-percent interest rate
(sec. 66010».
Bouse Bill
No pro\ision.

to

St'natt' Amendment

The Senate amendment allows an executor to elect special estate tax treatment for
qualified "family-owned business interests" ifsuch interests comprise more than SO percent ofa
decedent'S estate and certain other requirements are met. In general. the provision excludes the
first SI million of value in qualified family-owned business interests from a decedent's taxable
estate.
This new exclusion for qualified family-owned business interests is provided in addition
to the unified credit (which currently effectively exempts S600,000 oftaxable transfers from the
estate and gift tax. and will be increased to an effective exemption of$ I,000,000 oftaxable
transfers under other provisions of the Senate amendment), the special-use provisions of section
2032A (which permit the exclusion of up to $750,000 in value ofa qualifying farm or other
closely-held business from a decedent's estate), and the provisions ofsection 6166 (which
provide for the installment payment of estate taxes attributable to closely held businesses).
Qualitit'd family-ownt'd busint'ss interests

For purposes of the provision, a qualified family-owned business interest is defined as
any interest in a trade or business (regardless ofthe form in which it is held) with a principal
place of business in the United States if ownership of the trade or business is held at least SO
percent by one family, 70 percent by two familie~ or 90 percent by three families, as long as the
decedent's family owns at least 30 percent ofthe trade or business. Under the provision,
members ofan individual's family are defined using the same definition as is used for the
special-use valuation rules ofsection 2032A, and thus include (I) the individual's spouse, (2) the
indi\idual's ancestors, (3) lineal descendants of the individual, ofthe individual's spouse, or of
the individual's parents. and (4) the spouses of any such lineal descendants. For purposes of
appl~ing the ownership tests in the case of a corporation. the decedent and members of the
decedent's family arc required to 0\1,11 the requisite percentage of the total combined voting
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power ofall classes of stock entitled to vote Jml the requisite percentage of the total value ofall
shares of all classes of stock ofthe corporation. In the case ofa pannership, the decedent and
members of the decedent's family are required to own the requisite percentage of the capital
Interest, and the requisite percentage of the profits interest, in the pannership.
In the case ofa trade or business that owns an interest in another trade or business (i.e.,
"tiered entities"), special look-through rules apply. Each trade or business owned (directly or
indirectly) by the decedent and members ofthe decedent's family is separately tested to
determine whether that trade or business meets the requirements ofa qualified family-owned
business interest. In applying these tests, any interest that a trade or business owns in another
trade or business is disregarded in determining whether the fim trade or business is a qualified
family-owned business interest. The value of any qualified family-owned business interest held
by an entity is treated as being proportionately owned by or for the entity's panners,
shareholders, or beneficiaries. In the case ofa multi-tiered entity, such rules are sequentially
applied to look through each separate tier ofthe entity.
For example, ifa holding company owns interests in two other companies, each of the
three entities will be separately tested under the qualified family-owned business interest rules.
In determining whether the holding company is a qualified family-owned business interest, its
ownership interest in the other two companies is disregarded. Even ifthe holding company itself
does not qualify as a family-owned business interest, the other two companies still may qualify if
the direct and indirect interests held by the decedent and his or her family members satisfy the
requisite ownership percentages and other requirements ofa qualified family-owned business
interest. If either (or both) ofthe lower-tier entities qualify, the value of the qualified familyowned business interests owned by the holding company are treated as proportionately owned by
the holding company's shareholders.

-

;

"

J

An interest in a trade or business does not qualify ifthe business's (or a related entity's)
stock or securities were publicly-traded at any time within three years of the decedent's death.
An interest in a trade or business also does not qualify ifmore than 35 percent of the adjusted
ordinary gross income of the business for the year ofthe decedent's death was personal holding
company income (as defined in section 543). This personal holding company restriction does
not apply to banks or domestic building and loan associations.

The value ofa trade or business qualifying as a family-owned business interest is reduced
to the extent the business holds passive assets or excess cash or marketable securities. Under the
provision. the value of qualified family-owned business interests does not include any cash or
marketable securities in excess of the reasonably expected day-to-day working capital needs of
the trade or business. For this purpose, it is intended that day-to-day working capital needs be
determined based on a historical average of the business's working capital needs in the past,
using an analysis similar to that set forth in BardahJ Mfg. COI1?, 24 T.C.M. 1030 (1965). It is
further intended that accumulations for capital.acquisitions not be considered "working capital"
for this purpose. The value ofthe qualified family-owned business interests also does not
include certain other passive assets. For this purpose, passive assets include any assets that: (I)
produce dividends, interest, rents, royalties, annuities and certain other types of passive income
(as described in sec. 543(a»; (2) are an interest in a trust, pannership or REMIC (as described in
sec. 954(c)(l)(B)(ii»; (3) produce no income (as described in sec. 954(c)(l)(B)(iii»; (4) give rise
to income from commodities transactions or foreign currency gains (as described in sec.
954(c)(l)(C) and (D»; (5) produce income equivalent to interest (as described in sec.
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9S4(c)(1)(E»; or (6) produce income from notional principal contracts or payments in lieu of
dividends (as described in new sees. 954(c)(l)(F) and (G), added elsewhere in the Senate
amendment). In the case of a regular dealer in property, such property is not considered to
produce passive income under these rules, and thus, is not considered to be a passive asset.
Qualifyine estates
A decedent's estate qualifies for the special treatment only if the decedent was a U.S.
citizen or resident at the time of death. and the aggregate value ofthe decedent's qualified
familY-O\\l1ed business interests that are passed to qualified heirs exceeds SO percent of the
decedent'S adjusted gross estate (the "SO-percent liquidity test"). For this purpose, qualified heirs
include any individual who has been actively employed by the trade or business for at least 10
years prior to the date ofthe decedent's death, and members ofthe decedent's family. Ifa
qualified heir is not a citizen ofthe United States, any qualified family-owned business interest
acquired by that heir must be held in a trust meeting requirements similar to those imposed on
qualified domestic trusts (under present-law sec. 20S6A(a», of through cenain other security
arrangements that meet the satisfaction ofthe Treasury Secretary. The SO-percent liquidity test
generally is applied by adding all transfers ofqualified family-owned business interests made by
the decedent to qualified heirs at the time ofthe decedent's death, plus certain lifetime gifts of
qualified family-owned business interests made to members ofthe decedent's family, and.
comparing this total to the decedent's adjusted gross estate. To the extent that a decedent held
qualified family-owned business interests in more than one trade or business, all such interests
are aggregated for purposes ofapplying the SO-percent liquidity test.

The SO-percent liquidity test is calculated using a ratio. the numerator and denominator of
which are described below.
The numerator is determined by aggregating· the value ofall qualified family-owned
business interests that are includible in the decedent's gross estate and are passed from the
decedent to a qualified heir, plus any lifetime transfers ofqualified business interests that are
made by the decedent to members ofthe decedent's family (other than the decedent's spouse),
provided such interests have been continuously held by members ofthe decedent's family and
were not otherwise includible in the decedent's gross estate. For this purpose, qualified business
interests transferred to members ofthe decedent's family during the decedent's lifetime are
valued as ofthe date ofsuch transfer. This amount is then reduced by all indebtedness ofthe
estate, except for the fonowing: (1) indebtedness OD a qualified residence ofthe decedent
(detennined in accordance with the requirements for deductibility ofmongage interest set forth
in section 163(h)(3»; (2) indebtedness incurred to pay the educational or medical expenses ofthe
decedent, the decedent's spouse or the decedent's dependents; and (3) other indebtedness ofup to
$10,000.
The denominator is equal to the decedent's gross estate, reduced by any indebtedness of
the estate. and increased by the amount of the following transfers, to the extent not already
included in the decedent's gross estate: (I) any lifetime transfers ofqualified business interests

r
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t
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that were made by the decedent to members ofthe 'decedent's family (other than the decedent's
spouse). provided such interests have been continuously held by members ofthe decedent's
family. plus (2) any other transfers from the decedent to the decedent's spouse that were made
within 10 years ofthe date ofthe decedent's death, plus (3) any other transfers made by the
decedent within three years ofthe decedent's death, except non-taxable transfers made to
members ofthe decedent's family. The Secretary ofTreasury is granted authority to disregard de
minimis gifts. In detennining the amount of gifts made by the decedent, any gift that the donor
and the donor's spouse elected to have treated as a split gift (pursuant to sec. 2S 13) is treated as
made one-halfby each spouse for purposes ofthis provision.

...
.....

..,j

Participation requirements

To qualify for the beneficial treatment provided under the Senate amendment. the
decedent (or a member ofthe decedent's family) must have owned and materially participated in
the trade or business for at least five ofthe eight years preceding the decedent's date of death. In
addition. each qualified heir (or a member ofthe qualified heir's family) is required to materially
participate in the trade or business for at least five years ofany eight-year period within 10 years
following the decedent's death. For this purpose, "material participation" is defined as under
present-law section 2032A (special use valuation) and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. sec. 20.2032A-3. Under such regulations, no one factor is detenninative of
the presence of material participation and the uniqueness ofthe particular industry (e.g., timber,
farming, manufacturing, etc.) must be considered. Physical work and participation in
management decisions are the principal factors to be considered. For example, an individual
generaIJy is considered to be materially participating in the business if he or she personally
manages the business fully, regardless ofthe number ofhours worked, as long as any necessary
functions are performed.
Ifa qualified heir rents qualifying property to a member ofthe qualified heir's family on a
net cash basis, and that family member materially participates in the business, the material
participation requirement will be considered to have been met with respect to the qualified heir
for purposes ofthis provision.

...

Recapture provisions

-

The benefit ofthe exclusions for qualified family-owned business interests are subject to
recapture if, within 10 years ofthe decedent's death and before the qualified heir's death. one of
the following "recapture events" occurs: (1) the qualified heir ceases to meet the material
participation requirements (i.e., if neither the qualified heir nor any member of his or her family
has materially participated in the trade or business for at least five years ofany eight-year
period); (2) the qualified heir disposes ofany portion of his or her interest in the family-owned
business, other than by a disposition to a member ofthe qualified heir's family or through a
conservation contribution under section 170(h); (3) the principal place of business of the trade or
business ceases to be located in the United States; or (4) the qualified heir loses U.S. citizenship.
A qualified heir who loses U.S. citizenship may avoid such recapture by placing the qualified
family-owned business assets into a trust meeting requirements similar to a qualified domestic
trust (as described in present law sec. 20S6A(a», or through certain other security arrangements.
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If one of the above recapture events occurs. an additional tax is imposed on the date of
such event. As under section 2032A., each qualified heir is personally liable for the portion of
the recapture tax that is imposed with respect to his or her interest in the qualified family-owned
business. Thus, for example, ifa brother and sister inherit a qualified family-owned business
from their father, and only the sister materially panicipates in the business, her panicipation will
cause both her and her brother to meet the material panicipation test. If she ceases to materially
panicipate in the business within 10 years after her father's death (and the brother still does not
materially panicipate), the sister and brother would both be liable for the recapture tax; that is,
each would be liable for the recapture tax anributable to his or her interest.
The ponion of the reduction in estate taxes that is recaptured would be dependent upon
the number ofyears that the qualified heir (or members of the qualified heir's family) materially
panicipated in the trade or business after the decedent's death. 'Ifthe qualified heir (or his or her
family members) materially panicipated in the trade or business after the decedent's death for
less than six years, 100 percent ofthe reduction in estate taxes anributable to that heir's interest
is recaptured; ifthe panicipation was for at least six years but less than seven years, 80 percent
of the reduction in estate taxes is recaptured; ifthe panicipation was for at least seven years but
less than eight years, 60 percent is recaptured; ifthe panicipation was for at least eight years but
less than nine years, 40 percent is recaptured; and ifthe panicipation was for at least nine years
but less than 10 years, 20 percent ofthe reduction in estates taxes is recaptured. In general, there
is no requirement that the qualified heir (or members of his or her family) continue to hold or
panicipate in the trade or business more than 10 years after the decedent's death. As under
present-law section 2032A., however, the 10-year recapture period may be extended for a period
ofup to two years if the qualified heir does not begin to use the property for a period of up to
two years after the decedent's death.
If a recapture event occurs with respect to any qualified family-owned business interest
(or portion thereot), the amount of reduction in estate taxes anributable to that interest is
determined on a proportionate basis. For example. if the decedent'S estate included $2 million in
qualified family-owned business interests and $ I million of such interests received beneficial
treatment under this proposal, one-half of the value of the interest disposed ofis deemed to have
received the benefits provided under this proposal.
EfTtttive date

The provision is effective with respect to the estates of decedents dying after December
31, 1997.
Conference Aereement

The conference asrreement follows the Senate amendment, except that the exclusion for
family-owned business interests may be taken only to the extent that the exclusion for familyowned business interests, plus the amount effectively exempted by the unified credit, does not
exceed S1.3 million.
The conferees clarify that a sale or disposition, in the ordinary course of business. of
assets such as inventory or a piece ofequipment used in the business (e.g., the sale ofcrops or a
tractor) would not result in recapture of the benefits of the qualified family-owned business
exclusion.
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I.

THE PREMISE.
A.

Accounting principles draw a distinction between income and principal.
Trusts frequently measure the interest of a current beneficiary based on "net
income" and view principal as what is held in trust for eventual distribution
to the remainder beneficiary.

B.

The manner in which Trust principal is invested can dramatically influence
how much income is available or how quickly principal grows, exposing
the fiduciary to claims of the current beneficiary or remainderman or both,
for breach of one or more fiduciary duties.

c.

Swings in market performance can dramatically affect "return" and can
cause the net income beneficiary to be over compensated or under
compensated relative to the remainderman.

D.

Modem theories of investment reject income as a measure of fair return.

E.

Granting broad discretion to a Trustee to "invade" principal to supplement
what is paid to a current net income beneficiary does not provide greater
assurances to either the current beneficiary or to the remainderman, or
diminish the fiduciary's exposure to a claimed breach of duty.

r
r
r

r
r
i

r

r
r
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II.

CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES.
A.

A Trustee is subject to a number of duties including:

1.

r

Duty to make the trust property productive. Restatement (Third) of
Trusts § 181 (1990). Where a trustee fails to make any investment,
he or she is chargeable with interest at the usual rate of return on
trust investments. III Scott on Trusts § 288 (4th ed. 1988).

2.

Duty to pay net income to beneficiary. Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 182 (1957).

r

3.

Duty to deal impartially with beneficiaries. Restatement (Third) of
Trusts § 183 (1990). Ordinarily, this duty arises where there are
successive beneficiaries. IIA Scott on Trusts 558 (4th ed. 1988). If
a trust is created for beneficiaries in succession, the trustee is under a
duty to the successive beneficiaries to act with due regard to their
respective interests. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 232 (1990).

r
r
r
I

r,

r

a.

"If by the terms of a trust the trustee is directed to pay the
income to a beneficiary during a designated period and on the
C -1

expiration of the period to pay the principal to other
beneficiaries, the trustee is under a duty to the income
beneficiary to exercise care not merely to preserve the trust
property but to make it productive of trust income so that a
reasonable amount of income will be available for the
beneficiary. The trustee is also under a duty to the remainder
beneficiaries to exercise reasonable care in an effort to
preserve the trust property, and this duty ordinarily includes a
goal of protecting the property's purchasing power. In some
trust situations the trustee may invest with a goal of
increasing the real value of the principal. It is important to
note that protection or growth of the purchasing power of
principal also tends to preserve or enhance the purchasing
power of the income flow over the duration of the trust. This
effect would also be of importance in implementing a
comparable duty of impartiality that would exist if there were
successive income beneficiaries.

J

Even with best efforts and prudent action by the trustee,
however, the combined objectives with respect to income and
principal may not be accomplished, particularly over any
given time frame. Tradeoffs inevitably exist in these matters,
and a need to generate and distribute significant amounts of
income can be expected to impair the trustee's ability to
preserve the real value of corpus in periods of serious
inflation or other difficult market conditions.
The precise meaning of the trustee's duty of impartiality and
the balancing of competing interests and objectives inevitably
are matters of judgment and interpretation. Thus, the duty
and balancing are affected by the purposes, terms, distribution
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust, not only at
the outset but as they may change from time to time. For
example, the trust's risk tolerance and expected duration are
factors to be considered, as are distribution requirements and
the time horizons these factors may impose on the trust's
investment strategy. On investment standards generally, see
§ 227 [General Standard of Property Investment.]

j

The terms of a trust, as expressed or interpreted, may
influence the balancing of competing interests and affect a
particular trustee's duty of impartiality. See Comment e,
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below. Thus, although a trustee is ordinarily not to endanger
the safety of principal in order to produce a large income, the
purposes and needs of a particular trust may require the
trustee to pursue a high income yield at an increased risk to
principal, especially at the risk of failing to maintain its
purchasing power. Accordingly, it may be appropriate for the
trustee to invest heavily in bonds and other fixed-income
securities. Conversely, in the circumstances of a given trust it
may be appropriate for the trustee to seek a modest yield for
the income beneficiary and a high level of capital
appreciation. Trust terms granting the trustee authority to
invade principal or to accumulate income tend to alleviate
investment inhibitions or pressures based on the duty of
impartiality. See § 227, Comment i.
In short, trustees have a duty of impartiality with respect to
the diverse beneficial interests they serve. Thus, a trustee has
a duty to seek to balance the income and principal elements of
total investment return. This balance is to be achieved in a
manner that is fair to all beneficiaries as a reflection of the
trust's purposes, terms, and obligations and in light of the
circumstances of the trust and the relevant circumstances of
its beneficiaries.
One result of this (see § 240) is that a trustee has a duty to the
income beneficiary not to retain or purchase unproductive or
under-productive property to an extent that jeopardizes the
proper entitlements of that beneficiary through a low income
yield from the trust estate as a whole. This is so even though
it could be expected that the trust corpus would significantly
appreciate in value as a result of those investments. The
presence of a power to invade principal, however, may affect
the trustee's duty in this respect, although it would not
eliminate the income beneficiary's right to an income yield
that is reasonable in light of the objectives and circumstances
of the trust. See § 227, Comment i.
On the other hand, the beneficiaries of various forms of future
interests are also entitled to have reasonable consideration
given to their concerns over protection of the purchasing
power of trust principal. Thus, if there are subsequent income
beneficiaries, they as well as remainder beneficiaries have a

r

I

r
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right to see that their interests are not disregarded as a result
of efforts to provide what might amount to a higher than
appropriate yield for the current income beneficiary.
Ultimately these matters may be affected not only by
applicable provisions of the trust (see Commente, below) but
also indirectly yet importantly by principles of state law
governing principal and income accounting. See §§ 223
through 241, containing specific applications of the rule
stated in this Section. Also, on matters of investment policy,
see § 227, particularly Comments e and L" Restatement
(Tnird) of Trusts §232 (1990) Comment b.

b.

B.

A related commentary supports the original premise. "In
short, only when beneficial rights do not tum on a distinction
between income and principal is the trustee allowed to focus
on total return...without regard to the income component of
that return. In other trust situations there exists a fiduciary
duty to make the trust estate productive of trust accounting
income. The trustee then has a duty to consider two aspects
of the productivity question. First, what is an appropriate
level or range of income productivity for the particular trust?
...[T]his is a matter for interpretation and fiduciary
judgment... Second, how should that productivity objective be
incorporated into an overall portfolio strategy? In resolving
the latter question the trustee is not governed by the
productivity standard in the selection and retention of each
individual investment. The standard applies to the portfolio
as a whole." Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 227 (1990)
Comment L

-

-

The Prudent Investor Rule.
1.

The Old "Prudent-Man" Standard.
a.

Duty to preserve principal value at all costs.

b.

Each investment was considered on its own merits without
regard to the rest of the portfolio.

c.

Broad categories of investments were considered imprudent
per se.

j

-

-
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3.

Delegation of investment authority was generally prohibited.

Influence of Modem Portfolio Theory.
a.

The capital markets offer bigger rewards and risks for the
unknown than for predictability.

b.

Assumes that all investors desire the highest possible level of
return while bearing the lowest amount of risk.

c.

Assumed baseline for risk-free investors - the return on U.S.
government securities: the only way to participate in a market
returning greater than the baseline is to assume risk beyond
treasury risk.

d.

Concerns the relationship between risk and reward - investors
will search for those opportunities that offer the greatest
reward relative to the risk assumed.

e.

Diversification reduces the overall variability of the
performance of an investment portfolio - investments selected
to minimize covariance, Le., the tendency of certain
investments to behave the same.

f.

Focus is on portfolio selection rather than individual asset
selection - risk can be judged only within the context of the
whole portfolio.

g.

See generally, Jonathan R. Macey, "An Introduction to
Modem Financial Theory", (1991) (American College of
Trust & Estate Counsel Foundation) and R.A. Brealey, "An
Introduction to Risk and Return from Common Stocks," (2d
ed. 1983).

The New Standard.

r

a.

The "Standard of Prudence" in investing is applied to the trust
portfolio as a whole, rather than to individual investments.

r
r
r

b.

The fiduciary's· central consideration in investing is the
tradeoff between risk and return as applied to risk and reward
objectives suitable for the specific trust.

r
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D.

(1)

The investment strategy must protect real (as opposed
to historic) value, while providing for a suitable return
for any income beneficiary.

(2)

Trustees have a Duty to analyze and make conscious
decisions concerning the levels of risk appropriate to
the purposes, distribution requirements, and other
circumstances of the trusts they administer.

c.

There are no categoric restrictions on types of investments.

d.

Prudent investing generally requires diversification.

e.

Delegation of investment functions is permitted.

f.

A trustee with special skills or expertise has a duty to use
those special skills or expertise.

g.

The Rule is a standard of conduct. The focus is on process,
not results. Liability is not based on the performance of
investments if the fiduciary follows the right process.

h.

The new standard appears as section 227 of the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts (1990) and the Uniform Prudent Investor
Act (1994). Uniform Prudent Investor Act, 7B U.L.A. 21
(West Supp. 1997).

_

-

:;

Current Uniform Principal and Income Acts.
1.

The 1931 Act is in effect in eight states.

2.

The 1962 Revised Act is in effect in 34 states.

-

The Uniform Principal and Income Act (1997).
1.

Approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform Laws on July 21, 1997.

2.

Primary objectives of the 1997 Act.
a.

To revise the 1962 Act.

b.

To add provisions to the Act that will facilitate adoption by
trustees of investment techniques associated with modem

-
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r

portfolio theory and permitted by legislation such as the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act.

,r

r

r

3.

To facilitate a trustee adopting a total return approach to investing,
Section 104 of the 1997 Act provides the trustee with broad
authority to make adjustments between principal and income.

4.

Section 104 provides a power to adjust total return between principal
and income if three conditions are met: (1) the trustee must be
managing the trust assets under the prudent investor rule; (2) the
terms of the trust must express the income beneficiary's rights in
terms of the right to receive "income" in the sense of traditional trust
accounting income; and (3) the trustee must determine that he or she
is unable to comply with the duty to administer the trust impartially
by applying the terms of the trust and the provisions in other sections
ofthe Act. Comment to section 104.

5.

Examples.

r

r
r

r
r
r
r
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III.

A.

r
r

b.

If trust property produces significant income, a portion can be
transferred to principal.

c.

If the character of an investment's return is unclear, the
trustee can adjust to produce a fair and reasonable result.

Fixed Income Investments Versus the Domestic Equity Market.
1.

It is well recognized that, at least for the last 75 years, equity out
performs debt over time. Illustration I is based on data from
Ibbotson Associates and tracks the growth of one dollar from 1926
to 1996. Inflation alone would cause one dollar to grow to nine over
this period while Treasury Bills would grow to only $14 and Bonds
to only $37. During the same period equities increased to $1,371.

2.

Despite historic trends, investors generally prefer income to capital
appreciation and debt rather than equity. Joel C. Dobris, "Why
Trustee Investors Often Prefer Dividends To Capital Gain And Debt

r
i

If trust property does not produce sufficient income, the
trustee can transfer funds from principal to income.

A BRIEF HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE
FINANCIAL MARKETS.

r
r

a.
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Investments to Equity - A Daunting Principal and Income Problem"
32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 2 (1997).
B.

IV.

Which Approach Provides the Best Balance of Risk and Return Over
the Long Term?
1.

An analytical model of growth in wealth should take into account the
effects of inflation, taxes and spending over time.

2.

The "miracle" of compounding is balanced by the "need" to spend.

3.

Given that equity grows faster than debt and capital gains are taxed
only when incurred and at preferential rates, the more a portfolio is
weighted toward equity, the more effectively the investor can
maintain real spending power while preserving real wealth.

4.

The "Garland Rule" posits that the most reliable way to provide a
steady spending rate which adjusts for inflation is to invest entirely
in equity and spend all dividends. James P. Garland, "A MarketYield Spending Rule for Endowments and Trusts." 45 FINANCIAL
ANALYSTS JOURNAL, (July/August, 1989) at 50.

5.

For a good discussion of how various economic models perform
over time see Roger Hertog and David A. Levine, "Income Versus
Wealth:
Making The Trade-Off," 5-1 THE JOURNAL OF
INVESTING 1 (Spring, 1996).

WHAT CAN A TRUSTEE DO TO BETTER BALANCE THE INTERESTS
OF THE CURRENT BENEFICIARY AND THE REMAINDERMAN?
A.

-

The Litigator's Solution.
1.

-

-

In general, the remedies of a beneficiary against a trustee are
equitable. The beneficiary of a trust can maintain a suit:

a.

To compel the trustee to perform his duties as trustee;

b.

To enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust;

c.

To compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust;

d.

To appoint a receiver to take possession of the trust property
and administer the trust;

-

-
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e.

r

2.

If the Trustee has committed a breach of trust, the beneficiary can
maintain a suit to compel the trustee to redress the breach of trust. A
breach of trust is a violation by the trustee of any duty which as
trustee he owes to the beneficiary. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §
201 (1957). "Ordinarily a trustee does not commit a breach of trust
if he does not intentionally or negligently do what he ought not to do
or fail to do what he ought to do. In other words, he does not
commit a breach of trust unless he is personally at fault. He may,
however, commit a breach of trust where is not personally at fault, as
where he acts under a mistake of law or fact, ..." Comment a.

3.

If the trustee commits a breach of trust, he is chargeable with (i) any
loss or depreciation in value of the trust estate resulting from the
breach; (ii) any profit that was made as a result of the breach; or (iii)
any profit which would have accrued to the trust estate if there had
not been a breach. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 205 (1957).

4.

Nature of the action.

r
r

r
r

r

r

r

B.

To remove the trustee. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 199
(1957).

Changing The Mix of Trust Assets

r

1.

Trust assets heavily weighted towards growth can be rebalanced to
produce more interest and dividends.

r

2.

The risk of increasing conventional "income" is that it reduces the
ability to keep pace with inflation. Additionally, in the case of
bonds, it can be argued that interest payments include some
distribution (depletion) of principal.

3.

The "drag" of rebalancing includes taxes on capital gains as well as
transactional costs.

4.

Ideal market conditions for rebalancing may not coincide with
pressures from current and future beneficiaries to change the asset
mIx.

r
r
I

r
r

r

r
r

C.

Section 104 Adjustments - Examples from the Official Comment.
I.

"T is the trustee of a trust that provides income to A for life,
remainder to B. T received from the settlor a portfolio of financial
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assets invested 20% in stocks and 80% in bonds. In response to the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act, T determines that the suitable risk
and return objectives for this portfolio indicate that it should be
invested 50% in stocks and 50% in bonds. As a result, the dividend
and interest income is decreased. T is authorized, after considering
the factors in subsection (b), to adjust between principal and income
to the extent T considers it necessary to increase the amount paid to
the income beneficiary."
2.

"T is the trustee of a trust that requires the income to be paid to the
settlor's son C for his life, remainder to C's daughter D. In a period
of very high inflation, T purchases bonds that pay double digit
interest and determines that a portion of the interest, which is
allocated to income under the other provisions of this Act, is a return
of capital. In consideration of the loss of value of principal due to
inflation and other factors that T considers relevant, T may transfer a
portion ofthe interest to principal."

3.

"T is the trustee of a trust that requires the income to be paid to the
settlor's sister E for life, remainder to charity F. E is a retired
schoolteacher who is single and has no children. The terms of the
trust permit T to invade principal to provide for E's health and to
support her in her accustomed manner of living, but do not otherwise
indicate that T shpuld favor E or F. E's income from her social
security, retirement pension, and savings is more than the amount
required to provide for her accustomed standard of living. Applying
prudent investor standards, T determines that the trust assets should
be invested entirely in growth stocks that produce virtually no
dividend income. Even though it is not necessary to invade principal
to maintain E's accustomed standard of living, she is entitled to
receive from the trust the degree of beneficial enjoyment normally
accorded a person who is the sole income beneficiary of a trust, and
T is authorized to adjust from principal to income to provide her
with that degree of enjoyment."

4.

"T is the trustee of a trust whose situs is State X. The trust became
irrevocable before State X adopted the prudent investor rule. The
terms of the trust require all of the income to be paid to G for life,
remainder to H. The trust agreement gives T the power to invade
principal for the benefit of G for "dire emergencies only," and limits
the amount that can be distributed from principal over the lifetime of
the trust to an aggregate amount that does not exceed 6% of the
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trust's value at its inception. The trust's portfolio is invested 50% in
stocks and 50% in bonds. After State X adopts the prudent investor
rule, T determines that, to achieve the suitable risk and return
objectives for the trust, the assets should be invested 90% in stocks
and 10% in bonds, which increases the total return from the portfolio
and decreases the dividend and interest income. In a year in which
G does not experience a dire emergency T may nevertheless exercise
the power to adjust in Section 104(a) to the extent that T determines
that the adjustment is exclusively from the portion of capital
appreciation resulting from the change in the portfolio's asset
allocation. If T is unable to determine the extent to which capital
appreciation resulted from the change in asset allocation or is unable
to maintain adequate records to determine the extent to which
principal distributions to G for dire emergencies do not exceed the
6% limitation, T may not exercise the power to adjust. See Joel C.
Dobris, Limits on the Doctrine of Equitable Adjustment in
Sophisticated Postmortem Tax Planning, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 273
(1981)."
D.

Bringing Together All Parties at Interest.

1.

2.

3.

Identifying all parties at interest and assessing the ability for them to
enter into a legally binding agreement.
a.

dealing with minors and unborn beneficiaries.

b.

dealing with beneficiaries who have significantly different
goals and needs.

Agreements with respect to:
a.

investment strategy

b.

distribution patterns:
(1)

definition of income

(2)

authority to make discretionary payments of principal
and income and applicable limitations

(3)

application of rule 104 type adjustments

Is the IRS a party at interest?
proposed agreements.
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The transfer tax implications of

4.

v.

Let's take it to the Judge.

WHAT CAN A PLANNER DO TO BETTER ASSURE A BALANCE
BETWEEN
THE
CURRENT
BENEFICIARY
AND
THE
REMAINDERMAN?

A.

Drafting Options.
Professor Joel C. Dobris addressed this issue in his paper "New Forms of
Private Trusts For the Twenty-First Century - Principal and Income." 31
REAL PROP.,PROB. & TR. J (Spring 1995) at 1. He summarizes the
planning options as follows:

B.

1.

Traditional fiduciary income allocation rules with authority in the
fiduciary to determine a beneficiary's return based on asset
allocation.

2.

Empower the fiduciary to distribute Income and principal on a
discretionary basis.

3.

Authorize the fiduciary to allocate receipts and expenditures
between income and principal.

4.

Authorize the fiduciary to reallocate receipts to improve fairness.

5.

Create a noncharitable unitrust.

6.

Rely upon a formula based on real return for the allocation of trust
receipts.

7.

Rely upon a formula based on asset values that is essentially a
modified unitrust for the allocation of trust receipts.

8.

Rely upon a hybrid formula based on asset values and traditional
trust accounting income for the allocation of trust receipts.

Variations On the Non-Charitable Unitrust Theme.
1.

It is suggested a private, noncharitable unitrust:

a.

creates realistic expectations;

b.

replaces the inherited conflict between current and future
beneficiaries with a common purpose to provide maximum
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return given the risk tolerance of the beneficiaries and the
trust's probable duration; and
c.

addresses the trustee's duty of impartiality. Robert B. Wolf,
"Defeating the Duty to Disappoint Equally - The Total Return
Trust" 32 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1997) at 45.

2.

The Simple Illustration: "The Trustee shall pay to the beneficiary X
percent of the value trust estate as of the end of each year of A's life
and shall distribute the balance as of A's death to B."

3.

Additional considerations:
a.

b.

Fluctuating Needs:
(1)

Will the current beneficiary need all of the unitrust
amount each year?

(2)

Will the current beneficiary have predictable extra
needs, such as tuition?

(3)

Should emergencies be addressed
extraordinary medical expenses?

(4)

Should life events i.e., marriage, children, employment
status, be taken into account?

(5)

Each consideration can be addressed with caps,
minimums and powers of invasion.

such

as

Fluctuating Markets:
(1)

Does annual valuation produce a reliable payment?

(2)

To smooth fluctuations consider payments based on
valuations averaged over J to 5 years.

C -13

4.

Sample trust clauses to define a non-charitable unitrust amount.

J

***
ARTICLE I. DISPOSITION OF TRUST ESTATE

***
1.

The Trustees shall pay the "Unitrust Amount" to the
beneficiary [together with whatever other amounts of income
or principal they deem proper for his welfare]. Upon his
death, the beneficiary may appoint the balance of the Trust to
or for the benefit of anyone, [including his estate or the
creditors of his estate] [other than himself, his estate, his
creditors or the creditors of his estate]. Any part of the Trust
which the beneficiary does not so appoint, for any reason,
shall be divided among and held in separate trusts under the
following paragraph for his or her lineal descendants, then
living, per stirpes.

***
ARTICLE II. GENERAL

***
5.

Definitions. In this Agreement:

***
a.

Needs and Welfare. A person's "needs" include
such amounts as the Trustees deem proper for
such person's support, health (including
lifetime residential or nursing home care) and
education (at all levels). A person's welfare
includes such amounts as the Trustees deem
proper for such person's "needs" and also for
his advancement in life (including assistance in
the purchase of a home or the establishment or
development of any business or professional
enterprise which the Trustees believe to be
reasonably sound), happiness and general
well-being.
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***
b.

Unitrust Amount. The Unitrust Amount shall
be paid in equal quarterly installments on the
last day of March, June, September and
December.
The Unitrust Amount for any
taxable year shall be an amount equal to three
percent (3.0%) of the net fair market value of
the trust assets valued as of the first day of such
taxable year, decreased prorata in the case
where the taxable year is a short taxable year or
is the taxable year in which the beneficiary dies;
and increased prorata in the case where there
are additional contributions in the taxable year.
Any income of the trust which is in excess of
the Unitrust Amount shall be added to principal.
If any additional contributions are made to the
trust, the Unitrust Amount for the taxable year
in which the assets are so added to the trust
shall be equal to three percent (3.0%) of the
sum of (i) the net fair market value of the trust
assets as of the valuation date (excluding the
assets so added and any income from, or
appreciation on, such assets) and (ii) that
proportion of the fair market value of the assets
so added that was excluded under (i) that the
number of days in the period that begins with
the date of contribution and ends with the
earlier of the last day of the taxable year or the
date of the death of the beneficiary bears to the
number of days in the period which begins on
the first day of such taxable year and ends with
the earlier of the last day in such taxable year or
the date of the death of the beneficiary. The
assets so added shall be valued at the time of
contribution.
The trust assets, including
additional contributions, shall be valued on the
first business day of each taxable year. If no
valuation date occurs before the end of any
taxable year of the trust, the trust assets shall be
valued as of the last day of the taxable year of
the trust and, if no valuation date occurs before
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the date of the death of the beneficiary, the trust
assets shall be valued as of the date of the death
of the beneficiary. If the net fair market value
of the trust assets is incorrectly determined by
the Trustees as of the first business day of any
taxable year, within a reasonable period after
the final determination of the correct value, the
Trustees shall pay to the beneficiary in the case
of an undervaluation, or shall receive from the
beneficiary in the case of an overvaluation, an
amount equal to the difference between the
unitrust amount properly payable and the
unitrust amount actually paid.

***
ARTICLE III. FIDUCIARIES

-

***
ARTICLE IV. LIMITATIONS ON RIGHTS AND DUTIES

-
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I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Most persons drafting wills and trust agreements recognize the
desirability of giving the trustee as much flexibility as possible
regarding distributions of income or principal to a beneficiary or a
class of beneficiaries. Trusts giving the trustee such a discretionary
power are referred to in this outline as "discretionary trusts."

B.

Discretionary provisions are favored to give the trustee as much
flexibility as possible in:

f
r

r

1.

providing for a beneficiary's, or class of beneficiaries', wellbeing, including all of the reasons of health, education,
support, capital needs for a home or a business or otherwise,
and differences in income. Such provisions have also been
used for "family control", ~, to discipline beneficiaries for
family abandonment, matrimonial problems, divorce, use of
abusive substances, and other non-pecuniary situations.

2.

providing protection for spendthrifts, i.e., giving beneficiaries
protection from claims by creditors by prohibiting the
voluntary or involuntary assignment or alienation of a
beneficiary's beneficial interests.

3.

providing for minors.

4.

providing tax savings or tax deferral through a plan of favoring
or bypassing individual beneficiaries or generations based on
need (the corollary is favoring or bypassing based upon
comparative tax brackets).

5.

insulating trust assets from being countable assets that would
disqualify a beneficiary from receiving governmental benefits.

r
r
r
r
r
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r
r
r
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Much of the material in this outline is discussed at greater length in quarterly
commentaries of Practical Drafting, Copyright by United States Trust Company of
New York and is used here with permission See, particularly, April 1985 and July
1985 issues, "Discretionary Payments of Income or Principal" updated through July
1998. References are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Copyright (c) 1998 - All
rights reserved.
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II.

TAX CONSEQUENCES
A.

Trust income in a discretionary trust may be taxed to the beneficiary,
the trustee, the grantor or another (non-grantor).
1.

The beneficiary is taxed on amounts distributed to him to the
extent of the trust's distributable net income and in accordance
with the "tier" distribution rules. I.R.C. §662.

2.

The trust is taxed on accumulated income and these
accumulations are no longer subject to the "throwback rule"
(which was repealed by Section 507 of The Taxpayer Relief Act
of 1997 (p.L. 105-34». I.R.C. §665-667. The trust is also taxed
on capital gains.

3.

The grantor is treated as the owner of any portion of trust
property and taxed on trust income to the extent that
beneficial enjoyment of income or principal is subject to a
power of disposition exercisable by a nonadverse party without
the consent of an adverse party. I.R.C. §674(a). (This rule,
obviously, does not apply to testamentary trusts.) There are
exceptions to this general rule. Thus, if a grantor creates a
discretionary trust (and he is not the trustee), trust income
will not be taxed to the grantor if one of the exceptions in
I.R.C. §674(c), 674(b)(5), 674(b)(5)(A) or 674(d) is satisfied.
a.

b.

The grantor is not taxed on income of a discretionary
trust if the grantor is not a trustee and no more than
half the trustees are related or subordinate parties [a
term defined in I.R.C. §672(c) as any nonadverse party
who is the grantor's spouse (if living with the grantor),
the grantor's father, mother, issue, brother or sister and
certain other persons]. I.R.C. §674(c).

J

j

When the trustee is a related or subordinate party and
has discretion to distribute cornus, the grantor is not
taxed on trust income provided the trustee's power is
limited by a "reasonably definite standard" in the will
or trust agreement. I.R.C. §674(b)(5) and I.R.C.
§674(b)(5)(A).

j
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c.
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4.
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The grantor is taxed on trust income if it may be used for the
benefit of grantor or grantor's spouse. I.R.C. §677(a).
a.

This includes possible use of income to discharge a legal
obligation of grantor or grantor's spouse.

b.

If the legal obligation is the obligation of support, the
grantor is taxed only if income actually is used to
discharge the support obligation. I.R.C. §677(b).

r

r
r

5.

The non-grantor will be treated as the owner of any portion of
a trust with respect to which the non-grantor has a power,
exercisable solely by himself or herself, to vest the income or
corpus from the trust in himself or herself. I.R.C. §678. The
section does not state that an exception applies for a power
subject to an ascertainable standard. Nevertheless, if the nongrantor, who is serving as trustee of a trust for his or her
benefit, has discretion to distribute income or principal limited
to an ascertainable standard, cases hold that the trustee will
not be taxed on the trust income under I.R.C. §678 (a). See.
e.g.. De Bonchamps v. U.S., 278 F. 2d 127, 130 (9th Cir. 1960).
The non-grantor is taxed on trust income which is expended for
a beneficiary whom the non-grantor has a legal obligation to
. support if the non-grantor has the power as trustee to so apply
the income. I.R.C. §678. The Internal Revenue Service takes
the position that trust income applied to discharge a nongrantor's support obligation is taxable to the non-grantor, even
when the non-grantor is not a trustee. Reg. 1.662(a)-4.

6.

Cases on the subject of whether college expenses of a child fall
within the support obligation of a parent are numerous, and
the determination must be made under applicable state law.

r

r
r
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When the trustee is a related or subordinate party
(other than the grantor or grantor's spouse living with
the grantor) and has discretion to distribute or
accumulate income, the grantor is not taxed on trust
income provided the trustee's power is limited by a
"reasonably definite external standard" in the trust
instrument. I.R.C. §674(d) and Reg. §674(d)-1 and Reg.
§1.674(d)-1.

a.

Mter 1968 the general rule in New York appeared to be
that a father is not obligated to provide a private school
education for his minor child without "special
circumstances" and the factors to be considered
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include: (1) the educational background of the parents,
(2) the child's academic abilities and (3) the father's
financial ability to provide the necessary funds. Kaplan
v. Wallshein, 57 A.D. 2d 828,394 N.Y.S. 2d 439 (2nd
Dept. 1977). See Frankel v. Frankel, 82 A.D.2d 796,
439 N.Y.S. 2d 218 (2d Dept. 1981) ordering a very
wealthy parent to pay his children's college expenses.
In 1989 the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) was
enacted and a court, within its discretion, could
determine to award educational expenses where it was
in the "best interests" of the children and appropriate to
the circumstances. Cohen v. Cohen, NYLJ April 22,
1994, p. 25 col. 5, Romans v. Romans, NYLJ May 3,
1994, p. 27 col. 2 and Cassano v. Cassano, NYLJ May 2,
1994, p. 32 col. 2.

b.

In Frederick C. Braun, Jr., 48 TCM 210 (1984), the Tax
Court held that under New Jersey law a parent has a
legal obligation to pay (1) college expenses of a child age
18 and over and (2) private school expenses of a child
under age 18.

c.

The Supreme Court in Florida held that a parent has no
legal duty to provide a college education for an adult
child (a child over 17). Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So.2d 853
(1984).

d.

The Pennsylvania Court concluded in Griffin v. Griffin,
558 A.2d 75 (pa. Super. 1989) that (1) in determining
the support obligation for a child over age 18, the child's
own resources may be taken into account but he or she
may not necessarily be required to contribute as much
as possible or required to attend a state institution
rather than a more expensive private college, and (2)
only in exceptional cases, will the parent's obligation to
pay college expenses continue after the child becomes
23.

e.

Does payment of college expenses of a child over age 17
paid from trust income result in a parent being taxed on
such income in California? Section 196 of the California
Civil Code states that a father and mother have an
equal responsibility to support and educate their child
and §241(d) defines a child as a daughter or son under
the age of 18 or incapacitated. See Jones v. Jones, 225
Cal. App. 3d 1011 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1986) and
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Christopher Stone, 54 TCM 462 (1987), affd. without
published opinion 867 F. 2d. 613 (9th Cir. 1989), and
Joanne L. Sharon, 57 TCM 1562.
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B.

The estate tax consequences should be considered when a beneficiary,
trustee, or grantor is given a discretionary power to distribute income
or principal.
1.

The trust property will be included in the estate of a
beneficiary or power holder if he has an unrestricted power to
consume trust property. LR.C. §2041(b).

,

a.

r
r
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If the beneficiary or power holder has a power limited
by an ascertainable standard related to health,
education, maintenance or support, the trust property
will not be included in the gross estate. LR.C.
§2041(b)(I)(A) and Reg. §20.2041-1(c)(2). See also
LR.C. §2514(c)(i) and Reg. §25.2514-1(c)(2).
i.

The Regulations state that "support in his
accustomed manner of living" is an ascertainable
standard. Yet the IRS ruled that a power to
invade corpus "to continue the donee's
accustomed mode of living" is a general power of
appointment. Rev. Rul. 77-60, 1977-1 CB 282
(See quote at iii infra).

ii.

To avoid adverse tax consequences, statutes in
some states prohibit a beneficiary-power holder
from participating in the exercise of the power
(Wis. Stat. Ann. §701.20(12)(dm), New York's
EPTL 10-10.1, Missouri's Mo. Rev. Stat.
§456.540.4, North Carolina's N.C. Gen. Stat.63229) and Connecticut, P.A. No. 95-315 and other
statutes restrict the exercise of certain powers
(Florida's F.S.A. 737.402(4), Ohio Rev. Code
§1340.22, Virginia's Va. Code §55-78, California
Civil Code §2269, Montana Code Annotated §7234-130, New Jersey, NJSA 3B:11-4.1, New
Hampshire, N.H. RSA §564-A:3 and Colorado,
CRS §15-1-1401). Similarly, Garfield v. United
States, 80-2 USTC 13,381 (D.C. Mass. 1980)
holds that the common law in Massachusetts
prohibits the beneficiary-power holder from
participating in the exercise of the power and
Armington v. Meyer, 103 R.L 211, 236 A.2d 450

,.
J

r
r

r,...
j

,.
,.
I

r

r

,

r

D-5

J
(1967) holds that in Rhode Island the
beneficiary-holder must obtain court approval of
the exercise of the power for his benefit. An
Indiana statute requires the power holder to
secure court approval of the exercise of the
power (Ind. Code Ann. §30-4-3-5).
iii.

iv.

b.

The scope of the principal invasion language is
determined under applicable state law and the
words used mayor may not create an
ascertainable standard. The courts held
ascertainable standards were created in: Estate
of Wood v. Comm'r, 398 T.C. 919 (1963):
"support, maintenance, welfare and comfort";
Estate of Bell vs. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 729 (1976):
"well-being and maintenance in health and
comfort"; Estate of Gokey v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 721
(1979): "support, care, welfare and education."
The courts have held ascertainable standards
were not authorized in Miller v. United States,
387 F2d 866 (3rd Cir. 1968): "comfort and wellbeing"; Lehman v. United States, 448 F.2d 1318
(5th Cir. 1971): "comfort and welfare;" and in
Strite v. McGinnes, 300 F.2d 234 (3rd Cir. 1964):
"benefit". See also Rev.Rul. 77-60, 1977-1 Cum.
Bull. 282 where the I.R.S. said, "A power to use
property to enable the donee to continue an
accustomed mode of living, without further
limitation, although predictable and measurable
on the basis of past expenditures, does not come
within the ascertainable standard prescribed in
§2041(b)(A)...."
the potential tax problem exists only when a
person may exercise the power (or participate in
the exercise) for his own benefit.

If a trustee-beneficiary has a legal obligation to support
another beneficiary, and the support obligation may be
satisfied by a distribution from the trust in the trustee's
discretion, the power of the trustee to participate in a
decision to distribute, even if measured by an
ascertainable standard, is a general power. Reg.
20.2041-1(c)(1) and Reg. 25.2514-1(c)(1).
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2.

A power of appointment includes all powers which are in
substance and effect powers of appointment regardless of the
nomenclature used. Reg. §20.20401-1 (b)(I). These powers
may include the power in a donee to remove or discharge a
trustee and appoint a successor trustee.
a.

In Rev. Rul 79-353, 1979-2 C.B. 325 the decedentgrantor's unrestricted power to replace a corporate
trustee of an irrevocable trust with another
independent trustee caused the powers of that trustee
to be attributed to the grantor for estate tax purposes.
The Tax Court, in Estate of Wall v. Comm'r., 101 T.C.
300 (1993), rejected the holding of the Revenue Ruling.
(Mter this decision, the estate brought a proceeding
under IRC §7430(a) for its reasonable litigation costs.
To succeed it had to show that the IRS position was not
"substantially justified," a difficult task with a case of
first impression. The Tax Court held the test was not
met. 102 T.C. 13 (1994).) In Rev. Rul. 95-58 the Service
reconsidered its position and revoked Rev. Rul. 79-353
and Rev. Rul. 81-51, holding that if the grantor
possessed the power to remove the trustee and appoint
an individual or corporate successor trustee that was
not related or subordinate (for purposes of §672(c», the
grantor has not retained a trustee's discretionary
control over trust income.

b.

In LTR 8916032, the IRS extended the principle of Rev.
Rul. 79-353 (regarding grantor powers) to a
beneficiary's power to remove a trustee and appoint a
successor. The Ruling's position was that if the trustee
has a discretionary power (unlimited by an
ascertainable standard) to distribute principal to the
beneficiary, then the beneficiary will be deemed to have
a general power of appointment causing the trust
property to be taxed in the beneficiary's estate under
§2041(a)(2). Also, a release or lapse of the power to
remove and appoint successor trustees causes the trust
property to be taxed in the beneficiary's estate if the
beneficiary has an interest in the trust such that if the
property had been transferred to the trust by the
beneficiary, the property would be includable in the
beneficiary's estate under §2035 to §2038, inclusive.
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In LTR 8922003, a National Office Technical Advice
Memorandum, the IRS employs the rationale of Rev.
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Rul. 79-353 to attribute the incidents of ownership of
insurance in an insurance trust to the grantor, who
retained the right to remove the trustee. On April 23,
1979, the decedent created an irrevocable insurance
trust and designated a corporate fiduciary as initial
trustee. The decedent grantor reserved the right for his
life to remove any trustee and appoint anyone other
than himself as successor trustee. In 1986, the
decedent removed the corporate trustee and appointed
his two siblings as successor trustees. The decedent
died in 1987. The insurance, however, was held not
includable in the decedent's gross estate because the
policy was irrevocably transferred to the trust before
October 29, 1979, the grandfather date Rev. Rul. 81-51
established for Rev. Rul. 79-353.
The letter ruling was issued on February 24, 1989. On
August 7, 1989, the Tax Court decided Estate of
Headrick v. Commissioner, 93 T. C. 171 (1989), aff'd,
918 F. 2d 1263 (6th Cir. 1990). The decedent died
within three years of creating an irrevocable insurance
trust under which the corporate trustee purchased
insurance on the decedent's life. The Tax Court held
that the decedent never possessed incidents of
ownership in the life insurance policy within the
meaning of §2042. However, the trust agreement
reserved to the decedent the right to remove any trustee
at will and appoint a successor bank trustee. This
power was not discussed in the opinion.
In LTR 9607008 the IRS, citing Rev. Rul. 95-58, ruled
that beneficiaries of irrevocable trusts could be
appointed co-trustees but would not be deemed to have
a general power of appointment over the income and
principal of their respective trusts by virtue of their
power to remove and replace the corporate trustee of
their respective trusts. (The trust will also be reformed
to provide that any successor corporate trustee may not
be related or subordinate to the individual trustees
under §642(c».

c.

Consideration should be given to imposing restrictions
on the removal right. Letter ruling 9303018 relates to
the proposed construction and modification of a 1978
trust as to which additions were made through 1983.
The trust authorizes certain family trustees who are
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beneficiaries to remove and replace any other trustee
and states that no fiduciary power (including the
removal and replacement power) be exercised to benefit
the trustee. The trustees proposed to construe and
modify by court order certain provisions of the trust.
The family trustee's removal and replacement power
could only be exercised for "cause." The trust
agreement listed 13 grounds for removal.
1.

The legal incapacity of a trustee.

ii.

The willful or negligent mismanagement by the
trustee of the trust's assets.

iii.

The abuse or abandonment of, or inattention to,
the trust by the trustee.

iv.

A federal or state charge against the trustee
involving the commission of a felony or serious
misdemeanor.

v.

An act of stealing, dishonesty, fraud,
embezzlement, moral turpitude, or moral
degeneration by the trustee.

vi.

The use of narcotics or excessive use of alcohol
by the trustee.

vii.

The poor health of the trustee such that the
trustee is physically, mentally, or emotionally
unable to devote sufficient time to administer
the trust.

viii.

The failure by the trustee to comply with a
written fee agreement or other written
agreement in the operation of the Trust.

ix.

The failure of a corporate trustee to appoint a
senior officer with at least five (5) years of
experience in the administration of trusts to
handle the trust account.

x.

Changes by a corporate trustee in the account
officer responsible for handling the trust account
more frequently than every five (5) years (unless

I
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such change is made at the request of or with the
acquiescence of the other trustee).
xi.

The relocation by a trustee away from the
location where the trust operates so as to
interfere with the administration of the trust.

xii.

A demand from the trustee for unreasonable
compensation for such trustee's services.

xiii.

Any other reason for which a [state] court of
competent jurisdiction would remove a trustee.

The IRS ruled the family trustee did not have or release
a general power of appointment either before or after
the construction.

d.

3.

C.

III.

Consideration should be given to giving the removal
right to:
1.

the spouse-beneficiary of a marital deduction
trust;

ll.

a beneficiary to whom the trustee cannot
currently distribute principal; or

ill.

an individual who is not a beneficiary

The trust property will be included in the estate of a decedentgrantor if income from a discretionary trust is used by the
trustee to discharge the support obligation of the grantor. Reg.
§20.2036-1(b)(2). But if distributions from the trust for the
support of a dependent were discretionary (with independent
trustees), the Regulation does not apply. Ltr. Rul. 8504011.

When there is a splitting of trust benefits among younger generation
beneficiaries assigned to two or more generations, tax payment under
Chapter 13 may arise in a discretionary trust with power to pay
income or principal among a class of beneficiaries. In general, a
distribution of income or principal to a grandchild or more remote
descendant will be a taxable distribution under Chapter 13 unless if
made by an individual it would not be treated as a taxable gift under
I.R.C. §2503(e). See I.R.C. §2611(b)(2).

,
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PROPERTY LAW CONSIDERATIONS
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In creating a discretionary trust to distribute income and principal,
what standard is the trustee to apply in making distributions? The
clause in Appendix A gives the trustee as much flexibility as possible
regarding the exercise of the power.
1.

A trustee acting under a simple discretion should be judged by
a standard of reasonableness. Restatement (second) of Trusts
§187, comment j (1959).

2.

A trustee having "absolute," "uncontrolled," or "unlimited"
discretion should be judged by a standard based on his state of
mind. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §187, comment j (1959).
This is commonly referred to as the good faith test. Even
though the Restatement interpretation does not appear to be
supported by the cases, use of the words "absolute" or "sole"
should provide some additional discretion.

l"-

i

r
;

r
J

a.

In re Ledyard's Estate, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 860 (1939) aff'd.,
259 App. Div. 892, leave to appeal denied 284 N.Y. 819,
the Trustee had "absolute discretion" to distribute
income to wife and decendants. In an accounting
proceeding objections were filed because income was
distributed to the wife (who had sufficient income from
other sources). The court held that the trustee's exercise
of discretion would not be subject to review.

b.

Similarly, See Matter of Payson, NYU June 20,1989,
p.26, in which the scope of the invasion language set
forth in Appendix A of this outline was discussed and
the opinion found no abuse of discretion by the trustee.

c.

Compare the somewhat inconsistent interpretation
found in Matter of Stillman, 107 Misc.2d 102, 433
N.Y.S. 2d 701 (1980), where the trustees, who had
"absolute and uncontrolled" discretion to invade
principal for testator's grandsons, refused to invade
principal and were later compelled to do so by the
Surrogate.

r
i
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B.

It is important to know whether the terms "support and
maintenance", "use", "benefit," "emergency," and "need" are to be
interpreted liberally or conservatively in the applicable jurisdiction.
The use of these words may cause uncertainty regarding the
circumstances under which the power to invade principal may be
exercised.

r

r
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1.

2.

When the language allows for an invasion due to an
"emergency" and the beneficiary is a trustee, the I.R.S. takes
the position that the trusteelbeneficiary has a general power of
appointment. However, the courts have not found "emergency"
to be broadening language in Warner v. Trust Co. Bank, 250
Ga. 204, 296 S.E. 2d 553 (1982), Estate of Ira Maude Sowell,
74 T.C. 1001 (1980), rev'd, 708 F. 2d 1565 (10th cir. 1983)
(where the opinion stated: "The key characteristic of the
meaning of "emergency" is that of need. The Tax Court also
erred in concluding that the concept of an "emergency"
included broader uses than for support or maintenance.") and
Hunter v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 1293 (D.C. Pa. 1984)
(where the opinion, referring to Reg. §20.2041-1(c)(4) stated:
"allowing invasion in order to support the beneficiary in his
accustomed manner of living [as does the regulation] is surely
a more liberal standard than that embodied in the term
'emergency.' We can envision no emergency which would not
be reasonably measurable in terms of health or to support a
beneficiary's standard of living".)
The terms "support" and "maintenance" mean different things
to different people. Depending upon the governing jurisdiction,
it mayor may not be helpful to use modifiers such as
"comfortable" or "generous".
a.

b.

The terms are interpreted to mean more than the bare
necessities of life. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v.
Eaton, 36 F. 2d 710 (2d Cir. 1929). The terms may be
exercised taking into account the beneficiary's station in
life. Hill v. Comm'r, 88 F.2d 941 (8th Cir. 1937), In re
Levinson's Will, 5 Misc. 2d 979, 162 N.Y.S. 2d 287
(Surr. Ct. 1957) and Equitable Trust Co. v.
Montgomery, 44 A.2d 420 (Del. Ch. 1945).
When a trustee is authorized to invade principal for the
support of the beneficiary, most jurisdictions hold that
the trustee is also authorized to invade for expenses of
the beneficiary's dependents, including spouse and
children. In re Sullivan, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W. 2d 148
(1943); Robinson v. Robinson, 173 Mise 985, 19 N.Y.S.
2d 44 (Surr. Ct. 1940); and Seattle-First National Bank
v. Crosby, 42 Wash. 2d 234,254 P.2d 732 (1953). But
see Cavett v. Buck, 397 P. 2d 901 (Okla. 1964) where
the court limited distributions for the support of the
beneficiary alone, and not for the support of his wife
and dependent children.
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3.

It is often uncertain whether the trustee has the authority to
invade principal to enable the income beneficiary to make gifts.

a.

The court refused to permit such an invasion in a
marital deduction trust where the will authorized an
invasion "for the spouse or for her use" Matter of
Mandel, 46 Misc. 2d 850, 261 N.Y. 2d 110 (1965).
Similarly, the court denied an invasion to enable the
wife to make gifts to her children pursuant to a clause
which authorized "in the absolute discretion of my
Trustee [an encroachment on corpus as] shall be
appropriate and to the best interest of my wife...." In re
Estate of Howard, 236 S.E. 2d 423 (1977).

b.

In Estate of Hartzell v. Comm'r, the IRS took the
position that the exercise of an invasion power over
property held in an IRC §2056(b)(5) trust was invalid
and the surviving spouse's gifts of property should not
be recognized. The will authorized invasions of
principal as follows:

r
r
r
r
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"In addition thereto, the trustees are given the
right, in their sole and absolute discretion, to use
the principal of Trust A or any part thereof, even
to the exhaustion thereof, for the comfort,
maintenance, support and general well being of
said Miriam H. Hartzell, or to continue the
standard of living to which she is accustomed, or
to aid her in the event of any accident, injury,
illness or other emergency affecting her."
The Tax Court rejected the IRS contention. 68 TCM
1243 (1994).

r
r
i

r
r
r

In Estate of Halpern v. Comm'r., the invasion language
for the spouse was more limited than in Hartzell.
Invasions could be made if the surviving spouse had an
illness or other emergency requiring a distribution of
principal to ensure her maintenance and welfare. The
trustee of the marital trust made distributions of
principal to the spouse pursuant to an invasion power
and the spouse then made gifts with the distributed
property. The IRS asserted that the invasions were not
authorized and that the gift property should be included
in the spouse's estate. The Tax Court held that
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distributions made to the spouse from the trust before
her incompetency were not subject to estate tax, but
that post-incompetency distributions were taxable. 70
TCM 229 (1995).
Similar facts were involved in letter ruling 9337001, a
National Office Technical Advice Memorandum.

c.

C.

Often the spouse desires to make gifts to descendants
and, particularly, to children. This should be possible if
the trustee is given absolute discretion to make
discretionary payments (See language in Appendix A),
rather than having discretion to make invasions for the
"benefit" of or in the "best interest" of the spouse.

Whether or not the trustee must consider other income or resources
available to the beneficiary before exercising discretion to invade
principal is a frequently litigated issue.
1.

The general rule is that a beneficiary should be supported by
the trust regardless of the beneficiary's outside resources. "It
is a question of interpretation whether the beneficiary is
entitled to support out of the trust fund even though he has
other resources. The inference is that he is so entitled."
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §128, comment e (1959).

2.

In New York the standard is based on whether the
testator/grantor created a trust to provide for the support of
the beneficiary (i.e., a support trust is an absolute gift without
regard to the beneficiary's outside resources) or whether the
instrument authorizes the trustee to invade principal for the
beneficiary's support if the income is insufficient for the
beneficiary's needs. In re Martin's Will, 269 N.Y. 305, 129
N.E. 491 (1936). Courts disagree on the application of the New
York rule, and use of the words "need," "insufficiency," or
"necessary" mayor may not be determinative, so that prior
cases may have minimal precedential value.

a.

Where the will authorized the trustees "...to apply the
net income and so much of the principal as my said
trustees in their discretion shall deem necessary or
desirable for the support, maintenance and treatment of
my beloved sister...," and trust income was not
sufficient to provide for the beneficiary's maintenance,
the Court held the trustees were authorized to use trust
principal and to disregard the beneficiary's (substantial)
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personal income because an absolute gift to support was
intended by the testator. Estate of Fannie Brundage,
New York Law Journal, April 28, 1975, P. 16. But see
Matter of Flyer, 23 N.Y 2d 579, 245 N.E. 2d 718 (1969).

b.

Where the will provided for discretionary monthly
income to the widow, "always keeping mind [sic] her
necessities in the way of medical expenses, food,
shelter, clothing and other incidentals which would be
necessary to maintain the same standard of living to
which she is accustomed," the Court held the trustees
were not to consider the (private) income of the
beneficiary in reaching decisions regarding
discretionary distributions of trust income. Hamilton
National Bank v. Childers, 233 Ga. 427, 211 S.E.2d 723
(1975).

c.

Where the will provided for all income to be paid to the
widow and "in addition if such net income should be
insufficient to provide for her comfortable maintenance,
support and medical care, the trustee in its discretion
may from time to time use such part of principal as it
deems necessary therefor," the Court held that other
resources were to be considered before invading
principal to pay for nursing home expenses which
exceeded income. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Boynton, 15 Mass. App. 103, 443 N.E.2d 1344 (1983).

d.

Where the will created a trust of the residuary estate
for the surviving spouse, with income payable to her,
and the will provides, "in addition, my trustee may
expend such amounts of principal as my trustee, in her
sole discretion determines necessary for the support
and maintenance of my wife," the Trial Court held that
no invasion should be made after the trustee refused to
recommend an invasion. In re Estate of Tahjian, 544
A.2d 67 (pA. Super. 1988). The opinion contains an
extensive discussion of Pennsylvania law.
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3.

The term "other resources" is ambiguous and gives little
guidance to the trustee as to what resources must be
considered.
a.

must the trustee consider only the beneficiary's other
sources of income or should the beneficiary's separate
estate also be considered?
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b.

must the beneficiary sell appreciated property,
incurring a capital gains tax?

c.

must the trustee consider the beneficiary's non-liquid
assets?

d.

must the trustee consider the equity in a beneficiary's
home?

e.

what kind of an investigation must the trustee
undertake?

If a beneficiary is eligible for or receiving public benefits or residing in
a state institution, it mayor may not be possible to insulate income
and corpus from claims of governmental agencies for the cost of the
benefits or other services furnished to the beneficiary.
1.

Where the trustee has been given broad discretion as to
payments and the trustee did not invade principal to pay for
costs incurred while the beneficiary was receiving benefits
from the state, some courts have not intervened on the ground
that there was no abuse of discretion. Matter of Escher, 94
Misc. 2d 952, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 106 (1978), aff'd 75 A.D. 2d 531,
426 N.Y.S. 2d 1008 (1st Dept. 1980), aff'd 52 N.Y. 2d 1006, 420
N.E.2d 91 (1982), Matter of Roberts, 61 N.Y. 2d 782,461 N.E.
2d 300 (1984), and First National Bank of Md. v. Dept. of
Health, 399 A. 2d 891 (Md. App. 1979).

2.

If a beneficiary is denied needed care because of the trustee's
exercise of discretion to withhold payments, the court may find
an abuse of discretion and intervene. Restatement of Trusts,
2d, §187 and comments. Some courts have also required
payments be made even though the trustee has complete
discretion. See Estate of Lackman, 156 Cal. App. 674, 320 P.
2d 186 (1958); Bureau of Support in Dept. of Ment. H. & C. v.
Krietzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243 N.E. 2d 83 (1968); and
Stroudt v. Pennsylvania, 454 A. 2d 665 (Pa. 1983).

3.

In 1986 the Social Security Act was amended to prevent a
grantor from creating a discretionary trust so the trust
property would not be considered as his resources for purposes
of determining his Medicaid eligibility. 42 U.S. Code § 1396a(k).
And, of course, OBRA '93 containing major revisions of the
Federal Medical Assistance (Medicaid) program became law on
August 9, 1993 and affects planning in this area.
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E.

IV.

See Cali. Probate Code § 15306 and Ohio Rev. Code § 1340.22.

In general, courts will not interfere with a trustee's exercise of
discretion nor will they instruct the trustee how to exercise his
discretion. Matter of Emmons, 165 Misc. 192, 300 N.Y. Supp. 580
(Surr. Ct. 1937); People's National Bank v. Jarvis, 58 Wash. 2d 627,
364 P.2d 436 (1961).

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
A.

When two or more trusts are created for the same beneficiary, the will
or trust agreement should state how invasions are to be made (e.g., if
there are two trusts for the spouse, marital and non-marital, any
power of invasion of principal in the spouse's favor should be made
first from the marital trust).

B.

When multiple generations will participate in benefits from one trust,
consider creating a single discretionary trust for each child and his
descendants because:

r
r
I

r

1.

It is likely that each family branch will have different needs,
necessitating different investment strategies and

2.

Each branch of the family will expect "equal" distributions,
barring the occurrence of an unforeseen and very unusual
situation.

r

C.

Test the administrative predictability of the language to be selected
with the trustee who will administer the provisions. The current
trend is away from words which limit the powers in favor of broad
"absolute" powers. But when a trustee may benefit from the exercise,
the power should be restricted by an ascertainable standard.

r-,

D.

The will or trust agreement should provide that the trustee in
exercising a discretionary power may but need not consider any other
resources of any beneficiary.

r
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r
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r

r
r
r
1

r
r

r
r
r
r
\

r
I

i

r

"Sprinkle" Trust for Wife and Descendants
If my wife, Mary Doe (limy spouse"), survives me, I give and devise my
residuary estate to my trustees In Trust, to payout of the net income or principal or
both such amount or amounts (whether equal or unequal, and whether the whole or
a lesser amount) as my trustees (other than any current beneficiary) in their sole
discretion determine to such one or more of my spouse and my descendants, of
whatever degree and whether or not born during my life, as my trustees (other than
any current beneficiary) in their sole discretion select. In exercising this
discretionary power, my trustees (other than any current beneficiary) may but need
not consider any other resources of any beneficiary and shall give primary
consideration to the needs and desires of my spouse and the needs of my children
who are under age 21 or have not completed their education. Any net income not so
paid shall be added to principal.

(If no current beneficiary can be a trustee, omit the words "(other than any
current beneficiary)" in the first and second sentences. If the testator does not desire
to create a preference in favor of his spouse and certain of his children, omit
everything after "other resources of any beneficiary" in the second sentence. If none of
the testator's children is under 21 and all have completed their education, omit
everything after "my spouse" in the second sentence.)
(A distribution of income or principal to a grandchild or more remote
descendant will be a taxable distribution under Chapter 13 unless if made by an
individual it would not be treated as a taxable gift under IRC §2503(e). See IRe
§2611(b)(1).)

This clause is reprinted with permission from Trust and Will Provisions, published
by United States Trust Company of New York, Copyright 1995, pages 35 and 36.
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A.

Payments to Beneficiaries. The trustee shall pay anyone or more
persons in the group consisting of my spouse, Jane Doe ("Jane"), and
my descendants as much of the net income and principal, even to the
extent of all or none, as the trustee determines in his discretion. [In
determining whether to make payments to Jane, the trustee shall
disregard the interests of any other beneficiary.] [In determining
whether to make payments to Jane, the interests of any other
beneficiary shall be subordinate to Jane's interests.]

K.

Restrictions on Trustees. No individual trustee shall participate in
the exercise of any discretionary power relating to:

r
r
r
r

*

*

*

*

1.

r
r

A payment of trust property or grant of a power to
himself as a beneficiary except to the extent governed
by and made pursuant to an ascertainable standard
within the meaning of Sections 2041 and 2514 of the
Code.

2.

r

A distribution of trust property that would discharge or
satisfy any of his or my legal obligations.

3.

A distribution of trust property that would constitute a
taxable gift from him personally if he were to so
participate.

4.

A distribution of, or grant of a power with respect to,
trust property, if, as to such property, he, in his
individual capacity, previously made a Qualified
Disclaimer, except to the extent the distribution or
grant is governed by and made pursuant to an
ascertainable standard within the meaning of Sections
2041 and 2514 of the Code.

5.

The determination to grant or withhold consent to the
exercise of a general power of appointment if he has a
substantial interest in the trust property adverse to the
exercise of the power in favor of the holder of the power
or his estate within the meaning of Section 2041 (b).

r
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RESTRICTIONS ON POWERS OF FIDUCIARIES
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement to the contrary, no
person or entity acting in any fiduciary capacity hereunder shall participate in the
exercise of a power conferred hereunder:
A. that the fiduciary would either be entirely prohibited from exercising, or
prohibited from exercising in the manner desired, if he were serving as
trustee in place of the acting trustee,

J

!

J

..
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B. to vote shares of stock in a company controlled by the fiduciary (in an
individual capacity) (within the meaning of Section 2036 (b)(2» that were
transferred to the trust by the fiduciary (in an individual capacity),

C. that would constitute an "incident of ownership" (within the meaning of
Section 2042) with respect to insurance on the fiduciary's life, or
D. that would render any portion of the trust property includible in his gross
estate, and any such purported exercise shall be void and of no
effect.

*

*

*

*

4. "As the trustee determines in his discretion" shall, except as may be
specifically provided, be construed liberally so as to confer upon the
trustee the greatest amount of power to determine if, when, and for
what purposes payments will be made, and the amount of such
payments, and the trustee's determination to make or refrain from
making payments shall be conclusive on all persons interested in the
trust.

*

*

*

*

C. My Legal Obligations. Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement,
no payment shall be made to or for the benefit of a beneficiary that
would discharge any of my legal obligations.
D. Payments to One or More Beneficiaries. If the trustee of a trust is
authorized to make payments to one or more persons in a specified group,
the trustee may make equal or unequal payments to such persons,
without any duty to make equalizing payments, and the trustee's
determination with respect to such payments shall be conclusive on all
persons interested in the trust.
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These provisions by Roy M. Adams, Kirkland & Ellis (New York, New York and
Chicago, Illinois.) 1998, are reprinted with permission
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Credit Trust - - Invasions

4.10

Distribution: Trustee shall hold, administer, and distribute all other
property, including separate asset accounts, as follows:

4.11

Income:

4.12

Invasion of Principal for Spouse:

4.13

Invasion for Descendants: Trustee may pay principal to benefit one or more
of Settlor's descendants (if it will not impair
Settlor's spouse's security) when, in Trustee's
discretion, payment is necessary in order to (1)
provide proper care and support for any who is
not self-supporting, through no fault of his or her
own, (2) provide an education (including courses
in an accredited college or university, or
graduate and professional training), (3) meet
extraordinary requirements caused by illness or
other misfortune. These payments shall not be
taken into consideration when allocating the
principal upon termination of the Credit Trust.

4.14

Invasion for Children:

r
r
r

Trustee may accumulate income or may pay all or part of the
net income to one or more of Settlor's spouse and Settlor's
descendants as Trustee deems appropriate under the
circumstances existing at each date of distribution, taking into
account the potential recipients' economic needs, best interest,
and welfare, income tax brackets, availability of other
resources, and the guidelines provided below relative to
invasions of principal. Income distributions may be in unequal
amounts and may exclude members of the class to be
benefited.
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Trustee may pay principal to Settlor's
spouse from time to time (even to the
exhaustion of the trust) as in Trustee's
discretion is adequate and appropriate
after looking to other resources available
to maintain the standard of living to
which the spouse was accustomed during
Settlor's lifetime.

Trustee also may pay principal (if it will not
impair Settlor's spouse's security) to provide any
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of Settlor's children with a home of the child's
own or to enable a child to embark upon or to
pursue a business or professional venture. In
exercising this judgment, however, Trustee shall
determine the wisdom of the proposed
disbursement and shall consider any other
income or resources available to the child,
including the child's earnings or potential
earnings. Whenever principal is invaded for
these purposes, the amount shall be treated as
an advancement to the child (or the child's issue)
when Trustee allocates the principal upon
termination of the Credit Trust.
4.15

Intent:

Settlor's spouse is the primary object of Settlor's bounty. The
other beneficiaries are the secondary objects. Therefore, if
there is a conflict between the interests of the spouse and other
beneficiaries, Trustee shall favor the spouse.

c
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These clauses are reprinted with permission from "John Dough Trust" by John H.
Martin, Warner, Norcross & Judd (Muskegon, Michigan) Copyright (c) 1998.
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APPENDIXD
Discretionary trust to pay income and/or principal to a child with
precatory advice to the trustee.
Each share of the trust property set apart for a child of the grantor shall be
held by the trustee IN FURTHER TRUST, to pay to the child so much of the net
income or principal, or both, whether the whole or a lesser amount, as the trustee in
its sole discretion determines. Any net income not so paid shall be added to the
principal of the trust
In exercising this discretionary power, the trustee may, but need not,
consider any other resources of the child and shall give primary consideration to the
health, education and welfare of the child. The grantor desires, but does not direct,
that the trustee take into consideration when exercising its discretion to distribute
principal to the child after he reaches majority, the uses to which such property will
be applied by the child, and to favorably consider distributions for such purposes as
the child's continued education, purchase of an appropriate residence, an
appropriate business investment or payment of appropriate family expenses that
the child cannot reasonably meet. The grantor's expression of his desires does not
in any way limit the trustee's discretion hereunder.
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This clause is reprinted with permission from Trust and Will Provisions, published
by United States Trust Company of New York, and modified by M. Antoinette
Thomas, Carter, Ledyard & Milburn (New York, New York).
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This outline is based in substantial part on an article
by Lynn P. Hart of Del Mar, California which appeared under the name of
"Advanced Issues In Disclaimer Planning: Sharpening An Old Tool,"
published by Matthew Bender &: Co., Inc. in 1994.
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BY
JESSE T. MOUNTJOY

INTRODUCTION
The Disclaimer is a crucial estate planning tool. The disclaimer is a limited exception to the
general rules that impose tax on transfers of property. The effective use of disclaimers can provide
the post-mortem planner with a flexibility and an agility that can be invaluable in circumventing the
potential land mines which can arise in post-mortem administration. When properly anticipated in
the estate planning process, disclaimers can provide beneficiaries with an array of tax-planning and
dispositive options which otherwise would not be available to them.

1.

Disclaimers - The Kentucky Perspective
1.1

Common Law Rule

Under the common law rule, a testate share (inherited under a will) could be disclaimed by
the beneficiary within a reasonable period of time after the testator/decedent's death; however, an
intestate share could not be disclaimed or renounced by its recipient. See Thomas E. Atkinson. Law
of Wills, 30 (2nd·Ed 1953). Title to testate property passed to the intestate taker immediately at
and upon the decedent's death. On the other hand, a gift by will had to be accepted by the donee
recipient before title actually devolved to the donee. While a disclaimer by a beneficiary under a
will prevented title from passing to the intended· beneficiary, a disclaimer by an intestate taker
divested the intestate taker of title to the property renounced. Atkinson. suPra at 774-776. This
distinction between disclaimers by testate and intestate beneficiaries meant that with respect to
intestate beneficiary's disclaimers there was a gratuitous transfer of title by the disclaimant to
another (i.e. federal gift tax implications).

1.2

Kentucky's Uniform Disclaimer Act

Kentucky has adopted the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers by Will, intestacy or
appointment act (hereinafter the "Disclaimer Act"). Kentucky Revised Statutes ("KRS") 394.610 394-680. The Disclaimer Act eliminates the Common Law Rule discussed above and further
eliminates any conceptual difference between the two acts of renunciation by permitting disclaimers
by both intestate and testate takers. KRS 394.610. Both types of disclaimer are not treated as a
gratuitous transfer of the disclaimant's interest in the property (assuming that the federal disclaimer
requirements are also met).

1.3

Other Matters

A beneficiary under a will who is given a future interest (rather than a present interest) in
property of either illegal or equitable nature may disclaim such property. KRS 394.610.
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Testamentary beneficiaries of interests such as a power to consume or to appoint or to apply
property for any purpose also have the right to disclaim such interest. Uniform Probate Code
Section 2-801(8) Comment, 8 ULA 161 (1991). The act extends the right to disclaim to
representatives of incapacitated or protected persons and to appointees under a power of
appointment exercised by a testamentary instrument. KRS 394.610. Successive disclaimers are
permitted under the act since persons succeeding to a disclaimed interest also have the power to
disclaim. KRS 394.610. Since the amendment ofthe act in 1980, the right to disclaim survives the
death of the person having the right to do so. Such right may be exercised by the personal
representative of the person within the time period stipulated in the act. KRS 394.610.
The disclaimant must file the disclaimer in District Court in the county in which the probate
proceedings have been commenced (or could be commenced if not yet commenced) for the
administration of the decedent's estate. KRS 394.620(3). A copy of the disclaimer is required to
be delivered in person or mailed by registered or certified mail, to the personal representative or
other fiduciary of the decedent or donee of the power. KRS 394.620(3). If disclaiming real
property or an interest in real property, the disclaimant may record a copy of the disclaimer in the
office of the county clerk of the county in which the real property is located. KRS 394.620(3).
(Obviously from a real estate attorney's prospective, this provision should be mandatory even
though it's not.)

2.

Disclaimers - The Federal Perspective
2.1

Disclaimer Defined

Section 2518(b) of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code" or "IRC") defines a qualified
disclaimer as "an irrevocable and unqualified refusal by a person to accept an interest in property"
and sets forth the requirement for a qualified disclaimer. The disclaimer must:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)
(5)

3.

be irrevocable and unqualified;

be written;
be received by the transferor of the interest (or his or her legal representative) no
later than nine months after the date on which the transfer creating the interest is
made or the date on which the claimant attains age 21;
be made before the disclaimant has accepted the interest or any of its benefits; and
result in the passing of the disclaimed interest without any direction on the part of
the disclaimant to either the decedent's spouse or a person other than the disclaimant.

...

Tax Consequences of Disclaimers
3.1

Transfer Tax Treatment

For gift, estate, and generation-skipping transfer tax purposes, property which has been
disclaimed in a qualified manner is treated as if it had never been transferred to the disclaimant.
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IRC§2518(a). A qualified disclaimer is not a gift for federal gift tax purposes. Treas.
Reg.§25.2518-1(b). Ifa qualified disclaimer is made with respect to a transfer at death, the federal
estate tax provisions apply with respect to the property interest transferred as if the interest had
never been transferred to the person making the disclaimer. Treas. Reg. 20.2046-1. Similarly, the
generation-skipping transfer tax (GSTT) provisions apply with respect to a property interest
transferred under a qualified disclaimer as if the interest had never been transferred to the person
making the disclaimer. IRC§2654(c).
Disclaimed property is considered to pass directly from the transferor to the person (or
persons) entitled to receive the property as a result of the disclaimer. Thus, the federal gift, estate,
and GSTT that otherwise would be imposed on the passage of property from the disclaimant to the
ultimate recipient ofthe property is avoided. The governing instrwnent (usually, the decedent's will
and/or trust), as interpreted under Kentucky law, will determine to whom the property passes as a
result of a disclaimer. If there is no governing instrument or if it cannot be determined from that
instrument to whom disclaimed property should pass, Kentucky law will determine to whom the
property passes. In such cases, Kentucky intestacy laws generally will apply.

3.2

Income Tax Treatment

IRC 2518 is a transfer tax provision. There is no corollary provision under Subtitle A of the
Code, governing income taxation, which extends disclaimer principles to the income tax area
generally. Rev. Rul. 64-62, 1964-1 C.B.221. Nevertheless, disclaimers often have been recognized
to have effect in the income tax context.

3.2.1

Future Income Not Taxable to Disclaimant

If a disclaimer is qualified, the disclaimant will not be required to include in his or
her taxable income future income on disclaimed property. This rule also applies if the disclaimer
is not effective for transfer tax purposes, but results in a transfer under Kentucky law. Private Letter
Ruling ("PLR") 7933066.

3.2.2 Income Earned Prior to Disclaimer
If the disclaimant had the right to receive or control income after the date of the
transfer with respect to which the disclaimer is made, income earned from that date and prior to the
disclaimer may be taxed to the disclaimant. See, Grant v. Comro'r., 197 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1949);
Mildred Clem, 34 T.C. 728 (1960).
More often, however, income earned from the date of the transfer is attributed to the
taker ofthe disclaimed property. In particular, where income is earned on property which is subject
to an estate or trust proceeding and that income is subject to administration, a disclaimer of that
property should be effective for income tax purposes. PLR 8215056. With respect to qualified plan
benefits and individual retirement accounts (IRAs), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has ruled
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that the recipient of the disclaimed benefits, and not the disclaimant, will be subject to income tax
on those benefits. GeM 39858 (1991); PLR 9319029,9303027.
3.2.3

Disclaimers Recognized With Respect to Various Income Tax Provisions

IRC 678 contains specific statutory authority recognizing disclaimers with respect
to the application of that provision. IRC 678(d) provides that Code Section 678(a) will not apply
with respect to a power which has been "renounced or disclaimed within a reasonable time after the
holder of the power first became aware of its existence." Note that a disclaimer need not be
qualified under IRC 2518 to be effective under IRC 678(d).

-

Despite the lack of additional statutory authority, disclaimers have been recognized
with respect to a wide variety ·of other income tax provisions as well. For example, a qualified
disclaimer of income in respect of a decedent did not constitute a "transfer" under IRC 691 (c)(2)
such that recognition of the income would be accelerated as a result of the disclaimer. PLR
7830022; PLR 8215056.

-

The IRS has ruled that a disclaimer of qualified plan benefits that satisfies the
requirements of state law and IRC 2518(b) is neither a prohibited assignment or alienation of plan
benefits contrary to IRC 401(a)(13) and Section 206(d) of ERISA, nor is it an assignment of
income. GCM 39858 (1991). Similarly, the IRS has ruled that a disclaimer of benefits from an IRA
that satisfies the requirements of state law and IRC 2518(b) is not an assignment of income, nor is
the disclaimer contrary to IRC 408(aX4) and 408(bXl ).ld. As noted above, the IRS has detennined
that income earned on disclaimed qualified plan or IRA benefits will be taxed to the taker of those
benefits under the disclaimer. hi..
[Ironic Note: It is unfortunate that the IRS has limited its rulings to disclaimers
which satisfy the requirements of state law. The primary purpose of IRC 2518 (as
I recall) was to provide a unifonn scheme for disclaimers which was not dependent
on the differences in state law. HR Rep. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)
While that goal was not fully accomplished, it is not desirable to perpetuate a
reliance on state law to determine the validity of disclaimers.]
Disclaimers may be utilized to permit redemptions under IRC 302 and 303. PLR
9041005,9014015,8323027, 8149050. Disclaimers also may be utilized to pennit qualification of
a trust as a shareholder in an S corporation. PLR 8825055,8621057. In one recent ruling, takers
of disclaimed stock were treated as owning the stock during the period in which it was owned by
the decedent under IRC 382(1)(3)(B)(i)(I). PLR 9222041.
Takers of disclaimed property have been permitted to make a IRC 1033(aX2) election
not to recognize gain on disclaimed property that was sold during probate to the county under threat
of condemnation. TAM 9232004. A disclaimer also has been recognized under IRC 613A(c)(9)
with the result that takers under a disclaimer were considered to be heirs and not transferees for
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purposes of avoiding disallowance ofthe percentage depletion allowance under IRC 613A(c)(9)(A)
(as in effect at that time). PLR 8741073.
One United States District Court has indicated its inclination to recognize disclaimers
for income tax purposes. In dicta, the Court rebuffed the argument put forth by the government that
the disclaimer provision ofIRC 2055(a) was applicable only to estates and would not be valid for
purposes of determining the charitable income tax deduction. The Court stated it was "of the opinion
that the same principles apply to an income tax deduction as well as to an estate." Simmons v. U.S.,
80-1 USTC 1[9,287 (D. Ariz. 1980).

r

There appears to· be a trend towards extending the recognition of disclaimer
principles from the transfer tax arena to the income tax realm. [Specific authority from the IRS on
this point would be quite helpful.]
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Technical Requirements for Qualified Disclaimer
4.1

Irrevocable and Unqualified
4.1.1 General

A .qualified disclaimer must be irrevocable and unqualified. IRC 2518(b); Treas.
Reg. 25.2518-2(a)(1). These requirements are self-explanatory and generate few disputes or
controversies. A disclaimer which is conditioned on the receipt ofa favorable ruling by the IRS will
not be qualified. GeM 32625 (1963); GCM 32894 (1964). Such a disclaimer may be effective for
state (Kentucky) law purposes, however, causing disclaimed property to be transferred under state
law. Palmer v. White, 784 P.2d 449 (1989); Wilmin~on Trust Company y. Carpenter, 315 A.2d
625 (De. Ch.), aff'd 328 A.2d 141(Del. 1974).

4.1.2 Revoking the Irrevocable
Under the general rule regarding irrevocability, even a disclaimer based on mistake
may not be rescinded. Webb v. Webb, 301 S.E.2d 570 (W.Va. 1983); Estate of Munch, 480
N.Y.S.2d 95 (1984). A Texas case, however, illustrates one way in which this rule may be
stretched. Upon the death of her husband, a surviving spouse executed and filed with the Probate
Court a document entitled "Partial Disclaimer". This instrument purported to disclaim certain
interests passing to the spouse as a result of her husband's death. The disclaimant-spouse had been
advised by her attorney and her accountant that the disclaimer would cause the disclaimed property
to pass to her children, The deceased husband's children by a prior marriage sued, claiming that a
portion ofthe disclaimed property passed to them under the Texas laws of intestacy. The trial court
granted·the motion for summary judgment filed by the children of the decedent's prior marriage,
awarding them interests in the disclaimed property. Disclaimant appealed, arguing that the
disclaimer was ineffective because she had accepted the benefits of the disclaimed property prior
to making the disclaimer and further arguing that the filing of the "Partial Disclaimer" was simply
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a means of making a gift to her own children. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding
that issues of fact had been raised as to (1) whether the disclaimer was effective and, if not, (2)
whether the ineffective disclaimer was nevertheless an assignment of the disclaimed property under
state law and whether disclaimant had the requisite intent to make a gift to the plaintiffs (decedent's
children by a prior marriage).
This case suggests an interesting strategy for "revoking" an otherwise irrevocable disclaimer.
The Court noted,
'"We point out that Paragraph (d) of Section 37A which provides that 'any disclaimer filed
and served under this section shall be irrevocable' applies only to a 'disclaimer' and not to an
ineffective disclaimer which passes the property 'as an assignment."
By arguing that the disclaimer was invalid, the purported disclaimant hoped to prevent the
property from passing to the persons who would be entitled to take under a qualified disclaimer.
In a situation in which a disclaimer causes property to pass to unintended recipients, it may be
worthwhile to carefully examine the facts and circumstances to determine whether an argument can
be made that the disclaimer was not qualified. If so, it would then be necessary to determine that
the unqualified disclaimer had not caused the disclaimed property to pass to the purported takers
under state law.

...

-

-

4.1.3 The Estate of Monroe Case (1997)
Estate of Monroe, 124 F. 3rd 699 (5th Cir 1997) is a very recent and interesting case.

4.1.3.1 Facts
Louise Monroe died in 1989 at age 91, married but with no children. Her
husband (92 years old) was appointed Executor ofher estate (multi million dollars). Mrs. Monroe
in her will made 31 specific cash bequests to family members and friends and some employees and
some bequests to certain corporations. She also set up some trusts with $500,000 of Treasury Bonds
for some grandnieces and grandnephews and provided that each bequest would bear its fair share
of death taxes (rather than having all the taxes paid out of the residuary estate). Some of the
bequests were subject to GST tax and in some cases resulting in 75% or 80% of the gift being used
to pay the taxes. Mr. Monroe was obviously concerned about the high tax bite and sought the advice
of Touche, Ross, Accountants. The accountants recommended and Mr. Monroe asked 29 of the
legatees to disclaim their bequest. All ofthem agreed and executed disclaimers on December, 1989.
The disclaimed assets totaled $892,800. These assets passed to Mr. Monroe and were eligible for
the marital deduction. Also in December, 1989, and in January, 1990 (surprise, surprise) Mr.
Monroe ·sent each disclaimant a check with the notation "gift" on it for an amount similar to the
amount disclaimed. Mr. Monroe died in May, 1990. Gift tax returns for 1989 and 1990 were filed
in 1991. The IRS (surprise, surprise) audited Mr. Monroe's estate tax return and determined that
the disclaimers did not satisfy the requirements the qualified disclaimer requirements under Code
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Section 2518(b). The IRS disallowed the related marital deduction (i.e. the $892,800) and applied
a fraud penalty. The IRS and estate went to tax court which ruled in the IRS' favor disallowing 28
of the 29 disclaimers but only imposing a negligence penalty not a fraud penalty.

I

4.1.3.2 General Law of the Case
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The disclaimers in questions would be invalid under Code Section 2518 if
they were "irrevocable and unqualified", or if the disclaimant "accepted the interest or any of its
benefits". "Acceptance" of an interest includes the receipt of consideration in exchange for
executing the disclaimer as well as the explicit (or implicit) acceptance of the interest or any of its
benefits. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-1(d)(I).

4.1.3.3 Holding And Opinion of Fifth Circuit Court

•

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Monroe, ~., stated that an
"irrevocable and unqualified" disclaimer is "a relinquishment of a legal right
that is incapable of being retracted or revoked by the disclaimant and is not
modified by reservations or restrictions that limit its forceability". The Court
determined that all of the disclaimers made by the Monroe beneficiaries were
prima facie irrevocable and unqualified. Accordingly, the IRS could not
support the contention that the disclaimers were irrevocable or subject to
some condition (Query: Even with the use of something like the step
transaction doctrine?) The fact that Mr. Monroe gave gifts to the
disclaimants after the disclaimers were executed, did not change the
disclaimers' irrevocability, and the acceptance of the gifts did not revoke the
disclaimers.

•

The real issue was whether the disclaimers were ''unqualified'' and whether
''unqualified'' has broader meanings than those stated in the regulations (no
qualifications were specifically stated in the disclaimers.

•

The IRS and the Tax Court held that the disclaimers were made subject to a
qualification because the disclaimants "expected" eventually to receive the
amount disclaimed through a gift or bequest from Mr. Monroe. The Tax
Court reasoned that a disclaimer is not ''unqualified'' if it was executed as a
result of an "implied promise" that the beneficiary would "be better off
executing the disclaimer than not doing so". An "implied promise" could be
found even though there was no negotiating or bargaining between the
parties.

•

The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the Tax Court's interpretation of the term
''unqualified.'' The Fifth Circuit Court found that it was "inconsistent with
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a holistic reading ofsection 2518(b), contrary to the governing Treasury Regulations
and the Service's letter rulings, and intolerably, mmecessarily vague." The appellate
court believed that a disclaimer could be subject to a qualification only if there was
a tangible receipt or retention of the property disclaimed.

•

The position of the IRS and the Tax Court would greatly increase the
changes of a disclaimer being disqualified, and would create an
"incomprehensible subjective standard" against which to judge disclaimers.
As several letter rulings on this issue indicate, "a primary purpose of the law
authorizing qualified disclaimers is to facilitate post-mortem estate tax
planning and to increase family wealth on the 'expectation' that there will
thus remain more wealth to pass on to disclaimants in the future." See PLR
9509003,9427030 and 8701001. The Tax Court's subjective interpretation
ofthe term "unqualified" was at odds with this purpose. It could also cause
most disclaims to be subject to litigation since, realistically, heirs or legatees
rarely make disclaimers for tax reasons without some expectation of future
benefit.

•

The Tax Court's "expectation" or "implied promise" theory was
incompatible with the Regulations as well as the Code. The Regulations
specify two situations in which a disclaimer expresses a mere qualified
refusal to accept an interest in property. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(d)(l). The
first occurs when the disclaimant accepts, expressly or impliedly, the
property or any of its benefits. The second situation happens when the
disclaimant is given something as consideration for disclaiming.

•

The court noted that the term "implied" is found only in the first situation
(above). An implied acceptance of the property or its benefits occurs when
one takes an action inconsistent with the disclaimer, such as pledging as
security for a loan the assets that are to be disclaimed. When determining if
consideration is received, as in the second situation in the Regulations, there
must be actual receipt of the consideration.

•

The Fifth Circuit determined, therefore, that a mere expectation of a future
benefits is not consideration and will not disqualify a disclaimer. The circuit
court cited two Supreme Court cases, namely Philpot v. Gruninaer [81 U.S.
570 (S. Ct. 1872)] and Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Wickham [141 U.S. 564 (S. Ct.
1891)] which provide guidance in derming the term "consideration." The
estate had relied on these cases for support of its argument that a
disclaimant's motive or expectation are not the same as consideration.
According to Fire Ins. Ass'n, consideration is present when a promise has
"been offered by one party and accepted by the other, as one element of the
contract."

_

-

-
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-
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The Fifth Circuit also discussed the private letter rulings referred to earlier
(PLR 9509003, 9427030, and 8701001), in which disclaimers were ruled
valid even though it was obvious that the disclaimants expected that agreeing
to disclaim would ultimately benefit them. In each instance, it was clearly
stated that the disclaimers were being executed by children and grandchild
in order to reduce death taxes, and it could by assumed that such
beneficiaries would ultimately receive a comparable gift or bequest from the
surviving spouse. The IRS approved the disclaimers, however, because there
was no express or implied agreement between the disclaimant and the
ultimate taker regarding the disposition of the disclaimed property. The
court in Monroe determined that the private letter rulings were "properly
cited as evidence of how the Commissioner has interpreted the law in the
past."

•

The Fifth Circuit concluded that the question that must be raised regarding
each disclaimer is whether the person's decision to disclaim resulted from
mutually bargained for consideration, or whether it was due to an
unenforceable hope of future benefit. The court agreed with the estate that
each disclaimer required a separate evaluation. After reviewing testimony
from many of the disclaimants, the Fifth Circuit found that nothing
inappropriate was said during the majority of the presentations in which the
beneficiaries were asked to disclaim. Statements about the generous nature
of the decedent's husband (Mr. Monroe), without going further and
promising consideration, did not invalidate the disclaimers.

•

The Appellate court noted that many of the beneficiaries had personal
reasons for complying with the executor's request that he or she disclaim.
The decedent and her husband had been generous people who had taken care
of family and friends, and it was expected that the decedent's husband would
continue to do so. Some disclaimants simply wanted to comply with his
wishes to make him happy because he had been kind to them in the past, and
not from a particular expectation of future benefit. Other beneficiaries
expected to receive future gifts from him, during his lifetime or under his
will, and did not want to anger him.

•

The Appellate court concluded that, although questionable statements
(stronger indications of future benefit) may have been made to a few
beneficiaries, in the rest ofthe situations there was no agreement between the
parties. The Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's ruling as to the majority
ofthe disclaimers, and remanded the six questionable cases to the Tax Court
for further consideration.
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•

The Fifth Circuit also voided the negligence penalty. "Negligence" is found
if there is "any failure to may a reasonable attempt to comply with the
provisions of this title ..... IRC 6662(c). Although the decedent's husband
had sought the advice of CPAs on the correctness of requesting the
disclaimers from the disclaimant, the Tax Court believed that he had been
negligent because he had not informed the accountants of his intent to make
gifts to the disclaimant after the disclaimers were made. The accountants
testified that their advice would not have differed if they had known of his
gift giving intentions, but they would have advised him that such gifts would
probably result in greater scrutiny by the IRS. The Court found that this
would not have mattered to the decedent's husband. At age 93 and in
questionable health, he would probably have decided that it was best to make
any gifts sooner rather than later. In fact, he did die just five months later.
4.2

...

...

Qualified Disclaimer Must Be Written

A qualified disclaimer must be in writing which must specifically identify the
interest in property which is being disclaimed. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(b)(I).
4.2.1
Representative

-

Disclaimer Must Be Signed by Disclaimant or Legal

A disclaimer must be signed by the disclaimant or his or her legal
representative. Id. A disclaimer may be made by an agent of the disclaimant. The
following kinds of legal representatives have been authorized to execute disclaimers:
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)
(6)

an agent acting under a durable power of attorney
(PLR 9015017);
an attorney acting as agent on oral instructions from
the disclaimant Allen y. Comm'r., T.C.Memo 1989111;
under certain circumstances, the executor or
administrator of a decedent's estate (Rolin v.
Comm'r., 588 F.2d 368 (2nd Cir. 1978); Estate of
Kravis, 584 F.2d 274 (1992);
trustees, in some cases but not in others (see Section
7, infra, for further discussion of disclaimers by
trustees);
the conservator of the disclaimant (PLR 9318020);
and
a guardian ad litem fora minor disclaimant (PLR
9310020; PLR 9251019; and 9203028).
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Note: Certain states require that disclaimers for minors or other
incompetent persons be approved by the court (i.e. California and
New York are two). To my knowledge, Kentucky has no such
requirement.
Some courts will not allow disclaimers to be made on behalf of a
minor unless it can be demonstrated that the disclaimer is in the best interest of the
minor as an individual (as opposed to the family as a whole). It is often difficult to
argue that a disclaimer will result in personal benefit to a minor, as disclaimed
property must pass to another and the minor cannot receive consideration for the
disclaimed property. In re: Estate of DeDomenico, 418 N.Y. S.2d 1012 (1979). It
is important to be aware of the Kentucky law notice requirements for such actions.
The nine month disclaimer period will not be extended even if a petition requesting
authorization to make a disclaimer is pending.
While a disclaimer by a duly appointed guardian ad litem has been
approved in nwnerous cases, pwported disclaimers by a parent "on behalf of himself
and as natural guardian for his minor children" were not qualified with respect to the
minor children. PLR 7947008. The IRS ruled that the minor children could only
disclaim through a guardian ad litem under applicable state law (Georgia). This
ruling contained troubling language implying that, because a minor, upon reaching
majority, could attack disclaimers made on his behalf even by a guardian ad litem,
a disclaimer made on behalf of a minor would not be irrevocable as would be
required for a qualified disclaimer. The implication that a qualified disclaimer could
not be made on behalf of a minor because it potentially could be subject to
revocation upon the minor's attaining the age of majority is clearly wrong.
Nwnerous rulings since have approved disclaimers made on behalf of minors. PLR
9310020,9251019,9203028,9051007 and 9003007.
4.2.2

Delivery to Transferor or Legal Representative

The writing must be delivered to the transferor of the interest, his or
her legal representative ( usually the decedent's executor, administrator, or trustee
in a post-mortem situation), the person who holds legal title to the property to which
the interest relates or the person in possession ofthat property. Treas. Reg. 25.25182(b)(2). Note that IRC 2518(b)(2) requires that the writing be received by the
appropriate party within the allowable time period. The Regulations have liberalized
that requirement by allowing delivery within that period. hi..
A timely mailing of a disclaimer is treated as a timely delivery.
Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(c)(2). For this purpose, the mailing requirements under
paragraphs (cX1), (cX2), and (d) of Section 301.7502-1 of the Treasury Regulations
must be met. If the last day of the period within which the disclaimer must be made
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falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, delivery will be considered to be
timely if it is made on the fIrst succeeding day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or
legal holiday. liL
4.3

Disclaimer Must Be Made Within Nine Months

A qualified disclaimer must be delivered to the transferor of the interest (or
any of the persons designated in Treas. Reg. Section 25.2518-2(b)(2) no later than
nine months after the later of the date on which the transfer creating the interest is
made or the date on which the disclaimant attains age 21. Treas. Reg. 25.25182(c)(I).

4.3.1

Disclaimer Period Begins on Date of Taxable Transfer

..

-

-

4.3.1.1 General
The nine month period within which a disclaimer can be made
is determined with reference to the date of the taxable transfer creating the interest.
Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(c)(3).

_

4.3.1.2 Inter Vivos Transfers
The period within which an inter vivos transfer can be
disclaimed begins on the date on which the transfer becomes a completed gift for gift
tax purposes (regardless of whether a gift tax actually is imposed). If a gift is not
complete, there is no "taxable" transfer for disclaimer purposes until the gift
becomes complete. PLR 9001062. In the case of certain transfers which remain
revocable during the life of the transferor, the taxable transfer will not be deemed to
occur until the date of the transferor's death. For example:
•

U.S. savings bonds held in pay-on-death form may be disclaimed
within nine months of the date of death of the owner of the bond
(PLR 9017026; Rev. Rut. 68-269, 1968-1 C.B. 399);

•

life insurance policies could be disclaimed within nine months of the
death of the insured (PLR 9012053);

•

the beneficiary under ''totten'' or tentative trust bank accounts could
disclaim within nine months of the death of the account holder (PLR
8648070); and

..
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•

certificates of deposit that were held in "pay on death" fonn could be
disclaimed within nine months of the death of the owner (PLR
9336011).

4.3.1.3 Testamentary Transfers
The period within which a testamentary transfer can be
disclaimed begins on the transferor's date of death, and not the date on which a
decedent's will is admitted to probate. Estate ofFlemin~ v. U.S., 974 F.2d 894 (7th
eir. 1992).

4.3.1.4 Interest in Irrevocable Trusts
In the case of an irrevocable trust, the date on which an
interest in the trust must be disclaimed is detennined with reference to the date on
which the trust is created (or becomes irrevocable, if that is later), even when that
interest will not vest for many years. For example, the remainder beneficiaries of
a testamentary qualified terminable interest (QTIP) trust must disclaim their interests
within nine months after the death of the spouse creating the trust and not the death
of the surviving spouse. Treas. Reg. 25.25189-2(c)(3). The IRS has ruled that a
beneficiary could not disclaim her interest in an irrevocable trust that had been
created 20 years earlier, even though the beneficiary had never received distributions
from the trust. PLR 9027026.

4.3.1.5 Earliest Taxable Transfer
Where there is a taxable transfer of an interest for gift tax
purposes and that interest later is included in the transferor's gross estate for estate
tax purposes, the nine month period within which a qualified disclaimer can be made
is determined with reference to the date of the earlier taxable transfer. Treas. Reg.
25.2518-2(c)(3); PLR 8617011. For example, in the case of a grantor retained
interest trust (such as a grantor retained annuity or unitrust or a qualified personal
residence trust) which later is included in the transferor's estate because he or she
died during the trust term, the disclaimer period generally will run from the date on
which the trust was created, and not the date of the transferor's later death. Where,
however, the transferor retained a contingent "general" power to appoint the trust
corpus to anyone, including the transferor's estate, exercisable if the transferor died
within five years after the creation of a grantor retained interest trust, and the
transferor did die within five years, the IRS held that the disclaimer period ran from
the date of the transferor's death and not the date on which the irrevocable trust was
created. PLR 9340052. See Section 4.3.3., infra, for discussion of the rules
pertaining to the time limits governing disclaimers of powers of appointment.

r

r
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4.3.1.6 No Extenstions

-

The rules with respect to the timely exercise of disclaimers are
strictly enforced. No extensions may be granted. An extension to file the gift or
estate tax retwn reporting the taxable transfer which is the subject of the disclaimer
does not extend the time within which the recipient of the interest can make a
qualified disclaimer. See PLR 90223051. If the last day of the disclaimer period
falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or defined legal holiday, the period will be extended to
the next succeeding day which is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. Treas.
Reg. 25.2518-2(c)(3).
Interests passing as a result of a qualified disclaimer must be
disclaimed within nine months after the date of the original transfer. Thus, multiple
or successive disclaimers all must be made within nine months of the date of the
original transfer. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(c)(3).

-

4.3.2 The "Under 21" Rules
A recipient of property who is under 21 years of age has until nine
months after his or her 21st birthday within which to disclaim property. IRe
2518(bX2)(b). This is true regardless ofthe age of majority in the state in which the
beneficiary resides. Thus, a beneficiary can receive a gift at age 15, attain the age
of majority at age 18, receive an inheritance at age 19, and disclaim an interest in
either or both of the gift and the inheritance within nine months after he or she
attains age 21. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(d)(4), Example (11). More surprisingly, this
rule applies whether or not the beneficiary (or any individual acting on his or her
behalf, such as a parent or guardian) has taken any action that otherwise would be
considered an acceptance ofthe property. PLR 9046035; See also, Estate of Kravis,
584 N.Y. S.2d 274 (1992).
Although a beneficiary under the age of 21 cannot accept an interest
in property, the beneficiary apparently can disclaim such an interest after attaining
the age ofmajority in his or her state. PLR 8825101, 8622018. In one recent case,
a 17 year old beneficiary who was legally emancipate under state law was permitted
to disclaim an inheritance 15 months after the date of the transferor's death. PLR
9223051. A disclaimer can also be executed on behalf of a minor by a legal
guardian, conservator, or guardian ad litem. See Section 4.2.1., SlQIDl.
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4.3.3

4.3.3.1 General Powers of Appointment
The holder of a general power of appointment must disclaim
that power within nine months after the power is created. Treas. Reg. 25.25182{c)(3) An interest passing as the result of the exercise or lapse of a general power
of appointment must be disclaimed within nine months after the date on which the
power is exercised or lapses. Id.. A beneficiary taking in default of the exercise of
a general testamentary power of appointment must disclaim within nine months of
the death of the holder of the power. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(c)(3); PLR 8911028.
Beneficiaries taking as a result of the lapse or release of a pre-1942 general power
ofappointment have nine months from the date of the lapse or release within which
to disclaim, even though the lapse or release will not be treated as an exercise of a
general power of appointment for federal estate and gift tax purposes and will not
give rise to estate or gift tax liability. PLR 9318020, 9340053, 9245011.

4.3.3.2 Special Powers of Appointment
The rules with respect to disclaiming interests relating to
special or non-general powers of appointment are harsh. The holder of a special
power of appointment, any permissible appointee under such a power, and potential
takers in default of the exercise of that power all are required to disclaim their
interests within nine months of the creation of the power. Treas. Reg. 25.25182(c)(3), 25.2518-2(c)(5), Example (1). As a practical matter, this rule means that
potential takers under broad special powers of appointment often cannot disclaim.
Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(c)(3).

•

Example 1: Bill creates an irrevocable trust for the benefit of
his daughter, Chelsea, to be held for Sue's benefit during her
lifetime. Upon Chelsea's death, the trust terminates and is
distributed by right of representation to her descendants.
Chelsea's descendants have until nine months after the date
on which the trust is created (or they attain age 21, whichever
is later) within which to disclaim their remainder interests in
the trust.

•

Example 2. Hillary has a testamentary special power to
appoint the trust property to anyone except her estate, her
creditors, or the creditors of er estate. All potential takers
under the power must disclaim within nine months of the
creation of the trust.

r
r
f
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•

Example 3. Hillary has a testamentary general power of
appointment. Now, takers of the property have nine months
from the date on which the general power is exercised or the
date on which that power lapses or is released within which
to disclaim.

4.3.4 Joint property
4.3.4.1 Disclaimer Regulations Generally
The disclaimer regulations provide a general rule that a
qualified disclaimer of any interest or any portion of an interest in a joint tenancy or
a tenancy by the entirety must be made no later than nine months after the transfer
creating the tenancy. In the case of residential property held in joint tenancy by
some or all of the residents, the regulations provide that a joint tenant will not be
considered to have accepted the survivorship interest merely because the tenant
resided on the property prior to disclaiming his interest in the property. Treas. Reg.
25.2518-2(dXl). In addition, the service has ruled that a surviving spouse may make
a qualified disclaimer of her survivorship interest in the residence held as joint
tenants even if the surviving spouse furnished all the funds for the down payment,
the mortgage payments, the real estate taxes and other expenses. PLR 9135043.

4.3.4.2 Invalidity of Former Disclaimer Regulations
Several federal circuit courts held that former disclaimer
regulations were invalid to the extent that they require a survivorship interest in a
unilaterally severable joint tenancy to be disclaimed within nine months of the
creation of the tenancy. See Estate of Dancy, 872 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1989);
McDonald v. Corom'r. 853 F.2d 1494 (8th Cir. 1988) and Kennedy v. Comm'r, 804
F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1986). If a joint interest is unilaterally severable by either joint
owner, then at any time prior to a deceased joint owner's death, the decedent can
sever the tenancy and defeat the other owners survivorship interest. Therefore, the
Court concluded that a surviving joint owner survivorship interest is created at the
deceased owner's death. The IRS announced that it would follow the circuit court
decision [AOD CC-1990-06 (2/7/90)], and Proposed Regulations (and now final
Regulations) were issued to replace the invalidated Regulations.

-

4.3.4.3 Proposed and Final Disclaimer Regulations
Proposed Disclaimer Regulations were published in the
Federal Register on August 21, 1996. Reg. 208215-91, 61 Fed. Reg. 43197. The
proposed regulations created a distinction between joint interests that are unilaterally
severable under local law and joint interests that are not unilaterally severable. In
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response to comments from practitioners and the public, the recently issued Final
Regulations eliminate this distinction. The proposed regulations also contain special
rules with respect to (a) certain tenancies in real property between spouses and (b)
joint bank and brokerage accounts. The final regulations retain these rules and
extend the rules of governing bank and brokerage accounts and other investment
accounts such as mutual funds. The final regulations were issued on December 30,
1997, and were published in the Federal Registered and are effective on December
31, 1997. TD 8744.

4.3.4.4 Unilaterally Severable Interests under the Proposed
Regulations
Under the Proposed Regulations, in the case of an interest in
a joint tenancy with right ofsurvivorship or a tenancy by the entirety the either joint
tenant could sever unilaterally under local law, a qualified disclaimer of the interest
to which the disclaimant succeeded as donee upon creation 0 the tenancy had to be
made no later than nine months after the creation of the tenancy. A qualified
disclaimer ofthe survivorship interest to which the survivor succeeded by operation
of law upon the death ofthe first joint tenant to die had to be made no later than nine
months after the date of death. A surviving joint tenant could disclaim the interest
to which he succeeded by right of survivorship, regardless of (1) how much of the
property was attributable to consideration furnished by the disclaimant, (2) how
much ofthe property was included in the decedent's gross estate under Section 2040,
or (3) whether the joint owners were married. Prop. Reg. 25.2518-2(c)(4)(i), and
25.2518-2(c)(5), Example (7).

•

Although state law varies, a joint tenancy with right of survivorship
generally is unilaterally severable. Therefore, the proposed rules
described above would have applied to such joint tenancies. On the
other hand, those rules usually would not have applied to tenancies
by the entirety because such tenancies generally are not unilaterally
severable.

4.3.4.5 Interests That Are Not Unilaterally Severable
Under the Proposed Regulations
Under the Proposed Regulations, if an interest in joint
property with right ofsurvivorship or an interest held as a tenant by the entirety was
not unilaterally severable under local law, a qualified disclaimer of any portion of
the interest had to be made no later than nine months after the transaction creating
the tenancy. A tenant by the entirety or a joint tenant who could not unilaterally
sever the interest under local law could not make a qualified disclaimer of any
portion of the joint interest to the extent attributable to consideration furnished by
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that tenant even if the disclaimer was made within nine months of the creation of
tenancy. Prop. Reg. 25.2518-2(c)(4)(ii).

•

As noted above, a tenancy by the entirety typically is not unilaterally
severable. Thus, under the Proposed Regulations, an interest in a
tenancy by the entirety generally had to be disclaimed no later than
nine months after the transaction creating the tenancy by the entirety.
Nevertheless, in the preamble to the Proposed Regulations, the
Service requested comments on whether or under what circumstances
(e.g., tenancy by the entirety ownership of a personal residence) the
rules applicable to unilaterally severable interests should apply to
interests that are not unilaterally severable.

4.3.4.6 Joint Interests under the Final Regulations
According to the preamble to the final Regulations, the
comments unanimously suggested that a surviving joint owner should be able to
disclaim his survivorship interest in a tenancy within nine months of the date of
death of the first joint owner to die, whether or not the tenancy is unilaterally
severable. Consequently, the final Regulations eliminate the distinction based on
whether a tenancy is unilaterally severable.

•

Final Reg. 25.2518-2(cX4) provides a general rule that in the case of
an interest in a joint tenancy with right of survivorship or a tenancy
by the entirety, a qualified disclaimer of the interest to which the
disclaimant succeeds as donee upon creation of the tenancy must be
made n 0 later than nine months after the creation of the tenancy. A
qualified disclaimer ofthe survivorship interest to which the survivor
succeeds by operation of law upon the death of the first joint owner
to die must be made no late than nine months after the date of death.
Except as provided below with respect to certain tenancies in real
property created on or after 7/14/88, such interest in the property.
This is the case regardless of: (1) how much of the property is
attributable to consideration furnished by the disclaimant; (2) how
much ofthe property is included in the decedent's gross estate under
Section 2040: (3) whether the joint owners are married; and (4)
whether the interest can be unilaterally severed under local law.
Regs. 25.2518-2(cX4)(i), and 25.2518-2(c)(5), Examples (7) and (8).
4.3.4.7 Disclaimer of Certain Tenancies in Real Property

The Proposed Regulations extended the rule in the former
Regulations that applied to joint interests between spouses in real property created
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after 1976 and before 1982. Under the Proposed Regulations, in the case of a joint
tenancy between spouses or a tenancy by the entirety in real property created after
1954 and before 1982 with respect to which no election was made under former
Section 2515, the surviving spouse had to make a qualified disclaimer no later than
nine months after the death of the first spouse to die. The surviving spouse could
disclaim any portion ofthe joint interest that was includable in the decedent's gross
estate under Section 2040. Prop. Reg. 25.2518-2(c)(4)(iii). For purposes of this
rule, it did not matter whether the tenancy was unilaterally severally under state law.
Prop. Reg. 25.2518-2(c)(5), Example (9). The preamble to the final Regulations
indicates that, for purposes of simplification, these special rules dependent on the
application of former Section 2515 were eliminated from the final Regulations.
•
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The Proposed Regulations also provided that with respect to a joint
tenancy between spouses or a tenancy by the entirety in real property
created on or after 7/14/88, to which IRe 2523(i)(3) (relating to the
creation ofa tenancy as to which the spouse ofthe donor is not a U.S.
citizen) applied the surviving spouse had to make a qualified
disclaimer no later than nine months after the death of the first spouse
to die. Moreover, the surviving spouse could disclaim any portion of
the joint interest that was includable in the decedent's gross estate
under Section 2040. Prop. Regs. 25.2518-2(c)(4)(iii) and 25.25182(cX5), Example (10). These provisions are retained in the new final
Regulations.
Regs. 25.2518-2(c)(4)(ii), and 25.2518-2(c)(5),
Example (9).

4.3.4.8 Disclaimer of Joint Bank, Brokerage, and Other
Investment Accounts
Under the Proposed Regulations, in the case of a transfer to
a joint bank account or a joint brokerage account, if a transferor could unilaterally
withdraw the transferor's own contributions from the account without the consent
of the other cotenant, the transfer creating the survivor's interest in a decedent's
share of the account occurred on the death of the deceased cotenant. Therefore, a
surviving joint tenant had to make a qualified disclaimer with respect to funds
contributed by the deceased cotenant within nine months of the cotenant's death.
The surviving joint tenant could not disclaim any portion of the joint account
attributable to consideration furnished by that surviving joint tenant. Prop. Reg.
25.2518-2(c)(4)(iv). The fmal Regulations retain these provisions and extend them
to other investment accounts (e.g., accounts held at mutual funds). Regs. 25.25182(c)(4)(iii).
•

If one joint owner transfers his own funds into a joint bank account
with another joint owner, and the contributing owner dies first, the
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...
surviving owner may disclaim the entire account within nine months
of the decedent's death. The entire account is includable in the
decedent's estate under Section 2033. The result is the same
regardless of whether the joint owners are spouses. Reg. 25.25182(c)(5), Example (12).

4.4

•

If, on the other hand, the non-contributing owner dies first, the
contributing owner cannot disclaim any portion of the joint account.
Because the contributing owner furnished all the funds, he did not
relinquish dominion and control over the funds. A surviving joint
owner cannot disclaim funds that he has always owned and never
transferred. Reg. 25.2518-2(c)(5), Example (13).

•

If the contributing owner dies first and the noncontributing owner
disclaims only a portion of the account, the disclaimed portion is
included in the decedent's estate to the extent required by Section
2040. If the joint owners are spouses, half of the nondisclaimed
portion is included in the decedent's estate under Section 2040(a)
because the decedent furnished all the funds in the account. Reg.
25.2518-2(c)(5), Example (14).

-

-

Acceptance of Benefits

A disclaimer may not accept an interest in property or any of its benefits prior to making a
disclaimer of that property. IRC 2518(b)(3).
4.4.1

-

"Acceptance" Defined
4.4.1.1 Generally

Acceptance is manifested by "an affirmative act which is consistent with
ownership ofthe interest in property". Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(d)(l). The receipt of dividends, rent,
or interest is considered to be an acceptance of the underlying property, as is use of the property,
pledging the property as security for a loan, and directing others to act with respect to the property.
Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(dX4), Examples (1), (4) and (5). The acceptance of any consideration by the
disclaimant in exchange for the disclaimer is considered to be an acceptance of the entire interest
being disclaimed. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(dXl), 25.2518-2(d)(4), Example (2); Estate of Thompson
y. Comrn'r, 89 T.C. 619 (1987); PLR 8225096, 7809043.

...

4.4.1.2 Loan as "Acceptance"
The use of estate funds to pay personal income taxes due under joint returns
filed on behalf of a decedent and the disclaimant-surviving spouse was an acceptance of benefits
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even where the spouse agreed at the time ofthe tax payments to reimburse the estate for any portion
of the payments which later were deemed attributable to her personal income tax liability. PLR
9244012. The disclaimant-surviving spouse also agreed to pay interest on any such amounts at
market rate, and executed an interest-bearing promissory note which she repaid in full a short time
later. In finding the spouse had accepted the benefits of the loaned funds, the IRS ruled,
"In the instant case, the surviving spouse's borrowing of $7,469 from the
residuary estate ofwhich the spouse is the beneficiary provided the spouse with the use of the estate
funds until the loan was repaid. Although the loan was negotiated at arm's-length and the interest
rate was set at market rate, the loan nevertheless enabled the surviving spouse to use the bequest for
a period oftime before deciding to disclaim the property. Thus, the surviving spouse has accepted
the benefits with respect to $7,469 in dividend income to which she would not otherwise be entitled
as a beneficiary ofthe residuary estate. She, therefore, may not disclaim this income and the share
to which this dividend income relates." liL; See also PLR 8405003.

4.4.1.3 Exercise of Power of Appointment as "Acceptance"
The exercise to any degree of a power of appointment by the donee of the
power is an acceptance of the benefits of that power. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(d)(I). Where, for
example, a decedent exercised a general power of appointment over a marital trust to the extent
necessary to pay estate taxes, the decedent's executor could not subsequently disclaim the decedent's
interest in that trust. PLR 8142008. This was true even though the power of appointment had been
exercised only with respect to a portion of the trust.
The Regulations clarify, however, that an intended exercise of a power of
appointment which is not yet effective will not constitute an acceptance. Treas. Reg. 25.25182(d)(4), Example (7). In one example, the donee of a general testamentary power of appointment
executed a will which exercised the power. Shortly thereafter, and within nine months after the
power was created, the donee disclaimed the testamentary power of appointment. Assuming all
other requirements for a qualified disclaimer were met, the example approved the disclaimer. ill;
See also, Pennsylvania Bank and Trust Co. y. U.S., 78-2 USTC 1f13, 248 (W.O. Pa., 1978).

4.4.1.4

"Acceptance" of Life Insurance

A beneficiary under an insurance policy who filed a claim and received
checks from the insurance company enabling her to draw on an account funded with the proceeds
of the policy had accepted the benefits of the policy and could not disclaim, even though no
withdrawals were made from the account. PLR 8702024.

r
r
r
r
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4.4.2

Actions Which Do Not Constitute "Acceptance"
4.4.2.1 Generally

Certain actions, in and ofthemselves, do not constitute an acceptance that will
invalidate a disclaimer. The acceptance of one interest in property will not necessarily be
considered an acceptance of all other interests in that same property. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(d)( 1).
For example, acceptance of one asset in a joint brokerage account did not prevent (or invalidate) the
disclaimer of other assets. PLR 8922060,9214022,9218015.

4.4.2.2 "Vesting" of Title; Renunciation
The mere vesting of title in the disclaimant at the death of the transferor, (as
in the case ofjoint tenancy property vesting at the moment of death in the surviving joint tenant),
will not preclude a qualified disclaimer. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(d)(4), Example (6). Extending this
"vesting oftitle" reasoning, the IRS has ruled that a surviving spouse's election of a statutory share
against the decedent's will would not constitute an acceptance that would preclude a subsequent
disclaimer by the spouse of a portion of the elected interest. Rev. Rul. 90-45, 1990-1 C.B. 175. [For
Kentucky's renunciation statutes, see KRS 391.030 and 392.080].
Actions taken by the disclaimant which are required under local law merely
to divest ownership from the disclaimant and transfer it to another, in and of themselves, will not
constitute an acceptance that will preclude the exercise of a qualified disclaimer. IRC 2518(c)(3);
Treas. Reg. 25.2518-1(c)(l)(i).

4.4.2.3 Deposit of Dividend Check
A disclaimant did not accept the benefits of shares of stock when a dividend
check issued to the decedent was deposited, without disclaimant's knowledge, into an account held
jointly by the decedent and the disclaimant. The disclaimer of 250 shares of corporate stock,
together with a proportionate share ofthe dividend which had been deposited into the joint account,
could be disclaimed. PLR 9243024.

4.4.2.4 Premature QTIP Election
A surviving spouse's timely disclaimer of the life interest in a trust was
qualified, even though the executor of the decedent's estate already had filed a federal estate tax
return on which he had a IRC 2056(b)(7) "QTIP" election with respect to the property in which
spouse disclaimed the life interest. Rev. Rut. 83-26, 1983-1 C.B. 234. [Perhaps the most remarkable
aspect of this ruling is that the federal estate tax return in this matter was filed only six months after
the decedent's death!]
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4.4.2.5 Disclaimer Regarding Residences
A number of issues arise with respect to the acceptance of benefits when
residential real property is disclaimed. In the case of such property held in joint tenancy,
community property, or as a tenancy by the entirety, a beneficiary will not be considered to have
accepted an interest in the property merely became he or she continued to reside in the residence
prior to disclaiming his or her interest in it. Treas: Reg. 25.2518-2(d)(l); PLR 9135043.

•

Despite the permissive approach of the Regulations, practitioners should
proceed cautiously when counseling disclaimants who intend to continue to
reside in a residence after disclaiming an interest in that property. Kentucky
law should be consulted concerning the rights of co-tenants if the disclaimant
retains an interest in the property, as will most often be true if that property
formerly was owned as community property, joint tenancy, or tenancy by the
entirety property. Unless the disclaimant is a surviving spouse and the
disclaimed interest passes to a trust of which the spouse is a beneficiary (and
the terms of the trust or state law authorize a beneficiary to reside in trust
property without paying rent), in most cases, the disclaimant should plan to
pay fair market rent to the taker ofthe disclaimed interest. While there is no
direct authority on this point, presumably the rent would be a proportionate
amount ofthe fair market rent that would be charged on the entire residence,
although a strong argument can be made that the rental value of a portion of
a residence is significantly less than a proportionate amount of the rental
value of the entire residence.

•

It is helpful to note that, in many cases, payment of rent to the taker of
disclaimed property will have desirable transfer tax consequences, as the
rental payments will pass wealth from the disclaimant to the taker of the
property on a transfer tax-free basis. Ofcourse, the income ta payable by the
taker of the property will reduce those benefits. Still, to the extent the
disclaimant's marginal federal estate tax rate is likely to exceed the marginal
income tax rate of the taker of the disclaimed property, the payment of rent
will "convert,"in effect, a transfer tax payable at a higher rate to an income
tax payable at a lower rate. An explanation of these consequences may help
mitigate the initial reluctance a disclaimant may demonstrate at having to pay
rent on a portion of his or her family home to a child or other taker of the
disclaimed interest in that home.

•

The payment of real property taxes, even when payment is made by the
beneficiary of that property out of personal funds, will not preclude the
beneficiary from subsequently making a qualified disclaimer of that property.
Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(d)(4), Example (3); PLR 9135043. The IRS has ruled
that, with respect to residential real property that had been owned in joint
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tenancy, payments of mortgage principal and interest and other expenses
related to the residence prior to and after the disclaimer of a survivorship
interest in that property were a "natural consequence of the use and
occupancy of the residence and, thus, were not an acceptance of the
benefits". PLR 9135043; 8143022. In the case of a"transfer" disclaimer
under IRC 2518(c)(3), the IRS implied that, after delivery of the deed of
transfer, one-half of such payments would be gifts to the taker of the
disclaimed property, which gifts might qualify for the gift tax annual
exclusion. Rev. Rul. 83-26, 1983-1 C.B. 234. This reasoning, if correct,
should not be limited to the transfer disclaimer context, but should be
relevant in any disclaimer situation. See Section 6, infra., for a discussion
of transfer disclaimers.
4.4.2.6 Community Property Issues

-

A surviving spouse did not accept the benefits of the deceased spouse's
commwrity property interest in various assets when she segregated and took control of her one-half
community property interest in those assets. PLR 9232014,9218015.
4.4.2.7 Joint Property

In several rulings which arguably are related in concept to the segregation of
community property rulings cited in the preceding paragraph, the IRS has allocated the entire
amount of a withdrawal or other acceptance from a jointly owned asset to the disclaimant's personal
interest in that asset. PLR 9218015,9214022. If the withdrawal did not exceed the value of the
disclaimant's own interest in the property, no acceptance of the decedent's interest was deemed to
have occurred. In one such instance, payments on a credit card issued by a brokerage firm were
made, with the pennission of the surviving spouse, from a brokerage account that had been owned
by the decedent and the surviving spouse as community property. Where the payments were less
than the surviving spouse's commwrity one-half interest in the account at the date of the decedent's
death and where the surviving spouse had given the brokerage firm no other instructions regarding
the account and its disposition, there was no acceptance by the surviving spouse of the decedent's
interest in the account. PLR 9218015. In another such case, where the balance in a cash account
that had been owned in joint tenancy exceeded the value of the decedent's one-half interest in the
account at all times after the decedent's death, withdrawals by the surviving spouse during the
period preceding her disclaimer were deemed attributable to her interest in the account and were not
an acceptance of any portion of the decedent's interest in that account. PLR 9214022.

•

In other cases, withdrawals or other "acceptances" have been allocated onehalf to the decedent's interest and one-half to the surviving joint tenant's
interest. PLR 9012053,9214022. In one ruling, the decedent and his spouse
had owned a brokerage account in joint tenancy. After the decedent's death,
the spouse on two occasions, used a credit card issued in connection with the
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money fund portion of the account. She promptly repaid from her separate
funds the amounts charged to the account. The amounts charged were
allocated equally between the spouse's and the decedent's shares of the
account. The spouse was deemed to have accepted the benefits of that
portion of the credit card charges that was attributable to the decedent's share
ofthe account, together with a proportionate share of the income earned by
that account. PLR 9012053. In a second ruling, a portion of stock held in
a jointly owned brokerage account was "accepted" when it was sold and
reinvested with the permission ofthe surviving spouse. One-half of the stock
was allocated to the surviving spouse's interest in the account, and one-half
was attributed to the decedent's interest in the account. The surviving spouse
could not disclaim that portion of the decedent's interest in the account
which was attributable to the accepted stock, nor could she disclaim
dividends or income attributable to that portion of the account. PLR
9214022. This ruling is of particular interest because the cash and stock
accounts were treated differently, with no explanation why this is so.
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•

Certainly, a clear and consistent position from the IRS on this question
would be helpful. Given a joint owner's right to take the proportionate
interest attributable to his or her share ofjointly owned property, it seems
reasonable to adopt the position taken by the IRS in those rulings which have
charged withdrawals or "acceptances" during the administrative period first,
to the disclaimant's interest in that property. PLR 9218015. Only when the
disclaimant's own interest in the property is exhausted should acceptances
be deemed to have occurred with respect to the decedent's interest in the
property.

4.4.3 Actions Taken by Fiduciaries
4.4.3.1 GeneraUy
Generally, actions taken by an individual in his or her fiduciary capacity with
respect to property do not preclude that individual from making a qualified disclaimer of that
property. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(dX2); PLR 7821045. For example, the executor of an estate may,
in his or her fiduciary capacity, take steps to protect or preserve property which is an asset of that
estate and may collect income with respect to the property without jeopardizing the ability of that
same person, in his or her capacity as the beneficiary of an interest in that property, to disclaim.
Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(dX2). Moreover, the IRS has ruled that taking executor's fees on disclaimed
property was not an "acceptance" of that property that would disqualify the disclaimer. PLR
9051007,8921083.
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4.4.3.2 Disclaimant as Fiduciary For Disclaimed Property
An individual may not disclaim, however, where that individual, in a
fiduciary capacity, has exercised or will retain a discretionary power to direct the enjoyment of the
disclaimed interest. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(d)(2). Assume, for example, that a beneficiary wished
to disclaim property which then would pass to a trust for her children. Such a disclaimer would not
be qualified if the beneficiary served as trustee of the children's trust and held an unrestricted
discretionary power to sprinkle trust income or principal among the children.

•

•

4.5

A disclaimant can act as a fiduciary with respect to disclaimed property
where the disclaimant's fiduciary powers are limited by an ascertainable
standard. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(e)(1)(1). Thus, if the hypothetical trust
described in the preceding paragraph provided for the distribution of income
and principal only for the health, support, maintenance, or education of the
children, the disclaimant could disclaim property which then would pass to
the trust and she also could serve a trustee of the trust. PLR 9320015. If the
fiduciary powers were not so limited, the disclaimer would be qualified if the
disclaimant also disclaimed the right to act a trustee. PLR 9244012,
9236018. In either case, disclaimed property would have to pass to the
children's trust without direction by the disclaimant, presumably under the
terms of the decedent's will or trust.
Under certain circumstances, a disclaimant can continue to manage
disclaimed property in a partnership or a corporation when the disclaimant
holds a fiduciary or management position in the business. Where, for
example, a disclaimant continued to manage partnership property in her
capacity as a partner after disclaiming a portion of a partnership interest, the
IRS ruled that management of the partnership was not ac acceptance of the
underlying partnership interest so long as (1) the compensation to the
disclaimant-partner was reasonable and not based on the value of the
partnership or its profits, and (2) there was no control over the distribution
of income and profits of the partnership. PLR 8922082. Where, however,
an executor exercised the estate's voting rights, together with her own votes,
to elect herself, in her individual capacity, as the general partner of two
partnerships in which the estate held interests, thereby initiating a major
recapitalization of the partnership accounts, the executor could not later
disclaim the partnership interests in her individual capacity because she had
accepted the benefits of the interest by exercising incidents of ownership
intrinsic to the decedent's partnership interests. TAM 9123003.

...
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Disclaimed Property Must Pass Without Direction to Either Decedent's Spouse
or Person Other Than Disclaimant
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Property Must Pass Without Direction
4.5.1.1 Generally

Property passing tmder a qualified disclaimer must pass without direction on
the part of the disclaimant. IRC 2518(b)(4); See Dipole v. COmm'r, TC Memo 1993-577. Any
agreement, whether express or implied, that the property will be distributed as specified by the
disclaimant will be considered a direction on the part of the disclaimant and will invalidate the
disclaimer. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(e)(1).
•

The disclaimant may neither direct the transfer or redistribution of the
disclaimed property to another person nor have the power to do so. hL See
Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(eX5), Examples (11) and (12). This is true even if the
direction may be made or the power exercised only in conjunction with
another. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(eXIXi). Where, however, a fiduciary power
to distribute to designated beneficiaries is limited by an ascertainable
standard, the fact that the disclaimant will hold such a power with respect to
an interest in disclaimed property will not disqualify the disclaimer. Treas.
Reg. 25.2518-2(e)(5), Example (12).

•

A disclaimer of a power of appointment will meet the requirements of this
section only if the disclaimant does not direct either the transfer of the
interest subject to the power or the power itself to another. Treas. Reg.
25.2518-2(e)(1).

4.5.1.2 Two IRS Examples
The Regulations offer the following interesting example of an anticipated
abuse of the disclaimer statute:

''C died testate on January 1, 1979. According to C's will, D was to receive
1/3 ofthe residuary estate with any disclaimed property going to E. D was also to receive a second
1/3 ofthe residuary estate with any disclaimed property going to F. Finally, D was to receive a final
1/3 ofthe residuary estate with any disclaimed property going to G. D specifically states that he is
disclaiming the interest in which the disclaimed property is designated to pass to E. D has
effectively directed that the disclaimed property will pass to E and therefore D's disclaimer is not
a qualified disclaimer under Section 2518(a)." Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(e)(5), Example (9).
The next example goes on to approve the situation where D receives a bequest
of Whiteacre which, if disclaimed, will pass to F and a bequest of Blackacre which, if disclaimed,
will pass. to D. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(e)(5), Example (10). Under the second example, a
disclaimer ofeither property or an undivided interest in each property would be valid, assuming all
other requirements for a qualified disclaimer are met. These examples deal with estate planning

r
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situations where the use of a disclaimer is contemplated. The latter illustrates some of the flexibility
that can be incorporated into an estate plan through the use of disclaimers.

...

4.5.1.3 Probate Activities By Disclaimant To Control Disclaimed
Property
A recent private letter ruling suggests an interesting and creative planning
possibility with respect to disclaimers which cause property to pass to minor beneficiaries. The
beneficiary proposed to disclaim shares of stock out of an irrevocable trust. She petitioned the court
for a detennination that, under the terms ofthe trust, her minor children would receive any property
disclaimed by her. The disclaimant-beneficiary also petitioned the court for the appointment of a
conservator for her minor children. The conservator was not related to the disclaimant. The
conservator planned to petition the court to establish trusts for the benefit of the minor children to
hold the disclaimed property. Without specifically addressing the proposed creation of trusts to hold
the disclaimed property (which was the portion ofthe fact pattern that arguably crossed the "passage
without direction" line), the IRS ruled that the actions by the disclaimant to have the terms of the
trust construed and to get a conservator appointment for her minor children were not "directions"
by the disclaimant. The proposed disclaimer would be qualified, assuming all other requirements
for a qualified disclaimer were met. PLR 9226013.

•

•

This ruling suggests an intriguing planning strategy when disclaimers in
favor of minor beneficiaries are considered. One of the concerns that arises
when disclaimers are contemplated that will result in the passage of
disclaimed property to minor beneficiaries in the administration of that
property during the period of minority (and, in some cases, beyond). When
the disclaimer has not been anticipated in the estate plan and the disclaimed
property is not directed by the growing instrument to trusts for the minor
beneficiaries, most often state law will require that a conservationship or
guardianship be established to manage the property on behalf of the minor.
This result can be undesirable for several reasons. The disclaimant may
prefer to avoid the expense, inconvenience, and reporting requirements of a
court-supervised proceeding. Moreover, the age at which the guardianship
or conservator can petition the court to establish a trust to hold the
disclaimed property, these concerns may be avoided, or at least mitigated to
some degree.
If the IRS does, in fact, take the position implied in this ruling, practitioners
should examine the relevant state law to determine whether a guardian or
conservator in that state would be permitted to create a trust to hold
disclaimed property passing to a minor, and, if so, what restrictions might
pertain to such a trust. If this approach is pursued, the disclaimant should not
be appointed as the fiduciary who will create the trust on behalf of the minor
beneficiary. Caution is advised, however. Private letter rulings did not even
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address the issue directly, but merely implied, by the absence of discussion,
that such a procedure would not disqualify the disclaimer. Counsel should
consider obtaining a ruling if the creation of a trust by a court-appointed
fiduciary to hold disclaimed property is contemplated.
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4.5.1.4 Disclaimed Property Passing To Charity
A number ofrulings have been issued allowing disclaimers ofproperty which
then pass to a charitable organization or trust. PLR 9350033, 9350032, 9320008, 9319022,
9317039. Disclaimers have been utilized in conjunction with reformation proceedings to qualify
the resulting transfer for a charitable deduction for federal estate tax purposes. PLR 9347013,
9341003.
•

When property passes as a result of a disclaimer to a charitable organization,
the disclaimant cannot have the power to direct the enjoyment of the
disclaimed funds after the charity receives them. PLR 9350033. When the
disclaimant is an officer of director of the recipient charity, or otherwise is
in a position to influence the disposition of the disclaimed funds, this issue
must be addressed.

•

Under the facts ofrecent companion rulings, the decedent had three children.
Prior to the decedent's death, each child established a private foundation. At
the decedent's death, her revocable trust provided that her estate pass in
equal shares to her children. Ifany child disclaimed, that child's share would
pass to the private foundation created by him or her. Disclaimers by the
children were qualified when the appropriate sections ofthe By-Laws of each
foundation would be amended to require that any funds received as a result
of a disclaimer made by any director of the foundation would be held as a
separate and segregated fund over which only the independent (nondisclaiming directors) would have authority to distribute income and
principal. In addition, the By-Laws would be further amended to provide
that no disclaiming director could control the selection of persons who could
hold the position of independent director. PLR 9320008, 9317039.

•

Another ruling approves a rather elaborate mechanism established under a
decedent's revocable trust agreement which provided the family with a great
deal of flexibility concerning the disposition of the disclaimed funds. The
IRS ruled that disclaimers would be qualified and a federal estate tax
charitable deduction would be available if children of the decedent executed
disclaimers which would, under the decedent's revocable trust agreement,
cause disclaimed property to pass to one or more charitable organizations to
be selected by the spouses of the disclaimant within six months after the
disclaimers were executed. If a "selector" died before completing the
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selection of the recipient organizations, the surviving selectors could name
a successor selector. If no successor was named, the trustee would be
required to petition the court for the appointment of up to three individuals
who were lineal descendants of the decedent, none of whom could be a
disclaimant, to act as selectors. The recipient charities could include a
foundation created by decedent (the Foundation). The potential disclaimant
sat on the Board of Directors of the Foundation. If the Foundation were to
be selected as a recipient charity, the By-Laws of that Foundation would
have to be amended prior to the execution of the disclaimers to require that
all funds received as a result of a disclaimer by a member of the Board be
administered in a separate and segregated fund to be administered by the
Separate Fund Committee. Neither the Separate Fund Committee nor the
directors who selected that committee could include a person disclaiming
funds to the Foundation. PLR 9235022.

•

•

It is interesting to note that, in effect, these charitable disclaimer rulings are
permitting post-death reformations to qualify an anticipated disclaimer. In
these instances, however, the "reformations" are not of governing
instruments, but rather of the organizational structure of the charitable
organizations that will take the disclaimed property. When disclaimed
property is to pass to charity, it is common for that charity to be an
organization with respect to which the disclaimant has significant ties.
(Otherwise, the disclaimant is less likely to disclaim in favor of that charity.)
Frequently, the charitable organization will be an entity created by the
disclaimant's family, or perhaps by the disclaimant him or herself, and in
many cases, the disclaimant will hold a position of authority within the
organization. In earlier rulings, the disclaimant would resign from the Board
ofDirectors or from his or her office in the charity to qualify the disclaimer.
PLR 9008011, 9350032. Certainly, it is more desirable from the
disclaimant's standpoint to fashion an arrangement which allows him or her
to remain involved with the charity, isolating him or her only from the
administration of the disclaimed property.
When considering disclaimers in favor of charities, practitioners must be
conversant with the issues addressed in the rulings cited above and must be
careful to ensure that disclaimed PrOperty will be segregated in a manner that
will afford the disclaimant no opportunity to influence the disposition of that
property. Several ofthe rulings go so far as to prohibit the disclaimant from
even being in a position to select those Persons who will have authority to
distribute disclaimed funds. Several of the more recent rulings appear to
require that any amendment to the recipient organization's Articles and ByLaws which are necessary to accomplish this result must be made before the
disclaimer is executed. PLR 9350033, 9235022. While such disclaimers
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require careful analysis, and often additional expense because of the planning
that must be done with respect to the recipient charitable organization, they
also afford the opportunity for significant transfer tax benefits, as well as
personal satisfaction to the disclaimant.
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Disclaimed Property Must Pass to Either the Surviving Spouse of the
Decedent or a Person Other Than the Disclaimant
4.5.2.1 Disclaimant is Not Transferor's Spouse

Ifthe disclaimant is anyone other than the surviving spouse of the transferor,
the disclaimed property must pass in its entirety to a person other than the disclaimant, the
disclaimer will not be effective unless the portion of the disclaimed property in which the
disclaimant retains an interest is severable from the rest of the disclaimed property or constitutes an
undivided interest in the property. hL See Section 5 infra, for discussion of partial interests in
property.
A beneficiary who is not the spouse of the transferor may not disclaim
property which then will pass to a trust in which then will pass to a trust in which the beneficiary
holds an interest, even if the interest is merely a contingent remainder interest or an interest is
merely a contingent remainder interest or an interest that would pass to the beneficiary under
Kentucky intestacy laws. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(e)(3)(ii). In one instance, for example a child was
bequeathed certain shares ofstock. The residue of the estate was to be distributed to a family trust,
which was to be divided into a marital and a non-marital share. The marital share would be held
for the benefit of the surviving spouse during her lifetime and could pass, upon her death, to the
children (including the disclaimant) and the heirs of any deceased children. the non-marital share
would pass directly to the children and the heirs of any deceased children. The IRS approved the
child's proposed disclaimer of his entire interest in the shares specifically bequeathed to him and
him entire interest in shares that otherwise would be distributable to him under either the marital or
non-marital share of the family trust. PLR 8831032, PLR 8705029. This ruling illustrates the
necessity to determine whether disclaimed property will pass, as a result of the disclaimer, in a
manner that affords that disclaimant any kind of continuing interest in the disclaimed property and,
if so, the requirement that the secondary interest or interests also must be disclaimed.

•

Note: When planning disclaimers, it is critical to determine in advance to whom the
disclaimed property will pass. When, under the relevant documents or Kentucky (or
other state) law, disclaimed property will pass in a manner such that a non-spouse
beneficiary will continue to have an interest in that property, the beneficiary must
further disclaim the interests that arise under the initial disclaimer in a manner that
will cause the property to pass, without direction, to someone other than the
disclaimant. In other words, the property must be disclaimed "down the line" until
it will pass to another beneficiary.

'f

r
r

E - 31

4.5.2.2 Disclaimant is Transferor's Spouse
A special exception is made for spousal disclaimers. A spouse may disclaim
property passing from a descendent and still receive beneficial enjoyment from that property. Treas.
Reg. 25.2518-2(e)(2). For example, a spouse may disclaim an outright bequest which, under the
terms of the descendent's will, passes either to a trust for the exclusive benefit of the spouse or to
a discretionary trust ofwhich the spouse is a permissible beneficiary. When spouses prefer to leave
their estates outright to one another, disclaimer planning can be utilized to provide the surviving
spouse with the option to preserve all or a portion of the deceased spouse's unified credit by
providing for the disposition of disclaimed assets to an appropriately structured trust or to other
beneficiaries. Similar flexibility with respect to planning for the use of the GSTT exemption can
be obtained through the use of disclaimers in the estate planning process.
Property disclaimed by a surviving spouse must pass without any direction
on the part of the surviving spouse to that spouse or another person. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(e)(2);
Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(e)(5), Examples (5) and (6). This rule is applied differently with respect to
a disclaimant who is the surviving spouse of the transferor, however, than it is with respect to other
disclaimant. A surviving spouse will be treated as directing the beneficial enjoyment of the
disclaimed property in a transfer that is not subject to federal estate or gift tax (whether as trustee
or otherwise) unless that power is limited by an ascertainable standard. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(e)(2).
It is unclear whether the disclaimant spouse can retain a general power to appoint or direct beneficial
enjoyment to anyone, or whether that power must be limited to a "5 and 5" power or a general
power of distribution which would permit the disclaimant spouse to invade corpus for his or her
benefit alone. In other words, it is not clear whether the disclaimant spouse can retain a general
power to appoint disclaimed property to anyone other than the disclaimant spouse. Treas. Reg.
25.2518-2(e)(5), Example (5); PLR 9329025.

5.

Disclaimers of Partial Interests
5.1

Disclaimer May be Made of All or Undivided Portion of Any Separate Interest
in Property

-

A disclaimer may be made with respect to an undivided portion of an interest is all other
requirement for a qualified disclaimer are met. IRe 2518(c)( 1).

5.1.1 "Undivided portion"
An undivided portion of a disclaimant's separate interest in property must consist of:

"afraction or percentage ofeach and every substantial interest or right owned by the
disclaimant in such property and must extend over the entire term of the
disclaimant's interest in such property and in other property into which such property
is converted." Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(b) (Emphasis Added).
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If, for instance, a beneficiary were the devisee of a life estate in certain property, he could disclaim
the entire life estate or a fraction or percentage of that life estate, assuming all other requirements
for a qualified disclaimer were met. He could not, however, disclaim a portion of the life estate
measured by a term of years. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(a)(l)(i) and (d), Example (4). Such a
disclaimer also would violate the requirement that the disclaimed interest be separately created by
the transferor. (See Section 5.1.2, infra.) These two requirements are closely related, and often
overlap.
5.1.2

The "Separate Interest" Rule

Generally, any interest which is separately created by the transferor will be regarded
as a separate interest for disclaimer purposes. If, for instance, a decedent left shares of stock to his
daughter, Jane, Jane could disclaim all or any number of the share bequeathed to her, assuming all
other requirements for a qualified disclaimer were met. Jane could not, however, disclaim a
remainder interest in the shares and retain a life estate in them, as the remainder interest was not a
separate interest, separately created by the decedent. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(d), Example (2).
The inability to disclaim a temporal interest that was not separately created by the
transferor was illustrated by the facts of a Technical Advice Memorandum. The decedent's will
directed that his spouse be entitled to occupy a residence for so long as she continued to use it and
did not remarry. The residue of the estate passed to the decedent's children. The children
disclaimed all interests in the residence which might arise during the spouse's lifetime, either
through reversion or intestacy, but retained the right to receive the property at the spouse's death.
The IRS ruled that the children were attempting to disclaim a ''temporal part" of the remainder
which was not separately created by the decedent and was not an undivided portion of the interest.
the disclaimers were not qualified for the marital deduction. TAM 9140004. This rule illustrates
again the desirability of planning in advance for the use of disclaimer, as the creation of separate
interests in anticipation of disclaimers can greatly increase the planning opportunities available to
the beneficiaries.
5.1.3

Merger of Interests Under Kentucky (Or Other State) Law

There is a significant caveat to the "separate interest" rule. If, under Kentucky (or
other state) law, interests that are separately created by the transferor are merged, all or a portion
of the entire merged interest must disclaimed if the disclaimer is to valid. Treas. Reg. 25.25183(a)(I)(i).
Example: Ann receives life estate in a farm and is the sole beneficiary of the
residuary estate. The remainder interest in the farm passes to the residuary estate
under the decedent's will. Under state law, Ann's interests merge to give her a fee
simple interest in the farm. Under these circumstances, Ann cannot make qualified
disclaimer ofher interest in the life estate. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(d), Example (12).
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When merger would occur under state law but for the creation by the transferor of
a nominal interest in the property, a disclaimer must be made of all or an undivided portion of the
interests which would have merged but for the nominal interest. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(a)(I). A
nominal interest is an interest in property created by the transferor that;
(1)

has an actuarial value of less than 5% of the total value of the property at the
time of the taxable transfer creating the interest;

(2)

prevents the merger under local law oftwo or more other interests created by
the transferor; and

(3)

can be clearly shown from all the facts and circumstances to have been
created primarily for the purpose of preventing the merger of the other
interests. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(a)(I)(iv).

...
;;

Factors to be considered in determining whether an interest is created primarily for the purpose of
preventing merger include, but are not limited to the following:

5.2

(1)

the relationship between the transferor and the interest holder;

(2)

the age difference between the interest holder and the beneficiary whose
interests would have merged;

(3)

the interest holder's state of health at the time of the taxable transfer; and

(4)

in the case of a contingent remainder, any other factors which indicate that
the possibility of the interest vesting as a fee simple is so remote as to be
negligible. hi..

Disclaimers of Pecuniary Amounts
5.2.1 Generally

Disclaimers can be made ofpecuniary amounts. PLR 9338010,9245021,8539004.
A pecuniary amount can be expressed as a specific dollar amount or by formula. For example, a
spouse was permitted to disclaim that pecuniary amount which, when added to a child's intestate
share, would result in full utilization of the decedent's unified credit. PLR 9338010. Disclaimers
also can be made of reverse pecuniary amounts, and the use of such disclaimers has become
increasingly popular. PLR 9319022,9310020,9115062,9014005,9009007,8708069; Estate of
Henly stanley McInnes, TC Memo 1992-558. A reverse pecuniary disclaimer might be described
as an "all but" disclaimer. A child might disclaim, for example, all but the amount of the bequest
to him or her that can pass free of tax by reason of the unified credit. Such a disclaimer could be
particularly useful where a decedent's estate passes to a child, and a disclaimer by the child will
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cause property to pass to the surviving spouse and thus qualify for the marital deduction. PLR
8708069.
5.2.2 "Separate Fund" Protection
A disclaimer of a specific pecwriary (or reverse pecuniary) amount can be made out
of either a pecwriary or non-pecwriary bequest or gift if no income or other benefit of the disclaimed
amount inures to the benefit of the disclaimant, either before or after the disclaimer. Treas. Reg.
25.2518-3(c). Thus, following the disclaimer ofa pecuniary amount, the disclaimed amount and
any income attributable to it must be segregated from portion of the gift or bequest that was not
disclaimed. Id. While there is no specific guidance as to the nature and degree of segregation that
is required, the Regulations approve an example in which the executor set aside a disclaimed amount
after the disclaimer into a "separate fund." Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(d), Example (19). Presumably,
the establishment by an executor or trustee of a separate bank account to hold such funds would
satisfy this requirement. PLR 9232014. While some practitioners rely solely on separate accounting
entries to segregate disclaimed pecuniary amount, this approach is not recommended unless and
until there is some indication from the IRS that it will be sufficient.
5.2.3 Post-Disclaimer Asset Allocation
The segregation of assets in satisfaction of a disclaimer of a pecuniary amount must
be made on the basis ofthe fair market value ofthe assets on the date of the disclaimer or on a basis
that is fairly representative of appreciation and depreciation that has occurred between the date of
transfer and the date of the disclaimer. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(c). A disclaimer of a pecuniary
amount, which, by its terms, was based on date of death values was qualified when the disclaimed
amount would be satisfied using date of distribution values. PLR 8539004.
5.2.4 Determination of Share of Income
Any amount distributed to the disclaimant from the gift or bequest prior to the
disclaimer is treated as distribution of corpus from that gift, and an acceptance by the disclaimant
of the amount distributed as well as a proportionate amount of the income earned by the gift or
bequest between the date oftransfer and the date of the disclaimer. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(c). The
Regulations provide a formula under which the proportionate share of income is to be determined.
hL; Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(d), Example (17).

5.3

Powers of Appointment
5.3.1 Generally

A power of appointment is treated as a separate interest in property and may be
disclaimed independently from any other interests in that same property which are separately created
by the transferor. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(a)(I)(iii); PLR 9318020. Thus, a "5 and 5" power is a
separate interest which can be disclaimed. PLR 8824014. A qualified disclaimer of a general power
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of appointment is not a release ofthe power under IRe 2041. Treas. Reg. 20.2041-3(d)(6)(I); PLR
9236018.
5.3.2 What A Trust Beneficiary Can Disclaim
A beneficiary can disclaim the right to receive trust corpus upon distribution of a
trust, while retaining the right to discretionary distributions of income during the trust term. PLR

8825101, 8824014. Similarly, a beneficiary can disclaim the right to receive discretionary
distributions of principal during the trust term, retaining the right to receive all income from the
trust. PLR 9329025. A beneficiary also can disclaim inter vivos and testamentary powers to
appoint trust property, and retain the right to all income from the property. PLR 9236018. The IRS
has ruled that the disclaimer by surviving spouse of a lifetime power to appoint trust property to
descendants, while retaining the right to all income from the trust, the right to discretionary
distributions of the corpus, and a testamentary general power of appointment, was qualified when
all other requirements for a qualified disclaimer were met. PLR 9329025. Note that a similar
disclaimer by a beneficiary who was not the spouse of the transferor would not be qualified, as the
retention of the general power of appointment would violate the ''passage without direction" rule.
See discussion at Section 4.5.2.2., supra.
5.3.3 What a Trust Beneficiary Cannot Disclaim
A disclaimant may not, however, retain a power or right to direct the beneficial
enjoyment of disclaimed property unless that right is limited by an ascertainable standard. Treas.
Reg. 25.2518-3(a)(l)(iii), 25.2518-3(d), Example (9). In the facts presented in one ruling,
beneficiaries disclaimed property which passed to a trust in which neither disclaimant retained
beneficial interests, but of which the disclaimant were named to serve as co-trustees. The trust
permitted the trustees to made distributions to provide for the beneficiaries' "support, education, and
comfort." Concurrently with the execution of their disclaimers, the disclaimant proposed to resign
as trustees. Noting that the trustees' power to distribute from the trust was not limited by an
ascertainable standard, the IRS nevertheless ruled that the proposed disclaimers would be qualified
if the disclaimant resigned as trustees concurrently with the execution of their disclaimers.

•

-

-

Example: A trust is created for the benefit of Bob which provides for the payment
of all income to Bob, for invasions of principal for Bob's benefit, and which gives
Bob a testamentary general power of appointment over the trust corpus. Bob can
disclaim the testamentary power to appoint all or an undivided portion of the trust
corpus and retain his beneficial interest in the trust income and principal. Treas.
Reg. 25.2518-3(d), Example (21). Unless Bob were the spouse of the transferor,
however, Bob could not retain the right to direct the beneficial enjoyment of the trust
property unless that right were limited by an ascertainable standard. Treas. Reg.
25.2518-3(a)(l)(iii); 25.2518-3(d), Example (9). Thus, if Bob were the trustee of
the trust, Bob's disclaimer of his power of appointment would be qualified only if
Bob's ability as trustee to distribute principal were limited by an ascertainable

E - 36

r
r

r
r

standard. If, however, Bob were the surviving spouse of the transferor, the power
to distribute principal to himself need not be limited by an ascertainable standard,
and there is some authority which seems to indicate that the power to distribute even
to others need not be limited by such a standard so long as a transfer under the power
would be subject to estate or gift tax. PLR 9329025.

•

A general testamentary power of appointment can not be "pared down" by the
beneficiary. There is no statutory or regulatory authority which permits this kind of
pnming or shaping ofa general power. To ensure that the trust assets would not be
subject to estate tax at the death of the beneficiary, the appropriate course of action
would have been to disclaim the general power in its entirety.

•

An interesting question arises in a related area, however. Could a partial disclaimer
be make of a general power to distribute corpus (or of the right to have corpus
distributed) for the comfort or happiness of a beneficiary if the trustee had the power
to distribute trust principal for the "health, support, comfort, and happiness" of the
beneficiary? The Proposed Regulations included an example disallowing a
disclaimer where a trustee! beneficiary had the power to invade trust principal for his
own "health, maintenance and happiness" and attempted to disclaim the power to
invade for happiness. Prop. Reg. 25.2518-3, Example (15). The disclaimer was
disallowed because the trustee did not disclaim all powers to invade principal.
(Under the Proposed Regulations, a disclaimer of an interest in principal only could
be valid if all other interests in principal were disclaimed. This concept was not
carried forward in the Final Regulations.)
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Although the Final Regulations do not address this issue, it has been suggested that
such a disclaimer should be permissible under the present rules. It can be argued that the transferor
has separately created a general power (the power to invade principal for comfort (the power to
invade principal for comfort or happiness) and also has separately created a special power (the
power to invade for health and maintenance). Because the general power was separately created and
because, after the disclaimer, the remaining special power to invade principal for health and
maintenance is a power limited by an ascertainable standard, the general power of appointment
should be able to be disclaimed independently. This argument is persuasive and should be the
correct result for a policy standpoint. Practitioners should be aware, however, that there is no
authority ratifying this conclusion and should proceed cautiously.

5.4

Severable Property
5.4.1 Generally

Severable property is defined as "property which can be divided into separate parts
each of which, after severance, maintains a complete and independent existence." Treas. Reg.
25.2518-3(a)(1 )(ii).

r
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5.4.2 Shares of Stock
The classic example of severable property is shares of stock. The recipient of 100
shares of stock in a corporation may disclaim any specific number of those shares as long as the
other requirements for a qualified disclaimer are met. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(a)(I)(ii), 25.2518-3(d),
Example (1). Similarly, any stated dollar amount of a cash gift may be disclaimed. Treas. Reg.
25.2518-3(d), Example (16). Identifiable parcels of real property, such as individual acres, also are
severable, as are separate paintings. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(d), Examples (1) and (3). Surface estate
and mineral estate interests have been held to be severable as well. PLR 8212061.

-

..

5.4.3 Other AssetslInterests
Various other rights and interests have been hold to be severable for disclaimer
purposes. For example, a spouse's right to remove the trustee was considered to be separate from
all other interests. The spouse was permitted to disclaim that right, while retaining all other interests
in a trust for her benefit PLR 9329025, 8122075. The right to receive loans from a trust "on terms
determined by the trustee" also was a separate interest which could be disclaimed by beneficiaries.
PLR 8815038.

5.4.4 Sole Interest Of Decedentffransferor
Property that is severable but that ordinarily would not constitute an undivided
portion can be disclaimed if that property is the only property in which the decedent had an interest.
Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(a)(I)(ii). If, for example, a spouse is given the right to live in a residence
until his remarriage, he should be able to disclaim all or an undivided portion of that right. On the
other hand, had the spouse been given a life estate or fee interest in the residence, the right to live
in the residence until remarriage would not be severable and would not constitute an undivided
portion of the spouse's interest that could be disclaimed.

5.5

.J

Specific Asset

Specific assets can be disclaimed from an outright bequest. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(d),
Example (I); PLR 9243024,8705029. Specific assets also can be disclaimed out of a trust. Treas.
Reg. 25.2518-3(a)(2), 25.2518-3(d), Example (6); PLR 9014005, 8719014, 8705029. An asset
disclaimed from a trust must be removed from the trust and must pass, without direction on the part
of the disclaimant, to someone other than the disclaimant or the decedent's spouse. ld..; PLR
9244012, 9038031. If the disclaimed asset remains in the trust and the disclaimant retains an
interest in that trust, the disclaimer will not be qualified. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(d), Examples (5)
and (7).

...
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6.

Transfer Disclaimers
6.1 Generally

IRC 2518 was enacted primarily to create a uniform federal disclaimer law that
would eliminate the inconsistencies and confusion that arose from the need to satisfy divergent state
law disclaimer requirements. See, Estate orO. W. Newman. Jr., T.C. Memo 1979-223. Even after
the passage of IRC 2518, however, the impact of state law on the qualification of a disclaimer for
federal tax purposes remained unclear. The IRS initially took the position that, in order for a
disclaimer to be qualified under IRC 2518, it must be effective under state law to transfer the
disclaimed property from the disclaimantto another. Prop. Reg. 25.2518-1(c)( I). Fortunately, the
IRS reversed this position in the Final Regulations, which state that a disclaimer may be qualified
even when it is not effective under local law. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-I(c)(I)(i). Unfortunately, the
language ofthe Regulations is limited to disclaimers of interests created in transfers prior to 1982.
ld.. With respect to all other transfers, the Regulations continue to require that disclaimed property
pass, as a result ofthe disclaimer, without direction on the part of the disclaimant to someone other
that the disclaimant or to the surviving spouse of the transferor. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(e).
6.2 IRe 2518
In 1981, responding to continuing concern over the state law issue, Congress
expanded the scope ofIRC 2518 by enacting IRC 2518 (c) (3). IRC 2518(c)(3) provides that a
written transfer of the transferor's entire interest in property will be a qualified disclaimer if the
transfer is to the person or persons who would have received the property if the transferor had made
a qualified disclaimer and if the transfer meets all of the requirements for a qualified disclaimer
except the requirement that disclaimed property pass without direction on the part of the disclaimant.
Thus, a disclaimer that does not meet the requirements for a valid disclaimer under Kentucky law
nevertheless will be qualified for federal tax purposes if it is effective under Kentucky law to cause
the disclaimed property to pass without direction on the part of the disclaimant to someone other
than the disclaimant. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-I(c)(3), Example (I). If, however, the attempted
disclaimer does not cause the requisite transfer under Kentucky law, it will not be qualified for
federal tax purposes unless the requirements ofIRC 2518(c)(3) are met.
6.3 Some QuestionslUnresolved Issues
Although IRC 25 I 8(c)(3) was intended to provide a uniform alternative when state
law disclaimer requirements cannot or have not been satisfied, a number of issues remain. For
example, IRC 2518(c)(3) requires the transfer ofthe disclaimant's "entire" interest in property. IRC
2518(c)(3). While arguably and "entire interest" should include any severable or undivided portion
of an interest, there is no authority on this point on which to rely. It is unclear whether a spouse can
retain an interest in property disclaimed by transfer under IRC 2518 (c)(3), as he or she can under
IRC 2518 (b)(4)(A). Moreover, ifadisclaimer is not effective to transfer property under state law,
state law may not establish to whom the property would have passed if the disclaimer had been
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effective. To whom should the property be transferred under these circumstances? The IRS has
promised to issue regulations explaining the requirements ofIRC 2518 (c)(3), and IRC 25.~518
l(c)(l)(ii) ofthe Regulations has been reserved for this purpose. However, given the more pressing
need for guidance from the IRS in higher-profile areas such as GSTT tax, qualified domestic trusts,
and Chapter 14, it is unlikely such regulations will be issued anytime soon.

6.4 Approvals Of Transfer Disclaimers

-

Despite the continuing lack of clarity smrounding their use, transfer disclaimers have
been approved in a number of instances. See PLR 9228003, 9135043. In some cases, taxpayers
have attempted to "save" disclaimers which were attempted under the general provisions of IRC
2518(b), but which were found to be unqualified, by arguing that such disclaimers should be
recognized under IRC 2518(c)(3). This approach generally has been unsuccessful, and one court
recently scolded:
"Section 2518(c)(3) should not be viewed as a catch-all provision to save defective or
unqualified disclaimers but an entirely new relief provision under which, after a disclaimer
has been disqualified, the would be disclaimant makes an actual written transfer to the
person who otherwise would have received the property had the disclaimer been valid under
local law. The relief of section (sic) 2518 (c)(3) was designed to eliminate the gift tax
consequences for the beneficiary who had made a disclaimer that was disqualified and who
then made an actual written transfer to another individual. Estate of Bennett v. Comm'r..

mID·
On the other hand, a recent ruling allowed an agreement not to probate a will to
qualify as a disclaimer under IRC 2518(c) (3). PLR 9228004. In this extremely lenient ruling, the
IRS reasoned that, because the taxpayer could have obtained the same result by disclaiming, and
because an agreement not to probate a will caused a transfer to occur under applicable state law
(Texas), and finally, because the agreement was executed within nine months of the date of the
decedent's death and the "disclaimant" spouse had not accepted the benefits of the disclaimed
property, the spouse was considered to have made a qualified disclaimer under IRC 2518(c)(3). It
appears that a critical factoring this ruling was a provision of stat law which held that a transfer
occurred when that will. This should be considered when evaluating the holding of this ruling.
Nevertheless, if faced with a disclaimer which is determined to be invalid under IRC 2518 (b), it
is worth analyzing whether an argument can be made that the purported disclaimer should be
qualified under IRC 2518(c)(3).

7.

-

Disclaimers by Trustees

Disclaimers by trustees have had mixed reception. In some cases, disclaimers by trustees
have been recognized. See Cleaveland v. .u....s..., 88-1 USTC ~13,766 (C.D. IlI.,1988); McClintock
v. Scahill, 530 N.E. 2d 164 (1988). In other instances, such disclaimer have not been effective,
particular when the disclaimer purports to disclaim a beneficial interest in a trust, the beneficiary
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has not executed a simultaneous disclaimer (or, at minimum, consented to the disclaimer by the
trustee), and/or the trustee is not authorized to disclaim under either state law or the operative
instrument. Estate of Bennett y. Comm'r.. supra.; Rev Rul 90-110, 1990-2 C.B. 209; Matter of
Martin, 549 N.Y. S.2d 592 (1989); In reo Witz, 406 N.Y. S.2d 671 (1978).

In a number of cases in which a trustee has attempted to disclaim a fiduciary power, it has
been held that the disclaimer was effective with respect to the disclaiming trustee, but not with
respect to successor trustees. See PLR 8729002, 8605004, 8527009. In other words, the trustee's
disclaimer was not effective to remove the disclaimed power from the trust. Thus, the disclaimed
power would be exercisable by successor trustees, even though it was no longer exercisable by the
disclaiming trustee.
If it is desirable to eliminate a fiduciary power by disclaimer (where, for example, a trustee
has the power to made distributions to children from a trust for which the marital deduction is
desired), it would be a good idea to obtain disclaimers from the beneficiaries who could benefit from
the exercise ofthe offending power in lieu of, or at least in addition to, obtaining a disclaimer from
the trustee.

8.

Conclusion

The disclaimer is a valuable planning tool. Through the effective and creative use of
disclaimer, the estate planner can accomplish a wide variety of objectives for his or her clients,
particularly when disclaimers are anticipated in the estate planning process.
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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ISSUES

r

FOR
TRUST & ESTATE LAWYERS

r

by
Sheldon G. Gilman
Louisville, Kentucky
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I. INTRODUCTION TO ISSUES.

r

1.1

r

1.I(a) Does the lawyer represent the fiduciary? Ifthe lawyer represents the fiduciary, then
does the lawyer represent the fiduciary in a fiduciary capacity or an individual (corporate) capacity?

Review of Fundamental Issue: "Who does the lawyer represent?"
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1.1(b) Does the lawyer represent the beneficiaries?
1.I(c) Does the lawyer represent the estate/trust as an entity?
I.I(d) Does the lawyer represent the beneficiaries and the fiduciary?
1.2
Confidentiality and Privilege. Ifthe fiduciary reveals to the lawyer or the lawyer discovers
in the course of the representation that the fiduciary has made a mistake, or acted in a dishonest,
fraudulent, or criminal manner, mayor must the lawyer reveal this infonnation to the beneficiaries,
or the other fiduciaries, or a court that supervises estate: administration, or does the duty of
confidentiality or the concept ofprivilege preclude such revelation or discovery?
1.3
Conflicts of Interest. To whom must the lawyer be loyal if multiple co-fiduciaries or a
predecessor and a successor fiduciary disagree, or the fiduciaries and the beneficiaries disagree, or
a fiduciary is a creditor of the entity or one of several beneficiaries whose interests conflict with
other fiduciaries or beneficiaries, and does the lawyer have a conflict of interest in the context of
such representations? What is the potential for conflict among several constituents: the spouse as
against the children (the income beneficiary as against the remainder beneficiaries and one cofiduciary against another co-fiduciary), and the children as against the one child who is active in the
business.
1.4
Competence and Loyalty to the Beneficiaries. Must the lawyer protect the beneficiaries'
interests as individuals or only indirectly as beneficiaries of the fiduciary entity that the lawyer
serves, and must the lawyer seek protective measures if, for example, a beneficiary is being
overreached by a third party or by a fiduciary, or appears to require the appointment of a guardian
or conservator to protect the beneficiary?
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1.5

Review of Questions Presented By KBA E-401.

1.5(a) Question 1: Does a lawyer's representation ofa fiduciary ofa decedent's estate or
trust expand or limit the lawyer's obligation to the fiduciary under the Rules of Professional
Conduct?
1.5(b) Question 2: Does a lawyer's representation ofa fiduciary of a decedent's trust or
estate impose on the lawyer obligations to the beneficiaries ofthe decedent's trust or estate that the
lawyer would not .have toward third parties?

1.5(c) Question 3: Is the lawyer's obligation to preserve client confidences under Rule
1.6 altered by the fact that the client is a fiduciary?
1.5(d) Question 4:
decedent's trust or estate?

-

-

-

May the lawyer for the fiduciary also represent the beneficiaries of the

2. REVIEW OF PROFESSIONAL RULES.

2.1

Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule.
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client ifthe representation ofthat client will
be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client ifthe representation ofthat client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) The client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients inasingle matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved.

2.2

Comments To Rule 1.7.

-

-

Other Conflict Situations

[10] Conflicts ofinterest in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be
difficult to assess. Relevant factors in determining whether there is potential for
adverse effect include the duration and intimacy ofthe lawyer's relationship with the
client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood
that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict
if it does arise. The question is often one of proximity and degree.

-
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[11 ] For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation
whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common
representation is pennissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even
though there is some difference of interest among them.
[12] Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate
administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family
members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a
conflict ofinterest may arise. In estate administration the identity ofthe client may
be unclear under the law ofa particularjurisdiction. Under one view, the client is
the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its
beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the relationship to the parties involved
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2.3
Requirement of"Consent and Consultation." The Rules ofProfessional Conduct define
"consult" or "consultation" as denoting "communication of infonnation reasonably sufficient to
pennit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question." A lawyer is obligated to
disclose to the client the existence ofthe conflict, that multiple representation is sought, then disclose
the implications thereof, including its risks and advantages. In this regard pages 114 through 118
of the American Bar Association's text, Annotated Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct, Third
Edition, (1996) contains numerous citations and commentary on this issue of client "consultation,"
and is recommended reading for a further understanding ofthe requirements for and the meaning of
"consultation." All communications between a lawyer and multiple clients regarding questions of
conflict should be in writing, and the client's consent should be evidenced in writing.

2.4

Rule 1.2: Scope of Representation.
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision concerning the objectives of
representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and shall consult with the client
as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decision whether to accept an offer ofsettlement of a matter. In a criminal case, the
lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to
a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
(b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation
appointment, does not constitute an endorsement ofthe client's political, economic,
social or moral views or activities.
(c) A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the client
consents after consultation.
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal orfraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal
consequences ofany proposed course ofconduct with a client and may counselor
assist a client to meke a goodfaith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning
or application ofthe law.
(e) When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance notpermitted by the
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law, the lawyer shall inform the client
regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct.

I
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2.5

-

Comment to Rule 1.2.
[8] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special
obligations ,in dealings with a beneficiary.

2.6

Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information.
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal infonnation relating to representation ofa client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph
(b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such infonnation to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) To prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
hann; or
(2) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim againstthe lawyer based upon conduct in which
the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding
concerning the lawyer's representation ofthe client; or
(3) To comply with other law or a court order.

2.7

Comments to Rule 1.6.
[1] The lawyer is part ofajudicial system charged with upholding the law.
One ofthe lawyer's functions is to advise clients so that they avoid any violation of
the law in the proper exercise of their rights.
[2] The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate
confidential infonnation ofthe client not only facilitates the full development offacts
essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages people to seek
early legal assistance.
[3] Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to detennine
what their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed to be
legal and correct. The common law recognizes that the client's confidences must be
protected from disclosure. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all
clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.
[4] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyerrelationship is that the lawyer
maintain confidentiality of infonnation relating to the representation. The client is
thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to
embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.
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[5] The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of
law, the attomey-client privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in the
law ofevidence and the rule ofconfidentiality established in professional ethics. The
attomey-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer
may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a
client. The rule ofclient-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those
where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The
confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the
client but also to all information relating to the representatio~ whatever its source.
A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope.
Disclosure Adverse to Client
[9] The confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming
privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends
serious harm to another person. However, to the extent a lawyer is required or
permitted to disclose a client's purposes, the client will be inhibited from revealing
facts which would enable the lawyer to counsel against a wrongful course ofaction.
The public is better protected if full and open communication by the client is
encouraged than if it is inhibited.
[10] Several situations must be distinguished.
[11] First, the lawyer may not counselor assist a client in conduct that is
criminal or fraudulent. See Rule I.2(d). Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under Rule
3.3(a)(4) not to use false evidence. This duty is essentially a special instance of the
duty prescribed in Rule I.2(d) to avoid assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent
conduct.
[12] Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct
by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer has not
violated Rule I.2(d), because to "counselor assist" criminal or fraudulent conduct
requires knowing that the conduct is of that character.
[14] The lawyer's exercise ofdiscretion requires consideration ofsuch factors
as the nature ofthe lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be
injured by the client, the lawyer'S own involvement in the transaction and factors that
may extenuate the conduct in question. Where practical, the lawyer should seek to
persuade the client to take suitable action. In any case~ a disclosure adverse to the
client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary
to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by
paragraph (b)(I) does not violate this Rule.
Withdrawal
[15] Ifthe lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering
a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as stated in
Rule l.I6(a)(l).
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[16] After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making
disclosure of the clients' confidences, except as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6.
Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1. 16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving
notice ofthe fact ofwithdrawal, and upon withdrawal the lawyer may also withdraw
or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like.

3. REVIEW OF STATE CHOICES.

3.1

Representation of Fiduciary. Florida Law.
[C]ounsel for the personal representative ofan estate owesfiduciary duties not only
to the personal representative but also to the beneficiaries ofthe estate.... This does
not mean, however, that counsel and the beneficiaries occupy an attorney-client
relationship. They do not. "In Florida, the personal representative is the client rather
than the estate or the beneficiaries." Rule 4-1.7, Rules Regulating the Florida Bar
(comment). It follows that counsel does not generate a conflict of interest in
representing the personal representative in a matter simply because one or more of
the beneficiaries takes a position adverse to that of the personal representative. A
contrary position would raise havoc with the orderly administration of decedents'
estates, not to mention the additional attorney's fees that would be generated. I

3.2
Representation of Estate or Trust. In Delaware, North Carolina, New York and
Washington it appears that the lawyer for the fiduciary represents the fiduciary entity and notjust
the fiduciary.2
3.3
Recommendation for Action. In Representations Involving Fiduciary Entities: Who is the
Client?, 62 Fordham Law Review 1319 (1994), Jeffrey N. Pennell reviews the complexity of the
problem, and makes the following comments:
Following the approach in Florida, other states should be encouraged to
establish, by express amendment to their Rules or by a Comment explaining them,
who the attorney represents in the absence of a representation agreement to the
contrary. In establishing this rule it is necessary and appropriate to distinguish
between an attorney's duties to non-clients (such as beneficiaries under most of the
alternative visions ofthe entity representation situation) and to restrict the impetus
to expand the concept of "derivative" duties by adopting a rule that provides

-

...

....

-

I In re Estate o/Gory, 570 So.2d 1381, 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added)
(order disqualifying personal representative's lawyers in dispute over personal representative's
compensation reversed).

2 Riggs National Bankv. Zimmmer, 355 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1976); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n,
Ethics Ope 512 (1979},Jenkins v. Wheeler, 69 N.C. App. 140, review denied, 311 N.C. 758 (1984);
In re Vetter, 711 P.2d 284, 289 (Wash. 1985);
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protection to beneficiaries without creating untenable or undefinable obligations of
the attorney. Among the available options, regarding the beneficiaries as the
attorney's client should be rejected because the beneficiaries do not engage the
attorney, the beneficiaries almost always have conflicting interests (because some are
current and others are future interest holders), and in some cases the attorney may not
know the wishes or even the identity of the various beneficiaries. Casting the
attorney in the role of a watchdog over the fiduciary to protect the interests of
beneficiaries also is untenable and subverts the attorney-client relation, regardless of
who the client is deemed to be. Any rule that creates an obligation on an attorney to
police a fiduciary should be rejected. (At page 1344).
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4. DUTIES TO BENEFICIARIES.
4.1

Review Rule 1.2.

4.2
Communications with Beneficiary. The lawyer should be careful not to allow the
beneficiary to believe that the lawyer represents the beneficiary's interests. It is not uncommon for
the beneficiary ofan estate or trust to believe that the fiduciary's lawyer represents the estate or trust
as an entity and thus, to some extent, the beneficiary's interests. If the lawyer representing the
fiduciary believes that this has occurred, the lawyer should quickly correct the beneficiary's
misperceptions and clearly advise the beneficiary that the lawyer only represents the fiduciary. The
lawyer should avoid making comments, written or oral, which give the beneficiary a false sense of
security. The lawyer should not suggest that the allowance of the fiduciary account is merely
"routine," lest the beneficiary fail to scrutinize the account carefully on the basis of this
representation.
5. ABA FORMAL OPINION 94-380 & KBA E-401.

5.1

Review of Majority Rule - Lawyer Represents Fiduciary.

5.2

Review ofKBA Opinion Citing ABA Opinion.
6. CONCLUSION OF KBA OPINION.

;

,.
If

r

6.1

Review of Five Points.

6.1(a) In representing a fiduciary the lawyer's client relationship is with the fiduciary and
not with the trust or estate, nor with the beneficiaries of a trust or estate.
6.1(b) The fact that a fiduciary has obligations to the beneficiaries ofthe trust or estate does
not in itself either expand or limit the lawyer's obligations to the fiduciary under the Rules of
Professional Conduct, nor impose on the lawyer obligations toward the beneficiaries that the lawyer
would not have toward other third parties.

,..
I

r
,
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6.I(c) The lawyer's obligation to preserve client's confidences under Rule 1.6 is not altered
by the circumstance that the client is a fiduciary.
6.I(d) A lawyer has a duty to advise multiple parties who are involved with a decedent's
estate or trust regarding the identity ofthe lawyer's client, and the lawyer's obligations to that client.
A lawyer should not imply that the lawyer represents the estate or trust or the beneficiaries of the
estate or trust because ofthe probability ofconfusion. Further, in order to avoid such confusion, a
lawyer should not use the term "lawyer for the estate" or the term "lawyer for the trust" on
documents or correspondence or in other dealings with the fiduciary or the beneficiaries.
6.I(e) A lawyer may represent the fiduciary of a decedent's estate or a trust and the
beneficiaries of an estate or trust if the lawyer obtains the consent of the multiple clients, and
explains the limitations on the lawyer's actions in the event a conflict arises, and the consequences
to the clients ifa conflict occurs. Further, a lawyer may obtain the consent of multiple clients only
after appropriate consultation with the multiple clients at the time of the commencement of the
representation.
6.2

..

-

-

Recommendations.

-

6.2(a) Get It In Writing
6.2(b) You Do Not Represent Trusts - Estates

6.2(c) Use The Hot Line

7. PROCESS OF OPINION.
7.1
Recognition of Problem - Review By Committee - Through Committee - Board of
Governors.

7.2

-

Decision for Kentucky: Lawyers Representing Fiduciaries or Beneficiaries or Both.
8. MISCELLANEOUS ETHICAL ISSUES FOR THE ESTATE PLANNER.

8.1

Joint Representation of Spouses

8.2

Gifts to Lawyers

8.3

Will Provision Requiring Appointment as Fiduciary's Lawyer

8.4

Lawyer Representation of Fiduciary & Beneficiaries

8.S

Lawyer Selling Life Insurance

-

-

-

-
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8.6

Lawyer Serving as Fiduciary

8.7

Lawyer Disclosure of Information After Client's Death

9. QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW.
Partially disinherited (disgruntled) adult child wants to know the details of preparation of his
mother's trust/will. His mother (my client) died recently. I suspect that he plans to file a will contest
pr action to rescind the trust. I am not representing anyone/any estate at this time, so there is no
apparent conflict of interest. I drafted mother's will/trust 18 months ago.

I

#1

Is there any ethical reason why I should or should not share with him the events
surrounding preparation of mother's documents, as well as letters, drafts and notes
in my file?

#2

Do lowe the mother a continuing duty of confidentiality after her death?

r

#3

Should I tell the disgruntled child that I will share information with him if he gives
me written consent from all other legatees?

r

#4

If the child attempts to obtain a court order to have me disclose the information do
I have an affirmative obligation to oppose the child's efforts?

rt

r
r

,.,
r

r
r
,

,.

F-9

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

F -10

-

APPENDIX

r
r

r

r
rI

r

r
r

r
r

r,..
I

r
r

r
r
r
I

KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINION
E-401
The Committee has been asked to address the appUcabillty of the Kentucky
Rules of Professional-Conduct·with respect to a lawyer's representation of the
fiduciary of a decedent's estate or trust. and the lawyer's responsibillties to the
beneficiaries of estates and trusts. In order to provide the requested advice,
explain the Committee's position on these issues. and to give insight into the
appUcable Rules of Professional Conduct. the fonowing questions are presented
for response and discussion.

Question 1: Does a lawyer·s representation of a fiduciary of a decedent's estate
or trust expand or limit the lawyer·s obUgation to the fiduciary under the Rules
of Professional Conduct?
Answer: No.
Question 2: Does a lawyer's representation of a fiduciary of a decedent's trust or
estate impose on the lawyer obUgations to the beneficiaries of the decedent·s
trust or estate that the lawyer would not have toward third parties?

Answer: No.
Question 3: Is the lawyer·s obUgation to preserve cUent confidences under Rule
1.6 altered by the fact that the cUent is a fiduciary?

Answer: No.
Question 4: May the lawyer for the fiduciary also represent the beneficiaries of
the decedent's trust or estate?
Answer: Qualified Yes.
References:
ABA Formal Op. 94-380 (1994); Privilege and ConfidentiaUty Issues When a
Lawyer Represents a Fiduciary. 30 Real Property. Probate and Trust Journal 541
(1996); ACTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 28
Real Property. Probate and Trust Journal 865 (1994); Developments Regarding
the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Administration Lawyer: The Effect
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 26 Real Property. Probate and Trust
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Journal 1 (1991); When Loyalties Collide: Courts Resolve Conmcting Duties, 135
Trusts lit Estates 22 (1996); Professional Responsiblllty Issues Keep Practitioners
on Their Toes, 135 Trusts lit Estates 22 (1996); and The Fiduciary, His Counsel
And The Attorney - Client Privilege, 136 Trusts lit Estates 29 (1997); lItsect;73,
Duty to Certain Non-Clients, Restatement, The Law Governing Lawyers.
OPINION
From time to time Kentucky lawyers have requested advice from the Committee
regarding a lawyer·s J:eSPODStbmtles in the context of the administration of
trusts and estates. The primary problem in answering such questions arises from
the fundamental question: Whom does the lawyer represent? Does the lawyer
represent the beneficiaries of the estate or trust; does the lawyer represent the
estate or trust entity or does the lawyer represent the fiduciary? The complexity
of this problem is acknowledged in Comment 12 to Rule 1.7, which states:
ConOId questions may also arise in estate planning and estate
administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wU1s for
several famUy members, such as husband and wife, and, depending
upon the circumstances, a conOId of interest may arise. In estate
administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the
law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the
fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust,
including its beneflclarles. The lawyer should make clear the
relationship to the parties involved.

By issuing this Oplnlon it is the Committee's intent to clarify a Kentucky
lawyer's obUgations under the Rules of Professional Conduct. The examination
of these issues must focus on Rule 1.7, conmct of Interest: General Rule, and
the problems generated by a lawyer's multiple representation of cUents. The
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, hereafter referred to as "ACTEC,"
adopted Commentaries to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in October
1993, and their Commentaries and the Reporter's Notes on the ACTEC
Commentaries are helpful to this analYSis. The Reporter's Notes contained the
following statements:
Lawyer for Fiduciary.
Under the majority view, a lawyer who represents a fiduciary ••• stands in
a lawyer-client relationship with the fiduciary and not with respect to
the fiduciary estate or the beneficlarles.
Duties to Beneficiaries.
The lawyer who represents a fiduciary generally Is not usually considered
also to represent the beneflclarles. However, most courts have concluded that
the lawyer owes some duties to them. Some courts subject the lawyer to
the duties because the beneficiaries are characterized as the lawyer's
']oint," "derivative" or "secondary" clients. Other courts do so because
the lawyer stands in a fiduciary relationship with respect to the fiduciary,
who, in turn, owes fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, The duties, commonly
called "fiduciary duties," arise largely because of the nature of the representation
and the relative positions of the lawyer, fiduciary, and beneficiaries. However,
note that the existence and nature of the duties may be affected by the nature
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and extent of the representation that a lawyer provides to a fiduciary. Thus,
a lawyer who represents a fiduciary Indlvidually regardlng a fiduciary estate
may owe few, If any, duties to the beneficlarles apart from the duties that the
lawyer owes to other noncUents.

In addition to the Reporter's Notes, this Committee finds the following
comments from the ACTEC Commentaries on Model Rule 1.7 instructive for
purposes of clarifying the lawyer's obUgations to the fiduciary, to the
beneficiaries of an estate or trust, and the problems of multiple representation.

General Nonadversarr Character of Estates and Trusts Practice: Representation
of Multiple Clients. It Is often appropriate for a lawyer to
represent more than one member of the same family In connection
with their estate plans, more than one beneficiary with common
Interests In an estate or trust admlnlstratlon matter..••
ID some Instances the cUents may actually be better served by such a
representation, which can result In more economical and better
coordinated estate plans prepared by counsel who has a better overall
understandlng of all of the relevant famUy and property considerations.
.•. Multiple representation Is also generally appropriate because the
Interests of the cUents In cooperation, Includlng obtalnlng cost effective
representation and achieving common obJectives, often clearly
predominate over their limited inconsistent Interests•.••
Disclosures to Multiple Clients.
Before, or wlthln a reasonable time after, commencing the representation,
a lawyer who Is consulted by multiple parties with related Interests should
discuss with them the implications of a Joint representation (or a separate
representation If the lawyer believes that mode of representation to be
more appropriate and separate representation Is permissible under the
applicable local rules). ID particular, the prospective cUents and the lawyer
should discuss the extent to which material information Imparted by either
cUent would be shared with the other and the posslbWty that the lawyer
would be required to withdraw If a conflict In their Interests developed to
the degree that the lawyer could not effectively represent both of them.
The information may be best understood by the cUents If it Is discussed
with them In person and also provided to them In written form, as In an
engagement letter or brochure.

This Committee adopts the ACTEC Commentaries because the Commentaries
properly set forth a lawyer's ethical obUgations. Further, this Committee agrees
with ABA Formal Opinion 94-380, and adopts the majority view; that is, that a
lawyer who represents a fiduciary does not also represent the beneficiaries. We
reject the view that a lawyer who represents a fiduciary also owes fiduciary
obUgations to the beneficiaries that in some circumstances will override
obUgatioDS otherwise owed by the lawyer to the fiduciary, such as the obligation
of confidentiality. We also reject the view that when a lawyer represents a
fiduciary in a trust or estate matter, the cUent is not the fiduciary, but is the
trust estate. We adopt the following comments made in the ABA's Formal
Opinion:

r

r
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When the fiduciary Is the lawyer's cBent aD of the Model Rules prescribing
a lawyer's duties to a cUent apply. The scope of the lawyer's representation
is deftned by and Umlted by Model Rule 1.2. The lawyer must dWgently
represent the fiduciary, see Model Rule 1.3, preserve In conftdence
communications between the lawyer and the fiduciary, see Model Rule 4.1(a).
The fact that the fiduciary cUent has obUgations toward the beneficiaries
does not impose paraDel obligations on the lawyer, or otherwise expand or
supersede the lawyer's responsiblUties under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. A lawyer's duty of conftdentlallty to a cUent is
not lessened by the fact that the cIlent Is·a fiduciary. Although the Model
Rules prohibit the lawyer from actively participating in crlmlnal or
fraudulent activity or active concealment of a cUent's wrongdoing, they
do not authorize the lawyer to breach conftdences to prevent such wrongdoing.

-

-

-

The ABA's Opinion, in Footnote 6, included the following important caveats:
6. The Model Rules impose a number of Umitations on a lawyer representing
a fiduciary. For example, a lawyer may not participate in a breach of
fiduciary duty by the fiduciary that Involves fraud or crlmlnal activity
because the lawyer's conduct Is Umlted by Model Rule 1.2(d), which provides
that a lawyer may not actively participate in a cUent's criminal or fraudulent
activity. ·ThIs rule appBes to aD lawyers, not just those representing
fiduciaries. Lawyers are also prohibited from actively concealing cUent
breaches of fiduciary duty, or actively assisting In such concealment, by
Model Rules 4.1(a) (a lawyer shaD not Be to third parties) and 3.3(a)(1) and (2)
(a lawyer shaD not Be to or conceallnformation from a tribunal).
If a lawyer knows that a breach of flduciary duty has occurred, and that
an accounting Is misleading In that it hides wrongdoing committed by the
flduciary, the lawyer Is expressly prohibited by Model Rule 3.3(a) from
presenting the accounting to the court. Further, the lawyer Is prohibited by
Model Rule 4.1(a) from representing to the beneficiaries that a false
accounting Is accurate. These rules apply to a lawyer with a fiduciary cUent
to the same eztent as, but no farther than, they apply In any other
lawyer/tribunal/third. party scenario.
Continuing in the text of the Opinion, the ABA Ethics Committee then made the
following comments:
Although a lawyer may not disclose conftdences of the fiduciary, if the
flduciary insists on continuing a C01D'Se of fraudulent or criminal conduct,
the lawyer may be required to terminate the representation because the
lawyer's services wU1 be involved In that conduct, so as to invoke Rule 1.16(a)(1),
or may have the option of a voluntary withdrawal under Rule 1.16(b)(1).
If either of these provisloDB of Rule 1.16 appBes, this wU1 be not because the
cUent is a fiduciary, but because the cIlent Is acting In the manner described
by the Rule. The cIlent'. status Is irrelevant.
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Based upon the instructive comments of the ACTEC Commentaries and the ABA
Formal Opinion. thls Committee concludes with the fonowing advice for
Kentucky lawyers.
1. In representing a fiduciary the lawyer's client relationshlp is with the
fiduciary and not with the trust or estate. nor with the beneficiaries of a
trust or estate.

2. The fact that a fiduciary has obligations to the beneficiaries of the tmst
or estate does not in itself either expand or llmlt the lawyer's obligations
to the fiduciary under the Rules of Professional Conduct. nor impose on
the lawyer obligations toward the beneficiaries that the lawyer would not
have toward other third parties.
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3. The lawyer's obligation to preserve client's confidences under Rule 1.6
is not altered by the circumstance that the client is a fiduciary.
4. A lawyer has a duty to advise multiple parties who are involved with a
decedent's estate or trust regarding the identity of the lawyer's client, and
the lawyer's obligations to that client. A lawyer should not imply that the
lawyer represents the estate or trust or the beneficiaries of the estate or
tmst because of the probability of confusion. Further, in order to avoid
such confusion. a lawyer should not use the term "lawyer for the estate" or
the term '1awyer for the tmst" on documents or correspondence or in
other dealings with the fiduciary or the beneficiaries.
5. A lawyer may represent the fiduciary of a decedent's estate or a tmst
and the beneficiaries of an estate or trust if the lawyer obtains the consent
of the multiple clients. and explains the llmltations on the lawyer's
actions in the event a conmct arises. and the consequences to the clients
if a conmct occurs. Further. a lawyer may obtain the consent of multiple
clients only after appropriate consultation with the multiple clients at the
time of the commencement of the representation.
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As we approach the beginning of the 21th 'Century, we are finding
quite frequently that the largest single asset in our clients'
estates are the total of their qualified plan and IRA accounts.
These assets have very unique tax implications and are extremely
hard to deal with in adopting practical estate planning for our
clients. We will address some of these problems and choices,
inclUding the new Roth IRA and other provisions of the 1997 Tax
Reform Act, that directly affect this area in my presentation and
this outline. The interplay of the various income, excise and
transfer taxes creates a bewildering array of possibilities, some
of which without careful planning, can be catastrophic.
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GENERAL COMMENTS

II

ROLLOVERS
A.

A participant in a qualified retirement plan may avoid current
taxation on a distribution by rolling the distribution over
into another qualified retirement plan or into an individual
retirement plan.

B.

There are five types of rollovers:

r
r

r

r

1.

Amounts may be

2.

Amounts may be transferred from a qualified retirement
plan to an IRA.

3.

A rollover from one qualified retirement plan to another.

4.

A rollover to a qualified retirement plan from an IRA if
all amounts in the IRA are attributable to an earlier
rollover contribution from a qualified retirement plan.

5.

A Roth IRA can only be rolled over to another Roth IRA.

r1
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from one IRA to another.
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C.

An eligible rollover distribution is subject to automatic 20
percent withholding unless the distribution is transferred by
a direct rollover to an eligible retirement plan that permits
the acceptance of rollover distributions. A direct rollover
is an eligible rollover distribution that is paid directly to
an eligible retirement plan for the benefit of the distributee
(i.e., the distribution is made in the form of a direct
trustee-to-trustee transfer from a qualified retirement plan
to the eligible retirement plan). § 401(a) (31); Reg. §
1.401(a) (31)-1.

D.

with regard to a rollover from a qualified retirement plan to
an IRA, the payout must be transferred into one or more IRAs
within 60 days after receipt. It is not necessary, however,
to transfer the entire amount into the IRA; but the portion
not rolled over is taxed as ordinary income in the year
received. However, unless the distribution is transferred by
a direct rollover to the IRA, the distribution is SUbject to
automatic 20 percent withholding. Reg. § 1.402(c)-2. In
addition, don't buy stock or other property with any cash
distribution without first putting the cash back into the
rollover IRA. Reinvesting cash distributions from IRA and
Keogh accounts into other property before depositing the
property into a rollover IRA, even within the 60 day rollover
period, does not qualify as a rollover contribution and
instead, SUbjects the taxpayer to tax on the entire amount of
distribution. Lemishow v. Comr 110 TC IN011 (1998).

E.

The spouse of an employee who receives an eligible rollover
distribution from a qualified retirement plan or is the
beneficiary of an IRA at the death of the employee, is
permitted to rollover all or part of the distribution to an
IRA of his or her own.
1.

IRS has also ruled that, if the deceased spouse s
qualified retirement plan benefits are paid to a trust
and the trust distributes the benefits to the surviving
spouse, the surviving spouse may rollover the
distribution. PLRs 9633-43, 9633042, 9533042, 9509028
and 9234032.

-

-

4

2.

If the deceased spouse's qualified retirement plan
benefits are paid to the decedent's estate and the
surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary of the
decedent's residuary estate, IRS has ruled that the
surviving spouse may rollover the distribution to an
IRA. PLRs 9402023, 9351041, 9229022 and 9138067.

3.

The surviving spouse was permitted to rollover the
benefit to an IRA when the deceased spouse named a trust
as the beneficiary of the death benefit payable from a
qualified retirement plan, the trust beneficiaries
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disclaimed the benefit, and, as a result of the
disclaimer, the benefit was paid to the surviving
spouse. PLRs 9450041 and 9247026.
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5.

Generally, a rollover by the surviving spouse is
permitted where there is no discretion on the part of
someone other than the surviving spouse. PLRs 9721028,
9710034, 9703036, 9626049, 9623064, 9623056 and 9620038.

An IRA acquired by a beneficiary upon the death of a nonspouse
is an inherited IRA and does not qualify for rollover
treatment.

G.

The following distributions are not eligible as rollovers to
an IRA:
(Reg. 1.402(c)-2 [Q & A 4}

r
III

The spouse may establish an IRA rollover account even if
the spouse would not be eligible to establish a regular
IRA. However, the surviving spouse may not rollover the
distribution to another qualified retirement plan or from
the rollover IRA to another qualified retirement plan in
which the spouse is a participant. § 402(c) (9).

F.

r

r

4.

1.

ESOP Dividends. Deductible dividends paid to
participants by an ESOP.

2.

Life insurance policies.

3.

A participant's loan that is treated as a distribution is
therefore not eligible for rollover.
(Reg. 1.402(c)-2 {Q
& A 4(d)}.

LUMP SUM DISTRIBUTIONS
A.

A lump-sum distribution is a distribution from a qualified
retirement plan made within one taxable year of the recipient,
represents the balance to the credit of the employee and is
payable:
1.

On account of the employee's death;

2.

On or after the attainment of age 59-1/2 by the employee;

3.

On account of separation from service in the case of a
common-law employee; or

4.

On account of disability in the case of a self-employed
individual.
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B.

"One taxable year" will usually be the calendar year.

c.

To satisfy the requirement that the distribution be the
"balance to the credit" of the employee, all pension plans are
aggregated and all profit sharing plans are aggregated. An
employee may receive a lump-sum distribution. from a pension
plan in one year and a lump-sum distribution from a profit
sharing plan in a later year. However, special income
averaging can only be elected one time. A money purchase
pension plan is aggregated with a defined benefit pension
plan.

D.

E.

F.

The taxable amount of a lump-sum distribution is the total
distribution reduced by the employee's basis, unrealized
appreciation on employer securities (unless an election is
made to include such unrealized appreciation) and accumulated
deductible employee contributions plus income attributable to
such contributions.
The employee may elect five-year income averaging if the
employee had five years of participation in the plan prior to
the year in which the distribution is made. Since this does
not include the year of distribution, if the distribution is
received in 1998, the employee must have commenced
participation in the plan in 1993 or earlier. In order for
five-year averaging to apply, the lump-sum distribution must
be received after the employee has attained age 59-1/2.

...

...

1.

To calculate the five-year averaging tax, a tax is
computed on one-fifth of the total taxable amount after
reduction for the minimum distribution allowance using
the single taxpayer rate table and then such amount is
mUltiplied by five.

-

2.

Five-year income averaging can be elected only ence, and
the election must apply to all lump-sum distributions
received during the same taxable year. § 402(d) (4) (B)
(ii); Prop. Reg. § 1.402(e)-3(a).
.

-

3.

Five-year income aver~gi~g are repealed for taxable years
beginning on or after January 1, 2000. SBA'96, Act §§
1401(a), 1401(b)(2).

Prior to the enactment of Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA'86),
other favorable income tax elections were available with
regard to the receipt of a lump-sum distribution. These
elections are SUbject to transition rules.
1.

If the employee was age 50 on January 1, 1986, the
recipient may elect ten-year averaging in lieu of
five-year averaging.
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2.

In calculating the ten-year averaging tax on a lump-sum
distribution, the 1986 tax rates are used. Therefore,
ten-year income averaging is not always more favorable
than five-year income averaging.

3.

Based upon the tax rates in effect for 1998, ten-year
averaging is more favorable than five-year averaging
until the adjusted taxable amount exceeds approximately
$350,000. Above that amount, five-year averaging is more
favorable.

4.

Even though five-year income averaging will be repealed
in 2000, ten-year income averaging will remain available
for those individuals who are over age 62 years of age in
1998.

5.

If the employee was age 50 on January 1, 1986, and
commenced participation in the plan prior to 1974, then a
portion of the distribution may be taxed as long-term
capital gain at the old 20 percent capital gain rate and
not the current rate. TRA'86, Act § 1122(h) (3). with
the recent changes to the capital gain tax rates under
the TRA'97 § 311, this transition rule is no longer
beneficial. TRA'97, Act §311.

r
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G.

IV

The special tax treatment of a lump-sum distribution is not
available to IRA's or if any part of the distribution is
rolled over either to another qualified retirement plan or an
individual retirement plan.

REPEAL OF THE EXCESS DISTRIBUTION AND EXCESS ACCUMULATION TAXES
A.

Even though TRA'97 repealed the excess distribution and excess
accumulation taxes retroactive to January 1, 1997, T~'97, Act
§ 1073, there are some tax refund opportunities still
available in this area:
1.

A 15 percent excise tax was imposed on excess
distributions made after 1986 from qualified retirement
plans and IRAs.

2.

An individual whose total benefits in all qualified
employer plans and individual retirement plans on August
1, 1986 had a value in excess of $562,500 was eligible to
elect a special grandfather rule.

3.

Under the discretionary method, ten percent of the total
distributions that the individual received during a
calendar year was treated as a recovery of the
grandfather amount. The individual was permitted to
elect to accelerate the rate of recovery from ten percent

r

r
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to 100 percent of the total aggregate distributions
received during a calendar year commencing with any
calendar year (acceleration election).
4.

5.

To have made this special grandfather election, an
individual had to attach Form 5329 to the individual's
1987 or 1988 federal income tax return, which return had
to be timely filed. In addition to electing the special
grandfather rule, the individual was required to set
forth the initial grandfather amount and also elect one
of the two alternative methods of recovery. In addition,
a copy of such Form 5329 was also required to be filed
with Schedule S of Form 706 in the event of the
individual's death.

-

The acceleration election was also made on Form 5329 and
can be made or revoked on a timely filed amended return.
However, the acceleration election may not be made after
the individual's death other than with his final income
tax return or with a return for a prior year which was
not filed before the individual's death. The
acceleration election may not be made on an amended
return after the individual's death for a year for which
a return was filed before the date of death.

-

Example of possible refund: - Let us assume that, in
1995, P received distributions of $200,000, elected not
to make an acceleration election, and paid the excess
distribution tax of $7,500 [15% x ($200,000 $150,000)]. Further assuming that P is still alive, P
can now make the acceleration election on an amended
return for 1995 and receive a refund of the $7,500.
B.

-

Taxable excess accumulation for estate tax purposes:
1.

The estate tax imposed by Chapter 11 with respect to the
estate of a decedent was increased by an amount equal to
15 percent of the decedent's excess accumulation. A
decedent's excess accumulation was the excess of the
aggregate value of th~ d~cedent's interests in al~
qualified employer plans and individual retirement plans
(decedent's aggregate interest) as of the date of deaths
over an amount equal to the present value of a
hypothetical life annuity.

2.

The excess accumulation tax was added to the Code by TRA
'86 but was amended by TAMRA to permit a spousal
election. If the surviving spouse was the beneficiary of
all of the decedent's retirement accumulations (qualified
employer plans, individual retirement plan, etc.), the
surviving spouse was permitted to elect to have such
interests and any retirement distribution attributable to
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such interests treated as those of the surviving spouse.
S 4980A(d) (5) (A).
3.

r
r

Example of possible refund: - Let us assume that P died
in 1995 with a small excess accumulation. Even though
P's surviving spouse was the beneficiary of all of P's
retirement accumulation, the spousal election was not
made, and P's estate paid the excess accumulation tax.
The spousal election can now be made on an amended estate
tax return and the excess accumulation tax recovered.

r
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ROTH IRA
A.

For taxable years beginning after 1997, TRA'97 creates a new
nondeductible IRA called the Roth IRA. The income and
appreciation inside the Roth IRA is not taxable upon a
qualified distribution, if made after five years of Roth IRA
participation. However, a Roth IRA, like all other IRA's, is
taxable for Federal estate tax purposes.

B.

Qualified distributions from a Roth IRA are not included in
the taxpayer's gross income and are not SUbject to the
additional 10% early withdrawal tax. To be a qualified
distribution, the distribution must satisfy the five-year
holding period and must meet one of four requirements, which
are:

r
r
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The spousal election was made on Form 706 filed on behalf
of the decedent's estate.

C.

1.

made on or after the date on which individual attains age
59-1/2; or

2.

made to a beneficiary (or the individual's estate) on or
after the individual's death; or

3.

attributable to the individual being disabled; or

4.

a distribution to pay for; "qualified first-time h.omebuyer
expenses.

Roth IRA's are SUbject to income limits. The maximum yearly
contribution that can be made to an IRA is phased out for
single taxpayers with adjusted gross income (AGI) between
$95,000 and $110,000 and for joint filers with AGI between
$150,000 and $160,000.
(Code section 408A(6) (3).

r
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D.

Taxpayer and his or her spouse may contribute a maximum of
$2,000 each per year to all IRA's (deductible, non-deductible
and Roth IRA's). The $2,000 annual limit does not include
rollover contributions. Excess contributions to a Roth IRA
are sUbject to a 6% tax under Code Sec 4973). Roth IRA
contributions are not deductible for Federal income tax
purposes.

E.

Distribution from one Roth IRA may only be rolled over
tax-free to another Roth IRA.

F.

There is no rule requiring any distribution to a Roth IRA
beneficiary before his or her death.

G.

Commencing in 1998, amounts distributed from an IRA may only
be rolled over to a Roth IRA; or, alternatively, an IRA may be
converted into a Roth IRA. However, income taxes on the
distribution or conversion will have to be paid. Qualified
retirement plan distributions, even eligible rollover
distributions, could not be rolled over to a Roth IRA.
Therefore, you will have to rollover the qualified plan
benefits to an IRA first, then rollover the regular IRA to a
Roth IRA. § 408A, as added by TRA'97, Act § 302.
Example: In 1998, F rolls over a $60,000 IRA distribution to
a Roth IRA. The amount of $15,000 will be includible in F's
gross income in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001.
However, the ability to rollover or convert an IRA into a
Roth IRA is not available to an individual or joint return
taxpayer whose adjusted gross income (determined before any
amount includible in income as a result of the rollover or
conversion) exceeds $100,000. (Code Sec 408A(c) (3) (B)(8). If
the taxpayer is a married individual, filing a separate
return, then no rollover is allowed regardless of how low the
adjusted gross income is. During 1998 only, if an IRA is
rolled over or converted into a Roth IRA, the amount otherwise
includible in gross income due to the IRA distribution or
conversion is includible in gross income ratably over a
four-taxable-year period beginning with the taxable y~ar in
which the distribution or conversion is made. After 1998, the
entire IRA rollover or conversion will be includible in gross
income in the year of the distribution or conversion.

H..

You can contribute to a Roth IRA even if you are over 70-1/2
years old. However, contributions can only be made if the
taxpayer has employment income and his or her adjusted gross
income is below the limits discussed above.

-

-

-

-

-

-
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VI

The deadline for a contribution to a Roth IRA (like a
deductible IRA) is the due date for filing the individual's
tax return for the year (without regard to extensions). Code
Sec 408A(c) (7). Further, the 5-year holding period begins to
run with the tax year to which the contribution relates, not
the year in which the contribution is actually made.

PREMATURE DISTRIBUTIONS
A.

A ten percent additional tax is imposed on withdrawals from an
IRA or from a qualified retirement plan before attainment of
age 59-1/2.
1.

The most noted exceptions to this penalty tax are
distributions prior to age 59-1/2 made because of the
death or disability of the IRA account holder or
qualified retirement plan participant.

2.

There are a number of other exceptions to the imposition
of this penalty tax.

r
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3.

a.

One of those exceptions relates to distributions of
sUbstantially equal periodic payments over the life
or life expectancy of the IRA account holder or plan
participant or over the joint lives or joint life
expectancies of the IRA account holder or plan
participant and his or her beneficiary.

b.

For this exception to apply to distributions from a
qualified retirement plan, the plan participant must
have terminated employment.

c.

This termination-of-employment requirement, however,
does not apply to distributions from the IRA. §
72(t).

If the payment method changes before the later of five
years after payments commence or attainment of age
59-1/2, there is a ten percent recapture tax -- the ten
percent premature penalty tax is applied retroac~ively to
payments that were previously exempt. An individual who
has multiple IRAs can use the equal payment exception for
one IRA without having to take distributions from any
other IRA. § 72(t)(4); PLRs 9243054,9050030 and
8946045.

r
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REQUIRED BEGINNING DATE
A.

. B.

VIII

The required beginning date is the date on which periodic
payments have to be paid to the qualified plan recipient or
IRA owner. The required beginning date is normally April 1
immediately following the year in which the participant or IRA
owner reaches age 70-1/2.
The exception is if the participant of a qualified plan is
still employed at age 70-1/2 and owns less than a 5% equity
interest in the employer, then he or she can postpone the
mandatory payout period until April 1 immediately following
the date of retirement. (Small Business Protection Act of
1996)
FUNDING TRUSTS WITH QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLAN AND IRA DEATH
BENEFITS

A.

As a general rule, it is advisable to make the surviving
spouse the beneficiary of all benefits from qualified
retirement plans and IRAs. Such payment will provide the
surviving spouse with more flexibility since the surviving
spouse could then make a spousal rollover into his or her own
IRA and therefore defer income taxable distributions until the
spouse reaches his or her required beginning date. The spouse
can also elect instead to keep the benefits in the deceased
participant's IRA and not be required to take out benefits
until the deceased spouse would have reached his or her
required beginning date (70-1/2). However, there may be
compelling reasons not to pay such death benefits directly to
the surviving spouse.

B.

IRA or qualified plan benefits left to a trust is income in
respect of decedent (IRO) and thus the Estate receives no
step-up in basis upon the participant's death.

c.

The decedent could create a trust for the benefit of the
surviving spouse and have such benefits payable in a single
sum payment to the trust. However, such payment will cause
the immediate income taxation of all such benefits. II such
death benefits can be paid in installments to a trust for the
benefit of the surviving spouse, there will be a deferral of
income taxes and the funds remaining in the qualified
retirement plan or IRA will be able to continue to generate
. more tax-free income.

D.

QTIP is a type of martial deduction trust where the surviving
spouse has an income interest for life. § 2056(b) (7) (B) (i);
Prop. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(b). The surviving spouse has a
qualifying income interest for life if the surviving spouse is
entitled to all of the income from the property, payable at
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least annually, and no person has the power to appoint any
part of the property (income or principal) to any person other
than the surviving spouse during the surviving spouse's
lifetime. However, the deceased spouse can determine where
the trust principal is left following the death of the
surviving spouse. S 2056(b) (7) (B) (ii).
1.

In Revenue RUling 89-89 (1982-2 C.B. 231), IRS held that
the payment of the death benefit under an IRA in
installments to a trust for the benefit of the surviving
spouse could qualify for the marital deduction.

r

2.

In Private Letter RUling 9038015, IRS expanded upon the
payment method approved in Revenue RUling 89-89 by
holding that an IRA can qualify as QTIP if it annually
distributes to the QTIP trust the greater of (1) all IRA
income or (2) the required minimum distribution amount.
S 401(a) (9). The approach approved in the Private Letter
RUling is potentially more advantageous than the approach
approved in Revenue RUling 89-89 because the method of
payment approved in the Private Letter RUling will
require a smaller annual distribution.

3.

In both Revenue Ruling 89-89 and Private Letter RUling
9038015, the basic payout from the IRA to the
testamentary trust was over the life expectancy of the
surviving spouse.

4.

However, as clarification, under the new proposed
regulations, a trust must have the following
characteristics:

r
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a.

Whether the participant dies before or after his or
her required beginning date, the trust must be valid
under state law.

b.

The trust is irrevocable or will by its terms become
irrevocable upon the death of the employee. The
timing of the irrevocability requirement is now tied
firmly to the settlor's death and not the RBO (as in
the old proposed.regulations). It therefore does
not matter whether the participant dies before or
after his or her required beginning date.

c.

The beneficiaries of the trust who are beneficiaries
with respect to the trust interest in the employee
benefit must be identifiable from the trust
instrument.

d.

The documentation described in 0-7 of this section
has to be provided to the plan administrator. Prop
Reg Sec 1-401(a) (9)-1 {Q & A 0-5b}.

r
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E.

F.

G.

IX

If the two RUlings, 89-89 and Private Rule 9038015, had ruled
that the irrevocability requirement was not satisfied, then
the surviving spouse would not have been considered a
designated beneficiary; and, without a designated beneficiary,
the post-death distributions must be completed no later than
the end of the fifth year after the testator's death or,
possibly, no later than the end of the year following the year
in which the testator's death occurred, if death occurred
after the required beginning date. Prop. Reg. § 1.401(a}
(9}-1.

-

Payment of death benefits in a credit shelter or trust for
other beneficiaries can also qualify for the extended payment
benefits.
1.

In these type trusts, there must be current income
beneficiary or beneficiaries.

2.

The minimum distribution requirement must be paid under
the trust terms outright to or for the benefit of the
said beneficiary of the trust income at least annually by
the Trustee.

The provisions outlined above should be drafted in both the
trust agreement, as well as, in the beneficiary designation.

CONCLUSION:

All qualified plan and IRA assets are included in the decedent's
estate, for Federal Estate Tax purposes and in some states for
State Inheritance Tax purposes as well. In addition, the following
penalty taxes may also be applicable: A 10% penalty for taking out
the benefits when the participant is too young; a 50% penalty if
the minimum annual distribution is not distributed when the
participant reaches his or her reqUired beginning date. In
addition, a Generation Skipping Penalty tax of 55% can also be
assessed if too much of the Participant's total assets, which
includes all qualified plan and IRA benefits, skip a generation
which is usually grandchildren, but not always.
The Roth IRA has some sizable benefits over the years but is not
available to many of our clients because of the adjusted gross
income requirements. Very careful overall tax planning is required
if taxable IRAs are transferred to a Roth IRA.
The use of trusts as beneficiary of qualified plan and IRA benefits
can SUbstantially increase the payout period of benefits and
result in the long run in paying out more total benefits by
increasing the life of the qualified plan or IRA. However, to
accomplish this benefit, careful drafting of both the trust and the
beneficiary designation is required.
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If careful planning relative to qualified plan and IRA benefits is
not done, it is possible for the total taxes, at death, and income
taxes thereafter, can take up to 91% of the total benefits left by
the Participant to the family.
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There is no substitute for
during the lifetime of the
her ownership of qualified
frequently becoming a very
estates as we approach the

proper and careful estate planning
Participant relative to all of his or
and IRA plans. These plan benefits are
sizable asset in most of our clients'
21st Century.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Complex estate planning issues were introduced by provisions of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (TRA '86) which impose a generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax on certain
wealth transfers made to younger generation beneficiaries. It is a flat tax imposed
at the highest estate tax rate (now 55%). The GST tax is in addition to any gift tax,
estate tax, or income tax which may also be payable.
The GST tax is contained in Chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), which
consists of IRC §2601 through §2663. Technical corrections were made by TAMRA
in 1988, by OBRA in 1989 and by OBRA in 1990. Temporary regulations (now finalized)
were issued in 1987. Additional proposed and temporary regulations were issued in
1988 (and corrected later in 1988).
Two important sets of proposed regulations were issued on December 24, 1992 and
were revised and finalized on December 27, 1995 (60 Fed.Reg. 66898). Corrections
were made to the final regulations on June 12, 1996 (61 Fed.Reg. 29653). On May
1, 1997, one of the new regulations, Treas.Reg. §26.2652-1(a)(4), and two related
examples, were deleted (62 Fed.Reg. 27496). One set broadly deals with issues such
as definitions, how GST tax exemption is allocated, how the inclusion ratio and applicable
fraction is computed, the reverse QTIP election, and how single trusts may be separated.
The other set of regulations deals with the liability for GST tax on life insurance where
a direct skip occurs at death and with the exercise of special powers of appointment
contained in grandfathered trusts. Generally, the new substantive GST regulations
apply to generation-skipping transfers made on or after December 27, 1995.
It is possible to inadvertently incur GST tax under even relatively simple estate plans
where the client is not trying to engage in tax motivated multi-generational estate planning.
Many older persons with large estates are certain to be impacted by the GST tax.
Accordingly, the estate plans of all wealthy clients should now be reviewed to determine
if potential GST tax liability can be eliminated, minimized or deferred.
Historically, generation-skipping trusts have been the preferred method for the wealthy
to perpetuate their family fortune. Prior to the introduction of the first GST tax in
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (TRA '76), the Rule Against Perpetuities provided the
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only effective time limit on how long property could escape transfer taxation by remaining
in trust. It was possible for several successive persons to be given broad interests and
powers over property held in a trust without any gift, estate or other transfer tax being
due at the time one beneficiary's interest in the trust terminated in favor of a successor
beneficiary.
The TRA '86 retroactively repealed the GST tax introduced by the TRA '76 in favor
of a somewhat simplified (but still quite complex) approach to GST taxation that appears
likely to remain in effect. The GST tax contains exemptions designed to exclude most
persons, estates and trusts from ever having to pay GST tax or file a GST tax return.
But it is a brutally expensive tax; in fact, it is viewed by many as confiscatory.
It is easy to understand why generation-skipping trusts have been popular. Imagine
a wealthy client in a top 55% transfer tax bracket, and whose descendants are all likely
to be in a similar top 55% bracket. Each dollar our wealthy client has will net the
client's child only 45 cents after being estate taxed at the client's death, will net the
client's grandchild only 20.25 cents after the estate tax imposed at the child's death,
and will net the great grandchild 9.11 cents after the estate tax imposed again at the
grandchild's death.
Instead, assume that same property is tied up in trust for successive generations. The
initial estate tax of 55% would be paid, leaving 45 cents on the dollar left in trust to
benefit the child, then the grandchild, and to ultimately benefit (or be distnbuted outright
to) the great grandchild. Needless to say, having 45 cents on the dollar left is better
than having only 9.11 cents on the dollar left. Additional benefits of tying up property
in trust include the protection afforded such assets from the beneficiary's creditors,
divorces, or mismanagement.
The terms of the trust for the benefit of the client's descendants needn't be repugnant.
Trust benefits which can be granted to each successive beneficiary are so broad as
to be tantamount to ownership of the trust assets for most purposes. They included:
A

The right to receive all trust income;

B.

The right to receive discretionary distnbutions oftrust principal (self-determination
of needs is possible if the beneficiary was acting as his or her own trustee pursuant
to a so-called "ascertainable standard" for making distributions to himself or
herself, such as the authority to make distnbutions for "health, education, support,
and maintenance");

c.

The right to exercise a five-by-five right of withdrawal to withdraw from the
trust each calendar year, without the showing of any need for such funds, assets

-
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having a value equal to the greater of $5,000 or 5% of the trust's fair market
value.

,,.
r

D.

The right to possess a broad inter vivos (i.e., during lifetime) and/or testamentary
(i.e., at death) special power of appointment to direct the trust's assets to be
distributed to such other persons or institutions as the beneficiary sees fit (which
must only exclude the beneficiary himself or herself, the beneficiary's creditors,
the beneficiary's estate, and the creditor's of the beneficiary's estate as objects
of the power);

E.

The right to direct trust investments and vote trust securities;

F.

The right to occupy one or more homes owned by the trust; and

r

G.

The right to hire and fire trustees, at least when the trustee has an ascertainable
standard concerning discretionary distributions.

r

These rights (except to the mere extent that a five-by-five withdrawal right was unexercised
at the time of death) do not give the beneficiary holding such rights ownership of the
property for estate tax purposes. The GST tax is designed to minimize transfer tax
planning benefits which would otherwise arise from the use of generation-skipping
trusts (such as a trust for a child's lifetime benefit that eventually terminates in favor
of a grandchild) and from the making of direct gifts to descendants of younger generation
beneficiaries (such as a direct gift to a grandchild or great-grandchild). The GST tax
does not eliminate such planning techniques - it does, however, put a cap on the amount
that can be put into such multi-generational tax savings trust arrangements.
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II.

THE GST TAX RULES
A detailed analysis of Chapter 13 is beyond the scope of these materials. However,
it is necessary to understand several key definitions and concepts in order for GST
tax planning strategies to make sense.

A. Terminology
The GST tax is imposed on a "generation-skipping transfer" of property to a
"skip person". Under IRC §2611(a), a "generation-skipping transfer" is any "taxable
termination", "taxable distribution", or "direct skip".

1.

Skip-Person. IRC §2613(a) defines "skip person" as a person assigned
to a generation which is two or more generations below that of the transferor (e.g., a grandchild or great-grandchild) or any trust where all of

r
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the beneficiaries are skip persons. IRC §2613(b) defines a "non-skip
person" as any person who is not a skip person.

2.

Taxable Termination. IRC §2612(b) provides that a ''taxable tennination"
occurs upon the termination ofall of the beneficial interests held by nonskip persons in a trust, if thereafter any of the beneficiaries are skip persons. For example, where a trust is established for the lifetime benefit
ofthe transferor's child and is to eventually be distributed to the transferor's grandchildren, a taxable termination will occur at the child's death.
Transfers that qualify as both a direct skip and a taxable termination
(such as a general power of appointment marital trust that terminates
in favor ofgrandchildren at the surviving spouse's death) will be considered
to be a direct skip only. Treas. Reg. §26.2612-1(b)(1)(i).

3.

...i

Taxable Distribution. IRC §2612(b) provides that a "taxable distnbution"
occurs when any distnbution of income or principal is made from a generation-skipping trust to a skip person (other than a taxable termination
or direct skip). For example, where a discretionary sprinkle trust is established for the transferor's surviving spouse and descendants, any distnbution
made during the surviving spouse's lifetime to a grandchild or great-grandchild of the transferor is a taxable distribution.
GST tax (plus penalties and interest thereon) paid by a distributing trust
shall be an additional taxable distribution in the year in which the original
taxable distribution was made. However, if federal estate or gift tax is
imposed on an individual with respect to a property interest in trust, that
property interest is deemed to have been distributed to the individual
to the extent its value is subject to federal estate or gift tax. This often
happens with respect to a lapse of a power of appointment. Treas. Reg.
§26.2612-1(c).

4.

-

Direct Skip. IRC §2613(c) provides that a "direct skip" occurs when
a transfer subject to federal gift tax or federal estate tax is made to a
skip person. For example, where a transfer is made during life or at
death to the transferor's grandchild or great-grandchild, a direct skip
occurs. Only one direct skip occurs where a single transfer of property
skips more than one generation. Treas. Reg. §26.2612-1(a)(1).
However, a transfer to a grandchild of the grantor is not a direct skip
if the child of the grantor who is such grandchild's parent is dead at the
time of such transfer. This "predeceased child" exception, "sometimes
also called the "predeceased parent exception," also applies to transfers

-
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to generations below that of a grandchild if all lineal persons between
the transferor's and transferee's generations are deceased. Also, if the
child dies no later than ninety days after the transfer, the child will be
deemed to be a predeceased child for purposes of the transfer if the
governing instrument or local law so provides. Beginning in 1998, the
predeceased child exception is extended to transfers to collateral heirs
assigned to at least one generation below that of a child of the grantor,
provided that the grantor has no lineal descendants living at the time
of the transfer. The predeceased child exception only applies to transfers
in trust that are direct skips. If the transferor's child, or the ancestor
of the beneficiary who is in a generation below the transferor's, survives
the transferor and is a beneficiary of a trust, a taxable termination will
occur at the child's or ancestor's subsequent death when the trust assets
pass to (or are held in further trust for the benefit of) the ultimate
beneficiaries. A disclaimer cannot be used to cause a living descendant
to be deemed to have predeceased the grantor or donor. Treas. Reg.
§26.2612-1(a)(2).

r
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5.
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B.

Generation Assignment. IRC §2651 provides that a person who is
not a lineal descendant of a grandparent of the transferor or the transferor's spouse shall be assigned to a generation on the basis of such person's
date of birth. If such person is no more than 12-1/2 years younger than
the transferor, such person will be assigned to the transferor's generation.
Ifbetween 12-1/2 and 37-1/2 years younger than the transferor, such person
will be assigned to the first generation younger than the transferor. Similar
rules apply for a new generation every 25 years.

Excluded Transfers
1.

Estate or Gift Tax. IRC §2611(b)(1) provides that any transfer
(other than a direct skip) from a trust is not a generation-skipping transfer
to the extent federal estate tax or federal gift tax is imposed on such
transfer with respect to a person in the first generation below that of
the grantor. For example, if a trust provides for the grantor's child to
receive income for life and grants the child a general power ofappointment
over the remainder, the trust will not be GST taxable at the child's death
because the general power ofappointment will cause the trust to be included in the child's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. Further,
the determination as to whether an occurrence is a GST is made by
reference to the most recent transfer which is subject to estate or gift
tax, as this establishes the identities of the actual transferor and the skip
and nonskip persons. Treas. Reg. §26.2611-1.

Subject to

r
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2.

3.

Educational and Medical Expenses. Any transfer which, if made during
life by an individual, would not be treated as a taxable gift by reason
of IRC §2503(e) (relating to exclusion of certain educational or medical
expenses) is excluded from being a generation-skipping transfer by IRC
§2611(b)(2).

-

Prior GST Taxation. In addition, IRC §2611(b)(3) provides that a transfer
is not a generation-skipping transfer to the extent the property was subject

to GST tax with respect to a prior transfer to a person assigned to the
same generation (or a lower generation) as the current transferee if such
transfer does not have the effect of avoiding the GST tax.

4.

Annual Exclusion Gifts. Gifts that qualify for the $10,000 gift tax exclusion escape GST taxability by reason of IRC §2642(c), which excludes
such transfers from the GST tax base. However, a special provision
prevent most gifts subject to a so-called "Crummey" withdrawal power
from being excluded from GST taxation, even if they do not exceed the
$10,000 annual exclusion amount. IRC §2642(c)(2) provides that annual
exclusion gifts made to a Crummey trust are subject to GST tax, unless
(1) no portion of the corpus or income of the trust can be distributed
to anyone other than the "Crummey" power holder and that, ifsuch "Crummey" power holder and (2) if such "Crummey" power holder dies before
the trust terminates, the trust assets must be included in his gross estate
for federal estate tax purposes.
Sometimes, the advantage of doing GST planning is to have none of
the GST trust included in the beneficiary's estate at death, which means
that many gifts to trusts (especially gifts to irrevocable life insurance trusts)
that involve annually less than $10,000 per beneficiary (and require no
gift tax return to be filed by reason of the Crummey clause in the trust)
will still need to have a Form 709 filed --- in order to allocate GST
exemption to the gift that otherwise would not have required the filing
of a gift tax return. See below for planning considerations for Crummey
trusts, in light of the fact that properly structured annual exclusion gifts
to such trusts are not subject to estate or gift taxation but are subject
to GST tax.
An initial transfer to a Crummey trust constitutes a completed transfer
for gift tax purposes of the entire amount, and the lapse of a withdrawal
power (to the extent in excess of the 5 by 5 limitations) will also cause
the Crummey beneficiary to be the transferor to the extent the lapse
is treated as a taxable gift. Treas. Reg. 26.2652-1(a)(6), Example 5.
Further, if the Crummey beneficiary is a skip person, he or she will be
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considered to have received a taxable distnbution to the extent the amount
exceeds the 5 and 5 limitations. Treas.Reg. §26.2612-1(c)(1).

c.

Available Exemptions

1.

$1 Million GST Tax Exemption. Each transferor has a $1 million GST
tax exemption (GST exemption) which IRC §2631(a) allows such individual
to allocate in any manner desired. Beginning in 1998, the $1 million
GST exemption will be indexed annually for inflation, to the nearest
$10,000. Any GST exemption not used during life is available to the
transferor's estate. Once made, any GST exemption allocation is irrevocable. If no allocation of GST exemption is made by the transferor or
his executor, a mandated allocation of GST exemption is provided in
IRC §2632.

Prior regulations indicated that the election out of the automatic allocation
rules was revocable. Such election has now been made irrevocable, and
transitional relief is provided. Treas. Reg. §26.2632-1(b)(1).
Formula allocations of GST tax exemption are now allowed, which will
be very helpful where hard to value assets are involved. However, formula
allocations with respect to charitable lead annuity trusts are not valid
except to the extent they depend on values finally determined for federal
estate and gift tax purposes. Additionally, except in the case of charitable
lead annuity trusts, allocations in excess of the amount needed to obtain
a zero inclusion ratio are void. Treas. Reg. §26.2632-1(b)(2).
In the case of a lifetime transfer where a late allocation of GST tax
exemption to a trust is being made, the fair market value of the trust
assets (except with respect to life insurance) may (by election) be deemed
to be the value of such assets on the first day of the month during which
the late election is made. IRC 2642(b)(3)(A); Treas. Reg. §26.2642-2(a)(2).
After death a timely election ofGST tax exemption with respect to lifetime
transfers can be made by the personal representative on a timely filed
gift tax return -- which is the earlier of the due date for the Form 706
or Form 709. A late allocation of GST tax exemption by the personal
representative with respect to lifetime transfers can be made on Form
706; it is effective as of the date it is made. Treas. Reg. §26.2632-1(d)(1).
Exceptions to the automatic allocation rules at death have been added
to prevent GST tax exemption from being automatically allocated in such
a way as to be wasted for a certainty at the time the Form 706 is due,

r
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but such rules won't save you from affirmatively allocating GST tax
exemption in a wasteful way. Treas. Reg. §26.2632-1(d)(2).
After death GST tax exemption can be allocated to a trust created at
or after death even if the trust is not yet funded when the Form 706
is filed, by formula, if the notice of allocation clearly identifies the trust
and the amount of GST tax exemption being allocated to such trust.
This allows the division of a large trust into two separate trusts, one totally
GST taxable and one totally GST tax exempt. Treas. Reg. §26.2632l(d)(I).

2.

Gallo Amendment Transfers. A special $2 million per grandchild GST
exemption (the so-called "Gallo Amendment") is available for pre-l990
transfers to grandchildren by IRC §1433(b)(3) of the TRA '86. Such
transfers can be made by lifetime gift or at the transferor's death. Both
outright transfers and transfers in trust (provided that the grandchild
is the sole beneficiary to whom distributions can be made during the
grandchild's lifetime, that the trust will be included in the gross estate
of the grandchild if he dies after the trust's termination, and that - as
to transfers made after June 10, 1987 - the trust's income must be distributed to the grandchild at least annually after age twenty-one) will qualify
for Gallo Amendment transfers.

D. Computation of Tax

1.

2.

Overview. In the case of a taxable termination or taxable distribution,
the GST tax is computed on a tax inclusive basis (i.e., the GST tax base
or "taxable amount" is the value of the property to be distributed, with
certain deductions allowed by IRC §2621 or §2622, but with no deduction
for the GST taxes payable from such distribution). In the case of a direct
skip, IRC §2623 provides that the GST tax is computed on a more favorable tax exclusive basis (i.e., the GST tax base or "taxable amount" is the
value of the property actually received by the transferee and is not grossed
up by the GST taxes owed by the transferor).
Applicable Definitions. The GST tax due is defined by IRC §2602
as the taxable amount multiplied by the "applicable fraction". Under
IRC §2641, the applicable rate is the product of the maximum federal
estate tax rate (now 50%) and the "inclusion ratio". IRC §2642 provides
that the inclusion ratio is 1.0, minus the "applicable fraction", and that
the applicable fraction has a numerator equal to the GST exemption
allocated to the trust or direct skip and a denominator equal to the value
of the property transferred to the trust (or involved in the direct skip),
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reduced by the sum of (1) any federal estate tax or state death tax actually
recovered from the trust attnbutable to such property, and (2) any charitable deduction allowed under IRC §2055 or §2522 with respect to such
property. IRC §2604 allows a state death tax credit, not to exceed 5%
of the federal GST tax, for state GST taxes paid on transfers (other than
direct skips) occurring by reason of death.

,.

In determining the denominator of the applicable fraction with respect
to testamentary transfers, estate tax values are generally used (but special
rules may require the fair market value of property subject to a Section
2032A election to be used in the event oflRC §2032A recapture). Treas.
Reg. §26.2642-2(b).

IfIiit
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Special new rules for pecuniary payments have been implemented to
determine the denominator of the applicable fraction. Date of distnbution
values must be used or else the pecuniary payment must be satisfied
so as to fairly reflect appreciation and depreciation. If the pecuniary
payment is made in cash, the denominator is the pecuniary amount.
If an in kind distribution is made to satisfy a pecuniary gift, the pecuniary
gift must be satisfied either using property on the basis of the value of
the property: (a) on the date of distribution, or (b) if it is a date other
than the date of distribution, using values that are fairly representative
of appreciation and depreciation in the assets of the estate or trust at
such time, and such gift must be valued and satisfied at date of distnbution
values. Treas. Reg. §26.2642-2(b)(2).
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Complex rules govern the computation of the denominator where a residual
transfer follows a pecuniary payment (such as a $1,400,000 estate that
provides for $400,000 to wife and the balance to a GST trust). The preresiduary pecuniary bequest must carry "appropriate interest". If satisfied
in kind, date of distribution values must be used or the pecuniary amount
must be adjusted so as to be fairly representative of appreciation or
depreciation in the assets of the estate or trust. Otherwise, adverse
adjustments are made in the computation of the fraction. Treas. Reg.
§26.2642-2(b).
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3.

Examples. An example is helpful. Assume a lifetime transfer of $1
million is made to a trust which is to pay its income to the transferor's
child for life and thereafter be distnbuted to the transferor's grandchildren.
The normal gift tax rules will apply at the time the trust is created. If
$400,000 of the transferor's GST exemption is allocated to the trust at
its inception and the trust is valued at $2 million when the child dies,
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$660,000 of GST tax will be payable when the trust terminates at the
child's death. A 55% GST tax bracket is assumed to apply.
The
The
The
The
The

applicable fraction is .40 (400,000/1,000,000)
inclusion ratio is .60 (1.0 minus .40)
applicable rate is .33 (55% times .60)
GST tax due is $660,000 (.33 times 2,000,000)
maximum state death tax credit is $33,000 (5% times 660,000)

A different result would occur if the same transfer were instead taxable
as a direct skip upon the creation of such a trust for the sole benefit
of the transferor's grandchildren. Assuming the Gallo Amendment is
not applicable, GST tax of $330,000 (Le., the applicable rate multiplied
by the value of the trust at the time of the GST taxable event occurs)
would be due upon the creation of the trust. In addition, IRC §2515
provides that the amount of the gift for federal gift taxes is increased
by the $330,000 of GST tax imposed as a result of such gift.

E.

Who Pays the Tax
IRC §2603(a) provides that the transferor is liable for any GST tax due upon
a direct skip other than from a trust, and that the distributee is liable for any
GST tax due in the case of a taxable distribution. If the trust making a taxable
distribution pays the GST tax due by the distributee, such GST tax paid will
constitute an additional taxable distribution. Trustees now need to consider
the establishment of a GST tax reserve when making certain types of distnbutions,
as IRC §2603(a) makes the trustee liable for any GST tax due upon a taxable
termination or direct skip from a trust.
In the case of a direct skip occurring at death with respect to property held
in a trust arrangement such as life insurance, the personal representative must
file the GST tax return and pay the GST tax to the extent that the total value
of the property included from such insurance company causes a direct skip with
respect to the trustee of the trust to the extent of the first $250,000. Treas.
Reg. §26.2662-1(c)(2)(iii).

F.

GST Reporting Requirements

1.

Reporting During Ute by Donor. Form 709 is used by the donor to
allocate GST exemption on transfers occurring during lifetime, and to
report and compute the GST tax due on direct skip transfers occurring
during lifetime. Form 709 must be filed and the tax paid between January
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1 and April 15 of the year following the calendar year when the lifetime
direct skip occurred.

,
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2.

r
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In E. Norman Peterson Marital Trust v. C.I.R., 73 F.3d 795 (2nd Cir.
1996), the lapse of a surviving spouse's testamentary general power of
appointment upon the surviving spouse's death in 1987 was deemed to
be a "constructive addition" to a marital trust established in 1974 when
the first spouse died. The entire trust was thus subjected to GST tax
as a taxable termination, becnuse skip persons - grandchildren - were
the remainder beneficiaries in default of the power of appointment.

r
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3.

Reporting Taxable Distribution. Form 706 GS (0-1) is used by the
trustee to report a taxable distribution and to inform the distributee of
the distribution. Form 706 (0) is used by the recipient of a taxable
distribution to report and compute the GST tax on taxable distributions.
Form 706 GS (0) and 706 GS (0-1) must be filed and the tax paid
between January 1 and April 15 of the year following the calendar year
when the taxable distribution occurred.

4.

Reporting Taxable Termination. Form 706 GS (T) is used by the trustee
to report and compute the GST tax due on taxable terminations of trusts.
Form 706 GS (T) must be filed and the tax paid between January 1 and
Apri115 of the year following the calendar year when the taxable termination occurred.

r
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Reporting Direct Skip at Death. Form 706 is used by the executor
to allocate GST exemption on transfers occurring at death and to report
and compute the GST tax due on direct skips occurring at death. Form
706 must be filed and the tax paid within nine months of the decedent's
date of death. Schedules Rand R-l are the specific Form 706 schedules
relating to the GST tax.

G.

Effective Date Provisions

I

r
r

1.

General Rules. IRC §1433 of the 1RA '86 makes the GST law applicable
to every generation-skipping transfer occurring after October 22, 1986.
However, any lifetime transfer made after September 25, 1985 and on
or before October 22, 1986, is treated as if made on October 23, 1986
and is therefore subject to the GST tax.

r

2.

Exceptions. Transfers are exempt from the GST tax if made (1) from
trusts that were irrevocable on September 25, 1985 (to the extent not
made from additions to corpus occurring after that date), (2) under a

r
r
r

H-ll

will executed before October 22, 1986, ifthe testator died before January
1, 1987, or (3) under a will of, or trust included in the gross estate of,
a decedent who at all times from October 22, 1986 until his death lacked
the legal capacity to change the disposition of his property.

III.

PLANNING STRATEGIES

-

A.

Overview. The keys to GST tax planning are to take full advantage of those
transactions which are grandfathered and not subject to the GST tax law, to
maximize use of transfers which are excluded from being subject to GST taxation,
and to utilize all of the exemptions which are available to shelter transfers which
would otherwise be subject to GST taxability. A thorough review of all existing
wills, revocable trusts and gifting strategies is necessitated, as estate planing
strategies that might have been appropriate under prior law may be detrimental,
or without effect, under the GST tax law.

B.

Use of Multiple Trusts. As a general rule, it will be beneficial to structure
an estate plan so that only trusts which are wholly GST tax exempt (i.e., with
an applicable fraction of 1 and an inclusion ratio of zero) or wholly GST taxable
(Le., with an applicable fraction of zero and an inclusion ratio of 1) result. Such
a strategy may require the use of two separate trusts where one partially GST
taxable trust could otherwise have been established, but a great deal of GST
tax planning flexibility ensues. The GST tax exempt trust could be maximized
for the eventual benefit of skip-persons (such as the transferor's grandchildren
or great-grandchildren) by an aggressive investment growth policy and the making
of minimal distributions, while at the same time the wholly GST taxable trust
was being invested more conservatively and making GST tax exempt distnbutions
to non-skip persons (such as the grantor's children).

-

A single trust included in the grantor's gross estate may be divided into separate
trusts (i.e., so that one can have an inclusion ratio of 1.0 and the other an inclusion
ratio of zero) if: (a) expressly permitted by local law or the governing instrument;
(b) the terms of the new trusts provide for the same succession of interests and
beneficiaries as the old one did; (c) the severance occurs (or the reformation
begins) prior to the due date for the Form 706 (including extensions); and (d)
the severance results in a fractional or pecuniary division which is an appropriate
amount. Treas. Reg. §26.2654-1(b).

--

c.

Taking Advantage of Grandfathering

1.

Overview. Trusts which are grandfathered from GST taxabilitybythe
effective date provisions of TRA '86 are valuable tax planning vehicles
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which should be perpetuated if at all possible. The assets of a
grandfathered trust should be invested for growth and only distributed
to non-skip persons if it is not possible to make such distributions from
a non-grandfathered trust.

r
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2.

Utilize Annual Gift Tax Exclusion. In order to maintain their wholly
exempt status, no additions to a grandfathered trust should be made
unless the addition qualifies under the $10,000 annual gift tax exclusion
as a nontaxable gift, or GST tax exemption equal to the value of the
addition is allocated to the trust. The lapse of a five-by-five right ofwithdrawal over a grandfathered trust will not constitute an addition to that
trust for GST tax purposes.

3.

Special Powers of Appointment. The exercise of a special power of
appointment over a grandfathered trust may allow the imposition of all
transfer taxes to be postponed if the power is exercised so as to cause
the appointive property to be held in a new trust with an extended termination date. There are many trusts that were irrevocable on the effective
date of the GST law and which will eventually terminate in favor of the
current income beneficiary's children if an available special power of
appointment is not so exercised. Great care must be taken when a special
power of appointment is exercised in favor of a trust, as the maximum
duration that the new trust can last under the Rule Against Perpetuities
will be the same limitation imposed on the original trust.

4.

Continuous Mental Disability. Every effort should be made to document
the continuous mental disability of an individual who did not have the
competence to change the disposition of his property on October 22,
1986, or at any time during his life thereafter. It is not necessary that
the person be adjudged mentally incompetent, although it may be helpful.

l
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D.

Maximizing Excluded Transfers
1.

Gift Tax Exclusion Gifts. Annual exclusion gifts made to GSf tax exempt
trusts, rather than outright, are less useful than prior to technical corrections, as it is now necessary to either elect the use of GST exemption
or draft the trust in such a manner as will cause the "Crummey" power
holder to be subject to estate taxability on the trust assets resulting from
such lapsed "Crummey" power. Also, it may be necessary to consider
the timing of outright gifts and "Crummey" gifts made to a beneficiary
during a calendar year before any outright gifts are made in order to
avoid application of the rule which states that it is the first $10,000 of
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2.

E.

gifts made to a donee in a particular calendar year that qualify for the
annual $10,000 gift tax exclusion.

...

Education and Medical Expenses. Trustsshouldbedraftedtoallow
direct payment of the tuition and medical expenses of skip persons. If
such items could be paid from more than one trust, the trustee must
consider the potential transfer tax consequences when choosing the trust
from which payment is to be made.

-

Making Optimal Use of exemptions

1.

2.

3.

Overview. The GST exemption should be utilized as early as is possible
in order to cause the maximum amount of income and appreciation occurring after the transfer to escape gift, estate and GST taxation. The benefit
of the GST exemption can be maximized if it is used for assets with the
most appreciation potential (i.e., the GST exemption could be leveraged
and result in the sheltering of significantly more than $1 million if allocated
to gifts made to an irrevocable life insurance trust). A mandated allocation
of GST exemption should be avoided, as no allowance will be made
for the likelihood of various trusts having differing potentials for appreciation or the occurrence of generation-skipping transfers.
Gift Tax. A significant gift tax liability is possible if the GST exemption
is fully utilized during life, so most clients will postpone transfers in excess
of the $600,000 exemption equivalent until death. However, IRC §2652(a)
provides that split-gifts pursuant to IRC §2513 of the gift tax law will
be deemed to have been made one-half by each spouse for GST tax
purposes, so it is possible for a married couple to make transfers of $1,200,000 without incurring any gift tax or GST tax.

Reverse CTIP Election. If the transferor is survived by a spouse, traditional marital deduction estate planning will cause a $600,000 bypass
trust to be created, with the balance of the estate being paid to (or placed
in a marital deduction trust for the benefit of) the surviving spouse. It
is usually desired to completely avoid transfer tax at the death of the
first spouse, which means that $400,000 of the transferor's GST exemption
may be wasted. IRC §2652(a)(3) permits the transferor to create a QTIP
trust and elect to be treated as its transferor for GST tax purposes. It
is likely that $400,000 QTIP trusts will now be established under circumstances where they would not otherwise be desired. Any marital deduction
gift in excess of $400,000 should be distributed outright or held in a separate marital trust.

...

-

-

-

-
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At the death of a surviving spouse no constructive addition will be deemed
made to a trust for which a reverse QTIP election was made at the first
spouse's death if the estate taxes attributable to such trust are paid other
than from such trust. Treas. Reg. §26.2652-1(a)(3); §26.2652-1(a)(6),
Example 8.

r
rJ

Where a reverse QTIP election was made prior to December 24, 1992,
and GST tax exemption has been allocated to a single QTIP trust, such
single QTIP trust may be treated as two separate trusts (for GST tax
purposes only) by reason of a transitional rules if the appropriate election
is made on or before April 15, 1993. Treas. Reg. §26.2652-2(c); 26.2654-

r

r
r

l(a).

F.

Other Planning Considerations
1.

SUbject Assets to Estate or Gift Tax. It may be advantageoustocause
assets to be subject to estate taxation rather than GST taxation. The
value of the unified credit and lower estate tax bracket of the beneficiary
of a GST trust will be wasted at the death of a beneficiary who has minimal
personal assets. The GST tax is imposed at the top estate tax bracket
and significant transfer tax savings can result if some assets are given
outright to the beneficiary rather than placed in a GST trust. It would
also be possible to give the beneficiary a general power of appointment
over some portion of the GST trust in order to cause trust assets to be
subject to estate taxation rather than GST taxation.

2.

Use of Disclaimers. Disclaimers will now potentially cause the imposition
of GST tax, as disclaimed property often passes from a child to a
grandchild of the transferor. The use of disclaimers will probably be
reduced, although it is possible that no GST tax will be due by reason
of the grandfather rules, unused GST exemption or the availability of
the Gallo Amendment prior to 1990.

3.

Estate Tax Inclusion Period. Before the final regulations were issued,
it was thought that the creation of a concept called the "Estate Tax
Inclusion Period'" or "ETIP", might make it unwise to grant the grantor's
spouse a Crummey withdrawal right or to allow any distributions to be
made to the grantor's spouse from an irrevocable life insurance trust
until after the grantor's death. This is because no effective allocation
of GST exemption is possible during the ETIP, which is the period during
which the trust would still be deemed owned by the grantor for estate
tax purposes, and, under the proposed regulations, any interest in the
trust held by the grantor's spouse is deemed to be held by the grantor.

r

r

r
r
r

r

r
r
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r

r
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However, the spousal attnbution rules were eliminated from the final
regulations. Treas. Reg. §26.2642-1. Hence, estate plans which grant
powers and beneficial interests in a trust to a spouse will not prevent
allocation of the grantor's GST exemption to the trust.

4.

Crummey Trusts. It may be wise to consider giving a Crummey trust
beneficiary who is a non-skip person a testamentary general power of
appointment over his or her portion of the trust remainder if allocation
of GST exemption to annual exclusion gifts to the trust is not desired.
See above for a discussion ofspecial GST tax rules applying to Crummey
trusts.

5.

Miscellaneous Considerations. ComplexitiesintroducedbytheGST
tax law will cause many changes to be made in the way that wills and
trusts are drafted. It is likely that future administrative powers will routinely grant discretion to allocate GST exemption, to allow the final distribution of a trust to be postponed until the satisfaction of all GST liability
for which the trustee may be liable, and to allow trustees to augment
taxable distributions by an additional amount to cover GST taxes due
by the distributee. Issues such as the apportionment of GST tax due,
the allocation of GST exemption between potentially adverse beneficiaries,
multi-generational survivorship presumptions, the creation ofboth GST
tax exempt and GST taxable trusts where one trust would have sufficed
in the past (which may be accomplished, for example, under the authority
of the document or local law, and the use of a special QTIP trust to
prevent a transferor's GST exemption from being wasted create new
and unresolved drafting problems.

...

-

-

IV. CONCLUSION

A significant additional transfer tax burden is now imposed on gifts, estates and trusts
to which the GST tax law applies. Careful planning will allow such potential GST tax
liability to be eliminated, minimized or deferred if the appropriate steps are taken.
It is essential that estate planning professionals become familiar with the GST law and
that clients be counseled to make the appropriate modifications to their estate plans.
Tax return preparers need to be aware of the fact that it may also be necessary to
report GST tax consequences by reason of the same event necessitating the filing of
an estate, gift, or fiduciary income tax return.

-

-
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ESTATE PLANNING SOFTWARE
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Compiled by:
Jefferey M. Yussman
Stites & Harbison
Louisville, Kentucky

r

r
r

Like many areas of the law - and indeed the world - the
advancements in, and proliferation of, estate planning software and
assistance feels mind-boggling. Just several years ago there were
relatively few software systems available for the estate planner to
review and evaluate, leaving the planner wanting more; much more.
Well, like most things in life, this is another example where one
might have been better off to heed the advice of an unknown sage to
"be careful what you ask for, because you just may get it!"

f

r
r
r

Truly the estate planning software arena is a place where that
maxim has proved prophetic.
Attached to this introduction is a
listing of some of the products which are presently available on
the market for assisting the estate planner.
Surely there are
more, but the attached materials should give the seminar attendee
adequate references to begin researching which products are best
for his, her or their firm's practice. Likewise, the panel members
will provide their input as to the products they.have tried and
prefer.

!

r
I

Attached are the following:
A.

Copy of "SOHO Consumer: Software for the Estate Planning
Law Office." A web page designed to list software that
is particularly useful in an estate planning, trust and
probate law practice. Last updated February, 1998.

B.

Copy of Cover to Wills. Trusts. and Technology:
An
Estate Lawyer's Guide to Automation, Daniel B. Evans, ABA
Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section
and Law Practice Management, American Bar Association,
1996. Series Foreword reads:

r
I

r

r
r

r
r

r
r

"The first in Law Practice Management's planned
series of books for applying document assembly and
substantive systems tools to particular types of
law practices.
Evans' book shows you how to
harness the power of database and case management
systems to automate and manage an estate planning
and estate administration practice.
In concise, user-friendly chapters, Evans walks you
through the basics of understanding and choosing
the necessary hardware and software; helps you plan
for implementation of and training on your new
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system; demonstrates how to apply your system to
managing client
information,
will
and
trust
inventories, generating and managing documents and
performing estate planning (including generationskipping,
charitable giving,
and estate
tax
planning) ;
reviews
the
available
fiduciary
accounting, valuation, automated asset transfer,
and estate, death, gift and income tax return
programs; and gives tips on preparing probate court
pleadings.
Evans also guides you through the
ethical
considerations
and
other
management
problems that can arise from automating tasks where
Murphy's famous Law applies that 'anything that can
go wrong, will go wrong.'"
While this publication is highly recommended for general
information, because it is now two years old, many of the
specific applications are somewhat dated. Nonetheless,
this is still and excellent publication from which to
start assembling a technologically efficient estate
planning practice.
.
C.

Miscellaneous
E-mail
postings
and
advertisements
concerning certain software applications (many of which
were listed in the directory under (A) above. Note how
quickly the products are updated when comparing the
advertisements with the reviews from SOHO published just
several months ago.
.

D.

Copy of "A Small Firm's Perspective on Document Assembly
Software, II Ebenal, Evans, Violette and Hompesch,
Trusts & Estates, November, 1997.
"Utilizing document assembly software will be
imperative for every estate planning attorney who
practices in the 21st Century.
This article
surveys all of the popular document assembly
software programs for Will and trust drafting that
are on the market today.
The authors explore the
strengths and weaknesses of the best programs as
well as offer analysis as to what programs would
work better for different office structures."

E.

Copy of "How to Avoid Losing Your License on the
Information Superhighway," Metzmeier and Esposito,
Kentucky Bench & Bar, Vol. 62, NO.2, Spring 1998,
Kentucky Bar Association, May, 1998.
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SMALL OFFICE I HOME OFFICE (SOHO) CONSUMER:
Software For The Estate Planning Attomey
Small O~fi~f3LH~fll~Offic::e CO_r1l;lIfllf!r:ti()rnel~tJbrnit I Advertising I Email

SOHO Consumer: Software for the Estate
Planning Law Office
by Mark J. Welch -last update February 13, 1998

What is this page? This page is
Search for The Best Prices!
designed to list software that is
particularly useful in an estate
Select a Category:
planning, trust, and probate law
r Books
r Music
r Movies
practice. That's it. No hidden agenda,
r Magazines r Hardware (i" Software
no overwhelming biases, just a list
r Toys
r Sports
r Other
intended to provide a starting point
Enter Keywords:
for evaluating and researching tools
for estate planning attorneys. Please
~----_."._--- .. --".,,_... __...._---"
send email to
legal sw@sohoconsumer.com with any web links for any products or companies that
belong on this page!
..

'

It is my intention, as I get more experience with some of these programs, to include brief
descriptions and discussions of some or all of the programs listed on this page, but only
if written by myself or another estate planning attorney (or law office staff member).
Send your comments to legal sw@sohoconsumer.com and I'll include your name & an
email or web link to you, if I include your comments on this page (or let me know if you
don't want public credit). (Many thanks to John Brentin for sharing his list of estate
planning and probate software, and thus allowing me to add many more links on 3/20/97.
Visitors since 3/21/97:

.1Jl';~

.. ;a

WebTract. . .

Software to Assist in Planning, Number-Crunching, or to
Create Client Presentations

r
,r

r
r
r

These are in a single category because they overlap so much.
• ViewPlan: Vista ($849), Data+, Factuary, and BeneQuick (for
Windows); Estate Forecast Model (EFM) and Progeny (both for
DOS only). There is no price information available online, but
you can download fully-functional demos of Vista & Factua.ry
[800-826-2127]

http://www.sohoconsumer.com/legal_sw.htm
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Mark J. Welch says (after using the downloaded demo version): "ViewPlan's Vista
is excellent at showing in flowchart form the flow of assets into trusts to implement
basic tax planning, the benefits of transferring life insurance out of the estate, the
effects of annual gifting, and the effect of growth on estate taxes. Unfortunately, it
does not show income tax effects (such as capital gains taxes on assets in a bypass
trust, or ordinary income taxes on tax-deferred retirement accounts)."

• Estate Plan Plus from ProBATE Software - 17 reports, 7 graphs ($495) [800-2889169]

-

• Penn D'Caic "complex calculations for IRAs, 401Ks, pensions, life insurance
policies, defined benefit plans and other assets flowing through retirement to the
estate" - downloadable demo available
• zCalc from Lexite Development - "zCalc is a set of formulas that perform estate
and financial planning calculations within your own spreadsheet or program" downloadable 30-day demo available. [$399]

-

• BNA Estate Tax Planner ($995-$1495) [800-372-1033]
• Kettley Publishing: Back Room Technician, Estate Cost Estimator; Estate QuickPlan; Charitable Quick Plan; and Retirement Quick Plan [800-777-3162]

-

See an ABA-PTL posting about this software (10/8/97).
• PROFILES+ - from Financial Profiles, Inc. ("Presentation software for the
financial services profession") [800-237-6335]

-

• Master Plan [800-229-5080]

-

• Clark Boardman Callaghan [800-336-6365]:
o Estate Planning Explorer (software designed to be used by the client)

-

o Estate Planning Concepts
o Estate Practice Assistant by Donald Kelley - projects estate taxes; also
includes worksheets to facilitate 706 preparation and 1041 (IRD)
Computations
• FREE Estate Tax Calculator (updated for TRA'97) from BeachWalk Financial
(SeanO'Riordan) [800-613-2273]

-

• Brentmark Software's "Estate Planning Tools" and "Charitable Financial Planner"
[800-879-6665]

-

• Inter-Est: Interrelated Estate Tax Calculator from Cammack Computations - DOS
($595) or Windows ($695) [800-594-5826]

http://www.sohoconsumer.comllegal_sw.htm
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• Essential Software - software to assist in business valuations [414-475-3450]
• InsMark software designed to help agents sell life insurance [800-422 6644]
• Leimberg & LeClair CNumberCruncher & more) (select browse catalog then
software) [610-527-5216]
See an email posting (l0/8/97) by Dan Evans to the ABA-PTL list
about this software.
• Impact Technologies' Estate Tax Analysis for Windows (ETAW) [800-438-6017]
See 'praise for- this product by John L.Olson (10/8/97) posted to the
ABA-PTL mailing list
• EZ Gift Planner distributed by Jane Schuck & Associates - free demo [800-6947624]

r

• Chaptable Scenario Deduction Calculator / Remainder Trust Marketing Systems from PhilanthroTec - They are offering free software that calculates the optimum
payout rate to achieve the new 10% remainder. Click on Free Planned Giving
Software for information on downloading. [800-332-7832]

r

• CIRCALC [717-299-1181]

f

• Crescendo Planned Gifts Software - from Comdel, Inc. [800-858-9154] the web
site is missing!

•

r

• EP Expert Spreadsheet - from Eidelman Associates [800-775-2786]

t

• EPLAN - from U. S. Trust Company of New York [212-852-3564]
• ES: The Estate Plan Analyzer - from Superior Software, Inc. $495 ["slide-show"
demo (poorly designed demo. impossible to exit once started. automatically prints
reports at end)] [800-421-3264]

r

r

,.

• Estate Resource - from Benefit Analysis, Inc. [800-223-3601]
• Planned Giving Manager. $1,795 plus $575 annual service contract (required);
Mini Manager. $895 plus $425 annual service contract (required). - from PG Calc
Inc. [888-497-4970]
• Tax Facts Calculator - from National Underwriter Co. [800-543-0874]

I

• Tiger Tables - TSP Software [314-231-2800]

r

• TAXPLAN - from Daniel B. Evans [215-233-0988/215-233-1887]

r
r

http://www.sohoconsumer.comllegal_sw.htm
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• LifeNet's Online Estate Tax & Probate Fee Estimator

-

•
Soup to Nuts: Complete Software Solutions for the Estate Planning Law
Office

-

Each of these companies promises to meet your needs for every aspect of an estate
planning law practice, from marketing through drafting.

-

• Cowles Legal Systems [800-366-1730]
• National Network of Estate Planning Attorneys
• American Academy of Estate Planning Attorneys

-

• Estate Practice Systems from Clark Boardman Callaghan [800-336-6365]

•

-

Software to Create Client Correspondence
• ElderLaw Forms Manual on disk - Harry S. Margolis'
software (Little, Brown & Co.)
• See also: Mark J. Welch's Sample "Opening Letter" to new
clients (sent after first meeting)

-

• See also: InTrust (in the "Asset Transfer" section, below)

-

•

-

Software to Draft Wills and Trusts
• Drafting Wills and Trusts (Robert Wilkins) (CAPS) - distributed by Clark
Boardman Callaghan [800-336-6365]
• CAPS Practice System Series - California Wills and Trusts Software (John
Hartog) - offered by Matthew Bender, whose web site is incredibly difficult to
navigate
Mark 1. Welch says: "When I interviewed attorneys for an associate position with
my firm, more than half had experience with the Matthew Bender/CAPS California
Wills and Trusts software. But when I tried to buy it from Matthew Bender, I was

http://www.sohoconsumer.com/legal_sw.htm
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r
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quoted five different prices in five inquries. Finally, I spoke with the product
manager, who told me that the product was not adaptable enough to be useful to
me...••

• California Continuing Education of the Bar (CEB) - many of their books
(including California Will Drafting, Drafting California Revocable Living Trusts,
and California Durable Powers ofAttorney) come with forms on disk, or you can
buy all their estate planning, trust & probate books on one CD-ROM (with Folio
software) for $600-$750 (plus $300/year for updates). They do not provide
document assembly software, just their book forms on disk in WordPerfect format.
[800-232-3444]

r

• Cowles Legal Systems (TrustPlus, Will-Do-It, Trust Plus Life Insurance, and
TrustTerminator) - downloadable demos [800-366-1730]

r

• Drafting Libraries - Blumberg, NYC [800-LAW-MART]

I

• Automated Legal Systems, Inc: ProDoc; Lipman's Wills and Trusts; Probate
Forms; and Guardianships [800-659-1973]

r
r

,.
,.r-

r
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• Wealth Transfer Planning system - The Technology Group, Inc. [410-576-2040]
• EP Expert (for Microsoft Word) from Eidelman Associates [800-775-2786]
[review by Vince Wilk]
• Provisions Plus Estate Document Generation System - from Legal Works, Inc.
[203-232-7030]
• Wills and Trusts Expert I WillDraft - from ExperText Systems, Inc. [800-3872625]
• WillBuilder from Easy Soft, Inc. [800-905-7638]
• DL Drafting Libraries $200 per library (separate libraries for "wills" and "inter
vivos trusts") - Attorney's Computer Network, Inc. [610-347-1500] - sample diem
questionnaire for New York Wills module andfor inter vivos trust module
John D. Etheriedge (web) writes: "I use several of the DL Drafting Libraries by
Attorneys Computer Network, Inc. The question & answer format is quick and
produces a substantial draft in a fraction of the time I used to spend using WP
macro's. With DL, I am able to streamline the drafting process and focus more
attention on refining and editing specific clauses. Of course, DL does have
limitations. In most instances. however, I find the documents produced by DL to be
a good starting point in the drafting process."

.• Texas Probate Library with State Bar of Texas Forms - from Lawyer's Cooperative
Publishing (LCP) [800-711-4503]

r

r
r

• Legal Ease Auto Systems from Microcomputer Concepts, Inc. - includes
Guardianship and Probate modules ($295 each) and "Wills and Trusts 2000"
module ($395) (requires WordPerfect) [800-232-1321]

http://www.sohoconsumer.comllegaLsw.htm
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-

• Living Trust Maker and Will Maker - from Nolo Press (for consumers) [510-5491976]

-

• Will Builder - from Easy Soft, Inc. [908-754-7638]

•

Document Assembly Software

-

• HotDocs and CAPS from Matthew Bender's Capsoft division (free 30-day demo of
HotDocs) [800-500-DOC]
Mark J. Welch says (after using the downloaded demo version): "I was very
impressed with this software, but when I first tried to use version 4.0, there were
bugs; the company promised an upgrade, which finally arrived after I made several
calls, but the upgrade didn't fix the bugs. To its credit, the company gave me a
complete refund. In November 1997, I decided to try again, and ordered HotDocs
4.1, despite a large price increase (from $69 to $149 for HotDocs, and from "free" to
$149 for the Judicial Council Forms set). Unfortunately, the company refused to
accept my order because I refused to tell them my home address. Then, in January, I
decided to try again, and I mailed them a check. Although I have already received
the cleared check ($283.42) back from my bank, Matthew Bender's computer system
has no record of my order (as of February 13); apparently they delayed entering my
order because I ordered both the Judicial Council Forms ($149) and the Northern
California County Forms ($99) -- which were advertised as "Now Available" but a
month later were still not actually available. Clearly, Matthew Bender just
doesn't want me as a customer."

-

-

o HotDocs Toolbox (Newsletter from RPW Publishing) [803-359-9941]
o HotDocs Internet email Mailing List discussion groups
• FastDraft from InterActive Professional Software ($495 DOS, $595 Windows)
[800-364-2419]
Doug Duncan writes: ''I'm delighted that you list the "FastDraft" program in your
software summary. I'd suggest, however, that it should be included in the more
generic "document assembly" category. While the folks at InterActive Professional
Software have offered my Will and trust forms in conjunction with FastDraft, the
FastDraft engine is really generic and is intended to facilitate the user's employing it
with any forms he or she may choose."

-

• Agility from RealWorld Solutions Inc. - "document assembly for the law office"
(apparently for WordPerfect or ASCII only) $695 [617-621-7099]
• PowerTXT [800-422-3880]

http://www.sohocor.sumer.com/legaLsw.htm
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• Scrivener for Windows [215-592-2630]
• WinDraft from Eidelman Associates [800-775-2786]
• General Counsel [410-576-2040]

•
Software to Transfer Assets
Henson's softWare prepares Sched~le A and all transfer documents, including deeds and
state-specific forms (e.g. PCOR for California), and includes a comprehensive
nationwide database of county recorders, life insurance companies, stock transfer agents,
etc.; it can also export to fiduciary accounting and 706-preparation software. In contrast,
the cheaper InTrust software is more of a "do it yourself' document assembly system. (I'd
like to see a system that also incorporates a checklist and follow-up letters to clients, to
verify the status of asset transfers.)
• Henson's Transfers - developed by Richard W. Henson - (you can download a
tutorial, but it's not a functioning demo) - distributed by Jane Schuck & Associates
($695/year) [800-694-7624]
• InTrust for Windows - from AtLaw Software ($99-$168) [800-828-5154]

•
CD-ROM Trusts & Estates Libraries
• Tax Analysts OneDisc and related titles
• Kleinrock Tax Library [800-678-2315]
• Estate Planning Advisor - from Research Institute of America [800-431-9025]

•
Software to Prepare Probate & Trust Accountings
• ProBATE Plus ($495) [800-288-9169]
• Fiduciary Accounting for Trusts and Estates from Clark Boardman Callaghan
[800-336-6365]
• TEdec
http://www.sohoconsumer.comllegal_sw.htm
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• Zane Fiduciary Accounting System (FAS) - facilitates preparation of Probate Court
accounting as well as 706 and 1041, plus Fiduciary Calendar; more products in
development altlink Demos [800-331-2533]

•
Software to Value Assets

-

.• Software distributed by Jane Schuck & Associates [800-694-7624]:
o EZ Bond - Calculate value of U.S. Savings Bonds
o Wallace Pricing (see next item)
• Wallace Pricing by Financial Data Service - CD-ROM and online pricing of
securities for estate & gift tax reporting [800-762-5468]

-

• EPScom software to obtain securities pricing information online, for import to
fiduciary accounting and 706 software - from Clark Boardman Callaghan [800336-6365]

-

-

• Investools' historical stock prices

•

Software to Prepare the 706 Estate Tax Return

-

• BNA 706 Preparer for Windows ($795-$995) demo available [800-372-1033]

-

• ProBATE 706 Plus ($495) also offers 706 and 1041 products [800-288-9169]
• Rock Creek FormsXPERT for Windows or DOS includes 706, 709, 1041, and
most other federal and state tax forms ($195-$598) free evaluation CD available
[800-296-2621]
• UST 7061709 System from U.S. Trust Co. of NY

-

• from Clark Boardman Callaghan [800-336-6365]:
o Federal Estate Tax Returns: Calculation & Prep-aration (ponn 7QQl (also 709
and 1041 modules)software

http://www.sohoconsumer.comllegal_sw.htT!1
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o Estate Practice Assistant by Donald Kelley - projects estate taxes; also
includes worksheets to facilitate 706 preparation and 1041 (IRD)
computations
• TEdec
• Zane/706 [800-331-2533]
• LaCerte Software - complete tax prep software for accountants, including
7061709/1041 preparation. [800-876-6672]
• Faster Tax System - from Faster Software Products [908-846-5511]
• Form 709 Program - from Dunphy Systems, Inc. [614-431-0846]

I

• QUIK 706, QUIK 709 and QUIK 1041 - Lackner Group, Inc. [800- 709-1041]

r
r
r
r
I

r

• Taxtime 706 - from Austin Scientific [415-323-6338]

•
Database and Case/Client Management Systems
• The Will Tracker - from The Lackner Group, Inc. [412-279-2121]
• Wills Manager - from Canterbury Systems Corp. [416-977-8434]
• Agency Assistant - from Client Marketing Systems "client management software
for insurance agents, agencies, and financial planners"

•
Time & Billing Software

~I·I~~r~i
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• TimeSlips (and TimeSheet)
• TimeSlice for Macintosh and Windows
• BillQuickffimeCard 800-BILL-NOW

•
Word Processing Software

http://wwv:.sohoconsumer.com/legal_sw.htm
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• Microsoft Word I Microsoft Office '97
o What's in Office '97 for You? (draft article. by James Eidelman)

-

o Microsoft Word for Windows 95 v. WordPerfect 6.1 for Windows (LexTech
Inc.)
• Lotus WordPro (formerly AmiPro) I SmartSuite

-

• Corel WordPerfect I Suite
o Mark Welch's unpleasant experience with Corel WordPerfect Suite 7 (June
1996)

-

o The Perfect Lawyer Newsletter from RPW Publishing [803-359-9941]
o MicroCounsel (WordPerfect consulting, macro design, and training for
firms - San Franciscol

Ia'.:,!,

Other Useful Sites Regarding Law Office Computing & Technology

-

• Law Office Technology Homepage (Dana Shultz & Associates, Oakland CAl includes many useful articles

-

• LexTech Inc. (NJ) - includes useful articles
• Microsoft's Legal Industry News Page (apparently updated twice per month)
• Law Technology Product News This monthly magazine publishes "new product"
announcements from vendors - pricing information is never included

-

•

-

Books and Publications

-

• Wills. Trusts. and Technology: An Estate Lawyer's Guide to
Automation, by Daniel B. Evans (published by the ABA) - lists
more than 100 vendors in the appendix.

,

-

• RPW Publishing: Publishes several newsletters for attorneys,
including The Lawyer's PC, The Perfect Lawyer, HotDocs
Toolbox, and Mediator's Toolbox

-

• Technology Update by G. Burgess Allison (column in LPM, the ABA Law
Practice Management section's magazine)

http://www.sohoconsumer.com/legal_sw.htm
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• The Lawyer's Guide to the Intemet by G. Burgess Allison
• Net La'rV: How Lawyers Use the Internet by Paul Jacobsen
• Creating a Lawyer's Web Site: Results of My Web Site, by Mark J. Welch

•
Some Related Sites:

,..

California Estate Planning, Probate & Trust Law [Mark Welch's Home Page]

f

Estate Planning Newsletter Articles
Wills on the Web [Celebrity & Historical Wills]

r

Complete List of U.S. Estate Planning & Probate Attorneys with Web Sites

r
,

r
r

If you want an e-mail update notice from NetMind whenever this
page is updated, please enter your complete e-mail address:
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ATTACHMENT C
MISCELLANEOUS E-MAIL POSTINGS AND ADVERTISEMENTS
CONCERNING SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:

Joseph G.Hodges Jr. <jghodges@usa.net>
LOUISVILLE.SMTP("aba-ptl@home.ease.lsoft.com","cba ...
Thursday, June 18, 1998 1:30 am
Fwd: Release of HotDocs 5 and HotDocs Pro 5

The follow important official news from Capsoft Corporation about
the new
Version 5.0 upgrades to the popular HotDocs and HotDocs Pro
document assembly programs was finally posted today on the
hotdocs-dist list by Bob
Manning, the Product Manager for Capsoft Corporation.
The Moderators, ABA-PTL List
>From: "Bob Manning" <bobm@capsoft.com>
>To: <hotdocs-dist@capsoft.com>
>Subject: Release of HotDocs 5 and HotDocs Pro 5
>Date: Wed, 17 Jun 1998 18:12:07 -0600
>X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 4.72.3110.5
>Sender: owner-hotdocs-dist@capsoft.com
>Reply-To: "Bob Manning" <bobm@capsoft.com>
>

>Capsoft Development is pleased to announce the release of
HotDocs version 5
>and HotDocs Pro version 5. A few of the new features added
include (for more
>detailed information, see www.capsoft.com) :
>

>HotDocs 5
>-- Direct filling of form template fields
>-- URL's in the HotDocs library
>-- Ability to use auto-assemble and auto-install files
>-- Better overflow control in filling form templates
>

r
b

r
rt

r
r
r

>HotDocs Pro 5
>-- All things listed above (and more) in HotDocs 5
>-- New publishing options for creating auto-assemble and
auto-install files
>-- Ability to attach field wizards to form template fields
>-- Create templates that upload the answer file data back to a
server
>-- Attach post assembly macros to document templates
>-- Create detailed helps for users that reference infobases and
Windows help
>files
>

>You should have received an upgrade notice in the mail by now,
but if you
>haven't received one, you can order upgrades by calling
800-500-3627 (in
>U.S.) and 801-354-8000 from anywhere else. Upgrade pricing is
per licensed
>user and is as follows (all prices quoted in SUS) :
>

I

,..
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>Upgrade from HotDocs 4.x to HotDocs 5
>$79 ea
1 - 4 copies
>$74 ea
5 - 9 copies
>$68 ea
10 - 24 copies
25 - 49 copies
>$58 ea
>$47 ea
50 - 199 copies
>

>Upgrade from HotDocs 1.x, 2.x, 3.x to HotDocs 5
1 - 4 copies
.>$149 ea
>$139 ea
5 - 9 copies
10 - 24 copies
>$129 ea
25 - 49 copies
>$109 ea
50 - 199 copies
>$89 ea

-

-

>

>Upgrade from HotDocs 4.x-to HotDocs Pro 5
>$299 ea

.

>

>Upgrade from HotDocs Pro 4.x to HotDocs Pro 5
1 - 4 copies
>$129 ea
>$109 ea
5 - 9 cop~es
10 - 24 copies
>$99 ea

-

>

>For more than 200 copies, please call 800-500-3627 (in U.S.).
Maintenance
>customers (more than 25 copies with a maintenance contract) will
receive the
>upgrade automatically. If you have more than 25 copies and have
no
>maintenance contract, please call 800-500-3627 (in U.S.) to
discuss options.
>

>Bob Manning
>Product Manager
>Capsoft Development
>

>----------------------------------------------------------------

>This message came by way of your subscription to the
hotdocs-dist list.
>To unsubscribe, go to this web page in your browser:
>http://www.capsoft.com/cgi-bin/mlgate/HOTDOCS-DIST/unsubscribe.h
tml
>You can also unsubscribe by sending an e-mail message to
>majordomo@capsoft.com with no subject line and this in the body:
>unsubscribe hotdocs-dist
>

cc:

LOUISVILLE.SMTP(lllpm-counselors@abanet.org","rppt- ...

-

-
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From:
To:
Date:
Subject:

Vaughn W Henry <VWHenry@AOL.COM>
LOUISVILLE. SMTP ( "VWHenry@AOL. COM" )
Friday, June 19, 1998 5:48 am
Re: Estate & Charitable Planning Software

John Oler writes:
>Do any of you have suggestions on other software that can
illustrate Estate
>and Charitable plans?
Actually, for "quick and dirty" calculations, flowcharts and
client education pieces, KettleyPublishi.ngout in California has
'a pretty good charitable quick plan that integrates with their
estate cost estimator module. They offer it as an inexpensive
option to other estate planning software and I usually have
handouts and literature from several publishers and developers
when I do my seminars, and Kettley has been nice enough to
discount it heavily as a courtesy to my workshop attendees. I
make zip, nada, zilch on their products, but using my corp.
discount you'd have a hard time beating their price.
Vaughn W Henry
Springfield, IL http://mernbers.aol.com/CRTrust/CRT.html

r
r

r
r
r
I

r
r
r
r
r-I

I(a) - 19

-

ROTH IRA Conversion Kit Available
Clients with IRAs need to know whether to contribute to a ROTH IRA or convert funds from traditional IRAs into a ROTH IRA. Clients with no
present IRAs should also determine whether they
are eligible for a ROTH IRA and whether annual
contributions make sense.
CCH's new ROTH IRA Conversion Kit is an allin-one package that will help the I?ractitioner capitalize on this urgent, new plannmg opportunity.
Each kit includes:
• lRAs After the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, a
detailed reference book to help you understand the application of the hew IRA rules;
• 25 copies of New IRA Opportunities, a handy
booklet for client distribution;
• Sample Client Letters, to help you alert clien~
to ROTH IRA opportunities and to assist you
in proViding follow-up information;

-

• ROTH IRA Conversion Calculations CD-ROM,

-

a CD containing ROTH IRA conversion calculations to help you determine the best IRA
strategies for your clients by plugging in the
specifics on a client-by-elient basis; and
• A CPE Quizzer, to help you earn valuable CPE
credit.
With CCH's ROTH IRA Conversion Kit you'll
have all the tools you need to work more effectively. To order, for only $99, please call 1-800-2483248, priority code GC 44634, Prod. #05358101.

Windows Estate Planning
ntuitive Estate Planner from West
Group analyzes myriad estate plan
development options and saves users
time in collecting and organizing
client information, performing estate
tax calculations and preparing illustrative presentations for clients.
Authors Donald H. Kelley and Konrad Schmidt III created the Intuitive
Estate Planner with features that help
identify the present ownership and estate tax consequences of different assets for both the first and second estate
of spouses, display the effect of the estate tax in both tabular and graphic
form, and plan and demonstrate estate
tax techniques for the client. The user
can select different scenarios with specific assets, deductions, tax adjustments and other choices, such as splitinterest gift calculation, choices for the
marital deduction and generation
skipping, and how the tax burden is allocated among different legacies. In
addition, adjustment optiOns are in-

I

cluded for adjusted taxable gifts, gift
taxes payable, property previously
taxed, foreign tax credits and the
amount of any state death tax that
might be payable.
The program contains many display
formats and performs many calculations, including calculation of the
death tax on first estates and second
estates of spouses, split-interest trusts,
estate liquidity, IRS annuity and life interest calculations for valuation of annuities, life estates and remainders, as
well as calculation of growth in value
of estate assets by asset or overall average. The results of all calculations can
be viewed in flow chart, comparative
bar graph or table format, with the detailed calculations in columns. And
every screen, calculation, flow chart
and graph can be printed. The Intuitive Estate Planner also contains a
predefined slide show of information,
pictures and charts that can be used to
present options to clients and help
convince them of the significance of
estate planning.
I(a) - 20

The Intuitive Estate Planner is a
Windows program and requires a laser
printer. The current edition covers
Blanges made by the Taxpayer Relief
Al:t of 1997 and costs $795 for a onefear subscription.
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With Estate Planning

Dear Estate Counselor,
In the next ten years, over TEN TRILLION DOLLARS will pass from one generation to the
next. Portions of that amount will end up in the hands of accountants, attorneys, estate
planners and federal, state, and local governments. The estate planning market is growing
rapidly and is probably one that you are watching very closely.
You are also on the lookout for new
technologies to help you provide
breakthrough services for your
clients.

Thousands of estate planning
professionals are calling TrustWise
Estate Planning Presentation Software just
such a breakthrough. They no longer rely on calculators and pencil sketches on a yellow
legal pad. They use TrustWise, a time-saving tool for showing clients a crystal clear picture
of their estate planning options. They are providing their clients with highly professional, fullcolor reports with very useful and provocative information.
TrustWise allows you, as a trained and
experienced professional, to simply and
quickly put quality information in your
clients' hands. Your client can see the
clear and simple information on the
reports you provide, and the decision is
almost made!
Many people realize the need for an
estate plan. However, many times they
either lack information or are too
confused to take action. TrustWise
makes that information crystal clear by

J

Navigation through TrustWise is intuitive and simple. Point and click at
the information you want, and TrustWise takes you there.

OSI Software • 9460 Union Square. Suite 249 • Sandy, Utah 84070.801-495-3100 • 1-800-432-6947
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showing the projected savings to your client's estate, in real dollars, based on their assets.
Your effectiveness in moving clients to take action on estate plans will increase
dramatically - OSI absolutely guarantees it or your money back.
The process is very, very simple. In just five minutes, you can gather vital information
about your client's estate in a very non-threatening, unobtrusive way. In another moment,
the client sees a detailed comparison of
savings to the estate - with and
without an estate plan. The
rj bottom line is crystal clear.
What's more, TrustWise allows you
to show your clients variations of
estate planning using a living trust or
testamentary will, and a bypass or QTIP trust. And all of these
options take place in a matter of moments. Your clients will be well equipped and feel
confident about making decisions concerning their estate.

The benefits of TrustWise are numerous:
• You spend LESS time giving your clients MORE and better information.

r

• The actual cost of TrustWise software is returned in a single successful
presentation.

r

• You don't need to be a computer wizard to make TrustWise work. It's very simple,
intuitive, and easy to use.

r

• TrustWise is the most certain way to motivate clients to action on an estate plan.

r

r
r
r

• TrustWise generates professional looking reports, charts, and graphs for your clients
rather than pencil sketches on a yellow legal pad.
• OSI Software keeps you up to date on any changes in the tax code affecting the
formation and maintenance of wills, trusts, etc. Timely upgrades ensure that your
presentations are accurate and current.
• Technical support is completely FREE for one full year from the time you purchase
TrustWise.
• Spend less time crunching numbers and more time actually planning you clients
estate.
• Show your clients results in just minutes.

r
rI
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60-Day Money-Back Guarantee
TrustWise is fully guaranteed. If, for any reason, you are dissatisfied with TrustWise, simply
return it within 60 days of purchase for a full refund- no questions asked. (Note: Shipping
& handling charges are not refundable,)
Also, when you purchase TrustWise, you can download interim releases of TrustWise 3.0 via
the internet free of charge. In addition, you will be given special discounted pricing on
future upgrades of TrustWise, which will further enhance the capabilities of your software.
These additional modules, such as the Irrevocable Life Insurance Module, the Liquidation
module, and the Charitable Contribution module are available now. The Liquidation module
shows your client how his estate might be liquidated to pay probate fees and estate taxes.
It powerfully illustrates any need for estate liquidity tools such as a second-to-die life
insurance policy. The Irrevocable Life Insurance module allows you to illustrate how a such
a life insurance trust can provide liquidity to the estate, preventing the need for a wholesale
estate sale. The Charitable Trust module
enables your clients see the
effects of charitable giving on
estate and income taxes.
These modules further enhance
your ability to make your clients
confident and sure about the decisions
they make concerning their estates.

-

-

If you order TrustWise before July 31, 1998, you will automatically receive the Liquidation
and Irrevocable Life Insurance modules at no additional cost. Regularly priced at $99 each,
you save $198. Also, you have the option to purchase the Charitable Contribution module,
also regularly priced at $99 for only $49.
The hardware and software requirements to run TrustWise are a 486 66-MHz OX, IBMcompatible or better computer with at least 16 MB RAM, 10 MB of free disk space, and
Windows 3.1, Windows 95, or Windows NT.

-

The benefits of TrustWise 3.0 to an estate planner are clear. Those with the foresight to
take advantage of these benefits will have a significant competitive advantage. Don't get
left behind. Order today.

I(a) - 26
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There is nothing to lose. Your small investment today will mean large returns in the near
future as your estate practice grows. Get TrustWise 3.0 at a special, limited-time-only price
if you act before July 31,1998. TrustWise regularly retails for $189.95, but if you order
before July 31,1998, you can get the base module (which includes the AS Trust and QTIP
Trust modules) for only $99. Also, as part of this special offer, you will get the Life
Insurance and Liquidation modules (each valued at $99) absolutely FREE, AND have the
opportunity to purchase the newly released Charitable Contributions module (regularly
priced at $99) for only $49! If you take advantage of the full offer, you get over $485.00
worth of valuable software for only $148! (plus shipping.)
To order TrustWise, call 1-800-432-6947. Have your VISA or MasterCard number and
expiration date ready. Or, to order by mail, simply enclose a check or money order for the
appropriate amount in the postage-paid envelope along with the enclosed order card. Your
order will be processed promptly and you will be running TrustWise 3.0 in a matter of days.

Sincerely,

r
r

r

Craig Osterloh
President, OSI Software
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FINANCIAL & ESTATE PLANNING
PRODUCTS

INHERITANCE, ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX REPORTER-STATE
With the CCH Inheritance, Estate and
Gift Tax Reporter - State, you get
the big picture with all-state and
home-state coverage of inheritance,
estate and gift tax laws. This
six-volume reference combines the full
background of the laws affecting these
taxes - in all states, the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico.
•

Valuable, time-saving tools such as
charts and checklists provide a
snapshot of the various state laws.

•

CCH Explanations clarify pertinent
laws, regulations and decisions showing you what they mean and
how they may be applied.

•

•

The full text of relevant state laws
and annotations to court decisions,
Attorney General's opinions, and
administrative releases are included
in identical format - for your state
only or for all 50 states, the District
of Columbia and Puerto Rico. The
choice is yours.

ESTATE PLANNING REVIEW
Stay on top of the latest fmancial and
estate planning trends with this invaluable
monthly newsletter edited by CCH editors
in consultation with renowned expert
Sidney Kess. Estate Planning Review
reports and interprets the meaning and
planning implications of legislative,
judicial and administrative changes.
Each monthly issue, covering a wide
range of topics, keeps you in touch with
current planning techniques and key
fmancial and estate planning developments.
Other helpful features, including a Table
of Contents on the front page of every
issue, along with annual indexing, make
this newsletter perfect to retain for
future reference.

Monthly Newsletter

This valuable newsletter is also included
as part of a print or CD-ROM CCH
Financial & Estate Planning subscription. (See SmartPLANNER on page 23.)

All-State Compendiums summarize
each state's law and tax rates, while
the All-State Treatise offers a quick
picture of the entire field.

NEW YORK ESTATES,
WILLS AND TRUSTS
The interrelated statutes of New York
probate law affect practitioners with
clients who live or own property in New
York and serve as an important reference
source for practitioners around the
country. Many professionals will find this
loose-leaf reporter an indispensable
addition to their research libraries.
• Essential statutory provisions for
trust and estate practice in New
York are published in full .. text and
effectively organized for easy
access.

-.

Topics Include:

o
o

CCH Inheritance, Estate and Gift Tax
Reporter - State is the perfect
complement to the FederaL Estate and

Guardianships
Intestate Succession
Trusts and Estates
Fiduciaries-Rights, Powers.
Duties and Limitations
Will Interpretation and Construction
Estate and Trust Administration

Gift Tax Reporter.

:t+I

.

• Monthly reports offer the latest
coverage of important new law
provisions and amendments, plus
current court decisions back
referenced by paragraph number
to pertinent law sections, to
ensure that you're working
with only the most up-to-date
information.

o
o
o
o

I Loose-leaf Volume
Monthly Updates
PRINT

6 Loose-leaf Volumes
Monthly Updates

PRINT
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PRODUCTS
CCH® SMARTPLANNER™
When it comes to complete, comprehensive coverage of financial and estate planning issues, CCHe SmartPLANNER~
is unbeatable. It's an all-in-one productivity tool that enables you to offer more to your clients and affords more time
for you. We provide the superior content you deserve, giving you the most accurate, comprehensive coverage you
CD·ROM
won't fmd anywhere else. CCH SmartPLANNER is comprised of four unique products, which together provide a
Monthly
Updates
complete estate and financial planning library on one CD-ROM.

This all-encompassing guide covers all
stages of the estate plan - from development to administration - and at the same
time allows you to improve your financial
and estate planning expertise.

This reliable reference guide contains the
full-text of the Internal Revenue Code and
IRS regulations on federal estate, gift and
generation-skipping taxes, which allows you
to make infonned, accurate decisions.

•

• You'll have full text reporting on these
provisions at your fingertips, along
with applicable final, temporary and
proposed regulations and related
income tax provisions.

r
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FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAX
REPORTS

CCH FINANCIAL & ESTATE
PLANNING

•

•

•

Includes productivity tools that are
designed to assist you in the research
process. Includes detailed explanations,
strategies and planning aids that target
these major areas: income. estate and gift
tax planning, general investmellt
planning, insurance planning, pension,
and retirement planning and
estate administration.
You'tl get answers to the real issues you face
because this guide is written by tax professionals for tax professionals. CCH editors
provide you with cutting-edge guidance
on the latest financial and estate planning
trends.
You'll also be provided with timely
advice offered by Sidney Kess, Consulting Editor, and an Advisory Board of
leading practitioners representing law,
accounting, insurance, investment and
fmancial, and retirement planning.
You'll have access to fonns, client
communication letters, checklists and
sample documents designed by
experts and used in practice.

• We also include full-text reporting of
federal court decisions and IRS rulings,
including selected private letter rulings,
and pending legislation - keeping you
current with the latest infonnation.
• To simplify your research, CCH
explanations are integrated within the
official material to provide you with the
law, what it means and how to apply
it - and best yet, it's all in one place.

Monthly Updates
CD·ROM

•

ONLINE

PRINT

•

FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT
TAXES EXPLAINED
If you're searching for a source for
quick, concise answers to your federal
estate and gift tax questions, look no
further. This timely reference has it all.
• Clear, compr&i1ellliive explanations
of the laws relating to federal estate,
gift and generation-skipping transfer
taxes provides you with the practical
guidance you need.
• Timely discussions of recent law and
regulation changes, court decisions
and IRS rulings give you quick
answers to support your research.

BOOK

CCH® FinEst Cales TN
This electronic productivity tool is
designed exclusively for professionals
who perfonn estate planning and related
functions. It automates and consolidates financial and estate planning
calculations and provides graphical
representation - in one product!

Monthly Updates

• More than 20 separate calculations
covering Split Interest Transfers,
Retirement, Financial and Tax.

3 Loose-leaf Volumes
Weekly Updates

• These calculators may be modified
to accommodate a variety of
computational options - so you're
not locked into default settings.

Subscription includes Estate Planning
Review and Ideas & Trends newsletters.

• Each calculation has three different
scenarios displayed side.by-side allowing for "what-if' planning.
Monthly Updates

• A graphing capability is built right
into this program, allowing you to
display or print the results.

CD·ROM

4 Loose-leaf Volumes
Monthly Updates

CD-ROM

PRINT
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INTERNATIONAL TAX
PRODUCTS
THE CCH MEXICAN TAX LIBRARY

MEXICAN TAX GUIDE
Thrn to this one-of-a-kind guide for
practical analysis of Mexican tax
laws. You won't find another service
with this level of detail...not even in
Mexico! Authored by Jaime
Gonzlilez-Bendiksen and other experts
in the Mexico offices of Baker &
McKenzie, the Guide includes:
• Complete explanatory coverage of
income, asset and value-added tax
laws and Mexico's administration
of its tax system.
• Discussions of recent tax reform
packages and historical trends.
• Step-by-step examples of complex
calculations including:
• Inflationary adjustments
• CUFIN balance and
dividend distributions
• Income, asset and value-added
tax computations
• In-depth analysis of customs,
maquiladora and foreign
investment legislation.
• Official English-language versions
for all of Mexico's tax treaties or
expert translations of treaties not
drafted in English.

I Loose-leaf Volume
Quarterly Updates
PRINT

MEXICAN TAX, CUSTOMS AND
FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS
This one-volume loose-leaf reporter is
comprised of authoritative English
translations of Mexico's tax laws, as well
as laws concerning customs and foreign
investment. When combined with the
Mexican Tax Guide. subscribers can
research both law text and detailed
explanations to ensure accurate answers
to Mexican tax issues. And, you're
always up-to-date because translations of
new legislation are sent to subscribers
immediately to ensure that you are
working with the latest law text.
The publication, developed by CCH
editors working with Bryan, Gonzalez
Vargas y Gonzalez Baz, a leading
Mexican law firm, includes professional
translations of the following:
• Income, asset and value-added tax laws
and regulations
• Federal Fiscal Code and regulations
• Customs law and regulations

MEXICAN LAW & BUSINESS
REPORT NEWSLETTER
This newsletter can't be beat for coverage
of what's important to U.S. businesses
that trade with or have operations in
Mexico. This extensive news and
information source provides the "big
picture" of the Mexican legal and business
environment

..

• Coverage on trade, taxatJon. finance.
...
intellectual property, labor. real estate.
environment, business and industry and
economic indicators.
• Mexican news developments provided
by INFOSEL, a leading Mexican
information service.
• Feature articles and practical insights
from leading practitioners.
• Translations of key Mexican laws
and regulations.
• The latest Mexican official technical
standards (NOMS).
• Status of NAFTA dispute panels.

• Foreign investment law
• Maquiladora decrees

Tax. Customs and Foreign Investment

-

-

...and more!

• Miscellaneous Resolution
(Le., annual general rules)
Unlike other translations that come
without reference tools, CCH Mexican

-

Monthly Newsletter
NEWSlETTER

-

Laws provides an extensive topical index
and is fully cross-referenced among the
law, regulations and annual general rules.

I Loose-leaf Volume
4 - 6 Updates Per Year
PRINT
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FORMS
PRODUCTS
CCH® perform plus ™
The most current and comprehensive
library of tax forms available on just one
CD-ROM! Infinitely faster and more
convenient than traditional print products,
this innovative electronic resource enables
you to locate, view, fill out, and laser print
any of more than 5,000 federal and state
tax forms and their complete instructions
in seconds.
Limit or expand your purchase to federal
forms, state tax forms, or a combination
of both-you have the flexibility to
choose what best meets your needs.

FEDERAL TAX FORMS

Federal Tax Forms is a handy
compilation of income, estate, gift, excise
and employment tax forms, supplementary schedules and official Internal
Revenue Service instructions. All of these
forms are gathered together in three
convenient loose-leaf binders--eliminating the need for maintaining an independent file of tax forms. Timely loose-leaf
reports keep you up-to-date with the latest
revisions and annual versions of tax forms.
This convenient, desktop resource offers
the following helpful features:

The complete cc~ perform plus™
library includes forms, schedules and
instructions for virtually every type of return
and offers the following helpful features:

• New and amended forms are sent to
you upon release, giving you quick
access to the latest forms.

• A convenient search function, a forms
list and form category help you quickly
find the form you need.

• Topical and numerical indexes make
finding the appropriate form a breeze.

• Complete, official instructions are
accessible while viewing the form on
the screen, providing helpful guidance
on less familiar or more complex forms.

• Forms are printed full size and ready
to reproduce.

• Includes a handy tax calendar to
remind users of filing dates.
• Report letters offer brief summaries of
all new developments.

• Federal forms feature automatic
calculations which streamline data
entry and minimize errors.
• Updated every two weeks during tax
season to ensure that you have the most
current tax forms and instructions.
• A CD-ROM archival library of forms
and their instructions gives you
convenient access to the late filing
procedures and appropriate forms.
With complete fill-in-the blanks capability,
context-sensitive instructions, and print
and save functions just a keystroke away,
you'll have a comprehensive and efficient
system that facilitates your compliance
work-all on one easy-to-use CD.
Periodic UpdatcsBiweekly During Tax Season
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Includes a separate division containing
the full text of Internal Revenue
Service rules and procedures on the
private reproduction and printing of
forms, the filing of returns on magnetic
tape, computer preparation of income
tax returns and related matters.
Periodic Updates
PRINT

Did you know that
government could end
up liquidating a thriving business if the
unthinkable happens?
Most wilIs
won't proteet your
business.

J

Even if you or your "'~,
partner is only temporarily incapacitated.

livingTrustBuilder
helps you creole the
fromework for your
Wing 1rusl so you con

---

Lawyers and customers alike tell us that IlvingTrustBuilder gives business owners greater

understanding and more control over their legacy, while saving time. Which slashes legal
_1-- ... ",,_,-.•.1. costs. And gives you more say.

drolOOlical~ reduce

your

legal
fees.

--

Of course, we'd like to take credit for protecting people's businesses. But we
·~~.:-~E-.:'?know better. We just provide the templates and ask the questions.

....ft_.____
_------_ .__

....:;~=~.:.:~~7·

..~ 'You fill in the blanks.

::-"'~==-_._--

"

•
.•_•._ In oddilion to the
~Z:.~======= stondord living

documents,
UvingTrustBuilder
OffefS 0 comprehensive assortment of ogreements and
documents to protect your heirs ond your business.
"=.~:::,:-:=,,::::"'"='"

.:::=:-=~=-=-.:== ~-:=
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_.- ----------- --- ------ -All of the
documents in
livingTrust
Builder are
designed to
simplify the
process when
you meet with
your anomey.
Sa you
maintoin
conlTol, while
keeping costs
to 0 minimum.
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Ten years ago, JIAN
started offering our
first spreadsheet and
word·processing tem·
plates. Pre·formatted

r

documents brimming
with informa·
tion that you
could easily
customize to .
suit your company.

r

r
r

With J.IAN's inte~ctive
solutions, you Simply
It was all about infor. . fill in ~our company
- • ulformaMn once, and
mation.
the software places the
dote throughout.

r
r
r

r
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Today, it's still all
about information.
But now we've got

I l

some extra features
that make it easier to use. Today our software coaches you while asking questions. And then it
places your answers throughout the document, so you don't always have to search and replace
But most ofall, the documents we help you produce are first class. Not cookie-cutter. Just con·

liii55!~I. sistent, with all the information in the right places. So your business plan is easy to understand
and easy to finance. Your employee manual inspires your employees, and contains all the right
language to protect your company. Your marketing plan is _ _ . - .
Helpful hints tell you

through the
entire planning
~.:;;''=':::'~~''..=~.-.::::.:t.= not on~ what to do,
process.
thorough and easy to follow and implement. Your
but why.

=

. _._
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: ::ks.
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You will add too much of you into each document to make your com· =j.;':'~~=
:-.......
...... l_:~
pany look much like any other company usingJIAN software.
~:: .. '=;::,~-:-.-- ....'"'"

r

With one exception. We will help you look and be more successful.

employee records are impeccably organized.
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ATTACHMENT D
TRUSTS AND ESTATES
November 1997

A Small Firm's Perspective On
Document Assembly Software
U TILlZING DOCUMENT ASSEMBLY SOFfWARE will
l. estate plannIng attorneys
lave to solve
the problem of how to
deliver comprehensive
estate planning documents to their clients
quickly and at a reasonable cost. Our firm
includes three attorneys, a certified legal assistant, an
accountant/office manager and a
secretary, who live in a town that
supports a population of nearly
80,000 people. We rely on document assembly software as an essential part of our estate planning
practice and believe it is critical to
our success. Although our location
is unique (in the interior of Alaska, 165 miles south of the Arctic
Circle, in a borough as big as Connecticut), the practical problems
we face in our practice are not.
We are surprised by how few
good document assembly programs are on the market today.
We are more surprised by,the
number of attorneys that do not
use at least one of these programs on a daily basis. Without
question, all sole practitioners
and all estate planning firms or
departments with less than five
attorneys should consider making
document assembly software the workhorse of
their Will and trust business. Larger firms may have
good reasons for their reluctance to instalI a document assembly software
program (or programs), but
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be imperative for every estate planning attorney who
wants to maintain a thriving practice
in the 21st Century. This article surveys all of the popular document assembly software pograms for Will
and trust drafting that are on the
market today. The authors explore
the strengths and weaknesses of the
best programs as well as offer analysis as to what programs would work
better for different office structures.
these reasons will seem less compelling in the near future than
they may seem now. 1
Our purpose in writing this article is three-fold. First, we wanted
to assist attorneys and office managers who are looking for their
firm's first document assembly
software program and who want
to know what is out there. Second, we wanted to alert finns who
already are using document assembly software to the new programs. Third, we wanted to challenge the conclusions of alI attorneys, whether from large firms or
small, who do not appreciate the
economic importance of these
programs and their inevitable future impact on our profession.

A Brief Personal History
All but the newest members of
the profession have seen how
technology has changed our prac-

Shelley D. Ebenal,
Susan L Evans,
Cindy L Violette
and Richard W. Hompesch n
By

Hompesch & Associates,
Fairbanks, AK
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tices. Many of us graduated law school without
learning how to type.
When some of us start~d practicing, our secretaries used manual
typewriters and lots of
carbon paper. One of
the authors remembers
that it took him nine
hours to cut and paste his first
Will for a client with a S1 million
estate. J,.ater mag cards with their
limited memory were the rage.
only to be trumped a few years
later by personal computers. After
our secretaries had been using
personal computers for some
time, a few of us tried them out
for ourselves and some of us even
kept them on our desks to impress our clients. Eventually "'e
found out how important personal computers were for file management, keeping our calendar
and tickling important dates.
In our· office, we began using
documeht 'a~sernbLy software by
accident. We<",were subscribing to
the old Drafting ,Wills and Trust
Agreements form ~ook for a year
or two when they sent a flyer announcing their new DOS -based
software program. On a lark. we
mailed in our money and apparently were the first firm in
Alaska to get the program.
After we installed the program we were stunned. It
simplified all of th~ complicated commands that we
had created in \\'ordPerfect
to merge the forms. Later at

a training seminar in South Carolina, the author of the program,
Robert L. Wilkins, taught us how
to prepare "the five minute Will."
We were hooked. The Wills and
trusts flowed out of our printers
and to our clients.
In 1994, we attended the annual
TRUSTS & ESTATES conference in
San Francisco and saw a demonstration
of Jonathan
G.
Blattmachr's and Dan Hastings'
new program, Wealth Transfer
Planning. We stood in a group of
other attorneys, who probably had
drafted hundreds more CRUfs and
CRATs and Wills with reverse
QTIP elections than our firm ever
had. They scrutinized the program
and commented on how the program did not do "it" the way they
did. We quietly bought the program and for less than $1,000
hired two expert estate planning
attorneys as our ~senior partner."
At the time it sounded just too
good to be true.2
In a few years our practice was
transfomled in ways we had never
imagined. Now after receiving the
financial and family information
about a client, our legal assistant
enters the pertinent data into the
program, selects the options directed by the attorney, and sends
the attorney an e-mail that the
documents are ready. The attorney
reviews the data and the selected
options and finalizes the document. Then the legal assistant formats and prints the drafts. Drafting
customized documents for most
married couples does not take
more than an hour. Our goal is to
mail drafts of all documents to our
cl'ients no later than two weeks after the initial appointment' It usually takes us twice as long to review documents with our clients,
than it took us to draft them in the
first place.

Exploring Advantages
And Disadvantages
The advantages of a good document assembly program are quality, consistency and speed. These
advantages favor the new attorney
with little experience who faces a
drafting problem that he has never
seen before and who does not
have a senior partner close at hand

to direct him to the file where he
can find the appropriate pro\"ision
for that special client. Most good
programs include a checklist that
will prevent even an experienced
attorney from overlooking important considerations that are easy to
forget, such as whether both
spouses are U.S. citizens. Document assembly programs have
made it easier for attorneys to produce specialized documents that
previously would have taken hours
of research and drafting. Although
no computer generated document
should be taken verbatim. a good
document assembly program will
give an inexperienced attorney a
good first draft. These programs
have made smaller firms more
competitive and have assisted attorneys everywhere to deliver quality documents previously only
available from a few experts.
One disadvantage of adopting a
docu'ment assembly program is the
unbillable time it takes to learn a
new program; but the toughest
part is that, to some extent. you
must surrender your ego. \'i7e all
have our favorite forms. HO"'ever,
we have to ask why we need
three or four different perpetuities
saving clauses or survivorship
clauses in our form bank. On the
other hand, no one wants to be
accused of sending out "cookiecutter" Wills. The undeniable economic fact is that when uniformity
saves time and money, our egos
must yield.

Our Survey Of Estate
Planning Document
Assembly Software
We began our survey of estate '
planning document assembly soft-"..,
ware almost two months before we
started writing this article.3 We
searched the Internet and the articles listed in the Current Law Index
of legal periodicals for estate planning from 1991-1996 for document
assembly software. 4 We found
more than 20 different programs
and then began the tedious task of
contacting the vendors and requesting either a demo or a copy
of the program on a trial basis. We
deleted any programs that claimed
to be, or appeared to be. state specific. s In some cases we could not
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contact the vendors. despite numerous attempts.(' Our request for
the demo or copy of one program
was refused7 and another program
simply did not arrive before our
deadline for submitting this article.s
We apologize in advance to any
vendors with good programs th;t
we may have overlooked.
We reviewed each demo or program on the basis of available features, cost, user friendliness. network capability, hardware requirements, modification capability and
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word processing. We preferred
"interactive" document assembly
software. Interactive programs ask
the user a series of questions and
then based upon the responses,
asks other relevant questions. For
example, an interactive program
will ask if the client is married. If
the answer is yes, then the program will ask you for the spouse's
name and other relevant information, such as whether the spouse is
a U.S. citizen. If any answer is no,
then the program will move on to
another series of relevant questions. After entering the client data
and selecting the options for the
particular plan, the software will
assemble the estate planning documents by using the appropriate
provisions. If the plan is for a married client, an interactive program
will not offer provisions that only
should be used for a single client.

The Honor Roll
The three programs that we
liked the best are Cowles Legal
System (Cowles), Drafting Wills

and Trust Agreements (DWTA)
and Wealth Transfer Planning
(\'V'TP ).9 Each of these programs
is interactive, allows the user to
enter the client data once regardless of the number of documents
that will be assembled, and allows
the user to permanently modify
the text and insert his own provisions. All three programs have
network versions, good tech support, convert final documents to
Word or WordPerfect, and include
other resources in the program to
assist the drafter.
Cowles Legal System. Cowles'
drafting software comes in three
modules: Will-Do-It, Trust Plus,
and Trust Plus Li(e Insurance.
You can prepare Wills, pour-over
Wills, revocable trusts and irrevocable trusts on this software, plus
a wide variety of supporting documents including durable powers
of attorney, powers of attorney
fo'r health care, health care directives (living Wills), community
property agreements, asset transfer letters, assignments, state spe-
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cific real estate deeds. itemized
invoices, customized document
envelopes and covers, and letters
to corporate trustees, personal
representatives, and to clients including a follow-up questionnaire
to clients and a thank you letter.
In addition to software. Cowles
offers videos, booklets. binders.
envelopes, worksheets and fee
agreements. The purpose of
Cowles' videos and booklets is to
educate clients, thereby making
the estate planning process more
time and cost efficient. Although
we only reviewed the Windows9; version, Cowles will run
on DOS, Windows 3.1 or higher,
and Windows9;.
Cowles is very user friendly and
is easy to navigate. Cowles provides' explanations and ""arnings
with its provisions. These explanations and warnings are not as
comprehensive as WTP's. but are
easy to understand and are helpful, when making an informed decision as to whether the option
you are choosing is appropriate
for your client. The software includes easy-ta-read user manuals.
onlin~ substantive legal "help,"
phrase preview "help" and online
technical "help."
Cowles offers a complete practice system with membership in a
program called the Forum. The
purpose of this membership is to
facilitate contact and communication between estate planning attorneys and offers additional technical support and infomlation, including a quarterly newsletter.
There are two levels of the membership that entitles you to varied
levels of free technical support
and' piscounts on seminars.
Cowles>offers various seminars to
update 'their customers on estate
planning i~sues and changes in
the system..
Although Cowles offers more
options than D\'V'TA. the software
is expensive. Will-Do-It $490
(standard) or $690 (network);
Trust Plus $1,990 (standard) or
$2,390 (network); and Trust Plus
for Life Insurance $;90 (standard)
or $790 (network). You can buy
Cowles' entire comprehensive
system which includes: Trust
Plus; Trust Plus Life Insurance:

The Honor Roll
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.c .-; Of the programs that
~ .~ the authors reviewed,

the following programs
were selected as the, top
three:
.," .
.. ': ;;-.
(Note: This list is not in ,e.
ranking order')"~'J/<
:~.

• Cowles Legal Syste~i:~'
.' ···,;~J.~~1::··
• Drafting Wills and.'.,.<~,~~.
Trust Agreements a~dk:;~",'
,

• Wealth Transfer
Pia.
. '.

.: '~~':;,~.~~-;;;.:

r;,"·'""l·.,'

,-'!.;,~f.

nnmg
. ,'::~~~[;~S;~
Each of these progra¥~ii~'.;~
interactive, allows the usei;to';':,:
enter the client data onC~!~~e:1~~;'
gardless of the numbeiti~Qf;:;,;r
documents that will b~:i~f.~,:
sembled, and allows theJ\i~~~:f.;r
to permanently modify;:t,h~::~;
text and insert his. ownpr9Vi~t.,
sions. All three programs.:'t
have network versions, ·gqocllt,;,
tech support, convertJ~Ql!I:i:i:
documents -toWard 9r,~Q.'#r;~,:;.
. Perfect,and.,includept4~;f~i.'; sources inthe;progra~* . . ,
.

. '

'.

···,,~....'":"t:'4~i·'~·

Ui~:'~:~~~:1~~4i1;?Ji:~ ..
Will-Do-It; Estate Planning Development System; The Estate Planning Substance, Procedure and
Prosperity; six additional estate
organizers; and six months free
membership to the executive Forum for $3,490 (standard) and
$4,290 (network).IO
Drafting Wills and Trusts
Agreements. DWTA is probably
the best known document assembly. program on the market. Its
reputation is well-deserved. On
DWTA a user can prepare simple
Wills, pour-over Wills, long form
Wills. revocable trusts, trust
amendments, codicils, joint property trusts, community property
trusts. durable powers of attorney,
checklists, sample flow charts,
easy-to-read synopses of all documents and letters to clients, DWTA
offers resources within the program to view the actual text that
will be assembled into your
cli~nt's documents and to modify
the text. Although explanations
are not available for all options,
they usually are available for the

more complex choices, D\'\TA is
available for Windows, but is no
longer available for DOS, The program includes manuals along \\'ith
technical support.
Although DWTA does not offer
irrevocable trusts and does not offer as comprehensive a system as
Cowles does, its price of 5695 for
a program for one user or a network is a steal. This program has
been the workhorse in our office
for the last five years. l1
Wealth Transfer Pla,,,,tllg.
When the Windows version of this
program is released this winter, it
will be the hands-down winner
for the experienced estate planner. It will be the most comprehensive estate planning document
assembly program on the market.
WTP goes beyond all of the programs we reviewed and offers the
most comprehensive list of advanced estate planning documents, . including grantor retained
annuity trusts, charitable remainder trusts and family limited partnerships. The program also can
prepare a memorandum with
analysis to help you determine
whether a particular estate planning strategy is appropriate for
your client. We understand that in
the future, WTP will add Alaska
trusts and limited liability companies to its menu. The Windows
version of the beta release appears to have applications that are
almost limitleSs.
In addition to explanations for
each option and warnings on options that can have unintended or
adverse results, WTP supports its
estate planning documents with a
unique resource. In conjunction
with the Research Institute of'
America (RIA), a WTP user who
has RIA Estate Planning System
on CD-ROM can access the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), IRC regulations and other RIA information directly from \VTP. This allows you to instantaneously review the IRC or research an issue
while drafting a client's estate
planning document. This combination will create an effective research tool.
WTP is designed for the advanced estate planning attorney
with clients with significant
l(a) - 38

wealth, Many questions Illa\' be
irrelevant for small estate plans
and some of the documents generated from \'7TP will be difficult
for the novice estate planning attorney to understand. This is a
function of the inherent compleXity of the documents offered on
the program. To assist the less experienced user, WTP has a nice
feature that enables you to
choose whether you are a beginner or an advanced user of the
program. It also includes numer-
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ous windows with explanations to
give the user a general understanding of the documents he is
drafting.
For the most part, WTP is user
friendly. However, because the
program offers so many variations
compared to some of the other
programs, you may find WfP to
be a little more difficult to navigate, especially the first time.
WTP prOVides manuals and technical support and training seminars on how to use the program.
Our only real criticism is that
the Windows version of WTP is
not scheduled to be released until
December 1997. The price of $995
is so competitive that this program
will be a "must" for every attorney
who does advanced planning for
clients with significant wealth. 12

Honorable Mention
DL Drafting Libraries. DL
Drafting Libraries CDL) is a DOS based program that is not as user
friendly as other programs, but its
price and the fact that it offers all

the basic estate planning documents and some advanced documents, makes it a contender for the
user on a limited budget or with
older computer hardware. DL offers two libraries for estate planning, a Wills library and an inter
vivos trust library. Unlike Cowles
and DWfA, DL includes advanced
estate planning tools such as charitable remainder trusts and qualified
domestic trust§. Although DL is by
no means as sophisticated as \vrP,
it does include some of the same
advanced estate planning provisions and documents. Of the programs we reviewed, DL was the
only one that specifically addressed blended families. This is a
desirable feature because more
and more of our clients have
blended families and many of
these clients want to treat their
step<hildren as their own children.
Although DL allows you to permanently modify the provisions
within the program and add your
own provisions, we understand
that it is very difficult because the
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*- .• DL Drafting Libraries
DL Drafting Libraries
COL) is a DOS -based pro-"
gram that is not as user friendly as other programs, but its
price and the fact that it offers
all the basic estate plan,oing
documents and some' "advanced documents, makeS 'it 'a
contender for the user' On a
limited budget Or with :older,
computer hardwa~:"
.

coding is complex and difficult to
edit. However, the documents can
be edited in your word processors. You can order the program
with st:'ue specific forms. Because
it is a DOS -based program and is
not mouse-driven, we found DL to
be difficult to navigate. Options
are selected by pressing numbers
and letters.
You can purchase the Will library for $200 and the inter vivos library for $200. DL will run on any
PC including systems with Windows or Windows95. There is no
reason why an estate planning attorney with an old of 386 or 486
computer should not consider purchasing this program. 13

r

Creating Your Own
Document Assembly
Drafting Software

r

One reason some attorneys do
not use estate planning document
assembly software is because they
do not like the language in the provisions of the programs. In our
view, there are two reasons why
this is' frlValid. First, the better pro,grams al(ow the user to permanently modify 'the text of each provision. Second, you can purchase
your own document assembly engine and insert all of your own provisions and, in effect, create your
own interactive document assembly
program. For attorneys who are nbt
satisfied with the better document
assembly programs and want to
spend the time it takes to develop
their own program, there are a
number of good engines to drive
their system. \\;'e found at least
three that should be mentioned. I;
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Fast Draft. Fast Draft works
with any PC supporting DOS,
Windows 3.1 or higher, and Windows95. Fast Draft works with either Microsoft Word or WordPerfect. Fast Draft allows you to save
your text and forms to a database,
and from the information in the
database, create documents quickly and easily. Fast Draft allows
you to enter client information
one time and use this information
in a variety of documents. Fast
Draft appears to be a very sophisticated interactive program that
will fulfill your document assembly needs. This program costs
$595 for a single user using Windows and $495 for a single user
using DOS. You also can purchase
the program for networks at an
additional cost. IS
Form Bank. Form Bank is a s0phisticated document assembly
software program for legal professionals that is very user friendly.
Form Bank works in conjunction
with Microsoft Access, a database
program that allows you to catalog your provisions into tables.
Once the provisions are cataloged,
then you use Form Bank to develop questions that correspond with
the provisions in the table. This
program costs $395 per user, but
for more than 10 users a sliding
scale is used. 16
Hot Docs. Hot Docs is a very
popular program that can be purchased at most computer software retail outlets for $100 or
less. It allows you to create a matrix of questions with a variety of
available provisions depending
upon the response to the question. Although Fast Draft and
Form Bank are more sophisticated programs and are easier to
use, it is hard to beat Hot Docs
considering its price.

Other Document
Assembly Programs
There are a few other document
assembly programs that you may
want to consider. These programs
are probably better described as
merge document assembly programs, instead of interactive document assembly programs.
Will Builder. This document
assembly program allows you to

use the forms in the program or
create your own forms. Like the
other programs, you enter the
client information one time and
then can assemble several different types of documents. We did
not find this program to be user
friendly and it was very difficult to
navigate. You can purchase this
program for $175 (single user) or
$275 (network version).17
In Trust. This is a .document
assembly funding software for
Windows. Like Will Builder, In
Trust asks for basic client information and then merges that information into the form you choose,
whether it is a form already created in the program or one you
added to the program. Although
In Trust has incorporated generic
forms for WI.1ls and trusts, its best
feature is for asset transfers. After
entering the client data once, you
can generate all of the documents
necessary to transfer your client's
assets to his trust. You can print
reports which set out what assets
have been transferred, what assets
still are left to be transferred and
to what trust they have been
transferred. IS

nine-volume trust compendium. a
slide presentation, an assigned
development ac!viser to help develop the member's practice. a
subscription to the Network
newsletter with legal updates and
access to an electronic bulletin
board. Each member pays a fee to
the Network for each estate plan
prepared on its software. 19 The
fee for a married couple with mirror-image documents who do not
have a taxable estate is $90. The
fee for mirror-image documents

Attorney Organizations
with Document Assembly
Software
Hundreds of attorneys are joining commercial organizations to
help them develop and maintain
an estate planning practice. The
National Network of Estate Planning Attorneys and the American
Academy of Estate Planners offer
document assembly software with
their memberships. Although the
cost to become a member of.either of these organizations is suD- .
stantially more than the cost of
any other software, membership
includes additional benefits.
These benefits may be particularly
attractive to attorneys who want
to enter this area of practice, but
who have limited experience.
The membership fee to join the
National Network of Estate Planning Attorneys is $10,000, with a
refund option. Each member receives the Network's Net Plan
software, free attendance at two
training seminars and two
practicums, marketing videos, a
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for a married couple with A-B
tmst provisions and other tax provisions is $120. 20
The fee to join the American
Academy of Estate Planners is
$9,500. To conrinue your membership and license you must pay
$1,595 per month beginning 30
days after you receive the Executive Starter Kit. Partners and staff
members may participate at no
additional charge. The Execurive
Starrer Kit includes the Academy's proprietary Estate Planning
Practice-Building System and the
marketing tools, software programs,21 seminar presentation
system, and parricipation in the
Academy's Executive Training
Program. 22

Software For Laypersons
Some of your clients may be
tempted to prepare their own
\VilIs or tmsts and there is software out there to help them. 23 We
reviewed two of these types of
programs: WiIIMaker 6 and Living
Trust Maker 2 for Windows from
Nolo Press. Nolo Press claims
"WiIIMaker has made more Wills
than any lawyer or law firm in
history." We were curious about
these programs and wanted to report what we found.
Each program was easy to use
and included a 200-plus page
manual and an extensive turoria!.
Other than the basic client information, names of personal representatives, tmstees and guardians,
each program limits the user to
standardized forms that cannot be
modified. Neither program offers
a.ny estate tax planning provisions, but the manuals and estate
tax tutorial recommend tI{at users
with assets valued over $600,000
who wanted to minimize their exposure to estate taxes should contact an attorney.
The manuals for each program
are written for the layperson and
are designed to alIow the average
person to create his own Will or
tmsr. However, if alI the points in
the lengthy legal manuals and tutorials are not read and understood, errors will occur. The person who uses either of these programs to create his or her own
\"(Till or trust may not understand

the ramifications of what he has
created. For example, if the
layperson creating his own estate
planning documents fails to remember what he has read in the
manual or tutorial, he may believe
that by naming an individual other than his spouse as his devisee
or beneficiary that he has effectively disinherited his spouse,
which of course, cannot be done
in most states. without a written
agreement with t.hat spouse.
Trust Maker was specifically
designed for people with a small
estate who want to avoid probate. We were astonished that
Trust Maker does not allow the
user to prepare a pour-over Will
and, in fact, the manual for the
program states that "[plour-over
wills are not usually a good
idea." In addition, Trust Maker
does not include any documents
to help the user transfer assets to
his tnlst or to change beneficiaries of retirement accounts or life
insurance, The manual provides
some examples for transferring
certain assets to a trust. As you
may imagine, the manual does
not address every type of asset,
or why or why not, a certain asset should be transferred to a
trust. For example, the manual
explains that if you want to name
your trust as a beneficiary of your
life insurance policy or individual
retirement account, you do not
need to transfer the ownership of
the account or policy to the trust.
However, the manual did not address the income tax or other
consequences of naming your
trust as a beneficiary of a retirement account rather than your
spouse or children.
These programs are inappropriate for alI but the most basic estate plans. These programs may
sound like a great deal to someone out there who needs an estate plan, but does not want to
spend the money to retain an estate planning attorney. The problem is that it is impossible to cram
all of the information one needs
to prepare an effective estate plan
into a simple software program,
manual or tutorial. We are concerned that people who use these
programs without later getting the
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documents and their assets reviewed by a competent attorney
may generate more legal fees
than the authors of the programs
claim the programs save.

Conclusion
Document assembly software is
here to stay. In the future, the
programs will only become more
sophisticated and comprehensive.
The combination of the escalating
technological revolution and increased competition will take its
tolI on all of us, whether we like
it or nOt. The trend is clear: Document assembly software will be
a requirement for eve'T estate
planning attorney in the 21st
Century,
•
© 1997 Hompesch & Associates, P.C. All Rights Reserved
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End Notes
1. These reasons may include (1) the fact

that the firm alread)' has a complete library of forms, (2) the costs of the computer hardware to support a network
version of a program, and (3) the difficulty of getting a large number of attorneys to agree to usc a panicular system.
2. uter Howard M. zaritsky and Dennis I.
Belcher joined Jonathan Blattmachr and
Dan Hastings to revise and improve the
program. After attending a training session in Baltimore in June 1995 we were
asked to test rwo of the Beta release versions of the new Windows program.
That program should be released in December.>
3. We wert. challenged by Paul Bernstein's
statementJn "Cowles' Top-Notch Estate
Planning Software System" Illinois Legal
Times Gune 1996): "Even if the names
and addresses of vendors were available.
it would be impossible for one person
or even a small team of people to adequately. fairly and thoroughly review
and evaluate each such software package."
4. The most comprehensi\~e list of estate
planning document assembly software
programs that we found was on a \\'eb
site entitled "Small Office / Home Office
Consumer: Software for the Estate Planning UW Office" and can be found at
http:\\www
ca
probate.com/legal_sw.htm.
5. The continuing education section of

your statc bar association may have in·
formation about spccific software programs for drafting Wills and trusts for
your state. Our list of these programs is
not inclusive:
CAPS Practice S1'stem Series • California
Wills and Trusts Software <John HartOG)
We understand that this software may
be purchased through Matthew Bender.
California ContinuinG Education of the
Bar ("CEB") Many of CEB's books for
estate planning provide forms on disks
and also are available on CD-ROM. You
can contact CEB at 800·232·3444 for
more information.
Automau:d Legal Systems, Inc' Pro
~ We understand that Pro Doc is
specifically designed for drafting estate
planning documents in Texas. You can
contact Automated Legal Systems, Inc.
at 800-659·1973.
Texas Probate UbraO' with State Bar of
Texas Forms from Lawyer's Coonerative
Publishing CLCP) We understand that
they provide some type of software program for drafting Wills and trusts.
6. We did not review the follOWing programs:
(1) EP Exnert and Win Draft. We contacted Eidelman Associates regarding EP
Expert and Win Draft and were told that
we could review a demo of the software
from their Web site. We tried to download the software, howe\'er, we were
only able to download more infornlation
concerning the programs. When we
called them back to request that they
mail us a copy of their demo, we were
told that someone would call us back.
We are still waiting for a response.
From the information we obtained over
the Internet. it appears that Win Draft is
a document assembly engine similar to
Hot Docs that works with Windows and
Microsoft Word. A WordPerfect version
will be released in the near future. EP
Expert is an estate planning system for
Win Draft. The program allows an attorney to customize the provisions and
questions to meet their specific needs.
It appears that EP Expert prOVides options for preparing such documents as
revocable trusts, Wills. irrevocable trusts
and health care powers of attorney. For
ornore information contact Eidelman Associates at 800-775·2786 or visit their
Web
site'
at
http:\\www.lawtech.com/windraft/epexpert.
(2) Legal Ease Auto Svstems. "Wills and
Trusts 2000" by Microcomputer Con·
cepts, Inc. This DOS software is de·
signed to work with WordPerfect. Although we were able to download Legal
Ease's software demo from their Web
site, we could not get the demo to run.
When we attempted to contact Legal
Ease at 800-232·1321 there was no an·
swer. We sent Legal Ease an e·mail
(Iega!ease@netline.net), but did not reo
ceive a response. This program regularly costs $795. According to their Web
site they have an Internet Special for
$395. For more information contact Mi·
crocomputer Concepts. Inc. at 6424

Central Avenue, St. Petersburg, FL
33707; fax number 813-384.Q882; or visit their Web site at http:\\www.netline.net\legalease.
(3) ProviSions Plus Estate DocumCnt
Gcncration Systcm from Legal Works,
Inc. All we found for this product is a
800 number that is no longer in service.
(4) Nonhgn Trust. One of us attended
a seminar where she gained a limited exposure to Northern Trust's program. It
allows you to enter client information
and then create the estate planning document by choosing pertinent provisions.
Although she found the process rather
frustrating. attorneys with more experi·
ence appeared to like the program very
much. For more information visit their
Web site at http:\\www.ntrs.com.
7. We contacted the American Academy of
Estate Planning Attorneys and requested
a demo of their document software program. We were advised that the software could not be reviewed without reviewing the entire membership package
and paying a one-time fee of $9,500 for
their Executive Starter Kit that comes
with a 30 day money back guarantee.
8. The National Network of Estate Planning Attorneys said they would send us
their program to review, but we did not
receive it before the deadline for submitting this anicle.
9. Our list is alphabetical. Neither pro·
gram will be the absolute best for every
estate planning attorney. Each of these
programs has its own strengths and
weaknesses.
10. For more information contact Cowles
Legal Systems 3410 Sky Park Blvd. Eau
Claire, WI 54701 800-366-1730 or visit
their Web site at http:\\www.cowleslegal.com. Cowles has recently released a
software program entitled "TrusTermina·
tor" to assist you when terminating a
trust. The standard price: for TrusTermi·
nator is 53,990.
11. For more information on this program
contact Clark Boardman at 800-3366365.
12. For more information contact RlA at
800-346-7377 or visit their Web site at
http:\\www.riatax.com.
.
13. For more information contact Attorneys' Computer Network, Inc. 415 Marlboro Road, Kenneth Square, PA 193~8.
610·347·1500 or visit their Web site at .
http:\\www.draftinglib.com.
14. Another engine to consider is EP Expert. SlIJ2,ra n. 7.
15. For more infortnation contact InterActive Program Software, 1I Piedmont
Center, Suite 806, Atlanta Georgia
30305; 800·364-24189 or 404·262·2340
(fax) or visit their Web site at
http://www.fastdraft.com.
16. For more information contact Expert·
Text, 144 Front Street West, Ste. 460,
Toronto, Ontario Canada M5J 2L7; 800387·2625.
17. For more information contact Easy
Soft, Inc. 475 Watchung Avenue,
Watchung, NJ 07060; 908·754-S0FT
(7638).
18. For more information contact AtLaw
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Software at 800·828·" 1-;-1 or visit their
Web site at http:\\www.atlaw.com.
19. We did not review the :'-Ietwork's Net
Plan software. Inf:ul n. 9.
20. For information contact National Network of Estate Planning Allorneys at
410·17th, Ste. 1260, Denver, Colorado
80202; 303-446-6100 or 303·446·6100
(fax) or visit their Web site at
http:\\www.netplanning.com.
21. We did not review the Academy's soft.
ware. lnti:a n.8.
22. For more information contact American Academy of Estate Planning Attorneys at 800-846-1555 or visit their Web
site at http:\\www.aaepa.com.
23. Or hurt them.
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Ethical Issues Raised by the Use of the Internet
in the Practice of Law
by Kurt Metzmeier and Shaun Esposito
he last three years have seen a
revolution in the way that
Americans communicate with
each other, entertain themselves, and
research purchases and services.
Millions ofAmericans have learned
how to negotiate the expanding
byways ofthe information superhighway. One of the most popular uses of
the network ofcomputers, collectively
known as the Internet, is the transfer
ofwritten messages. Electronic mail,
or email.isincreasingly employed in
the practice of law by small and large
firms alike. A recent survey by the
ABA's legal technology research
center showed that 64% of responding small law firms reported using the
Internet in 1997, up from 38% just
one year earlier.! Some 54% of the
respondents used email to communicate with colleagues, and 41 %
employed the Internet to communicate with clients.
Almost as popular as email is the
use of the world-wide web. 2 The
same ABA study found that most
large firms have invested in Internet
development: A majority ofthe larger
firms had firm web pages; 60% of
those who did not have pages planned

T

to create one in the near future. 3 The
ubiquitous web address has become
as essential to American business as
the toll-free number and the yellow
page ad. The challenge for attorneys
is to incorporate these new communication technologies into their practices
without compromising the interests of
their clients or falling afoul ofthe
rules ofprofessional ethics.

Using Email in the Practice of
Law
The increasing use ofemail by law
firms, as well as lingering doubts over
the security of the Internet, has raised
questions about whether the responsibility oflawyers to protect the confidentiality ofclient information is being
unwittingly violated by the use of
email to communicate with clients.4
Although the Kentucky bar has not
yet visited the issue, the initial ethics
opinions from other states have been
mixed. Advisory boards in Iowa and
South Carolina concluded early on
that either encryption or the explicit
consent of the client would be required to shield an attorney from
ethics liability. The Illinois bar, on the
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other hand, has taken the position that,
because the likelihood ofthe interception ofemail is comparable to traditional communications and is heavily
prohibited by federal law, no special
protections are required. The split
between these ethics advisory
committees can, to a large degree, be
explained by the varying degree of
understanding that these bodies have
ofthe technical processes involved in
electronic communication over the
Internet.
The increased use of email
listservs and discussion groups has
caused commentators to question
whether the participation of attorneys
in these forums is a form of advertising, or ifit is more analogous to the
participation oflawyers in public
interest programs broadcast on radio
and television.

How Email on the Internet
Works
The Internet is, at its most basic
level, a loosely interwoven network of
computers connected by telephone
lines that, by use of a variety of
accepted rules, or protocols, can be

used to exchange information. It was
reportedly designed by the defense
establishment to withstand a nuclear
war on the idea that an open network
of computers, each able to pick up the
tasks of another, would be better able
to adapt to the loss of component
parts than a closed network. 5 The
transfer of messages from one
computer account owner to another
was one. of the earliest uses of the
Internet.
One relevant characteristic of
email over the Internet is that the path
of a particular piece of email is
unpredictable. Instead of being
transferred whole from the sender to
the recipient, each email document is
broken up by the sender's host
computer into small "packets" ofdata,
each roughly the size of a paragraph.
Each packet is then sent out onto the
Internet and passed from computer to
computer in a path determined by
which computer is least busy at that
millisecond. The packets are then
reassembled by the recipient's host
computer where the message remains
until accessed and deleted by the
recipient. 6 The architecture of the
Internet makes it extremely difficult
to intercept a particular piece ofemail
while the packets are on their journey.
In fact, the majority of Internet email
security breaches occur not on the
Internet itself, but rather when a
hacker gains access to the recipient's
host computer or when a system
administrator abuses his or her
legitimate access rights. Tampering
with electronic mail is a federal
offense under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and anyone
who violates the ECPA risks both
criminal and civil sanctions. 7

Protecting Client Confidentiality
Neither Rule 1.6 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct adopted by the
Kentucky Supreme Court, nor the
official Comments, explicitly provide

A member of the
Kentucky Bar
since 1981,
Shaun Esposito
received his J.D.
from the University of Louisville
School of Law.
Following a year
as law clerk to Justice Marvin
Sternberg of the Kentucky Supreme
Court, Esposito spent five years
with the Louisville Legal Aid
SOCiety. Turning to the legal academic world, he then spent three
years as a Legal Writing and
Research Instructor at Florida
State University s College of Law.
At Florida State, he also earned a
M8. degree from the School of
Library and Information Studies
there. His work as a professional
librarian started at the University
of Toledo s College of Law Library.
Since 1994, Esposito has worked at
the University of Kentucky s law
library, where he is the Reference
and Electronic Information Services Librarian.

guidance on the technical means used
by lawyers to communicate with
clients and share confidential client
information with colleagues. The
text ofRule 1.6 itself indicates only
that "A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representation ofa client unless the client
consents after consultation ... " By
implication, the rule has been found to
impose a responsibility on an attorney
to prevent the inadvertent publication
of client information,8 but there are
currently no formal or informal ABA
opinions or Kentucky formal ethics
opinions that discuss the issue of
email confidentiality. For guidance,
the Kentucky lawyer must tum to the
admittedly mixed message conveyed
by the advisory bodies of other states
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that have examined the issue.
One of the first state ethics bodies
to take up the issue of the ethics of
email communication was the South
Carolina bar. In a 1995 opinion, the
South Carolina Ethics Advisory
Committee determined that "the
confidentiality requirements ofRule
1.6 are implicated by any confidential
communication which occurs across
electronic media, absent express
waiver by the client."9 The committee found what it believed was a
cogent analogy to email communications in cellular telephony and noted
three state ethics advisory opinions
barring the use of cellular telephones
to communicate confidential client
information without that client's
consent. 10 Ignoring the possibility that
perhaps another "ire-based means of
communications, like ordinary telephony, was more analogous than the
cellular technology, which broadcasts
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signals over the air, the advisory
committee found:
"Thus, it is the opinion ofthe
committee that unless certainty can be obtained
regarding the confidentiality
ofcommunications via
electronic media, that representation ofa client, or
communication with a client,
via electronic media, may
violate Rule 1.6, absent an
express waiver by the
client. "11
The South Carolina opinion was
followed in May 16, 1996 by a formal
opinion ofthe ethics committee ofthe
Iowa bar association that advised that:
"Pure inter-exchange ofinformation
or legal information with clients [need
not conform to advertising rules], but
sensitive material must be encrypted
to avoid violation ofDR4-101 ... "12
Apparently the ruling was later found
to be too restrictive and was slightly
revised three months later in an
August 29, 1996 opinion:
"[I]f sensitive material is to
be transmitted via e-mail, the
lawyer must have written
acknowledgment by client of
the risk ofthe violation of
Rule 4-101 [i.e. client confidentiality] and obtain consent
for the communication via
Internet or non-secure
Intranet or other forms of
proprietary networks. Otherwise the communication must
be encrypted or protected by
a password/firewall or other
generally accepted equivalent
security system. Opinion 9530 is rescinded."13
The Iowa body did not go into its
rationale in requiring either encryption
or explicit consent, but it was no doubt

influenced by the perception that
email communication was somehow
less safe than traditional forms of
communication such as fax, telephone, courier and ordinary mail. The
implicit assumption ofthe South
Carolina and Iowa opinions was that
email communication is inherently so
unsafe as to require an assurance of
"certainty" regarding confidentiality
not required for other means of
communication. Under this theory,
only encryption or explicit waiver
could satisfy Rule 1.6.
In stark contrast with the initial
response ofthe South Carolina and
Iowa ethics bodies (both of which
later revised their opinions), the Illinois
State Bar Association, in an intelligent
and well-reasoned advisory opinion,
found that attorneys may communicate with clients using ordinary,
unencrypted email, unless unusual
circumstances dictated otherwise.14
The Illinois committee began its
opinion by noting the implied duty of
lawyers to prevent the inadvertent
publication ofconfidential client
information, and recalled its opinion
barring the transmission ofclient
secrets over cordless and mobile
telephones because of the susceptibility ofthat medium to interception.
It then briefly discussed the opinions
ofthe Iowa and South Carolina
bodies, but decided those opinions
were in error. The committee noted
that "courts and ethics committees
have uniformly held that persons using
ordinary phones for confidential
communications have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The three
common types ofelectronic mail
messages appear no less secure."IS
The committee then examined three
common types ofemail, finding them
more analogous to wire-based
telephony than over the air cellular
and wireless technologies. The
committee admitted that dishonest
persons could intercept email at a host
machine, but that same type of threat
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could occur using ordinary telephonic
communication, and that, in each
case, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act l6 made criminal such
activities: "The committee does not
believe that the possibility for illegal
interception by the personnel of an
ISP (Internet Service Provider)
makes it unreasonable to expect
privacy of the message."17 The
Illinois committee thus found:
"In summary, the Committee
concludes that because (I)
the expectation of privacy for
electronic mail is no less
reasonable than the expectation ofprivacy for ordinary
telephone calls, and (2) the
unauthorized interception of
an electronic message subject
to the ECPA is illegal, a
lawyer does not violate Rule
1.6 by communicating with a
client using electronic mail
services, including the
Internet, without encryption.
Nor is it necessary, as some
commentators have suggested, to seek specific client
consent to the use of
unencrypted email. The
committee recognizes that
there may be unusual circumstances involving an extraordinarily sensitive matter that
might require enhanced
security measures like
encryption. These situations
would, however, be ofthe
nature that ordinary telephones and other normal
means ofcommunication
would also be deemed
inadequate."18
Since the Illinois decision, those
state ethics bodies examining the
issue ofclient communications via
electronic mail have generally avoided
requiring encryption or written

waivers in all circumstances. 19
Recently, both Iowa and South
Carolina have revised their previous
opinions to allow greater freedom for
unencrypted emaiPo Iowa shifted
ground slightly to require a written
waiver from the client, but South
Carolina turned full circle recognizing
a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
in email communications that satisfied
Rule 1.6. 21 North Dakota, the latest
state to take up the issue, refused to
require encryption for "routine
matters wi~ clients, and/or other
lawyers jointly representing clients."22

So, Should a Kentucky Lawyer
Avoid Email?
Although it is clear that recent
decisions by ethics committees in
other states indicate a strong trend
toward the view that routine email
communications are as safe as other
ways attorneys maintain contact with
clients, the absence of a state advisory opinion leaves a lawyer in
Kentucky that chooses to use email
with the legitimate fear that he or she
will be second-guessed down the
road. Some attorneys have decided
to avoid the issue by refusing to use
email, but the prevalence ofemail use
makes this a short-term solution for
most lawyers. Increasingly, potential
clients will expect and, in many cases
demand, the opportunity to communicate with their lawyer by email.
Attorney's Liability Assurance
Society (ALAS), a large attorney
malpractice insurance firm, has
carefully examined the issue and
perhaps offers the soundest course.
The ALAS insists that it is not
necessary for its insured attorneys to
encrypt ordinary client communications over the Internet to protect
confidences. Nonetheless, it urges its
clients to use "great caution" because
ofthe possibility that courts and ethics
committees "will be tempted to

bypass a careful analysis" and hold
that unencrypted email "either violates
ethics rules or waives the [attorneyclient] privilege."23 Until the KBA
offers any guidance on email communication, the prudent lawyer wishing
to use email to communicate with his
client should seek the client's written
consent and perhaps investigate one
ofthe email packages that includes
encryption. Fortunately, several easyto-use email packages with encryption
capabilities are now beginning to enter
the market.24

Solicitation by Email
Persons using email often subscribe to interactive discussion groups
and Iistservs. Listservs or discussion
groups are independently organized
electronic forums where participants
"post" email messages concerning the
discussion topic around which the
Iistserv or group has been organized.
The participation by attorneys in
public electronic forums may implicate ethics rules concerning advertisement and solicitation, especially
when the topic ofdiscussion explicitly
involves legal issues. The Kentucky
Rules of Professional Conduct
regulate the way a Kentucky lawyer
can broadcast information about his or
her practice to the general public.
There are specific rules concerning
advertisements, direct and indirect
solicitation, professional cards,
telephone listings, announcements,
signs, and letterheads. There is no
discussion ofthe participation of
lawyers on electronic discussion
groups or listservs. However, Rule
7.02 which defines an advertisement,
also notes exceptions to the advertising rules that are relevant to the
activities oflawyers on Iistservs and
online discussion groups. Rule
7.02(1)( f) states that:
"Any communication by a
lawyer to third parties that is
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published or broadcast by a
third party who is not in any
way controlled by the lawyer,
and for which publication or
broadcast the lawyer pays no
consideration, shall be exempt
from all the provisions of
these Rules except Rule 7.10
[Rule 7.10 bars "false,
deceptive or misleading
communication about the
lawyer or the lawyer's
service"]."
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The rule seems to indicate that
ordinary postings by an attorney to a
listserv or discussion group would not
be subject to advertising and solicitation rules so long as the group was
independent of the lawyer and the
lawyer not pay to post his message.
However, ifthe posting did not flow
from the topic of the group and/or
explicitly solicited clients, this narrow
.J
exemption would likely not apply.
Four KBA formal ethics opinions
relating to other media seem to
support this theory. In Opinion KBA
E-50, the committee said an attorney
could appear on a commercially
sponsored radio program in a "public -:oi
service context" to discuss legal
problems involved in real estate
w
transactions. In Opinion KBA E-78,
an attorney was allowed to write a
series of articles for a local newspaper discussing probate and estate law.
In 1975, a local bar association was
allowed to place a series of articles in
newspapers on legal issues by
Opinion KBA E-ll O. Finally, Opinion
KBA E-270 allowed a local bar
association to sponsor a television
show and allowed lawyers to participate. A number of states have also
explicitly allowed the participation of
attorneys in email discussion groups,
so long as their participation does not
cross over from discussion to solicitation,25 but others have found it to be
subject to rules regulating advertisements. 26
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A few additional cautionary notes
for attorneys using email. When
using listservs and other electronic
forums, lawyers need to be cautious
that their replies are made publicly to
the listserv, not privately to individuals.
Answering questions "off-list" could
inadvertently establish an attorneyclient relationship or lead to a charge
that the attorney is practicing law in a
state where he or she is not licensed.

Also, attorneys should take every
means to ensure that email is properly
addressed. Finally, lawyers must take
care that their firm's technical support
staft27 and email service provider are
competent and trustworthy.

Advertising on the World-Wide
Web
.An information explosion in the last
few years has changed the Internet
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from a scholarly back road to a major
marketplace for information, ideas
and products. The web provides the
opportunity for those using it to obtain
graphically rich and visually appealing
information with the click ofa mouse.
A major part of the web now deals
with the marketing of products and
services. Businesses ranging from
auto dealers to book sellers have set

1

up stalls on the information superhighway. Given these marketing opportunities, it is not surprising that lawyers
have begun to promote themselves
and market their services in this new
marketplace. 28 The marketing of
lawyers' services naturally raises
questions of the propriety oflawyer
advertising and the ethical questions
inherent in such activity. Kentucky's
rules on lawyer advertising make no
specific reference to the web, but a
number of other states have issued
rules regarding this issue that may be
instructive.

Basic Mechanics oftlte Web
Information on the web is provided
through specific locations on the
Internet known as home pages.
Attorneys using the web for marketing will have a home page with a
unique address. That address, known
as an URL (Uniform Resource
Locator) follows a standard naming
convention that typically begins with
http://www. and includes the name of
the host computer and ends with a
three-letter code that indicates
whether the site is educational,
governmental or commercial. Information consumers view these home
pages through the use of a web
browser, such as Netscape Navigator
or Microsoft Internet Explorer. An
interested person might reach the site
by typing a known URL directly into
the browser, or by "hyper linking" to it
by clicking on a link to that site in
another home page. Several web
search engines also provide access to
specific pages in response to a search
query entered by the person seeking
information. On a web browser the
pages display in a graphical mode
. providing colorful packaging for the
information conveyed. The underlying program language for a web page,
Hypertext Markup Language
(HTML) looks like gibberish to most

web users, but provides a wealth of
information about the home page
creator's desired audience.

Attorney Web Pages As
Advertising
Kentucky provides no specific
guidance on whether attorney home
pages fall under the general rules of
attorney advertising. An examination
ofthe rules dealing with lawyer
advertising would seem to include this
type ofcommunication within their
scope. Concerning applicability ofthe
rules, Kentucky Rule ofProfessional
Conduct 7.01 states that the rule
"shall apply to advertisements related
to or concerning legal services ... "
Under the defmitions provided in Rule
7.02, "advertise or advertisement
means to furnish any written, printed
or broadcast information or any other
communication containing an
attorney's name or other identifying
information" [with certain exceptions]. These provisions seem to
strongly imply that Kentucky's rules
cover web-based marketing. Few
states' rules provide explicit mention
of the web- or computer-based
activities, but the ethics committees of
a number of state bars have provided
guidance through ethics opinions or
commentaries.29

Reporting Requirements As
Applied to Web Advertising
Kentucky Rule of Professional
Conduct 7.05 provides the procedural
mechanism required ofall attorneys
wishing to advertise. In particular,
section 7.05(1)(b) requires that
"simultaneously with the publication of
any advertisement under this subsection, the attorney shall mail to the
Commission ... a copy of the
advertisement, or ifby radio or
television, a fair and accurate representation of the advertisement plus a
typed transcript of the words spoken.
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... A list of all persons or firms or
groups to whom the advertising has
been sent shall be maintained in the
principal office in Kentucky ofthe
advertising lawyer or firm for a period
of two (2) years ... "
Just what is required of a Kentucky attorney using the web is not
clear from this rule. Would a notification of the home page's address (its
URL) be enough? What about a
printed copy of the home page? And,
ifso, how much of the home pagethe opening screen, or every screen?
Some law firms provide a wealth of
information on various topics, and
providing copies ofall this material
could become burdensome for both
the attorney and the Commission.
Nearly every home page provides
links to other sites maintained by third
parties. Would hard copies of these
sites also be necessary? Web pages
require constant updating and changing. Are Kentucky attorneys under a
con~inuing duty to disclose any
changes to the web page by providing
additional hard copies ofthe whole
web site or just the changes? Do any
changes trigger the reporting requirement or just material ones, and if so,
what is a material change?
While Kentucky has remained
silent on these points, other states
have offered some guidance to
attorneys attempting to comply with
these type of requirements. Florida's
Bar Ethics Department advised that a
hard copy must be filed with the
department, as well as a statement
explaining when and where it will
appear;30 Although Florida provides
some guidance with this bit of advice,
it still provides little insight into the
amount of material that must be filed.
And, the advice seems to be ignorant
of how the web is used. Any web
user anywhere could view the page
with the click of a mouse. It would
be impossible for an attorney to know
who will view the page. Texas has
provided more guidance on the
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amount ofmaterial to be filed, limiting
it to the first page viewed and any
subsequent screens primarily dealing
with client solicitation. J1 Iowa has
also provided that the first screen and
biographical screens must contain
required disclosures. J2 Recently, the
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory
Opinion Committee advised attorneys
to keep copies of all pages of the web
site (not just the initial home page) for
the required two year period.33
Recognizing that web pages are
frequently updated, the Committee
approved the retention ofelectronic
rather than hard copies of the
changes to web pages. The North
Carolina Bar's Ethics Committee, also
recognizing the frequency of web
page updates, requires hard copies be
retained only ofany "material
changes in format or content" to the
original pages. 34

Many commentators believe that
attorneys should list those jurisdictions
in which they are admitted to practice,
in order to avoid any confusion and to
remain consistent with those ethical
rules requiring the avoidance offalse,
deceptive or misleading communications (see Kentucky Rule of Professional Conduct 7.10). Cautious
attorneys will at a minimum provide
disclaimers about the limits oftheir
practice and provide information
about states in which they are licensed to practice. At minimum,
attorneys should be certain to comply
with the requirements for each state
in which they are Iicensed.38 Finally,

Jurisdiction and Choice ofLaw
on the World-Wide Web
By its very nature, the web spans
the globe; it is, after all, the worldwide web. Thus, persons anywhere
in this country or around the world
might access a given home page.
This raises troublesome questions for
both the advertising attorney and the
bar's governing ethical body. Which
state's ethical rules apply: the
attorney's home state, or any state
where someone can access the home
page?3S Must an attorney licensed in
more than one state meet requirements in all states in which the
attorney is licensed? And for those
states where the attorney is not
licensed, does contact with potential
clients in those states resulting from
web pages give rise to unauthorized
practice of law problems?36
Although no reported cases deal
specifically with attorney web advertising, conflicting decisions have been
issued by courts concerningjurisdictional issues related to web pages. 37
Kentucky Bench & Bar, Spring 1998
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some commentators suggest that the
conflicting state rules are so confusing, some national standards need to
be developed. 39

Web Pages As Solicitation
For the most part, states examining
the topic consider web home pages
with proper disclaimers to be akin to
advertising rather than solicitation.40
Solicitation rules are much stricter
than those governing advertising (see
Kentucky Rule of Professional
Conduct 7.30). By their nature, web
pages are viewed only when someone

purposely chooses to seek out and
view them. This makes a charge of
improper solicitation very unlikely.
Some commentators, though, have
noted that with developing technology,
such as interactive web pages,
concerns about solicitation might
groW. 41 Even now, some have raised
concerns about banner advertising
(where a firm or company ad will
appear, unsolicited, on a web search
engine's page following entry ofa
research query). Additionally, web
page creators can put keywords iIi
fields used by Web search engines to
determine whether a given site
matches the search query entered by
the user. Some web page designers
"pack" this field with every possible
relevant term, many duplicated or
triplicated to increase possible hits. If
a lawyer uses these tactics this could
be held to border on solicitation
depending upon the index terms used
and how accurately they reflect the
contents of the home page. 42
While existing ethical rules in
Kentucky may seem to cover attorneys' activities on the web, the
questions raised here, and the activities ofthe bar governing authorities in
several other states, suggest the need
for clarification of exactly how these
rules apply to web activities. To craft
meaningful new rules or commentaries on existing rules, the bar's governing authority must consult those who
are knowledgeable about the workings ofthe web. If rule drafting in the
area is left to persons without an
understanding of how the web works,
more rather than less confusion will
likely result. 43

Conclusion
The information superhighway may
be fraught with dangers for attorneys,
particularly those who are apt to skirt
the rules. Unwary lawyers may risk
losing their license for inadvertently
betraying client confidences, by

soliciting clients on listservs and in
chat rooms, or by passing over
unclear ethical lines with a flashy web
page. Despite these road hazards,
attorneys will find that in the very
near future a web page will be as
essential as a shingle and a yellow
page listing, and that clients will insist
on using email to communicate with
their lawyer, just as they use it to
manage their businesses and to stay in
touch with their kids.
•
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I. INTRODUCTION

r
!

\Vhat is Estate Administration Software and how can it make my life easier?

r

Generally, the purpose of such software and applications is to provide accurate,
complete and timely information to the court, the client and the government.

r

For many years, PNC Bank's tax and estate administration areas have been
enjoying the efficiencies achieved by utilizing estate administration software. We
have found that there are three main areas that can significantly benefit from the
use of software; 1) asset valuation, 2) fiduciary accounting and 3) death tax return
preparation.
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OBJECTIVE:

The objective ofthis outline is to provide a broad
overview of the various t)·pes of software available to
the estate administrator within these defined areas.

II. ASSET VALUATION
A. Introduction

Trying to manually value securities as of a decedent's date of death can be a
trying experience. If the security is even remotely exotic you may have to go
through some pretty extreme mathematical contortions. With the use of estate
valuation software it is no longer necessary to go sifting through old editions
of The Wall Street Journal, S&P's Dividend Record and Capital Changes
reports. We use a software product called EstateVal which all.ows us to
efficiently value all types of traded securities.
1. Importance of Valuation
The importance of an accurate estate valuation can not be overstated. Date of
death values are necessary to step up the basis in estate property and to
accurately determine death taxes, including the calculation of the marital and
charitable deduction. To this end, EstateVal does an excellent job of valuing
all kinds of securities. Moreover, the program includes accrued interest and
dividends as of date of death.
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B. How It Works
l. EstateVal software comes in many forms. There are packages for both DOS
and Windows formats. However, it is necessary that your computer have a
modem.

2. To produce valuations, the user must first enter some preliminary data about
the decedent; namely date of death. Thereafter, all that is needed for an
accurate valuation is the security's CUSIP # and the quantity owned.

...oJ. EstateVal can successfully value all of the following traded securities:
Equities, Municipal Bonds, Mutual Funds, Savings Bonds, Corporate and
government Bonds, GNMA's, FNMA's, FHLMC's, CMO's, UIT's, and US.
Treasuries.

4. While much legal software charges by the amount oftime the user is "online," EstateVal charges by the security.
5. EstateVal allows you to generate four different kinds of security valuation
reports. Date of Death, Alternate Date, and Distribution Date reports pertain
to an estate valuation.
a. Date of Death reports provide the following information: Security
Descriptions, Accrual interest/dividend, Total Security Values, Total
Portfolio Value; and Mean Pricing.

-

-

-

-

b. Date of Death reports provide mean pricing on the valuation date when
actual trades are available. If trades are not available on the valuation
date, EstateVal searches forward and backward in time, for a reasonable
period, for trade dates.

-

c. If actual trades are not available within a reasonable period of time, ask
and bid prices are retrieved either on the valuation day if available, or most
recent and next prices if not.

-

C. The IRS Uses EstateVal
EstateVal has recently signed a five-year contract with ·the Internal Revenue
Service to provide "on-line" automated valuation services for estate and gift tax
returns. Estate Val will be used to verify all audited Form 706 Estate Tax Returns
through year 2003. The contract covers all IRS offices.
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Introduction
Fiduciary Accounting can be challenging because of the need to differentiate
between income and principal postings. Income in respect of a decedent,
intangible tax refunds and may other items can make the books of an estate less
than a model of clarity. Unfortunately, your clients and possibly the court all
want to see the receipts and disbursements of the estate set forth in an accurate
and easy to understand format.

B. Software For All Types of Administrators
Throughout the pages of periodicals such as Trusts & Estates there are several
advertisements for various types of fiduciary accounting software. Generally, this
type of software falls into two categories; mainframe and PC based.
1. The mainframe, multiple-user products are geared towards large institutional
trust departments.
1.

Fiduciary accounting software allows each user to closely monitor the
income and principal postings in each estate.

11.

At the end of the month, statements are generated from the system which
list all postings and include an asset summary. Various other statements
can be produced, allo\\ing some degree of customization.

iii. Such mainframe accounting systems are most commonly used by financial
institutions and have the added benefit of expediting the preparation of
fiduciary tax returns and K-l 'so
2. The PC based products, more thoroughly discussed in Section V of this
outline, are geared more toward accounting firms, law firms and the individual
serving as a fiduciary. This type of software is generally installed on only a
few computers in the office. One benefit is that software ofthis nature allows
the user to highly specialize their fiduciary accounting system. It is also easier
to update PC based software because the update only needs to be installed on a
few computers.

r
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C. The Benefits of Fiduciarv Accounting Software
1. Organization - Using software provides a common database where all receipts
and disbursements can be easily recorded and retrieved. Most software will
allow you to produce reports that can group various activities within the estate
(Le. all principal receipts, all income disbursements, all medical bills paid).
2. Efficiency - Recent activity within the estate can be easily retrieved to
instantly provide information.
3. Presentation - Reports generated from most fiduciary accounting software are
very professional looking and can go straight from printer to envelope.

-

...

IV. TAX PREPARATION
A. Introduction
One of the major responsibilities of a personal representative is the preparation
and filing of death tax returns and fiduciary income tax returns. Typically, the
most time consuming responsibility of the estate administrator is preparing and
analyzing these returns. Luckily, it is also an area that benefits from technology.
The following lists just a few items which are challenging to calculate manually,
but can be done with software at the "touch of a button," and virtually eliminates
the potential for mathematical errors assuming, of course, the correct data was
input.
1. Fiduciary Return Preparation - Use software to tally interest and dividends, to
calculate distributable net income ("DNI"), the corresponding income
distribution deduction and to navigate the most confusing Schedule D in
income tax history!
2. Death Tax Return - Use software to tally the schedules for the gross estate and
corresponding deductions. Use it to figure the new unified credit, the credit
for state death taxes and the total tax due. Most death tax software can even
apply Applicable Federal Rates and IRS Actuarial Tables to determine
remainder interests for the charitable deduction.
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B. Different Types of Software
1. General Tax Software - Some packages, such as CCH's "ProSystems" can
produce the whole range of income and transfer tax returns. This includes
returns not only for estates and trusts, but also individuals, corporations
partnerships and tax-exempt organizations. However, CCH can tailor your
ProSystems package to provide only those applications needed by your office.
Apart from basic tax return preparation, there are other reasons ProSystems
stands out:
a. Fonns Access - How many times have you needed one fonn SS-4 to
obtain a Tax ID number for an estate? With CCH, you have the ability to
access and print miscellaneous forms, such as W-9's, Fonn 56 and SS-4,
as they are needed.
b. On!anizers and ProForma's - Once a taxpayer has been setup in
ProSystems, it is possible to produce Tax Organizers and ProForma's to
aid in the return preparation.
1.

The organizer generally follows the 706 or 1041 schedules and allows
the preparer to gather all the pertinent information in one place. Then
it is transformed to the ProForma.

11.

The ProForma mirrors the '~on-screen" menu of a ProSystems
taxpayer. By transferring the organizer to the ProForma, the actual
data entry cln be delegated.

;
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c. A Word About the Kentuckv Inheritance Tax Form - ProSystems, like
other companies, does not offer software that will produce a completed
Kentucky Inheritance Tax Return. That is, all the beneficiary
classifications, applicable tax calculations and discounts must still be done
by hand or self designed software programs. CCH does offer a blank onscreen Kentucky Inheritance Tax Form the fields of which must be
manually populated.
2. Death Tax Specific Software - At PNC, the professionals who specialize in the
preparation of death tax returns are very fond of using West Group's
"Federal Estate Tax Returns" ('~FET'). FET is software that is specific to
Form 706 and is, therefore, a littler more streamlined than ProSystems.
a. How it works - Currently FET is a DOS based program. However, I
understand that in the fall of this year, West will be releasing a Windows
version that will also contain the recent legislative changes.

r
I

r
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1.

Pro's - Our tax specialists like FET because it allows the user to really
micro-manage the return. Unlike ProSystems, which has very rigid
data entry criteria, you can enter information in FET anywhere you
want on the return as if you were writing on it. In this manner, FET is
considered by some to be more "user friendly."

-

11.

Con's - The obvious drawback to FET is that you are limited only to
the preparation of Form 706 returns.

-

b. Pro's and Con's

v.

-

TYING IT ALL TOGETHER

-

A. Introduction

While those who have the latest in software technology often boast about
increased efficiency, they may have in fact gained very little at the cost of much
hardrive space. This phenomenon occurs when people do not use software
effectively. There are two easy ways you can maximize effectiveness with Estate
administration software. The first, is through importing and exporting
information from one application to another. The next way to increase
effectiveness is by purchasing software packages that "Do it all."
B. Import and Export

•

The best example of this is \\;th asset valuation and death tax return preparation.
1. If a decedent dies \\;th a large portfolio of securities, entering that information
into the computer can be a very long process; especially if it must be entered
first into EstateVal and then into FET.
2. However, through the application of an export format, the two programs can
communicate and share the same information. Information entered into
EstateVal can be transported to FET. Thus, the data entry time is cut in half.

-

-

-

-

C. "Do It All" Software
This type of all-inclusive software, often used by law firms, provides nearly onestop shopping for the estate administrator.
1. These packages provide fiduciary accounting, federal estate tax return
preparation, fiduciary income tax return information, checklists, ticklers and
administrative reports all wound into one application.
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2. Data has only to be entered once and it is automatically carried to all
necessary schedules. This eliminates hours of duplicated work, therefore
maximizing your time.
3. Two very popular companies offering all-inclusive software are "ProBATE
Software" and "ZANE."
a. ProBATE Software - This company touts an all-inclusive, windows based
package that is extremely user friendly. The data entry screens are almost
identical and the tax screens resemble IRS forms. According to the
company, this type offormatting greatly reduces the learning curve and
increases efficiency.
b. ZANE - According to ZANE, their clients report a 50% to 80% time
savings by the use of their "fully integrated" software. The company
points out that their program is not an accounting program. Rather, it is
dedicated to keeping principal and income cash flow and inventory records
specific to trust and estate accounting. This design philosophy is
supposed to facilitate the ease of use for its dedicated purpose.
1.

Also of interest is that ZANE Software keeps track of time applied
to its use both by user and by client account. Therefore, creating
billable hour reports is simplified and may be generated on
demand, by either client account or by user.

VI. CONCLUSION
Hopefully, \\ith this brief overview the reader will see the benefits technology can
bring to the estate administration process, particularly vvith respect to valuation of
securities, automated estate accounting and tax return preparation. While this outline
reviews only those programs or applications currently used by the \\Titers, a more
comprehensive list of available software is attached.
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ATTACHMENT

Estate Valuations & Pricing Systems, Inc.
5855 Topanga Canyon Boulevard, Suite 520
Woodland Hills, CA 91367
1-800-237-3440
www.evpsys.com
HWA International
Trust Accounting Software
1-800-328-8661
CLR FAST-TAX/Omega
2395 Midway Road
Carrollton, Texas 75006
1-800 FAST-TAX, Ext. 8778
AM HORIZON
Trust Management Software For Windows
1-800-786-5168
ProSystems
1577 Parsons Place, Suite 2
Louisville, KY 40205
1-888-CCH-REPS Ext. 1065
www.prosystem(..{.com
BNA Software
BNA 709 & 706 Preparer
Tax Management, Inc.
1-800-372-1033
u.S. Trust
The UST 7061709 System
Contact: Nicole S. Spliner,V.P.
(212) 852-3564
ProBATE Software
1990 59th Avenue, Suite E
Greely, CO 80635
w\,,"w.probate-software.com

r
r

ZANE
130 West White Horse Pike
Berlin, New Jersey 08009
J-800-331-2533
email: lou~zanenet.com
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NORVIE L LAY
Professor of Law

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE SCHOOL OF LAW
Louisville, Kentucky

I. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS AND GENERAL DISCUSSION OF
AFFECTED INDIVIDUALS
II. PROPERTY AGREEMENTS
A.

Antenuptial Agreements
1.

Purpose
a. Protection at Death. Used to effect a transfer of
property at time of marriage or death and to protect the
rights of the spouses at time of death. Kentucky has
long recognized the validity of these contracts. Gaines
v. Gaines, 163 Ky. 260, 173 S.W. 774 (1915).
b. Protection upon Divorce. Provisions relating to
property payments or division upon divorce in Kentucky
were originally considered void and unenforceable as
being violative of public policy. Stratton v. Wilson, 170
Ky. 61, 185 S.W. 522 (1916).
c. Recent Kentucky Cases.
(1) Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky.
1990). In Gentry, the husband and wife entered
into an antenuptial agreement whereby they each
renounced any and all right, title and interest in any
property of the others. There was full disclosure
and, at the time of the agreement, H's net worth
was approximately $1,500,000 and W's was

r
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nominal. The contract provided that one of its
purposes was to prevent any claim to the estate of
the other upon his or her death.
(a) Question of Intent. The Court held that
the agreement was intended to be applicable
at time of divorce as well as death even .
though the language at the end of the
contract made reference to the death of the
parties. Previous language made it clear that
it intended to be applied at time of divorce.
(b) Public Policy Issue. The Court cited
recent decisions in other states where the
underlying public policy issue had been
reexamined and where it had been held to no
contracts
longer prohibit antenuptial
becoming effective at time of divorce. Based
on these changes, the Court reexamined
Stratton. The Court noted that in Jackson v.
Jackson, 614 S.W.2d 942 (Ky. 1981), it had
acknowledged doubts about the continued
In Jackson,
it
validity of Stratton.
distinguished Stratton and upheld the
application of an antenuptial contract in a
divorce where the agreement provided that
the husband would furnish "decent support"
for the wife during his life. In Gentry, it was
argued that the Kentucky Legislature had
intended to codify a public policy approving
antenuptial contracts fixing rights at divorce
when it adopted the Uniform Dissolution of
Marriage Act in 1972 by defining "marital
property" to omit any property excluded by
valid agreement of the parties. KRS 403.190
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(2)(d). The Court disagreed that this
constituted a specific intent to approve such
agreements but felt the Legislature "was
responding to significant changes in the
expectations of parties to the marital contract
and in the attitude of society toward
divorce." Id. at 934. In light of such changes,
the Court concluded that Stratton no longer
reflected public policy and to the extent it
precluded a premarital contract on such
basis, it was overruled. It then held that
spouses may define their rights in each
other's property and, provided they are
otherwise valid contracts, they are entitled to
be enforced upon the termination of the
marriage by divorce. The Court noted that
no provision in the contract purported to
waive any claim to both marital property and
maintenance although it felt that the trial
court had broad discretion to review such
agreements for unconscionability and thus
adequately protect this interest.
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(c) Application to Marital Property. The
Court held that by their agreement and the
allocation of assets between them, they had
effectively excluded any assets acquired
subsequent to the marriage from the
definition of marital property under KRS
403.190.
(d) Requirements for Valid Contract. The
Court listed the following criteria: (1) Was
the agreement obtained through fraud,
duress or mistake, or through

J-3

misrepresentation or non disclosure of
material facts? (2) Is the agreement
unconscionable? (3) Have the facts and
circumstances changed since the agreement
was executed so as to make its enforcement
unfair and unreasonable?
(e) Adequacy of Maintenance. The amount
of maintenance must be determined under
KRS 403.200(2) and the award thereof is left
to the trial court's discretion unless it be
abused.
(2) Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941
(Ky.1990). Decided on the same day as the Gentry
case, the Court arrived at the same conclusion
giving effect to antenuptial agreements and upon
the same conditions; those being:

-

-

-

-

(a) the agreement is free from any material
omission or misrepresentation;

-

(b) the
agreement must not be
unconscionable at the time enforcement is
sought; and,

-

(c) the agreement may apply only to
dispositions of property and maintenance and
issues of child support, child custody and
visitation are beyond the scope of such
contracts.
One factual difference in
Edwardson was that the wife was seeking to
enforce the terms of the agreement whereas
in Gentry, she was arguing against its
validity.

-

-
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General Requirements.
a. Must be executed prior to marriage.
b. Should contain a recitation of the consideration.
c. Must be in writing to comply with Statute of Frauds.
See KRS 371.010(5).
d. Must be recorded to be effective against a purchaser
for a valuable consideration without notice or against a
creditor. KRS 382.080.
e. No particular form must be complied with in
Kentucky. Check other relevant states to see if they
have the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act or expressly
require a specific form.
f. Must be a full disclosure of all assets or adequate
independent knowledge thereof.

r
r

(1 ) Should use detailed inventory or balance
sheets for each spouse.
(2) Issue of undue influence or overreaching if
such documents do not exist.
(3) Issue of fraud if there is a gross disparity
between the benefits accorded each party.

r

g. Should specify exactly which rights the parties are
waiving as a result of the agreement and what they are
receiving in exchange as well as what time.

,
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3.
Advisability of Separate Legal Counsel. The specific
question as to whether an attorney may represent both parties
to an antenuptial agreement was given a qualified yes by the
KBA's Ethics and Unauthorized Practice Committee in KBA
E-290. After discussing the problems of full disclosure,
possession of pertinent facts by the attorney which one client
is unwilling to disclose, etc., the opinion concluded that
" ... joint representation should be undertaken only if each

J-5

party consents to the representation after full disclosure of the
potential problems inherent in such representation."
It
concluded with the admonition that prudent counsel would
obtain such consent In writing. A second question as to
whether it would be proper for the attorney representing one
spouse to talk with the other and answer questions was given
a qualified no.
4.

Advisability of Periodic Review

5.

Specific Applicable Law if Possible

6.
Revocation. The destruction of an antenuptial contract
with the intent to negate its effectiveness will rescind the
agreement. Carter v. Carter, 656 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. App.)
7.
Modification. Does a modified antenuptial contract
become a post-nuptial agreement?

...

..

8.
Failure to Destroy a Proposed Agreement. A California
horror story.
B.

-

Post-Nuptial Agreements
1.

Purpose
a. Same as with Antenuptial Agreements

2.

Potential Problems
a. May require greater care in drafting to accomplish
the desired result

..
-
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III.

JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS
A.

Specific Showing of Intent Necessary
1.
Statutory Provision. A Contract to make or not to
revoke a will, if executed after June 16, 1972, can be
established only by:
a. the terms of the will stating the material provisions
of the contract;

b. an express reference in the will to a contract and
extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract;
or
c. a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the
contract. KRS 394.540(1).
No presumption of a contract not to revoke a
will can be drawn from the execution of a joint
will or mutual wills. KRS 394.540(2).
2.
Statutory Interpretation. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals has held that the statute is so plain, that no
reference of a contract can be drawn from joint or mutual
wills, that it is not susceptible to any other interpretation.
Martin v. Cassady, 628 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. App. 1982).
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IV.

TAX CONSEQUENCES

A.

-

Income Taxation
Timing of Transfers

1.
a.

After Marriage

-

(1) Gain or Loss. Neither gain nor loss will be
recognized on a transfer of property from an
individual to (or in trust from the benefit of) his
or her spouse but only if the transfer to the
former spouse is incident to the divorce. IRC
1041 (a).
(a) Nature of the Transfer. According to the
House Committee explanation the nonrecognition
rule applies regardless of "whether the transfer
is for the relinquishment of marital rights, for
cash or other property, for the assumption of
liabilities in excess of basis, or for other
consideration and is intended to apply to any
indebtedness which is discharged." Hence, the
Federal income tax consequences of such
transfer will be uniform even though the
property may be subject to different state
property laws. Should eliminate thoughts of
forum shopping.
(b)

Time of Transfer
(1) During Marriage. Applies to transfers of all
property during the marriage as well as transfers
related to a divorce or annulment. IRC 1041 (a)( 1).
(2) Incident to Divorce. A transfer is considered
incident to the divorce if it occurs within a year after
the marriage ceases, or is related to the cessation of
the marriage. IRC
1041 (c). The relation to the

-

...
...
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cessation of the marriage rule has no time limits
specified in the Code but the Regs. 1.1041 (b) (3)
provide for a six year rule. Even then, there may be
circumstances where the transfer is still considered to
"be related to the cessation of the marriage" even
though it takes place more than six years after the
divorce. An illustration would be the transfer of an
asset, such as ali interest in a closely held business,
where no other buyer could be found within the six
years.

r
r

r
r
r
r

(c) Exception. The new rule does not apply if the
recipient is a non-resident alien. IRC 1041 (d).
Any
(2) Basis of Transferred Property.
property so transferred shall be treated as
acquired by the transferee spouse by gift with
his/her basis being the adjusted basis of the
transferor. IRC 1041 (b). The usual section
(§ 1015) with respect to the determination of
the basis of property received by gift is
inapplicable to this transfer.

r
r
r

r
r
r

r
r
r
r

r

Drafting to Prevent Inequitable Tax
Consequences

(3)

b.

(a)

Problems of Rollovers from
Prevous Residence under
§ 1034 after 1997 Tax Act.

(b)

Problems of Gains in General.

Before Marriage.
(1 ) Gain or Loss. If the transfer occurred prior
to marriage, 1041 is inapplicable and the case
law represented by United States v. Davis, 370
U.S. 65 (1962) and Faird-Es. Sultaneh v.
Commissioners, 160 F.2d 812 (2nd Cir. 1947)
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would still be applicable. Hence, the transferor
would have gain measured by the difference in
the fair market value of the property at the time
of the transfer and its adjusted basis. May be
able to recognize a loss but this could be
accomplished by selling the property to another
and have the would-be spouse buy it if he/she
wants the property.
In the
(2) Basis of Transferred Property.
absence of the applicability of 1041 , the above
cases treat the recipient spouse as having
received the property by purchase so his/her
basis would be its fair market value at date of
transfer. This is done on the assumption that
this is the value of the rights given up by the
transferee. The logic is totally lacking but that is
the holding in the above cases. The error is
magnified by the failure to require the transferee
to recognize a gain at the time of the receipt.

-

-

-

B. Gift Taxation
1.
Lack of Consideration. Even though there may be a
relinquishment of certain rights for property received under
an antenuptial contract, it may be considered as a gift for
gift tax purposes because the transfer was for less than an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
IRC 2512{b).
a.
Actual Tax Consequences.
The lack of
consideration doesn't automatically cause a gift
liability because of the annual $10,000 exclusion, IRC
2503{b), and the potential use of the unified credit;
IRe 2505.
2.
Use of Marital Deduction. The above potential gift tax
problems can be resolved by making the transfer

J -10
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r

r
subsequent to the marriage and taking advantage of the
unlimited gift tax marital deduction. IRC § 2523.

r
r

3.
Transfer After Divorce. A transfer pursuant to an
antenuptial agreement after the divorce of the parties will
trigger the application of § 2512(b).

r

4.
Certain Property Settlements. The relinquishment of
marital property rights may be considered adequate and full
consideration under certain divorce settlements but that is
usually of little help in the estate planning arena. IRC 2516.
Neither does the required time period normally provide any
relief where the antenuptial agreement is triggered by a
divorce.

r
r
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C.

1.
Lack of Consideration. Except for some transfers
relating to property settlements for purposes of divorce, a
relinquishment or promised relinquishment of dower or
curtsey, or any statutory rights created in lieu thereof shall
not be deemed to be a consideration for money or money's
worth. IRC 2043(b).

r
r
r

2.
Included in Transferor's Gross Estate. The property
transferred under the antenuptial contract may have to be
included in the decedent's gross estate.

r

3.
Use of Marital Deduction. If the parties are still
married at time of the transferor's death, the inclusion of
the property in his/her estate may produce no estate tax
consequences because of the marital deduction. See IRC
2056 generally.

r

r

r
r

Estate Taxation

4.

D.

Use of QTIPs. § 2056(b)(7)
Consideration of Retirement Equity Act of 1984.

r
,r-
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1.
In General. Certain retirement plans and death benefits
thereunder are automatically paid to the surviving spouse
unless they have taken affirmative action to the contrary.

-

2.
Scope of Coverage. Applies to all defined benefit and
money purchase pension plans but not to profit sharing or
stock bonus plans if certain requirements are met. IRC 41 7.
3.
Effect of Antenuptial Contract Should comply with
requirements of REA with respect to a waiver if parties
agree even though there is an antenuptial contract. New
contracts should be drafted with REA in mind.

V.

OTHER PROBLEM AREAS EVEN WITH AN ANTENUPTIAL
CONTRACT
A.

-

Jointly Held Property
1.

B.

Intent of the Parties
Life Insurance Policies

1.

Non-Tax Considerations
a. Designation of Owner
b. Designation of Beneficiaries and the need for a
possible change.

C.

Possible Selection of Domicile

D.

Will Provisions
1.
In particular make sure that the will refers to the
existence of the antenuptial agreement.

-
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